THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

FREDERIC THOMAS BLANCHARD
ENDOWMENT FUND

BISHOP WARBURTON'S

WORKS.

VOLUME THE SEVENTH:

CONTAINING

CONTROVERSIAL TRACTS.

PART II.

THE

WORKS

OF THE

RIGHT REVEREND

WILLIAM WARBURTON,

LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE SEVENTH.

LONDON,

PRINTED BY JOHN NICHOLS:

AND SOLD BY T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.

MDCCLXXXVIII.

*PR
3757
C7
1788
v.7

CONTENTS

OF

THE SEVENTH VOLUME.

A LETTER to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, the Idea of a Patriot King, and the State of Parties, &c. occasioned by the Editor's Advertisement, p. 537—549.

A VIEW of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, compleat, in Four Letters to a Friend. In which his whole System of Infidelity and Naturalism is exposed and confuted, 1754; *with the Apology prefixed*, 1755; p. 551—844.

REMARKS on Mr. David Hume's Essay on the Natural History of Religion, p. 845—887.

REMARKS on Neal's History of the Puritans, by Bp. Warburton; entered in an Edition of that Work in the Library at Durham, p. 889—921.

A LETTER from an Author to a Member of Parliament, concerning Literary Property, 1747, p. 923—937 [*misprinted* 957].

APPENDIX; containing Letters between Dr. Middleton and Mr. Warburton in 1736; *and between Dr. Lowth and Dr. Warburton in* 1756; p. 959—1014.

853783

A

LETTER

TO THE

EDITOR OF THE LETTERS

ON

THE SPIRIT OF PATRIOTISM,

THE IDEA OF A PATRIOT KING,

AND

THE STATE OF PARTIES, &c.

OCCASIONED BY THE

EDITOR'S ADVERTISEMENT.

Is this my Guide, Philoſopher, and Friend? POPE to L. B.

TO THE

EDITOR OF THE LETTERS.

SIR,

I ADDRESS this to you, as to a perſon different from the *Author* of theſe *Letters*. My reſpect for L. B's character will not ſuffer me to think you the ſame. Your *Advertiſement* is the crudeſt and moſt unmanaged attack on the honour of his deceaſed Friend; and he appears to be under all the tyes of that ſacred relation, to defend and protect it.

Your Charge, againſt Mr. POPE, is in theſe words,—"The "original draughts [of theſe Letters] were intruſted to a man, on "whom the Author thought he might entirely depend, after he "had exacted from him, and taken his promiſe, that they ſhould "never go into any hands, except thoſe of five or ſix perſons, who "were then named to him. In this confidence, the author reſted "ſecurely for ſome years; and though he was not without ſuſpi- "cion that they had been communicated to more perſons than he "intended they ſhould be, yet he was kept, by repeated aſſuran- "ces, even from ſuſpecting that any copies had gone into hands "unknown to him. But this man was no ſooner dead, than "he received information that an entire edition of 1500 co- "pies of theſe papers had been printed; that this very man had

" corrected the preſs, and that he had left them in the hands of " the printer, to keep with great ſecrecy till further orders. The " honeſt printer kept his word with him better than he kept his " with his friend: ſo that the whole edition came, at laſt, into " the hands of the author, except ſome few copies, which this per- " ſon had taken out of the heap, and carried away. Theſe are " doubtleſs the copies which have been handed about, not very " privately, ſince his death. The reſt were all deſtroyed in one " common fire.—By theſe copies it appeared, that the man who " had been guilty of this breach of truſt, had taken upon him fur- " ther to divide the ſubject, and to alter and omit paſſages, accord- " ing to the ſuggeſtions of his own fancy. What aggravates this " proceeding extremely is, that the author had told him, on ſeveral " occaſions, amongſt other reaſons, why he could not conſent to " the publication of theſe papers, that they had been written in too " much heat and hurry for the public eye.—He chanced to know " that ſcraps and fragments of theſe papers had been employed to " ſwell a monthly magazine, and that the ſame honourable em- " ployment of them was to be continued—The Editor, there- " fore, who has in his hands the genuine copy—reſolved to pub- " liſh it."

This is the charge. And as to the fact, that " Mr. P. did print " an entire edition of Lord B's letters without his conſent," it muſt, as far as I can ſee, be taken for granted. For the *Man* accuſed is *dead*. He cannot ſpeak for himſelf; and his papers, which might have ſpoken for him, were all of them deviſed, by the dying *Man's* laſt Will, to the truſt and abſolute diſpoſal of his *noble friend*.

My complaint (and, I perſuade myſelf, all impartial men will indulge me in it) is, that the charge is inforced with ſo unfriendly, nay, ſo vindictive a ſeverity, that the public is even invited to think the worſt of the offender's *intention*: there being nothing ſo baſe, or ſo mean, which the terms of the accuſation will not juſtify them to infer from it.

Since,

Since, therefore, you have ſo far forgot the office of a fair accuſer, as not only to avoid aſſiſting the judgment of the tribunal, you appeal to, in the *nature* of the FACT; but to prefer your accuſation in ſuch terms as muſt neceſſarily miſlead it; let me be allowed to remind the Public of what you have ſo diſingenuouſly omitted or diſguiſed. Which I ſhall do no otherwiſe, than by conſidering all the poſſible motives Mr P. could have for this action, ſuppoſing it to have been committed in the manner charged upon him. For though the *Motive* cannot ſo alter the nature of actions, as to make that right, which, in itſelf, is wrong: yet it may alleviate the weight of the very worſt; it may make others pardonable, which are confeſſedly bad; and in ſome again, it may give even to their obliquities, an amiableneſs which a truly generous mind would honour; and which the ſevereſt caſuiſts would only degrade into the *limbus* of their *ſplendida peccata*. Whether the crime, in queſtion, be not of this claſs muſt be ſubmitted to the tribunal, to which we now make our joint appeal.

In an offence of this nature, committed by one Author againſt another, the Motive, that moſt readily occurs to us, is *Plagiariſm*: So that one might ſuſpect this *breach of Truſt* was accompanied with an intended violation of property; and that the offender propoſed aſſuming to himſelf the glory of his friend's performance; eſpecially as he took the liberties here complained of, "to divide the "ſubject, and to alter and omit paſſages according to the ſuggeſ-"tions of his own fancy." But if, in criminal proceedings, it be held a reaſonable anſwer to the charge of a paultry theft, that the accuſed was immenſely rich, we ſhall need no other plea to acquit Mr. P. of this ſuſpicion. Beſides, the Author of the *Letters* was well known to all L. B's friends; the title-page of this ſurreptitious edition tells us, they were written by a *Perſon of Quality*; and the *honeſt* printer himſelf knew the true author, as appears by his applying to Lord B. with information of the 1500 copies.

As to any *lucrative* views; if Mr. P's beneficent temper, his generous contempt of money, which made him at several periods of his life refuse an honourable Pension from ministers of more than one denomination, and decline every other way of establishing his fortune than by a noble appeal to the public taste: If this, I say, will not acquit him of so mean a suspicion, I might appeal to the very *circumstances* of the fact itself. He prints, at a considerable expence, 1500 copies of an eighteen-penny pamphlet, to lie in the printer's warehouse; and which, according to your own account, did actually lie there till his death. And what book? one, which of all the Author's writings, was least calculated to catch the public attention (however this extraordinary *Advertisement* may now raise their curiosity) as the subject of it had been so often hackney'd over in the papers of the CRAFTSMAN. Had Profit been his point, who can doubt but he had rather chosen some of Lord B's *historical* tracts, which he had equally in his possession?

Least of all will it be suspected to have been done to injure L. B. in his Fame or Fortune; the book itself being manifestly calculated to support both, by putting him in that light wherein he most affects to be seen, *a dispassionate and disinterested Lover of his Country*. Had Mr. P. designed to hurt his ease or reputation, he would probably have enriched us with his *philosophical* or *theological* works, where his noble Friend gives less quarter to religious prejudices, than, here, to political corruptions: and which, by their being kept unpublished, deprive Religion of one considerable advantage.

In a word, had Mr. P. been conscious to himself of any low, oblique, or unfriendly motive, how happened it that, at his death, he chose it should come to the knowledge of his Friend? That he did *chuse* it, is most certain. "His honest printer," you tell us, "faithfully kept his word with him." His last illness was long and tedious, and known by him, as well as by his physicians, to be fatal. He might therefore have burnt these 1500 copies with a secrecy

ſecrecy equal to the oſtentation with which they *were all deſtroyed in one common fire* by this depoſitary of the Writings and Reputation of a MAN, whoſe laſt vows to Heaven were for the proſperity of his ſurviving *Friend*.

But, if we allow the fact, ſome reaſon, after all, muſt be given for committing it. We have ſeen the high abſurdity of ſuppoſing it to be on any of the motives already mentioned: which, indeed, only Envy and Malignity can ſuggeſt. One, only, remains: and happily, it is that which every man, at firſt ſight, muſt acknowledge to be the true; *An exceſſive and ſuperſtitious zeal for Lord B's glory*. He paid, as all the world knows, a kind of idolatrous homage to the divine attributes of his friend. And ſhould this be thought a folly by ſober admirers, (a ſtrange one it muſt be to Lord B. himſelf) yet, ſure his Lordſhip, though the laſt, in juſtice, ſhould be the firſt, in pity, to forgive it.

He was not only the warmeſt advocate for his Lordſhip's *private* and *public* Virtues againſt his adverſaries, but even againſt himſelf. It was his common ſubject of complaint, amongſt his other friends, that Lord B. was faultily negligent of his glory, even where the good of his country, and the happineſs of the world depended on its being unveiled. That, though he ſeemed to be ſent down hither by Providence, from ſome higher ſphere, to become the conſervator of the *Rights* and *Reaſon* of mankind, yet he ſuffered his actions to be miſrepreſented, and his character to be blackened, even where the ſhewing himſelf, truly, tended to the happineſs of the erroneous. And this being an important concern, was the reaſon, I ſuppoſe, why his Friend choſe to prevent the loſs of theſe *Letters*: which, likewiſe, very well accounts for his allaying the extreme ſplendor of them, ſo offenſive to mere mortals, with that terreſtrial mixture of his own. The very circumſtance, which you, Sir, well expreſs, where you ſay, "he had taken upon him, further "to divide the ſubject, and to alter and omit paſſages, according "to the ſuggeſtions of his own fancy." Perhaps too he thought himſelf

himſelf ſomething more than a *Porte-feuille* of his friend's papers; for he frequently told his acquaintance (to whom I appeal on this occaſion) that L. B. would, at his death, leave his writings to his diſpoſal. A mutual confidence! which they placed in one another. But the execution of Mr. P's part, at the ſame time that it makes the other probable, prevents our having any written evidence of it. But concerning the particular nature of thoſe changes and interpolations, and the difference between the two editions, I ſhall ſay no more at preſent.

Having ſeen Mr. P's motives for *printing*, the reader may be curious to know when he thought of *publiſhing*. It could not be till he had the Author's leave: that, the long detention of the pamphlet in the printer's warehouſe ſufficiently ſhews. It could not be in expectation of his death: That, the great diſparity in the chance of ſurvivorſhip will not allow us to ſuppoſe. Beſides, to what purpoſe was the expence of printing, and the hazard of ſecreting an edition, projected now, when he would have had it equally in his power, if that event happened, to do it then? We have nothing left, even on your own ſtate of the caſe, but to believe that he expected very ſpeedily to obtain L. B's concurrence. What grounds he had for ſuch expectation, the prudent diſpoſition of his papers will not permit us to ſay.

The too eager purſuit then of his Friend's Glory being his only motive for this preſumptuous liberty (a truth ſo evident, that, I am perſuaded, Mr. P. has not a ſingle Friend or Acquaintance remaining, who does not as firmly believe it, as that L. B. wrote the *Letters*, and that Mr. P. committed them to the preſs) ſince this, I ſay, is the caſe, his Lordſhip's known *Virtue* will never ſuffer me to ſuppoſe that you, Sir, and the Author of theſe *Letters*, can be the ſame perſon.

His known *Wiſdom* would leſs endure ſuch an imputation. Whatever you, Sir, may think, his Lordſhip's glory will never ſtand fairer with poſterity, than in the lines of this immortal poet. So that to defile

the

the mirror, which holds him up, by a kind of *magic* virtue, to the admiration of all times and places, would indeed ſhew him more *detached from the world, and indifferent to cenſure*, than even you, his apologiſt, think fit to repreſent him. It muſt ſurely be ſome fatal neceſſity that could make him willing to riſque ſo flattering an advantage. And yet your *Advertiſement* ſupplies neither him nor your reader with any excuſe of this nature. You thought fit, I will ſuppoſe, that ſome reaſon ſhould be given for the publication of the *Letters*. But had not your bookſeller done this already, when he ſo often told the public, that it was "to prevent their being "impoſed on by a ſpurious and mangled edition, of which one or "two ſcraps had appeared in a Magazine?" Poſſibly you will ſay, the reader might expect to know how they came there. Why then did you not ſeek out and detect the man engaged in that *honourable employment*, as by a proper irony you call it? Sure it was no difficult matter: for you tell us, again, that ſome of the copies *had been handed about not very privately* ſince Mr. P's death. Beſides, the Law would have obliged the proprietor of the *Magazine* to diſcover from whom he had received his ſtolen goods. Why then ſo much tenderneſs for him, who manifeſted his deſign by *publiſhing*, and ſo little for him, who only gave ſuſpicion of it, by *printing?* Or did the ORDER OF THINGS, which, indeed, (in Mr. P's Language of his Lordſhip) was here violated, require, that Vengeance ſhould purſue, and trace up the crime, to the original offender: who had ſo audaciouſly ſtretched his hand to the forbidden tree, and gathered, without leave, of the knowledge of political Good and Evil? Or if the ſeverity of juſtice required even this; was it not enough to ſay, that the miſchief came firſt from Mr. P. by his giving abroad too many copies; without telling their COMMON ENEMIES, that he had printed fifteen hundred? For it came not from theſe, (which, you own, "were all deſtroyed "in one common Fire)" but from a ſtraggling copy which eſcaped that deſolation. As this brand therefore on Mr. *Pope's* me-

many were needless, it could not come from the hand of his *noble Friend*.

But whatever high notions I myself may have of L. B. I am not so vain to think my readers must needs subscribe to them. They may, Sir, for aught I know, believe you and him to be the same. And then, I am half afraid, even his character, great as it is, will not secure him from their censure. Are the laws of Friendship then so weak (may some of them be apt to say) are its bonds so slight, that *one* imprudent action committed against the humour of a friend, (or a mistaken fondness for his Glory which came near to Adoration) that *one* shall obliterate the whole merit of a life of service, though flowing from the warmest heart that the passion of Friendship ever took possession of? Obliterate, will they say, nay pursue, with inexorable vengeance, the poor delinquent to the foot of the most merciless tribunal; *that* PUBLIC, one part of which he had much offended by a vigorous war upon the general profligacy of manners; another, much more offended by the insufferable splendor of his talents; and no small nor inconsiderable part, by his over-zealous attachment to his very ACCUSER? Unhappy Poet! will they say, who has received the only wound to his Honour from the hand of that Friend, whose reputation, for many years, he had singly supported against an almost universal prejudice. But more unhappy FRIENDSHIP, if these be thy iniquitous conditions! Who after this shall seek, in Thee, a solace for the cares of private Life; or believe Thee to be, what thou hast been so often boasted, the purest and largest source of *public Virtue?* Never, after this, wilt Thou be thought deserving of a fairer or better progeny than MODERN PATRIOTISM. Where true Love of our Country is, There Friendship wears a different face. At such time it has been known, that when real and repeated injuries had torn in sunder a well-united Friendship, the *death* of one has buried every past resentment, and revived, in the bosom of the other, all his ancient tenderness: as if the refined and defecated passions of him, who had

shaken

ſhaken off Mortality, had, by that divine ſympathy of affections which lives in Friendſhip, communicated of their virtue to the ſurvivor. Nay, I have heard, ſome where or other, of a MAN, who, when his dying friend (at the inſtigation, and to quiet the impotent paſſions, of another; for what generous mind has not been hurt by ill-placed friendſhips?) had inſerted an unkind clauſe againſt him in his laſt Will, took no other revenge for an injury ſo unprovoked, than by doubling the legacy his deceaſed friend had left to an old faithful ſervant, becauſe the ſurvivor deemed it to be too little.

But the greateſt have their weakneſſes. A *French* author, I have ſome time read, who has given us a hiſtory of the *Hermetic Philoſophy*, brings almoſt every great name into the number of his Alchemiſts. He gives them all their due, but concludes every various eulogium alike—"now his Folly was in hoping to *extract* "*Gold from baſer metals*." And may we not, after all the good that may be ſaid of our illuſtrious Poet (and there are few of whom ſo much can be *juſtly* ſaid) lament, that the folly which ran through his whole life was, in trying to *extract Friendſhip from Politics?*

However, Sir, let the World think as it may. I muſt ſtill perſiſt in believing, that that noble Perſon had no hand in your *Advertiſement*. On this principle, perhaps, it will be ſaid, I might have left it to its own fortune, as not at all likely to miſlead poſterity; while it repreſents Mr. P. as mean, low, intereſted, and perfidious, whoſe nature, if I were to define it, I ſhould do it by the word FRIENDSHIP; ſo pure and ſo warm was the ray of that ſacred paſſion, which animated and governed all his faculties. But when I conſider how light a matter very often ſubjects the beſt eſtabliſhed characters to the ſuſpicions of Poſterity, Poſterity, often as malignant to Virtue, as the age that ſaw it was envious of its glory; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low revived ſlander, which the times that brought it forth

law despised and forgotten almost in its birth, I cannot but think it a matter that deserves attention. These *Letters*, Sir, of your publishing, afford us an indignant instance. The Chastity of the *Lord S[illegible]*, in the case of the *Spanish* captive, was as celebrated, and as notorious as Mr. P's Friendship for L. B. But one *Valerius Antias* (for calumny and history, the *Oldmixon* of *Rome*) "made no scruple to assert, that, far from restoring the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauched and kept her." One would have hoped so mean a slander might have slept forgotten in the dusty corner of a poor pedant's * Common-place. And yet we see it quoted as a fact †, by an instructor of kings. Who knows, but

* A. Gellius.

† "Now the reputation of the first Scipio was not so clear and uncontroverted in "every thing as in public life; nor was he allowed by all to be a man of such severe virtue "as he affected, and as that age required. *Nævius* was thought to mean him in "some verses *Gellius* has preserved. And VALERIUS ANTIAS made no scruple to assert, "that, far from restoring the fair *Spaniard* to her family, he debauched and kept her. "Notwithstanding this, what authority did he not maintain? in what esteem and ve"neration did he not live and die?" p. 404, of *The Idea of a Patriot King*.

The Words of *Nævius* are these,

"Etiam qui res magnas manu fœpe gessit gloriose,
"Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud gentes solus
"Præstat: eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit."

These obscure verses were, in *Gellius's* opinion, the sole foundation of *Antias's* calumny, against the universal concurrence of Historians. *His ego versibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem adversum ceteros omnes scriptores de Scipionis moribus sensisse*, L. vi. c. 8. And what he thought of this historian's modesty and truth, we may collect from what he tells us of him in another place, where, having quoted two tribunicial decrees, which he says he transcribed from *Records* [*ex annalium monumentis*] he adds, that *Valerius Antias* made no scruple to give the lye to them in public. "Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc de"cretorum memoriam contraque auctoritates veterum annalium"—dixit, &c. L. vii. c. 19. And *Livy* in his xxxvi B. quoting this *Antias* for the particulars of a victory, subjoins, concerning the number slain, "scriptori parum fidei fit, quia in eo augendo "non alius intemperantior est." And he that will amplify on one occasion, will diminish on another; for it is the same intemperate passion that carries him indifferently to either.

that

that at ſome happy time or other, when a writer wants to prove, that real Friendſhip becomes a great man no more than real Chaſtity *, this *Advertiſement* of yours may be advanced to the ſame dignity of credit with the calumny of *Valerius Antias?* If it ſhould, I would not undertake to diſpute the fact, on which ſuch an inference might be made; for I remember *Tully*, a great ſtateſman himſelf long ago obſerved, "Veræ amicitiæ difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in republica verſantur."

In concluſion, what we may learn from the moral of the tale is this, That exceſs, though in the ſocial paſſions, lays us more open to *popular cenſure* than even the total want of them: becauſe ſuch exceſſes often produce effects that low minds cannot underſtand; or if they could, they would ſtill want hearts warm enough to feel the value of them.

I am, Sir, &c.

* See p. 201, of the "Idea of a Patriot King."

A VIEW

A

VIEW

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY,

COMPLEAT,

IN FOUR LETTERS TO A FRIEND.

IN WHICH HIS WHOLE SYSTEM

OF INFIDELITY AND NATURALISM

IS

EXPOSED AND CONFUTED. MDCCLIV.

WITH THE APOLOGY PREFIXED. MDCCLV.

Lettre du feu Preſident Montesquieu à l'Auteur.

J'Ai reçu, Monſieur, avec une reconnoiſſance tres grande, les deux magnifiques ouvrages que vous avés eû la bonté de m'envoyer, et la lettre que vous m'aves fait l'honneur de m'ecrire ſur les œuvres poſthumes de My Lord Bolingbroke : *et comme cette Lettre me paroit être plus à moi que les deux ouvrages qui l'accompagnent, auxquels tous ceux qui ont de la raiſon ont part, il me ſemble que cette Lettre m'a fait un plaiſir particulier. J'ay lû quelques ouvrages de My Lord* Bolingbroke, *et s'il m'eſt permis de dire comment j'en ai été affecté, certainment il a beaucoup de chaleur : mais il me ſemble qu'il l'employe ordinairement contre les choſes, et il ne faudroit l'employer qu'à peindre les choſes. Or, Monſieur, dans cet ouvrage poſthume, dont vous me donnes une idée, il me ſemble que vous prepare une matiere continuelle de triomphe. Celui qui attaque la Religion revelée n'attaque que la Religion revelée ; mais celui qui attaque la Religion naturelle attaque toutes les Religions du monde. Si l'on enſeigne aux hommes qu'ils n'ont pas ce frein ci, ils peuvent penſer qu'ils en ont un autre : Mais il eſt bien plus pernicieux de leur enjeigner qu'ils n'en ont pas du tout. Il n'eſt pas impoſſible d' attaquer une Religion revelée, parce qu'elle exiſte par des faits particuliers, et que les faits, par leur nature, peuvent être une matiere de diſpute : mais il n'en eſt pas de même de la Religion naturelle ; elle eſt tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas diſputer, et du ſentiment interieur de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas diſputer encore. J'ajoute à ceci, Quel peut être le motif d'attaquer la Religion revelée en* Angleterre ? *on l'y a tellement purgé de tout prejugé deſtructeur qu'elle n'y peut faire de mal, et qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire, une infinité de biens. Je ſais, qu' un homme en* Eſpagne *ou en* Portugal *que l'on va bruler, ou qui craint d'être brulé, parce qu'il ne croit point de certains articles dependans ou non de la Religion revelée, a une juſte ſujet de l'attaquer, parce qu'il peut avoir quelque eſperance de pourvoir à ſa defence naturelle : Mais il n'en eſt pas de même en* Angleterre, *où tout homme qui attaque la Religion revelée l'attaque ſans intereſt, et où cet homme quand il reuſſiroit, quand même il auroit raiſon dans le fond, ne feroit que detruire une infinité de biens pratiques pour etablir une verité purement ſpeculative.*

J'ay eté ravi, &c.

A Paris, ce 26 May 1754.

Montesquieu.

A Letter from the late Preſident Montesquieu to the Author.

SIR,

I Am exceedingly obliged to you for the magnificent Preſent you have been pleaſed to make me of your Books, and for the Letter you did me the honour to write me on Lord *Bolingbroke's* Poſthumous Works. As that Letter ſeems to be rather more my own than the two Books which accompany it, every reaſonable creature being intereſted therein as well as myſelf, I enjoy it with particular delight. I have dipped into ſome of my Lord *Bolingbroke's* Diſcourſes; and, if I may be allowed to ſay in what manner they affected me, I muſt own that he writes with a good deal of warmth; but methinks he generally employs it againſt things, whereas it ought to be employed only in painting them. Now it appears to me that, in the poſthumous work of which you have given me an account, he hath prepared for you, Sir, continual matter of triumph. He who attacks revealed Religion, attacks revealed Religion only; but, he who attacks natural Religion, attacks all the Religions in the World. Though men ſhould be taught to diſbelieve the Obligations of revealed Religion, they may ſtill think themſelves bound by ſome other; but it is moſt pernicious to endeavour to perſuade them that they are bound by none at all. It is not impoſſible to attack a revealed Religion, ſeeing it depends on particular facts, and facts are, in their own nature, liable to be controverted: but that is not the caſe with Natural Religion; for it is drawn from the Nature of Man, which cannot be diſputed, and from the internal Sentiments of mankind, which are equally indiſputable. Beſides, what motive can there be for attacking revealed Religion in *England?* In that country, it is ſo purged of all deſtructive prejudices, that it can do no harm; but, on the contrary, is capable of producing numberleſs good effects. I am ſenſible that, in *Spain* or *Portugal*, a man who is going to be burnt, or afraid of being burnt, becauſe he does not believe certain articles, whether depending or not depending on revealed Religion, hath very good reaſon to attack it, becauſe he may thereby hope to provide for his natural defence. But the caſe is very different in *England*, where a man that attacks revealed Religion does it without the leaſt perſonal motive; and where this champion, if he ſhould ſucceed, nay, ſhould be in the right too, would only deprive his country of numberleſs real benefits, for the ſake of eſtabliſhing a merely ſpeculative truth. I was charmed, &c.

Paris, May 26, 1754.

Montesquieu.

AN APOLOGY FOR THE TWO FIRST LETTERS: WHICH MAY NOW SERVE FOR A VINDICATION OF THE WHOLE.

SOON after the publication of the two firſt of theſe Letters, I had the honour of an anonymous advertiſement, in the warmeſt terms of friendſhip lamenting the diſpleaſure, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke had given to that part of the *Public*, where the Advertiſer had an opportunity of making his obſervations.

There was in this friendly notice ſo many ſure marks of the Writer's regard to the Author of the *View*; ſo much good ſenſe, elegance, and weight of Authority in the compoſition; and the whole ſo ſuperior to every thing, but the force of plain and ſimple truth, that I had as much pleaſure in the honour of the admonition as I had real pain for the occaſion.

He aſſures me I ſhall never know from what hand it came; ſo that when ſuch a Writer will remain unknown, it is fooliſh as well as indecent to preſume to gueſs.

Yet I am very confident that a Friend ſo generous could never intend, by keeping himſelf out of ſight, to deprive me of the means of vindicating my conduct to him. I am rather inclined to think, that he took this method to oblige me to convey my Apology to *him*, which he had a right to expect, through the hands of *that Public*, which appear to have none: and which yet, I am perſuaded, it was his principal concern, I ſhould firſt ſatisfy. For I muſt inform my Reader, that the ſevere reflexions, I am about to quote, are not his proper ſentiments, but the ſentiments of thoſe whom he is pleaſed to honour with the name of the *Public*.

They are introduced in this manner: *I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.*—I am very ſure he is; and ſo, I think, muſt every good man be; and more for the ſake of *that* World than for mine. For what muſt an indifferent perſon think of a World, by profeſſion, Chriſtian, of ſo exceeding delicate a feeling as to be leſs ſcandalized at three or four bulky volumes of red-hot Impiety, becauſe they come from a LORD, than at the cool contempt of ſuch an inſult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, becauſe he may be a poor Prieſt or an ignoble Layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me ſo abject a ſtate of things, as that muſt be, where atheiſtic principles give leſs offence to our politeneſs, than ill-manners; and where, in *good Company* you may be better received with the plague-ſore upon you, than the itch?

It vexes me (ſays the anonymous writer) *to hear ſo many poſitively deciding that the Writer muſt be—by the* SCURRILITY *and abuſe.*—— The term is a little ſtrong. But the beſt of it is, that it is one of thoſe words the *Public* think themſelves at liberty to apply indifferently, either to *ſcandalous abuſe* or to *honeſt reproof*, juſt as they happen to be diſpoſed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, ſo readily paſſed upon Authors, had been ſufficiently apparent in the caſe of one much more conſiderable than the Author of the *View*. The Author of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* compoſed a Book in Support of Revelation; and ſenſible that he

the novelty of his Argument would give the alarm, and bring down whole bands of Anſwerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publickly engaged that a candid, and ingenuous Adverſary ſhould never repent him of his civility. Anſwerers, as he foreſaw, came down in abundance: but it was not his hap to meet with one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of theſe writers, one or two, and no more, he thought fit to anſwer; and (who can wonder!) without much ceremony. This was in the heat of controverſy, when his reſentments were freſh; and the injury aggravated by every circumſtance of the loweſt malice and moſt bare-faced miſrepreſentation. Since that time to the preſent, a courſe of many years, he has ſeen theſe miſerable railers, ſome with names, and ſome without, go on in all the nonſenſe and billingſgate with which they ſet out. Yet though he has ſeen all this, and without any other marks of reſentment than a contemptuous ſilence, he could not eſcape the character of a *ſcurrilous and abuſive* Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever ſince.

But to return to the Author of the *View*. He was detected, it ſeems, by his *ſcurrility and abuſe*. Surely there muſt be ſome miſtake, and my Lord's own dirt imputed to his Anſwerer. The Author of the *View* ſeems to be in the caſe of a Scavenger (his enemies, I hope, will take no offence at the compariſon), who may not indeed be overclean while at ſuch ſort of work; but it would be hard to impute that ſtink to him, which is not of his making, but of his removing.

The Letters are univerſally read; *and it is almoſt univerſally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke deſerved any treatment from You, both as a man perſonally ill uſed by him, and a member of that* ORDER, WHICH HE HAS TREATED IN THE LIKE MANNER:——In a Law of Veſpaſian, we read, *Non oportere maledici Senatoribus*; *remaledici, civile faſque eſt*. And the equity of it ſeems here to be allowed. But I will claim no benefit from the Authority of Veſpaſion, nor even from that which I more reverence, my anonymous Friend's. The truth

is,

is, that nothing perſonal ever once entered into my thoughts while I was writing thoſe two Letters. Had that been the caſe, it would rather have been the ſubject of my vanity, than my reſentment. For nothing could be more glorious for an obſcure writer of theſe dark and cold days, than to find himſelf treated in the ſame manner with the greateſt and moſt famous of the golden Ages of antient and modern Literature.

—*But* (ſays the anonymous letter) *it may diſhonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deſerved, eſpecially after his death. It is falling into the* VERY FAULT *ſo juſtly objected to him: every body would have applauded your ſelecting thoſe inſtances of his railing, arrogance, and abuſe, had not you followed his example.*—This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as HE DESERVES, may *diſhonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman.* Here, I think, we ſhould diſtinguiſh. When the thing concerns only the civil intereſts of Particulars, a *Gentleman* has but little provocation for unuſual ſeverity of language, and leſs right to perſonal reflexion, eſpecially on one of ſuperior Quality. But when the higheſt of our religious intereſts are attacked, the intereſts not of this man, nor of that; not of this Community, nor the other; but of our common Nature itſelf; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to be Judges, there, I think, all paultry diſtinctions of Title ceaſe, they vaniſh before ſo great an object, and every *Gentleman* who loves his Religion and his Country ſhould take the quarrel on himſelf, and repel the inſult with all his vigour.

" When TRUTH or VIRTUE an affront endures,
" Th' affront is mine, my Friend, and ſhould be yours."

POPE.

The manners of a *Clergyman*, if they are to be diſtinguiſhed from the manners of a *Gentleman*, conſiſt in Zeal for God, and Charity towards Man. The occaſion will ſometimes call out one, ſometimes the other: they may be exerted ſeparately, but never at one another's expence; for they are diſpoſed by Nature to be joint promoters

promoters of the common good: as in the caſe before us, I preſume to ſay, a zeal for God is the greateſt Charity to Man.

Now when Opinions of that kind, which the *View of L. Bolingbroke's Philoſophy* expoſes, proceed to their extreme, not to confute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for fear of tranſgreſſing the civil maxims of politeneſs, would be like that Preacher, the Poet ſpeaks of, who ſcrupled to mention *Hell* before his audience at Court.

If then, amongſt the Chriſtian duties, there be a force to be exerted againſt Deceivers, as well as a patience to be obſerved in compaſſion to thoſe who are miſled; and that the occaſion before us was not a time for vigorous meaſures; I deſire to know when this time comes?

When men are ſincere in their miſtakes, after a diligent and candid ſearch; when the ſubject is of ſmall moment, ſuch as the mode of diſcipline, the meaſure of conformity, or a diſtinction in Metaphyſics; the miſtaken, and even the perverſe, ſhould be treated with tenderneſs. But when the avowed end of a Writer is the deſtruction of Religion in all its forms; when the means he employs, are every trick of prevarication and ill faith; and every term of ſcurrility and abuſe; when, to uſe the expreſſion of Cicero, *eſt inter nos non de* terminis, *ſed de* tota poſſeſſione *contentio*; Then, a practiſed calmneſs and an affected management look like betraying the Cauſe we are intruſted to defend; or, what is almoſt as ill, like defending it in that way only which may turn moſt to our private advantage: As where, in queſtions of the greateſt moment, we comply with this *faſhionable indifference*; or flatter it into a Virtue; when we ſhould have ſtriven to rekindle the dying ſparks of Religion by a vigorous colliſion with its profeſſed Enemies, *whoſe faces* (to uſe the unpolite language of the Prophet) *are harder than a Rock* *.

Men who have had Chriſtianity indeed at heart have never been diſpoſed, in capital caſes like the preſent, to ſpare or manage the

* Jer. v. 3.

Offenders.

Offender. When the incomparable STILLINGFLEET undertook to expose the enormity of the Court of Rome, in turning the *dispensation of the word* into a lucrative trade, he profecuted the controverfy with fo much vigour of ftyle and fentiment, as to be reviled by thofe who found themfelves affected by it, with the names of *Buffoon* and *Comedian*. *The fervant of the Lord* (faid they) *muft not ftrive, but be gentle unto all men; in meekneſs inſtructing thoſe who oppoſe themſelves.* An anfwer equally apt and fatisfactory. Without doubt, offenders would find themfelves much at their eafe, when, fecure from the refentment of the *Laws*, they underftand they have nothing to fear from the animadverfion of the *Learned*.

But this leads me to another conſideration, which may further juſtify the Author of the *View*, in the account he has given of this relentleſs Enemy of RELIGION and SOCIETY.

The Engliſh Government, fecure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath eſtabliſhed, and jealous of that Liberty which at fo much expence it hath procured, doth now, with a becoming conſciouſneſs of the fuperiority of Truth and Reafon, think fit to fuffer this, and many other writings (though none fo criminal in the form and manner), to pafs through the Preſs, into the hands of the People; writings, in which not only the Inſtitutions of poſitive and national Worſhip have been inſulted, but even thofe very GROUNDS OF NATULAL RELIGION, which hitherto have been eſteemed the bond of civil Society, as they inforce obedience on the principle of Conſcience. A bond, which no Nation under heaven but our own have ever ſuffered to be brought in queſtion: becauſe no Nation but our own has a perfect confidence in Truth, or is in perpetual alarm for Liberty.

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more privileged or reſpectable? Or rather, Is there not the greater need that thoſe evils, which the Public cannot redreſs, ſhould at leaſt be checked and oppoſed by a private hand? Why do the civil Laws of all other Nations interfere to puniſh theſe offenders, but to prevent the miſchiefs of their writings? Why are not the ſame Laws put in execution

cution here, but from the experience, or, at leaſt, from a foreſight, that recourſe to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public Liberty? However, the *end* is confeſſed to be of the utmoſt importance, though *theſe means* may be thought incommodious. What is left then, but to uſe others of a private nature, where no ill conſequences are derived to any but to the Inſtrument employed in the correction of theſe evils? Now the miſchief done by licentious Writers is from their credit with the People. If their credit be undeſerved, the way lies open for the Defender of Religion to leſſen it, either by Ridicule or ſerious expoſtulation. The Author of the *View* preferred the firſt. He thought it more effectual; for now-a-days, Folly diſcredits more than Impiety: He thought it more generous; for he had no deſign of bringing in the Magiſtrate to ſecond his arguments. Nor is he one of thoſe impertinents who are for directing Authority, or who think there is any need of ſuch as him,

" To virtue's work, to urge the tardy Hall,
" Or goad the Prelate ſlumb'ring in his Stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The CONVOCATION, in their late addreſs to his MAJESTY, *lament the depravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which ſtrike at the very vitals of all Religion, and ſhake the foundations of civil Government.* Yet they are ſo far from throwing the ſcandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magiſtrate for redreſs, that, as if they even reſpected the ſlander of their Enemies, *they engage themſelves to his Majeſty to exert themſelves to the utmoſt, to maintain the honour of our moſt holy faith.* Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to that work which the whole body of the Clergy hath, with ſo much glory to themſelves, engaged to undertake.

But his Lordſhip's *death* is a further objection to the manner in which his writings are treated.

——Cuperem ipſe Parens ſpectator adeſſet!

Had these *Essays* been published during his life, and had the Author of the *View* deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the censure might appear to have its weight. But what shall we say if his Lordship was publicly invited to give *his Philosophy* to the world, by the promise of a speedy answer? If a Writer's death may screen his Works from the treatment they would deserve in his life, he has a very effectual way to secure both his Person and his Principles from disgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confessed that in these posthumous Works published by his Lordship's direction, the Author of the *View* is abused in the grossest manner. Now, what is said in discredit of a living Writer, and by one of his Lordship's Authority in politics and letters, may prove a real injury: The harm to a dead Writer is but imaginary. This is only said to shew, that, had the Author of the *View* retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts, the return had been still short of the provocation.

But He commits the VERY FAULT *objected to Lord Bolingbroke—and in selecting the instances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lordship's* EXAMPLE.—This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the most contemptuous manner, reviled almost all the Wise and Virtuous of antient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive Saints; the modern Doctors, the whole body of the Christian Clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of Mankind; which, ever since Religion came amongst us, deserves, he says, to be considered in no other light than as one great aggregate of Lunatics. He has abused *Moses* and *Paul*; he has ridiculed the SON, and blasphemed the FATHER. Here is another Writer, *who by his scurrility and abuse is judged no other than*——and what has he done? *He has fallen into the same fault, and followed his example.* What, Has he likewise *railed* at all the Good, the Virtuous, and the Pious? Has he likewise had the *arrogance* to say, that the World was one great Bedlam? Has he likewise blasphemed his Creator and Redeemer? Alas! no. Two such Writers would be too much for one age! And yet, what less can justify *this* Public in saying,

ſaying, that the Author of the *View* has *fallen into the ſame fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example?* All he has done is occaſionally telling the World, That his Lordſhip, once in his life, was for bringing in *Popery* and the *Pretender*; and is now for introducing *Naturaliſm*, a more ſpecious form of Atheiſm: that he is overrun with paſſion and prejudice: that he underſtands little or nothing of the ſubjects he handles, which yet he treats with ſovereign contempt: that his learning is ſuperficial, his reaſoning ſophiſtical, and his declamation inflated: and that, if ever Religion ſhould happen to regain its hold on the People, his *Philoſophic* works will run the hazard of being applied to the loweſt and vileſt uſes. This is the ſubſtance of what he has ſaid. And if this be falling into the *ſame fault, and following his Lordſhip's example*, the Author of the *View*, for aught I can perceive, muſt be content to plead guilty.

But we will ſuppoſe, the *manner* of writing only, as ſeparated from the *ſubject*, is here to be underſtood. Is the railing at all Mankind; at all Religion; at God Almighty himſelf, but of the ſame ſpecies of writing with His, who ſhall tell the world, that this Railer was once as much an Enemy to the *Civil*, as now to the *Religious* Conſtitution of his Country; that he reaſons ill, and that he declaims worſe? Did the politeneſs of a *Clergyman* or a *Gentleman* require, under pain of being matched with his Lordſhip in *railing* and *arrogance*, that, after the Author of the *View* had quoted all his Lordſhip's horrors in principle and expreſſion, he ſhould have added, "This, good People, is the FIRST PHILOSO-"PHY, which is to be ſubſtituted amongſt you, in the place of "RELIGION. But take me along with you; Though this, indeed, "be the bane and poiſon of your HOPES; though it reduce Hu-"manity to the moſt diſconſolate and forlorn condition, by de-"priving it of the MORAL Ruler of the World, and by diſſolving "all the ties of CIVIL Government; Yet, Courage! The Author "was a man of diſtinguiſhed Quality, of uncommon abilities, and

" of infinite politeneſs. His great talents for *Buſineſs* enabled him " to ſee what was beſt for Society; his penetration into *Philoſophic* " matters, what was beſt for human Nature; and his profound " knowledge of *Divinity*, what was beſt for Both. He had govern- " ed State; he had inſtructed Kings; and this laſt great Book of " Wiſdom was the reſult of all his ſkill and experience."

All this indeed I might have ſaid: and, it is probable, a good deal of it I ſhould have ſaid, had the aim of my *View* been to recommend Myſelf; and to raiſe a reputation from the defeat of this mighty Man. Had this, I ſay, been my aim, the raiſing the character of an Adverſary who was preſently to fall by my hand, would hardly have been amongſt the laſt of my Contrivances. But as I had another purpoſe, the preventing the miſchiefs of his Book, I took the different method of reducing his Authority to its juſt value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the eaſy reception of his Opinions amongſt a corrupt People.

The Letters, ſays *this* Public (whoſe ſentiments have been, with ſo much real kindneſs, conveyed unto me) *purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philoſophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and converſation. It may be true and juſt. But that is not the queſtion. Whether he made a good treaty, or wrote the Craſiſman, neither concludes for nor againſt the divinity of the Chriſtian Religion.*

I readily confeſs, that, had Lord Bolingbroke's *Morals* and *Politics* nothing to do with his *religious Principles*, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his *Treaties* and his *Craſtſmen* into a *View of his Philoſophy*. But I held all theſe to be the various parts of the ſame Syſtem, which had contributed in ſupport of one another to produce a Whole.—I can believe he found it for his eaſe in *retirement*, to adhere ſtill cloſer to a ſet of Principles, which having forwarded his Practice, enabled him to bear the retroſpect of its effects: but I am much miſtaken if he did not *begin the World* with his notions of GOD and the SOUL; hence his rounds of buſineſs and amuſements——

" Now all for Pleaſure; now for Church and State." POPE.

The

The reſt followed in courſe. For, as Cicero well obſerves, *Cum enim* DECRETUM *proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vitio et* AMICITIARUM *proditiones, et* RERUM PUBLICARUM, *naſci ſolent.*

But this is not all. I beg leave to ſay, there was not only a cloſe connexion between his Principles and his Practice, but that it was neceſſary to a juſt defence of Religion againſt him, to take notice of that connexion.

One of his Lordſhip's pretended purpoſes, in his Philoſophic *Eſſays*, was to detect the abuſes brought into the Chriſtian Religion by a CORRUPT CLERGY: My aim in this *View* was to expoſe a ſpecies of Atheiſm, inculcated on the ruin of all Religion by an IMPIOUS LAYMAN.

Conſider, how his Lordſhip proceeded.—Not that I place my juſtification on his example: that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am endeavouring to refute; neither would I inſiſt upon the right of retaliation; for, though that be ſomething a better plea, it is the laſt which a Writer for Truth would willingly have recourſe to. I quote his Lordſhip's method with perfect approbation, as that which right reaſon preſcribes to all who propoſe the detection of error and impoſture. His Lordſhip's point, as we ſaid, was to ſhew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and ſimplicity of Religion. It is not my deſign to inquire with what ingenuity he has repreſented the Fact, or how juſtly he has deduced the Conſequences, which he pretends have riſen from it. He has ſhewn ſome corruptions; he has imagined more; and dreſſed up the reſt of his catalogue out of his own invention; all which, he moſt unreaſonably offers as a legitimate prejudice againſt Religion itſelf.—Well, be it ſo, that the Clergy are convicted of abuſe and impoſture. The queſtion, which every one is ready to aſk, who thinks himſelf concerned to enquire into the truth of the fact, is, CUI BONO? What END had the Clergy to ſerve by theſe corruptions? His Lordſhip thinks the queſtion reaſonable, and is ready to reply, That they had a wicked antichriſtian Yoke to impoſe upon the

necks

necks of Mankind: in order to which, they contrived to introduce ſuch kind of corruptions into Religion as beſt tended to pervert men's underſtandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impreſs upon their conſciences an awe and reverence for their ſpiritual Tyrants. The anſwer is ſatisfactory, and ſhews the uſe of this method of detecting error. With his rhetorical exaggerations, with the extenſion of his liſt of corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at preſent, no concern.

As the Author of the *Eſſays* had, what he called, a tyrannical Hierarchy to unmaſk; ſo, the Author of the *View* had, what he called, a declared, an impious, an outrageous Enemy of all Religion to expoſe. I believe they are both rightly named. Now, as errors to be detected, we muſt trace them to their ſource; and as errors influencing practice, we ſhall find their original to be in VICE.

His Lordſhip had publickly and openly, in his reſpectable Character of a NOBLEMAN, a STATESMAN, and a PHILOSOPHER, declared Religion to be all a Cheat, ſupported only by Knaves and Madmen; which indeed was a large Party, ſince, by his own account, it takes in the whole body of Mankind. His Lordſhip had been held up to the People * as an ALL-ACCOMPLISHED Perſonage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral Wiſdom: And the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant Character was conveyed, had made it received, even againſt the information of our ſenſes. A PUBLIC thus prejudiced, would, on ſuch a repreſentation of his Lordſhip's religious principles as his *Eſſays* contain, and the *View* collects together, be ready to aſk, "could ſo ſublime a Genius be diſpoſed to deprive himſelf, and us, of all thoſe bleſſings which Religion promiſes, had he not diſcovered, and been perfectly aſſured, that the whole was a deluſion; and therefore, in pity to Mankind, had broke the Charm, which kept them from ſeeing their preſent good, in fond expectation of a recompence in the ſhadowy regions of futurity?" We ſay, *deprive himſelf*, for he

* See the Fourth Epiſtle of the *Eſſay on Man*, and the great Poet's other Works.

ſeems

ſeems ſufficiently vext, and ſenſible of his diſappointment, when awaked from the pleaſing dream of a life to come. *There is no one thought* (ſays his Lordſhip) *which ſooths my mind like this: I encourage my* IMAGINATION *to purſue it, and am heartily afflicted when* ANOTHER FACULTY *of the intellect comes boiſterouſly in, and* WAKES *me from ſo pleaſing a dream, if it be a dream* *."—In this manner I ſuppoſed, that they, for whoſe uſe the *View* was intended, were diſpoſed to argue; I mean that part of them who yet retain any concern for another life; and who have not thrown off, together with their Guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, againſt this dangerous prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was firſt to remove their deluſion concerning Lord Bolingbroke's Philoſophic Character; and to ſhew, that he had none of thoſe talents of Reaſoning, of Learning, or Philoſophy, which are neceſſary to qualify a man to decide on ſo important a Queſtion. But this oppoſed only one half of their prejudice. They could by no means be brought to think that ſo good a Man, ſo benevolent a Citizen, ſo warm a friend to Mankind, as his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* repreſent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of Society, that great ſupport of Humanity, RELIGION. The Advocate of Religion therefore, unleſs he would betray his cauſe, was obliged to ſhew, that the Social light, in which his Lordſhip puts himſelf, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a falſe one; that his moral virtues were the counterpart of his religious principles; And public virtue (according to his favourite Cicero) embracing and comprehending all the private †, it was to the purpoſe of ſuch a defence, to ſhew, that his Lordſhip had been a BAD CITIZEN.

"Prodita laxabat portarum clauſtra Tyrannis
"Exſulibus——"

* Letter xliii. to Swift, in Pope's Works, Vol. ix.

† *Omnes omnium Charitates* PATRIA *una complexa eſt.*

Now

Now though Religion has the ſtrongeſt allurements for the Good and Virtuous, it abounds with objects of affright and terror to the profligate and abandoned; who, in ſuch circumſtances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their Vices, or their Religion. All the world knows his Lordſhip's choice. He himſelf tells us, it was made on the conviction of Reaſon; others think, by the deluſion of his Paſſions. The world is to determine; and that they might judge with knowledge of the caſe, the Author of the *View* attempted to obviate the latter part of this popular prejudice; which would not ſuffer them to conceive any reaſon ſhort of demonſtration, that could induce a man in his ſenſes to part with the *ſoothing* conſolation of futurity, as his Lordſhip ſo juſtly calls it.

And now, I ſuppoſe, every candid Reader will allow, at leaſt I am ſure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lordſhip's *Morals* and *Politics* come within the *View of his Philoſophy*; where the queſtion is of the TRUTH or FALSHOOD of Religion; and of his Lordſhip's AUTHORITY to decide in it.

To ſum up this Argument: His Lordſhip deſcants on *Romiſh ſuperſtition*; the Author of the *View*, on *his Lordſhip's Philoſophy*: Not to ſhew for what *end* the one was eſtabliſhed, or by what *means* the other was produced, is relating Facts without *their Cauſes*; which the Writer on *the uſe of hiſtory* juſtly throws into the claſs of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordſhip, ſpeaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into Religion, accounts for them by a SPIRIT OF DOMINION; and the Author of the *View* ſpeaking of his Lordſhip's religious principles, reminds the Reader of his MORAL PRACTICE; but ſo far only as ſerved that purpoſe, and was, beſides, notorious to all mankind.

Lord Bolingbroke (ſays this Public) *deſerved every thing of you; but who are thoſe friends and admirers of his, whom you repreſent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unneceſſarily upon many occaſions? I dare ſay they are very few. You had better have named them.*

As

As unexceptionable perhaps as that liberty might have been thought, I ſhould certainly have ventured on it, had I conceived it poſſible for the Reader to underſtand, by ſuch *friends and admirers*, any of thoſe few illuſtrious Perſons, whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeneſs, his diſtance from buſineſs, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occaſionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. The Chief of theſe I have the honour to know, and the pleaſure of being able to inform thoſe who do not, that they were ſo far from being in the principles of his *Philoſophy*, that ſome of them did not ſo much as know what thoſe Principles were; and thoſe who did, gave him to underſtand, how much they deteſted them. Indeed, nothing but this Fact, which I here aſſert on my own knowledge, can account for the diſpoſition in his Will, concerning his *Philoſophic* papers. And were it only for the ſake of this fair occaſion, of explaining myſelf, I could readily excuſe all the hard thoughts *this Public* ſeems to have entertained of me. As to the *friends and admirers who applauded all he wrote*, I meant thoſe who perſuaded him to change his mind, and give thoſe *Eſſays* to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the inſpection of a Few; and which thoſe Few had given him to underſtand, were fit for nobody's inſpection at all. Nay, he ſeems willing the World ſhould know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting thoſe places in his *Eſſays* ſtand, where he declares his own opinion of their *unfitneſs for general communication.*

But what grieves and hurts your friends moſt (ſays this Public) *is ſtill behind. Poor Pope did not deſerve to be treated by you with ſo much cruelty, contempt, and injuſtice. In a work where Lord Bolingbroke is repreſented as a Monſter, hated both of God and Man, Why is Pope always and unneceſſarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer? Why as approving of, and privy to all that was addreſſed to him? Why ſhould he, who had many great talents, and amiable qualities, be deſcribed only by the ſlighting Epithets of* tuneful *and* poetical. *You ſay, Pope* announced the glad tidings of all theſe things. *In*

what work can he be ſaid to have done it, except in his Eſſay on Man? *This is throwing a reflexion on the excellent* Commentary *on that* Eſſay.

The Editor of Pope's Works certainly thought with this generous Animadverter, that the great Poet *deſerved* every thing of his Friends. For he tells us, "That to have been one of the greateſt "Poets in the World, was but his ſecond praiſe: that Pope was in "a higher Claſs. He was one of the *nobleſt works of God:* He was an *honeſt Man.* "A man who alone poſſeſſed more real virtue "than, in very corrupt times, needing a Satyriſt like him, will "ſometimes fall to the ſhare of multitudes. His filial piety, his "diſintereſted friendſhips, his reverence for the conſtitution of his "Country, his love and admiration of Virtue, and (what was the "neceſſary conſequence) his hatred and contempt of Vice, his "extenſive Charity to the indigent, his warm benevolence to Man-"kind, his ſupreme veneration of the Deity, and, above all, his "ſincere belief of Revelation (the Editor tells us), ſhall, amongſt "other things, be the ſubject of the hiſtory of his Life. NOR "(ſays he) SHALL HIS FAULTS BE CONCEALED. It is not for the "intereſts of his Virtues that they ſhould. Nor indeed could they "be concealed if we were ſo minded, for they *ſhine* through his "virtues; *no man being more a dupe to the ſpecious appearance of Vir-"tue in others* *."

But then, who it was that *treated poor Pope with cruelty, contempt, and injuſtice*, Lord Bolingbroke, or the Author of the *View*, let this *Public* themſelves judge; and, by their freedom from paſſion and reſentment, at a time when a *friend* would be moſt *hurt*, they appear well qualified to judge impartially.

When, on the publication of the *Patriot King*, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed uſe the memory of poor Pope with exceeding *contempt, cruelty, and injuſtice*, by repreſenting him, in the *Advertiſement* to the Public, as a buſy ignorant interpolator of his works; a mer-

* See the Editor's *Advertiſement* to his works.

cenary

cenary betrayer of his truſt; a Miſerable, who bartered all the friendſhip of his Philoſopher and Guide, for a little paltry gain. Who was it then that manifeſted his *hurt and grief for poor Pope?* Was it *this Public!* Or was it the *Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke*, on that occaſion?

But in what conſiſts the *contempt*, *cruelty*, *and injuſtice* of the *View?* The *contempt* is in the *ſlighting epithets of tuneful and poetical*: the *Cruelty* in giving inſtances of Pope's unbounded admiration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the *injuſtice* in ſaying that he denounced the *glad tidings of the firſt Philoſophy*, and that he approved and was *privy to all that was addreſſed to him.*

My uſing the epithets of *tuneful and poetical*, in ſpeaking of a man who had many ſuperior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well ſuited to the occaſion. It is where I ſpeak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke: and they aptly inſinuate what I would have them mean, that, *Judgment* had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical *Imagination.* Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordſhip's *ingratitude* and Mr. Pope's *idolatry* ſide by ſide, in order to their ſetting off one another?

But *cruelty* is added to contempt, in the inſtances I give of Pope's unbounded admiration. I am verily perſuaded, had Pope lived to ſee Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendſhip, as well in his Lordſhip's uſual converſation *, as in the *advertiſement to the Patriot King*, he would have been amongſt the firſt to have laughed at his own deluſions, when this treatment of him had once broken and diſſolved the Charm; at leaſt, he would have been ready to laugh with a Friend, who ſhould chuſe to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongſt the offices of friendſhip, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you;

" Laugh at your Friends; and if your Friends be ſore,
" So much the better, you may laugh the more."

* See the concluſion of the fourth Letter.

as implying, that, while they continued *ſore*, they continued to ſtand in need of this friendly operation.

My *injuſtice* conſiſts in ſuppoſing *Pope was privy to all that was addreſſed to him.* An injuſtice indeed, had I ſuppoſed any ſuch thing; I, who with greater certainty than moſt men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the ſecret, but the deſign of the Addreſs, and the preliminary Diſcourſes. So little did Pope know of the Principles of the *firſt Philoſophy*, that when a common Acquaintance, in his laſt illneſs, chanced to tell him of a late converſation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordſhip took occaſion to deny God's *moral attributes* as they are commonly underſtood, he was ſo ſhocked that he did not reſt till he had aſked Lord Bolingbroke, whether his informer was not miſtaken? His Lordſhip aſſured him, he was; of which, Pope with great ſatisfaction informed his Friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordſhip's real ſentiments it was, that Pope gave eaſy credit to him, when he vapoured that *he would demonſtrate all the common Metaphyſics to be wicked and abominable* *. And this leads me to that part of the charge, where it is ſaid, I could only mean the ESSAY ON MAN, by the *glad tidings of the firſt Philoſophy*. I meant a very different thing; and alluded to the following paſſages in his LETTERS. *Do not laugh at my Gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a Philoſopher, till I pull it off, and make a jeſt of it myſelf. 'Tis juſt what my Lord Bolingbroke is doing with* METAPHYSICS. *I hope you will live to ſee, and ſtare at the learned figure he will make on the ſame ſhelf with Locke and Malebranche* †. And again, *Lord Bolingbroke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to deſtroy volumes. I ſhall not live, I fear, to ſee that work printed* ‡. Where, by the way, his fancy that this METAPHYSICS was deſigned for the public, ſhews he knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant. The *Eſſay on Man* I could not mean. For in the 55th page of the *View*, I

* Bolingbroke to Swift, Letter xlviii. Vol. ix.

† Letter lxxi. Vol. ix. ‡ Letter lxxiii.

make

make the fundamental doctrines of that *Poem* and of his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* to be directly oppoſite to one another. The one, a real Vindication of Providence againſt Libertines and Bigots: the other a pretended Vindication of it againſt an imaginary Confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts.

Thus I have explained, in the beſt manner I am able, my reaſons for ſpeaking of this great Poet in terms which give offence. But what ſhall we ſay, if this air of negligence to his memory was aſſumed, the better to conceal the Author of an anonymous Epiſtle? The motive ſure was excuſable; though the project was without effect: for *this Public* have poſitively decided, that *the Author muſt be —— by the ſcurrility and abuſe.*

But, *Had you purſued* (ſay they) *the advantage you have ingeniouſly taken from an expreſſion in one of Pope's Letters, to have ſhewn that Pope differed from Bolingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but deſpiſed the futility of his reaſoning againſt Revelation; that where he was right Pope improved but never ſervilely copied his Ideas; you would have done honour to your Friend and Yourſelf; you would have ſerved the cauſe of Religion; you would have diſcredited Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contraſt——*

Now all this, the Reader will ſee in the *fourth Letter*, I had actually done; and (as it was in its place) fully and largely too. In the mean time, every body might ſee, it was what I was ready, on a fit occaſion, to do, by the paſſage referred to juſt above from the *ſecond*; where *Pope is honoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more diſcredited by the contraſt.*

But I muſt not leave this head without taking notice of one expreſſion in the cenſure. It is ſaid, that the *View* REPRESENTS *L. Bolingbroke as a Monſter hated both of God and Man.* The expreſſion had been juſter, had it been—*from the View it may be* COLLECTED; becauſe, whatever ideas Men may form of his Lordſhip from a peruſal of the *View*, they ariſe from his Lordſhip's own words, which are faithfully quoted. What the Author of the *View* adds, is only

only a little harmleſs raillery, which can preſent the Reader with no idea but what (in the opinion of *Pope*) ariſes from every fruitleſs attempt of Impiety.

" Heaven ſtill with LAUGHTER the vain toil ſurveys,
" And buries madmen in the heaps they raiſe."

That the Author of the *View* aſſiſted in the dreſſing up ſo ſtrange a ſight, as *a Monſter hated both by God and Man*, was very far from his intention. He made a ſcruple of accompanying his Lordſhip's quotations with thoſe reflexions of ſerious indignation which ſuch a Scene of horrors naturally ſuggeſts, leſt he ſhould be thought to aim at ſomething more than private animadverſion. He therefore generouſly endeavoured to turn the public attention from the *horror*, to the *ridicule*, of the *firſt Philoſophy*, and to get his Lordſhip well laughed at; as being perſuaded, that when the Public is brought to that temper, its reſentment ſeldom riſes to any conſiderable height.

Men had better ſpeak out, and ſay, the Author of the *View* ought to have repreſented L. Bolingbroke as neither *deteſtable* nor *ridiculous*. He could have wiſhed, that his ſenſe of honour and duty would have permitted him to have done ſo. He is neither a Fanatic, nor an Enthuſiaſt, and perhaps ſtill leſs of a Bigot. Yet there are occaſions when the moſt ſober and candid thinker will confeſs, that the intereſts of Particulars ſhould give way to thoſe of the Public. It is true, there are others, when politeneſs, civil prudence, and the private motives of Friendſhip, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the ſtate and condition of the times; and even to chuſe the worſe, inſtead of the better method of doing good. But his misfortune was, that this did not appear to him to be one of thoſe occaſions, in which, when he had explained the Doctrines and Opinions of an erroneous Writer, he could leave them with this reflexion: " Theſe are the " Writer's notions on the moſt important points with regard to hu- " man happineſs. They are indeed very ſingular and novel. But " then

" then conſider; the Writer was a great man, and high in all the " attainments of Wiſdom; therefore weigh well and reverendly be- " fore you condemn what I have here expoſed to your Judgment."— But had I, with a view to prudence, ſaid this, Would it have ſecured me from OFFENCE, the very thing that PRUDENCE would moſt avoid? Would it not rather have furniſhed out another handle, a handle for the making me a Confederate in his guilt, only a little better diſguiſed? Had this happened, it would not have been the firſt time I had been ſo ſerved, when endeavouring to *avoid offence*.

And yet there was but one of theſe three ways; Either to laugh, to declaim, or to ſay nothing. I choſe the firſt, as what I fancied leaſt obnoxious; in which, however, I was miſtaken; and as moſt likely to do good; in which, I ſtill hope, I was not miſtaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke, whoſe reputation of parts and wiſdom had been raiſed ſo high, can poſſibly do, is amongſt the PEOPLE. His objections againſt Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when uſed by their original Authors, long before his Lordſhip honored them with a place in his *Eſſays*. What then was that Man to aim at, who had made it his buſineſs (indeed without being ſet on work) to put a ſpeedy ſtop to the miſchief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the Author of them, but to give a true and ſuccinct repreſentation of his *Syſtem*, in a popular way; to make a right uſe of that abundance, which the ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS afforded, to ſhew that his Lordſhip's *Principles* were as fooliſh as they were wicked; and that the *Arguments* uſed in ſupport of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing: that he was a pretender in matters of Learning and Philoſophy; and knew no more of the genius of the Goſpel, than of that ſuppoſed corruption of it, which he calls *artificial Theology*. This I imagined to be the only way to reach his Lordſhip's AUTHORITY, on which all depended;

and

and then, the very weakeſt effort of ridicule would be able to do the reſt. Theſe were my motives for the method I laid down; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them in a way that tends to defeat their end, it ſhould, I think, be laid to the account of thoſe who make this explanation neceſſary.

I have been the longer on this matter as it will ſerve for an anſwer to what follows.

Lord Bolingbroke (ſays this Public) *is ſo univerſally and ſo juſtly obnoxious to all ſorts and ranks of people, that from regard to him, no body cares how he is treated, but be aſſured your* MANNER *has deſtroyed all the merit of the work.*——Though with regard to the *manner* I have ſaid enough; yet the candid Reader, I am ſure, will allow me to add a word or two *Concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public ſervice.* It had, till of late, been always deemed deſert to do a general good, though in a way not perfectly acceptable. But we are now become ſo delicate and faſtidious, that it is the *manner of doing*, even in things of higheſt importance, which carries away all the merit. And yet, this falſe delicacy on a queſtion of no leſs moment than *Whether we ſhall have any Religion or none at all*, ſeems as abſurd as it would be in a Great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for ſaving his falling Palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he ſhould have conſidered of a ſupport more conformable to the general taſte and ſtyle of Architecture in his Lordſhip's ſuperb piece; or to find him diſconcerted by that charitable hand, which ſhould venture to pull his Grandeur by head and ſhoulders out of a flaming apartment.

But in theſe ſuppoſitions I grant much more than in reaſon I ought. I ſuppoſe the PUBLIC TASTE, which the *manner* in queſtion has offended, is a reality, founded in Nature; whereas 'tis the fantaſtic creature of Faſhion, and as ſhifting and capricious as its Parent. TRUTH, which makes the *matter* of every honeſt man's enquiry, is eternal; but the *manner ſuited to the public taſte*, is nothing elſe than conformity to our preſent paſſions, or ſentiments; our

our prejudices, or diſpoſitions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got poſſeſſion of a People, then a warmth for its intereſts, and an abhorrence of its Enemies, become the public taſte; and men expect to find the zeal of an Apoſtle in every defender of Religion: But when this awful Power has loſt its hold, when, at beſt, it floats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect to be read with approbation, you muſt conform your *manner* to that polite indifference, and eaſy unconcern, with which we ſee every other trial of ſkill played before us.

But now I am advanced thus far, I will venture a ſtep further. When Infidelity firſt made its appearance amongſt us in ſet Diſcourſes addreſſed to the Public, our eccleſiaſtical Watchmen inſtantly took the alarm; and communicated it to their Brethren with a warmth and vigour that gave Luſtre to their high Truſt. No Writer eſcaped unnoticed; no argument remained unanſwered; and a learned Critic received public honours, as the deliverer of his Country, in reſcuing common ſenſe from the very ſilliеſt rhapſody * that ever diſgraced human Reaſon. But ſince the danger is become imminent, or, to ſpeak more properly, ſince the miſchief ſo much dreaded has done its work, and one would naturally expect to ſee this vigilance increaſed, and the Body up in arms, we find a perfect peace and tranquillity reign amongſt them. Which, were it not attended with equal unconcern, one might miſtake for a well-grounded confidence in vigorous meaſures. As if it were our unhappy fate to be ſtill miſtaken, as well when we thought the *Church in danger*, as now when we appear to believe it *triumphant!*

Indeed (ſays this Public) *it* [your manner] *has furniſhed your enemies with a handle to do you infinite miſchief. Your* COLD *friends lament and make the worſt ſort of excuſe, by imputing it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in controverſy; Your*

* Diſcourſe of Freethinking.

WARM *friends are out of countenance, and forced to be ſilent, or turn the diſcourſe.*

Would not any one by this imagine, that the Author of the *View*, after much pretended oppoſition to Infidelity, was at laſt detected of being in confederacy with it, and all along artfully advancing its intereſts; that the Maſk had unwarily dropt off, and that he ſtood confeſſed, what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleaſed to call him, *an Advocate for civil and eccleſiaſtical Tyranny?* At leaſt, no one would imagine, that this *handle afforded to his enemies of doing him miſchief*, was no other than the treating the Author of the moſt impious and inſulting book that ever affronted public juſtice, as a bad Reaſoner and a worſe Philoſopher, whoſe VANITY led him to abuſe every *Name* of Learning, and his FEAR to diſcredit every *Mode* of Religion.

Theſe *cold Friends* however acted in Character; the great ſecret of whoſe addreſs is the well poiſoning an Apology, or, as the excellent writer better expreſſes it, *making the very worſt excuſe they can find.* But here, methinks, we want their uſual caution, which rarely ſuffers an ambiguous expreſſion to admit of a favourite meaning: For, the compliment *of drawing blood in controverſy*, the Author of the *View* may fairly take to himſelf with great complacency. As his *Controverſy* has always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation; neither with Miniſters nor Factions; and on no leſs a queſtion than the truth and honour of Religion, againſt Infidels and Bigots; the *drawing blood* ſhews him to have been *in earneſt*, which is no vulgar praiſe. It would be but poor commendation, I ween, of a brave Engliſh Veteran, who had ſeen many a well-fought field for Liberty and his Country, to ſay, he never *drew blood*; though ſuch a compliment might recommend the humanity of a Champion at Hockley-hole. When the ſituation of the times have engaged two learned Men, at the head of oppoſite factions in a Church, to engage in a party-quarrel, and play a prize of diſputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between

between them, it is no wonder if there ſhould be much ceremony, and little *blood ſhed*. But the Author of the *View* writes for no Party, nor Party-opinions; he writes for what he thinks the TRUTH; and, in the point in queſtion, for the CLERGY, its Miniſters (they will *forgive him this wrong)*; and as Both of them are yet by good fortune of public authority, he thinks himſelf at liberty to ſupport them, though it be by *drawing blood* from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be ſubdued by management or a mock-fight. Yet as much *in earneſt* as he is, he ſhould be aſhamed to turn the ſame arms againſt ſimple error; againſt a naked adverſary; or againſt the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, againſt any but him, who ſtands up boldly to defy Religion, or, what is almoſt as bad, to diſhonour it, by falſe and hypocritic zeal for the errors and corruptions which have crept into it. In a word, had I written with any oblique views, and not from a ſenſe of duty, I ſhould have ſuited the entertainment to the taſte of my Superiors. For a man muſt be of a ſtrange complexion indeed, who, when he has *conformed to Religion* for his convenience, will yet ſcruple to go on, and reap the benefit of his compliance, by *conforming to the Faſhion*.

So far as to the Author's *cold Friends*. With reſpect to his *warm* ones, They have not played their parts ſo well; they ſeem to have given up their Cauſe too ſoon. They might have ſaid with truth, and a full knowledge of what they ſaid, "That no man was more diſpoſed than the Author of the *View*, to comply with the temper of the times; and eſpecially with the Inclinations of his Friends; to whoſe *ſatisfaction* he has been ever ready to ſacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their *ſervices*, every thing—except his duty and his honour: Was he capable of doing this, he would not deſerve a virtuous Friend: That probably he conſidered the matter in queſtion as one of thoſe excepted caſes, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of

his ſtation: That he ſaw *Religion* inſulted, a *moral Governor* defied; *Naturaliſm*, a ſpecies of *Atheiſm*, openly, and with all the arts of ſophiſtry and declamation, inculcated; and the oppoſing World inſolently branded as a cabal of fools, knaves, and madmen." They might have ſaid, "That where errors of ſmall conſequence are in queſtion, or even great ones, when delivered with modeſty and candour, ſuitable meaſures are to be obſerved: but that here the impiety and the inſult were both in the extreme." To which, in the laſt place, they might have added moſt of thoſe other conſiderations, which have been urged in the courſe of this Apology. And had they been ſo pleaſed, the Defence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage to their Client.

However, the Author of the *View* has yet the vanity, amidſt all this mortification, to reflect, that there is a very wide difference between *diſpleaſing*, and *the being diſapproved:* and that *this very Public*, who complain by the pen of my anonymous Friend, feel that difference. The decencies of Acquaintance, the impreſſions of habit, and even the moſt innocent partialities, might make them uneaſy to ſee Lord BOLINGBROKE expoſed to contempt: But their love of the Public, their reverence both for its Civil and Religious intereſts, will make them ſee with Pleaſure his PRINCIPLES confuted and expoſed. When a noble Roman had in public Senate accuſed one of the greateſt Peſts of his age and country, he obſerved that the vigour with which he purſued this Enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneaſy; but he ſatisfied himſelf with this reflexion, *tantum ad fiduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines facias, an non probent.*

In a word, my duty to God, to my Country, to Mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the *manner* I have done it. If I have offended any good Man, any Friend to my perſon, or my Cauſe, it is a ſacrifice to Duty; which yet I muſt never repent of having made, though the diſpleaſure of

of a Friend be the ſevereſt trial of it. I know what that man has to expect, both from *Infidelity* and *Bigotry*, who engages WITHOUT RESERVE in the ſervice of Religion.

" Ah! let not VIRTUE too, commence his Foe!"

However, I have long ſince taken my party:

" Omnia præcepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi.
" Nec recuſo, ſi ita caſus attulerit, luere pœnas ob honeſtiſſima facta,
" dum FLAGITIOSISSIMA ULCISCOR."

Jan. 4, 1755.

TO

TO

RALPH ALLEN, ESQ.

DEAR SIR,

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY, ſo much and ſo long talked of, is now come, and very fairly, into the hands of the public. For I think it would be injuſtice to the Editor to ſuppoſe his Lordſhip did not deſign us this LEGACY. His laſt Will ſufficiently declares his kindneſs to us. But, you will ſay, he ſpeaks of his Philoſophy as a thing compoſed only for the ſolace of a few friends in a corner *. What then? might not his Lordſhip change his mind, and extend his benefits? Hardly, you think, without *contradicting* his profeſſed principles. So much the better. The publication then will be of a piece with the reſt. And never trouble your head with one *contradiction*, where you may meet with a thouſand.

Quid te exempta levat ſpinis de pluribus una?

* "Let us ſeek truth, but ſeek it quietly as well as freely. Let us not imagine, like "ſome who are called FREE-THINKERS, that every man who can think and judge for "himſelf (as he has a right to do) has therefore a right of SPEAKING, any more than "of *acting*, according to the full freedom of his thoughts. The freedom belongs to him "as a rational creature. He lies under the reſtraint as a *member of Society*.—As we think "for ourſelves, we may keep our thoughts to ourſelves or communicate them with a "DUE RESERVE, and in ſuch manner ONLY, as it may be done without *offending the Laws* "*of our Country, and diſturbing the public peace.*"—*Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope*, Vol. iii. p. 343. Quarto Edition.

Now

Now though I know You have as little Curioſity to hear what a Freethinker can object to the FAITH which has got poſſeſſion of your heart, as what a pick-pocket can chicane to the Property in your purſe: yet the name of L. BOLINGBROKE's METAPHYSICS (which, I think, were become as famous, and hitherto as little underſtood, as his POLITICS) cannot ſure but incline you to ſome ſlight acquaintance at leaſt with this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as he calls it; and which, in the manner of other Conquerors, he erects on a general deſolation.

The only part of his Lordſhip's Character, that yet remained equivocal, was his *literary*. How this will fare by the publication of his *Philoſophy*, I will not pretend to ſay; perhaps not altogether ſo well as his Friends might give him the pleaſure to expect. He frequently tells his reader, that the Doctrine of his ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS had been occaſionally thrown out amongſt them, and made the ſubject of many free converſations. And while he harangued in that circle, I will ſuppoſe he met with the applauſe he ſought after. But had he choſe himſelf to bring them to the bar of the Public, he might have ſeen ſtrange revolutions. "Illic, et "Judex *tacet*, et Adverſarius *obſtrepit*, et nihil TEMERE DICTUM "perit: et, ſiquid TIBI IPSE SUMAS, PROBANDUM eſt: et, omiſſo "MAGNA SEMPER FLANDI TUMORE, loquendum eſt *." Indeed his Lordſhip could hardly expect to eſcape the ſeverity of this Tribunal but by the ſuperior evidence of his principles: ſince his meditations on divine matters are ſo extenſive, that ſcarce any one, who has written in defence of Virtue, or Religion, but will find himſelf either inſulted in his perſon or miſrepreſented in his opinions; and this, merely for being in the great man's way.

But ſurely, when a perſon of his Lordſhip's polite manners had condeſcended to enter into learned altercation, the world might expect, at leaſt for the *courtly management of Controverſy*, a moſt conſummate Model, which ſhould either reform, or ſhould for ever

* Quint.

diſcredit,

diſcredit, the groſſer Polemics of the Schools. So that though the DIVINE might expect no great *matter* from theſe oracles of reaſon, yet he ſhould readily accept his amends in the *manner* of ſo elegant a pen. And perhaps You, who have obſerved their commerce with the world, and their conduct to one another, might be apt to think they would have been no loſers by the bargain. Indeed, Divines have been generally thought wanting in forms; whether their pride prompts them to appeal to the Authority of reaſon; or their prudence teaches them to ſubmit to the Wiſdom of their Betters. And the management of their Controverſies in the Schools, and their intereſts in Courts, have, on different accounts, been equally obnoxious both to the dealers in Truth and Falſehood. I would willingly avoid both their extremes. For I would, if poſſible, preſerve and ſupport that love and reverence to an uſeful body, which the noble Writer, relying not on his own politics but on other men's, has in his *fourth Eſſay* devoted to Deſtruction. He, indeed, may call for aid on the *Secular arm*; he has the old reaſon for ſo doing; but I dare ſay, the *Clergy* never will. Things are now come to that paſs, that the State ſeems to be in more need of their Support, than They, of the State's. For, though the cavils of licentious men always *end* in the Confirmation of Truth and Virtue, yet they generally *ſet out* in looſening the hold, which Religion had got upon the PEOPLE. And when that is gone, what other Engine the Magiſtrate will invent, to keep the Multitude in order, They, whoſe principal concern it is, would do well to conſider.

As I ſaid, then, I had taken it for granted, that our noble Adverſary, for an Adverſary he has condeſcended to be, would be principally anxious to teach us in his writings, what was his wont in converſation, that ſtudied politeneſs, which is ſo well fitted to keep inferiors at a diſtance: And that, when he had declared mortal war againſt every thing the world hath hitherto called RELIGION; and againſt every Order of PRIESTS, or MINISTERS, which civil Government

vernment has thought proper to eſtabliſh for the ſupport of it, we ſhould ſee his attack carried on by the faireſt as well as ſtrongeſt reaſoning, the gentleſt as well as firmeſt addreſs, and the politeſt as well as keeneſt raillery.

But how were we diſappointed, to find this Conſervator of States, this Legiſlator in Philoſophy and Religion, utterly unable to raiſe his head above the rank contagion of the Schools: to ſee Polemics go their uſual train: and this Sun of our new Syſtem, whirled along the turbid vortex of Controverſy, like any the moſt *ignoble* of the earthly Bodies! But his POET, or rather his *Prophet* (who ſo magnificently announced to us the glad tidings of all theſe good things) had prepared us for it. He had contemplated this ſtrange phænomenon: not, indeed, without ſurprize. Is it not, ſays he,

—— "mighty odd?
"A fit of vapours clouds this DEMI-GOD!"

To be plain, I met with nothing in theſe big volumes, but the rankneſs of SOUTH without his force; and the malignity of MARVEL without his wit. You ſhall not take it on my word: the evidence lies before us. Give me leave then to preſent you with a SPECIMEN, under his own hand, of his candour, his temper, and infinite politeneſs. And though one can but ill judge of the *harveſt* by a ſample of the field-flowers, yet we may form a pretty good gueſs of the *ſoil*.

Nor is this intemperance of language, of which I propoſe to give you a taſte, the mere eſcape of fancy or humour, which it would be candid to overlook: It is a ſort of *formula dicendi*, without which all his Lordſhip's authentic acts of Legiſlation would be invalid: It is the very *Spirit* of his *new Religion*, without which, the whole would be indeed but a *dead letter*.

It was with the leſs reluctance I entered upon this part of my deſign, that I might have to juſtify myſelf to the world for the plainneſs and freedom with which I may hereafter chance to treat his Lordſhip's REASONING; for, as Quintilian well obſerves,

" Præſtatur hoc aliquando etiam DIGNITATIBUS ut libertatis noſ-
" træ ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut *petulantes* in lædendis his, aut
" etiam *ambitioſos* putet."

Without any further prologue, then, let the Shew begin: Only premiſing, that as his Lordſhip had a FIRST PHILOSOPHY to erect, he had an immenſe deal of rubbiſh to remove: The authority of every great Name, and of every ſacred Order, ſtanding directly in his way.

With CUDWORTH he begins: and of CUDWORTH he ſays, *The heads of many reverend perſons have been turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philoſophical delirium. None hath been more ſo than this Divine* *. Again, CUDWORTH [in his INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM] *gives you little leſs than a nonſenſical paraphraſe of nonſenſe. It was not his fault. The good man paſſed his life in the ſtudy of an unmeaning jargon; and, as he learned, he taught* †.

To talk, like CUMBERLAND, *of promoting the good of the whole Syſtem of rational Agents, amongſt whom God is included, and of human benevolence towards him, is to talk metaphyſical jargon and theological bloſphemy* ‡.

CLARKE *triumphs in this fooliſh and wicked rhodomondate* §, *&c.* — *All* CLARKE *ſays about the diſcovery of God's will, is a rhapſody of preſumptuous reaſoning and of prophane abſurdities* ||. — *Audacious and vain Sophiſt! His terms have a ſolemn air, that may impoſe on the unwary, and confirm the habitual prejudices of others; but more abſurdity cannot be ſtuffed into ſo few words* **.

Of WOLLASTON, he ſays, *But I will detain you no longer about ſuch diſcourſe as would convince you, if you heard it at* MONROE's, *that the Philoſopher who held it was a patient of the Doctor's not yet perfectly reſtored to his ſenſes* ††. Again, of the ſame excellent Perſon, *We have here an example of the ſecond ſort of Madneſs mentioned*

* Vol. iii. p. 353. of his Works, in Quarto.
† Vol. iv. p. 92.
‡ Vol. v. p. 82.
§ Vol. v. p. 252.
|| Vol. v. p. 292.
** Vol. v. p. 395.
†† Vol. iii. p. 518.

above.

above. The man who writ all this nonſenſe was a man of parts.—But when theſe learned Lunaticks *, *&c.*

CLARKE and WOLLASTON ſoon grow outrageous; and ready to be chained together. Indeed, from henceforth they are rarely ſhewn aſunder. We ſometimes find them in the *height of a metaphyſical frenzy* †: And, by what one can perceive, without much provocation. They had proved the Soul to be a thinking ſubſtance diſtinct from Matter: We may allow them to be jealous of the glory of this atchievement. But who conteſted it with them? Nobody, that I know of, before his Lordſhip. And he very civilly let them enjoy the honour of it for life.

The Preſident FORBES is *really mad*; but it is only *quoad hoc*. For obſerve, he was *no Divine by profeſſion, but ſomething better* ‡. Indeed, not much. He was a LAWYER. Of which UNLEARNED Profeſſion, as he calls it, *ninety-nine in a hundred at leaſt* (he ſays) *are Petty-foggers, Sharpers, Brawlers, and Cavillers* §.

But, to give the better edge to his well-tempered language, he ſometimes dips it in irony: and then it is, *The good Earl of Nottingham*; and the *righteous Biſhop Sherlock*. They deſerved his anger. The Firſt publickly defended, and ably too, that *Faith* which ſtands ſo much in his way: and the Other ventured to oppoſe that *Party*, whoſe patronage he had condeſcended to aſſume ‖.

He comes next to the whole BODY of the Chriſtian Clergy. And now the *firſt Philoſophy* begins to work, and the taſk to grow ſerious. The PRIMITIVE SAINTS and DOCTORS have the precedence, as is fitting. "The liſt of MARTYRS conſiſted, I believe, of thoſe who "ſuffered for BREAKING THE PEACE **. The PRIMITIVE CLERGY "were, under pretence of Religion, a very LAWLESS TRIBE ††." "ALL the Chriſtian FATHERS uſing a DELIRIOUS STYLE, it became "that of Chriſtian Theology ‡‡." "It would ſcarce be poſſible to "believe that the greateſt Saints and Doctors of the Church had "talked ſo much BLASPHEMOUS NONSENSE, and employed ſo much

* Vol. v. p. 374. † Vol. iii. p. 514. ‡ Vol. v. p. 523.
§ Vol. ii. p. 353. ‖ See *The Craftſman*.
** Vol. iv. p. 434. †† Id. ib. ‡‡ Vol. iv. p. 612.

" *artifice* about it, if their writings were not extant *."—" Of all " this *abſurdity*, *profaneneſs*, *and ridicule*, they who built up Chriſ- " tian theology were guilty."—You aſk, with ſurpriſe and impa- tience, What this *abſurdity* was? He was going to tell you; for he never minces matters. " They ADDED (ſays he) the EPISTLES " to the GOSPELS; the doctrines of PAUL to thoſe of CHRIST; " till the APOCALYPSE became a part of our holy Scriptures †." And now, I hope, you are ſatisfied. If not, take what follows, " Chriſtian Divines and Philoſophers have done more to DEBASE " our notions of the Supreme Being, than all the Doctors of Poly- " theiſm ‡."

This was reaſonably well, for new-beginners: But nothing like the exploits of MODERN DIVINES.

" It is MADNESS, *or ſomething* WORSE *than madneſs*, for Divines " to imagine themſelves able to comprehend a whole Oeconomy of " divine Wiſdom from *Adam* down to *Chriſt*. And yet this is ſo " cuſtomary, that not only the learned and ingenious, but every " dabbler in Theology, who muſt paſs for a *fool* or a *knave* when- " ever he grows extravagant, affects to reaſon in the ſame man- " ner §."

—" Would Divines inſiſt chiefly on the external proofs of the " authenticity of Scripture—they would avoid *a great deal of* BLAS- " PHEMY ‖."—They are abſurd and licentious in urging both the " external and internal evidence of Revelation **."

—" Our Divines turn themſelves to declaim on certain and un- " doubted marks of divine Authority of the Scriptures of the Iſ- " raelites—Let us compare ſome of theſe ſuppoſed marks with " thoſe of human original, and they will ſtare us in the face, and " point out plainly the FRAUD and IMPOSTURE ††."

—" It is common and yet aſtoniſhing to obſerve, with how " much ſolemnity and confidence almoſt all thoſe who teach and

* Vol. iv. p. 303. † Vol. iv. p. 371. ‡ Vol. iii. p. 541.
§ Vol. iv. p. 274. ‖ Vol. iii. p. 272. ** Vol. iv. p. 273.
†† Vol. iii. p. 288.

" defend

" defend Chriſtianity, preſume to AFFIRM ANY THING, though " never ſo evidently FALSE *."

—" The beſt, and even ſuch as paſs for the faireſt controverſial " Writers, improve by artifice the natural infirmity of the human " mind. They do, on purpoſe, confound ideas and perplex the " ſignification of ſigns—the moſt ſcandalous frauds are applauded " under the name of ſubtilties. This I call theological fraud †." Hence, in another place, he ſays, that *folly and knavery prevail moſt amongſt Divines* ‡: and again, that They are THE PLAGUES AND SCOURGES OF THE WORLD §.

" The doctrine of Clarke and other Chriſtian Divines about our " obligation to imitate God is FALSE and PROFANE ||."

" Divines have IMPUDENTLY and WICKEDLY aſſumed, that there " is a law of right reaſon common to God and man **."

" What I have advanced will be treated as an impious paradox by " ſome of the trifling ſolemn dogmatiſts in Criticiſm and Theology, " who have advanced ſo many *abſurd and impious* paradoxes of their " own ††."

We now come to what the noble Author calls the DELIRIUM OF METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY ‡‡.—" The man who walked ſoberly " about in the Bedlam of Paris, and believed himſelf God the Father, " was mad. Thus the Philoſopher, who takes a bold leap from a " few clear and diſtinct ideas to the firſt principles of things, is " *mad* §§."

" The *reaſoners à priori* reſemble very much one ſort of MAD- " MEN. Some of theſe are ſo VERY MAD that they loſe all uſe of " their reaſon. Others again deduce conſequences, and argue very " juſtly, but are STILL MAD: becauſe they reaſon from principles " that have no appearance of reality out of their own overheated " and diſordered imaginations. You will find inſtances of this kind,

* Vol. iv. p. 295. † Vol. iii. p. 424, 425. ‡ Vol. v. p. 6.
§ Vol. iv. p. 435. || Vol. v. p. 65. ** Vol. v. p. 77.
†† Vol. v. p. 190. ‡‡ Vol. iii. p. 356. §§ Vol. iv. p. 139.

" without

" without the trouble of going to *Bedlam*; but you will find them " principally in *Colleges* and *Schools* *."

— " They deſerve to be treated like patients proper for Dr. Mon- " ROE, and to be put under his care. Nothing leſs than *Metaphyſics* " could have turned ſo many good heads †."

Well then, Divines are all MAD; and, for fear of miſchief, in ſafe cuſtody. Sometimes, indeed, his Lordſhip lets them out to cool, and air themſelves; nay, he is ſo good to give them their lucid intervals; but it is only to *play the rogue*, and to *cant in the pulpit*; and then, back again to their kennel, to *Monroe*, and his diſcipline; or, what is much worſe, to his Lordſhip's; to hear themſelves called *Fools*, *Knaves*, *Cheats*, *Madmen*, *Impoſtors*, and *Blaſphemers*. And, for theſe haſty changes of the Scene, he has contrived a moſt ingenious expedient. He has divided the Clergy into the two claſſes of *Theologians* and *Metaphyſicians:* in the firſt of which, the KNAVE is predominant; in the ſecond, the MAD-MAN. So that he has of either ſort always ready and at hand, juſt as he wants them. But as *Madmen* are much eaſier dealt with than *Knaves*, he has prepared one common BEDLAM for them all. *For God forbid* (he ſays) *he ſhould be as uncharitable as Divines*, to think they deſerved a worſe place, *as blaſpheming in their ſenſes* ‡. Good man! How kind now is all this! How humane! What ſhall the Clergy do for him in return? Alas! he thinks not of it: his *modeſty* is ſtill greater than his *charity:* and he is only anxious not to be miſunderſtood. He is even ready to fear that Divines ſhould take his honeſt freedom in dudgeon; and that it may poſſibly *procure him, in return, ſome eccleſiaſtical* BILLINGSGATE; *to be called infidel, deiſt, and perhaps atheiſt. My reply* (ſays he) *to* SO ANGRY *Diſputants ſhould be* CALM, AND SUCH AS MIGHT TEACH CHARITY *to thoſe who preach it ſo much, and practiſe it ſo little* §. To ſay the truth, his Lordſhip ſeems, like JUSTICE SHALLOW in the Play, to be ſuſpicious of thoſe he had ſo well entertained. *Davy* (ſays the

* Vol. v. p. 396. † Vol. v. p. 417. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 464.
§ Vol. iv. p. 225.

Juſtice,

Juſtice, of his Court-gueſts) *be civil to theſe Knaves, for they will* BACK-BITE. *Not worſe than they are* BITTEN (replies Davy) *for they have marvelous foul linen.* Whether his Lordſhip found the *Prieſt's Surplice* in the like condition, or whether he has left it ſo, is not material. No marvel at its evil plight, when it has been ſo long over-run with Vermin; ſuch as Toland, Chub, Morgan, and thoſe who have been ſince bred out of them.

The BILLINGSGATE, however, if we give but equal credit to what we ſee of his Lordſhip, and to what we hear of the Clergy from their Enemies, lies pretty nearly between them. Yet I agree with him it becomes the Miniſters of Religion, much leſs than it does his Lordſhip. They are *Diſputants*; he is an *Orator*. Their buſineſs is to *reaſon*; his is to *rail*. While each confines himſelf to his province, all goes well. But ſhould they change weapons; ſhould the Orator attempt to reaſon, and the Diſputant be provoked to rail, every thing would be out of order. I venture, on the authority of Quintilian, to reckon *railing* amongſt the ARTS of Eloquence. "CONVITIIS implere VACUA cauſarum," ſays this able Rhetor. It is true he holds it to be of the leſs perfect kind— "eſt enim prorſus CANINA ELOQUENTIA." But his Lordſhip might naturally think, that his *Dog-Eloquence* was well enough fitted to their *Dog-Logic*. However, Quintilian would not overload this ſpecies of Eloquence, nor would I; though neither of us be diſpoſed to extol it; he confeſſes there is yet a ranker kind. "Sed "hæc minora ſunt ILLO VITIO ANIMI, quo MALEDICUS a MALE-"FICO non diſtat, niſi OCCASIONE." "In which *(ſays he)* nothing "but *opportunity* is wanting to make the *evil-ſpeaker* an *evil-doer*." But the *Miniſter of State* muſt join the *Orator* before this compound excellence can diſplay itſelf; juſt as the *Divine* and *Atheiſt* muſt *conſpire* to make that ARTIFICIAL BLASPHEMY, which gives his Lordſhip ſo much concern.

But the mention of this CONSPIRACY reminds me that it is now high time to give you ſome account of it.

Hitherto

Hitherto we have only the out-lines, or at moſt the general air of this *Clerical Portrait*; all he could catch at the firſt ſitting. A horrid combination finiſhes the Picture: a CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS, TO DISHONOUR AND DEGRADE THE GOD OF THE UNIVERSE. This is the ſtriking feature; and ſo artificially diſpoſed, that, turn the Portrait which way you will, it has ſtill a *plotting*, which, in his Lordſhip's juſtice, is little better than a *hanging look*.

A Confederacy ſo mad, ſo monſtrous, may perhaps ſtartle you at firſt. But do not be frightened. Take my word for it, it will come to nothing. It is a Treaty of his own making. And you have heard enough of his talents for Treaty-making. It is true, you ſay, he could reconcile the moſt unnatural alliances to the delicacy of his *morals*; and the moſt ridiculous miſcarriages to the ſuperiority of his *Politics*; but a *confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts!* Was any thing ſo odious! What think you, my Friend, of that blind bargain he once drove between certain of King George's Proteſtant Subjects, and a Popiſh Pretender? How *that* came to nothing, he has not thought fit to tell us, in his curious account of that tranſaction *. But, as to *this* confederacy, I may have an opportunity of ſhewing you, that, after all his pains to form it, he betrayed and diſſolved it himſelf. At preſent, my buſineſs is only to ſhew you what he *ſays* of it.

" After pleading the cauſe of natural and revealed Religion, I am " to plead the cauſe of God himſelf, againſt DIVINES AND ATHEISTS " IN CONFEDERACY †."

" The conduct of Chriſtian Divines has been ſo far from defend- " ing the Providence of God, that they have joined in the clamour " againſt it. Nothing has hindered, even thoſe who pretend to be " his Meſſengers, his Embaſſadors, his *Plenipotentiaries*, from re- " nouncing their allegiance to him, as they themſelves have the " FRONT TO AVOW, but the hypotheſis of a future ſtate. On this

* See the whole Letter to Sir W. Windham.

† Vol. v. p. 305.

" hypotheſis

" hypotheſis alone they inſiſt; and therefore, if this will not ſerve " their turn, God is diſowned by them, as effectually as if he " was ſo in terms *."

" Divines, if not Atheiſts, yet are ABETTERS of Atheiſm † "

" That there were ſome men who knew not God in all ages " may be true: but the ſcandalous taſk of COMBATING HIS EXIS- " TENCE, under the maſk of Theiſm, was reſerved for Metaphyſi- " cians and Theologians ‡."

—" Divines are ſtill more to be blamed. A CONFEDERACY " WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the profeſſors of Theiſm. No " matter. They PERSIST, and have done their beſt, in concert " with their allies, to DESTROY the belief of the goodneſs of God:— " They endeavour to DESTROY that of his goodneſs, which is a " farther article of their Alliance §."

" The CONFEDERACY between Atheiſts and Divines appears to " have been carried VERY FAR—Nay the Atheiſt will appear, to " that reaſon to which they both appeal, more conſiſtent in his " abſurdity than the Divine ||."

" Divines UPBRAID God's goodneſs, and CENSURE his Juſtice **."

" INJUSTICE is, in this life, aſcribed to God, by Divines ††."

" The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaſton and Clarke, do " in effect RENOUNCE the God whom you and I adore, as much " as the rankeſt of the Atheiſtical Tribe. Your Prieſts and our " Parſons will exclaim moſt pathetically, and RAIL OUTRAGEOUSLY " at this aſſertion. But have a little patience, and I will prove it " to their ſhame to be true ‡‡."

Give me leave, Sir, for once, to go a little out of my way to vindicate the whole body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy. To ſay the truth, the charge is too

* Vol. v. p. 487, 488.
† Vol. v. p. 485.
‡ Vol. v. p. 327.
§ Vol. v. p. 393.
|| Vol. v. p. 348, 349.
** Vol. v. p. 327.
†† Vol. v. p. 541.
‡‡ Vol. v. p. 485.

ſerious to be paſſed over with the ſame lightneſs I am diſpoſed to treat the reſt of his Lordſhip's Extravagances.

Be pleaſed then to underſtand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to ſupport itſelf, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of ſenſe can give it; namely *the unequal diſtribution of moral good and evil.*

—" Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
" Adſpicerem, *lætoſque diu florere nocentes,*
" *Vexarique pios*——LABEFACTA CADEBAT
" RELIGIO"——

was the common language of the impatient ſufferer. From hence the Atheiſt inferred, that the Univerſe was without an intelligent Ruler; and all things driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which firſt produced them. DIVINES oppoſed this *concluſion*: for they did not venture to be ſo paradoxical as, with his Lordſhip, to call in queſtion *the premiſſes*, a phænomenon which objected itſelf to all their Senſes. They demonſtrated, ſtrictly demonſtrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL attributes: And then ſhewed, that if the whole of man's exiſtence were included in this life, the preſent diſtribution of moral good and evil would contradict that Demonſtration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole was not included in this life: but that man was reſerved for an after-reckoning; in which, an *equal diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments* would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But *Atheiſts* were not the only enemies that *Divines* had to deal with. There was a ſet of men, who allowed an intelligent firſt Cauſe, endowed with thoſe moral attributes, which Divines had demonſtrated: and, on that account, called themſelves DEISTS. Yet they agreed ſo far with *Atheiſm*, as to confine the whole of man's exiſtence to the preſent life. Theſe, the *Divines* combated, in their turn; and with the ſame arms; but in an inverted order. In diſputing

diſputing with the *Atheiſt*, the principle held in common was *the preſent unequal diſtribution of Good and Evil.* So that to cut off their concluſion from it, of NO GOD, they demonſtrated his Being and Attributes: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be ſet right. With the *Deiſt*, the common principle was *the Being and Attributes of God.* Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, they appealed to the preſent *unequal diſtribution* of good and evil (which theſe Men, as well as his Lordſhip, were very backward to allow and very induſtrious not to ſee), and from that inequality inferred, that there muſt be ſuch a State.

This is a ſhort and true account of their conteſt with ATHEISTS and DEISTS, ſo far as the ſubject of *a future ſtate* came in queſtion: In either controverſy, that State is deduced from *the moral attributes:* only with this difference. In the diſpute with Atheiſts, the demonſtration of thoſe attributes is *made*; in the diſpute with Deiſts, it is *allowed.* The final purpoſe againſt Atheiſm is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God; the final purpoſe againſt Deiſm is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can ſubſiſt without *believing that God* IS, *and that he is a* REWARDER *of them that ſeek him* *. Thus, we ſee, the *queſtion*, in either controverſy, being different; the *premiſſes*, by which each was to be proved, muſt needs be different. The difference is here explained: the premiſſes, in the argument with Atheiſts, were the *moral attributes*; the premiſſes, in the argument with Deiſts, the *unequal diſtribution* of good and evil.

What Enemy to Religion now could ever hope to ſee a Calumny either thrive or riſe on ſo unpromiſing a ground? or flatter himſelf with the expectation of an advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY *with* ATHEISTS, *to decry God's providence*; *to blot out his attributes of goodneſs and juſtice*; *to combat his Government*; *and to deny his very exiſtence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And

* St. Paul.

mere;—he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity ſo far, had he ſeen his way clear before him.—— His Lordſhip is always ſublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a diſtance to look into the detail of things, or to enter into their *minuteneſs*; (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he has jumbled theſe two Controverſies into one; and, in the confuſion, commodiouſly ſlipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, repreſents Divines as making *a future State* THE PROOF *of God's moral attributes:* Whereas, we now ſee, on the very face of the controverſy, that they make *the moral attributes* A PROOF *of a future State.* Let us conſider how the diſpute ſtands with *Atheiſts.* Theſe men draw their argument againſt a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine anſwers, by demonſtrating *God's Being and Attributes*; and, on that demonſtration, ſatisfies the objection. Conſider how it ſtands with the *Deiſt.* Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine ſtands, to deduce a *future ſtate* from the unequal diſtribution of things.—But this was to ſupport his ſlander of a CONFEDERACY. There was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious, by proving a *future ſtate*, from his attributes; but could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a *future ſtate*, he would eaſily find credit with his kind Readers, for the reſt.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That *Divines and Atheiſts hold a principle in common*; but in common too with all the reſt of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the diſtribution of moral good and evil. His Lordſhip has been angry with all POLITICAL, as well as all RELIGIOUS Parties in their turns. Suppoſe he had taken it into his head to ornament a CRAFTSMAN with the detection of a *political confederacy*, between the WHIGS and JACOBITES, to dethrone KING

KING GEORGE; becauſe both denied that he reigned *jure divino*; *Mother Oſborne* would have ſmiled at this, in ſpite of all her gravity; and told him, that the *Whigs* only urged a common principle to ſupport their Monarch's title againſt *indefeaſible hereditary right*, the nonſenſical claim of his Adverſary. And is it not as evident that, in this pretended *anti-theological conſpiracy*, *Divines* employed the other common principle, to ſupport Religion againſt *Atheiſm and Deiſm!* But whatever his Lordſhip might think proper to diſguiſe in this reaſoning, there is one thing the moſt careleſs Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and ſolemnity of accuſation, you ſee lurking that poor ſpecies of a Bigot's calumny, which, frome *one* principle held in common with an obnoxious party, charges his Adverſary, with *all* the follies or impieties that have rendered it odious. This miſerable artifice of impoſture had now been long hiſſed out of learned controverſy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political ſkill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION diſtruſt its beſt Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

TINDAL and COLLINS were manly Adverſaries. They knew how to invent, to puſh, and to purſue an Argument. But what does this noble Writer know—His Followers will tell you. They admire him for his Wit and Eloquence. But They admire, where You and I ſee nothing but an inflamed ſpirit, and an inflated ſtyle. For (to uſe the words of a great Maſter * of expreſſion) TRUE ELOQUENCE I *find to be none but the ſerious and hearty love of* TRUTH: *And that, whoſe mind ſoever is fully poſſeſſed with a fervent deſire to know good things, and with the deareſt* CHARITY *to infuſe the knowledge of them into others, when ſuch a man would ſpeak, his words, like ſo many nimble and airy Servitors, trip about him at command, and in well-ordered files, as he would wiſh, fall aptly into their own places.*

* Milton.

He

He has not yet done with the CHRISTIAN CLERGY. What remained behind was to collect together his ſcattered abuſe; and to pour it all at once on that venerable Body, with an unfeeling hand, and unrelenting heart.

"Nothing more (ſays he) will be wanting to anſwer all the "ends of *artificial Theology*, than to aſſume that they who miniſter "in holy things are the *Omrahs*, the *Vizirs*, and the *Baſſas* of THIS "MIGHTY KING, whoſe commands they publiſh, interpret, and "execute, or cauſe to be executed, rather than his EMBASSADORS: "by aſſuming which latter characters, they ſeem to leſſen, over "modeſtly, the dignity of their own order, and to raiſe that of the "Laity too high: BUT I AM ASHAMED TO HAVE SAID SO MUCH "ON THIS SUBJECT *."

He may pretend what he pleaſes. But whoever it was that brought him to *ſhame*, it certainly was not the Clergy. They are ready to aſſure him, in the words of the Poet,

"Let SHAME come when it will, we do not call it."

Beſides, after what has paſſed, I ſee nothing he has to be *aſhamed* of; unleſs it be for ſtealing the paultry joke of *Embaſſadors* and *Plenipotentiaries* † from Lord Shaftſbury:

"Far be it from me (purſues this Right Honourable Perſon) and "from every lover of Truth and common ſenſe, to wiſh that the "race of Metaphyſicians and Caſuiſts ſhould increaſe, or ſo much "as continue. But ſince there are, have been, and will be ſuch "men in all ages, it is very reaſonable to wiſh that they may ſerve "to the ſame good purpoſe that the HELOTES, the DRUNKEN SLAVES "did at Sparta; and that their DELIRIUM, inſtead of impoſing on "others, and even infecting many, may be at length LAUGHED "OUT of the world ‡." What pity is it his Lordſhip himſelf had not tried this expedient (whoſe efficacy, other Lords of better

* Vol. v. p. 540, 541.

† See p. 592, of this Letter.

‡ Vol. v. p. 446.

temper,

temper, for kindly recommend and practice), and employed the pleasantry of his *wit* to laugh the Clergy out of the world, rather than the sublimity of his *eloquence* to scold them out of it! He may rail through all his figures, at *the impertinence of Logic, the futility of Metaphysics, the fraud of Disputation, and the blasphemy of Divinity* *: These are the arms of impotent hysterical Women when they want to have their will. After the long labours of a HOOKER, a STILLINGFLEET, a CUDWORTH, a SPENCER, a TILLOTSON, and a CLARKE, the English Clergy may answer his Lordship, in the words of *De Rosny*, as I think the story goes, to some old Ladies of the *Guisian League*; who, when HENRY IV. had got possession of Paris, were one day very eloquent in their invectives against him: "Good ancient Gentlewomen," said this rough old Soldier, "spare your breath, and set your hearts at rest, for OUR MASTER is not a man to be scratched and scolded out of his KINGDOM."—But when, between his malice and his magic, he had transformed the CLERGY into *drunken slaves*; you must not think he would neglect so good an occasion of exposing them to his NOBLE SPARTANS. Indeed the Entertainment is at hand: and no cost is spared of lavish expression to set out these drunken revels. "The Choirs of birds (says he) who whistle and sing, or scream "at one another, or herds of beasts who bleat and low, or chatter "and roar, at one another, have just as much meaning and com-"municate it as well—Such is the common conversation—Such, "too, for the most part, are all the public discourses that are held, "and the SOLEMN HARANGUES OF THE PULPIT †."

After so large a gleaning from his Lordship's abundance, you will dispense with me from gathering up his looser flowers of speech; such as, *absurdity, effronderie, knavery, folly, nonsense, delirium, frenzy, lunacy, downright madness, impiety, prophaneness, blasphemy*, and *atheism:* which, like seed pearl, are every where scattered over the embroidery of his eloquence.

* Vol iv. p. 353.

† Vol. iii. p. 422, 423.

Though

Though our indignation at this torrent of ribaldry makes us prompt enough to aſk,

—— " An quæ
" Turpia cerdoni, Voleſos Brutumque decebunt ?"

yet I am ready, in charity to ſuſpect, that his Lordſhip may be abuſed. Who knows, but juſt as his Lordſhip gave BOWNCE (his friend's dog) the ſentiments of his Maſter *, ſo his Lordſhip's Secretary, attending to two at once, his Lord and his Lord's PARROT, might unaware put down to the great man, what indeed belonged to the Favorite: who, however *eloquent* he might be, yet, we are told, was *no Philoſopher*.

" The Coxcomb bird, ſo talkative and grave,
" That from his cage cries *cuckold, whore*, and *knave*,
" Though many a paſſanger he rightly call,
" We hold him NO PHILOSOPHER at all."

And I the rather ſuppoſe the Secretary to be here in fault, ſince his Lordſhip, in one place, ſeems to think, that ribaldry and ill language diſgrace the *animal implume, bipes*, the *two-legged, unfeathered Philoſopher*. For, ſpeaking of SPINOZA and HOBBES, he ſays, *Let it not be ſaid, they are men of* DEPRAVED UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DEPRAVED MORALS; THIS IS TO RAIL, NOT TO ARGUE. To *rail*, then, when we ſhould *argue*, is, in his Lordſhip's opinion, unbecoming a Philoſopher, unleſs you will ſuppoſe, that theſe two

* *The world* (ſays his Lordſhip to Pope) *is as well fitted for* BOWNCE *as for* YOU, *with reſpect to phyſical nature*; *and with reſpect to* MORAL *nature*, BOWNCE *has little to do beyond hearkening to the* STILL WHISPERS, *the* SECRET SUGGESTIONS, *and the* SUDDEN INFLUENCES *of inſtinct*. Vol. v. p. 467. This, the Reader ſees, is intended for a compliment on the following ſtanza of his Friend's *Univerſal Prayer*:

" Where I am right, THY GRACE IMPART,
" Still in the right to ſtay;
" Where I am wrong, O TEACH MY HEART
" To find that better way."

Atheiſts

Atheiſts were eſpecially favoured, for not being found in bad company, or taken in the fact, wickedly CONFEDERATING with *Divines* and *Metaphyſicians*.

Seriouſly, as good men may be ſcandalized to find their beſt and ableſt Paſtors accuſed of *blaſphemy* and *prophaneneſs*, it will be right to tell the plain truth: which is no more than this, that his Lordſhip is apt to annex *new ideas* to *old words*; and not very careful to give us notice of his handy-work. So, in the caſe before us, Who would ſuſpect, that teaching a *law of right reaſon, common to God and man*, and inforcing *man's obligation to imitate God*, were BLASPHEMY *and* PROPHANENESS? Yet ſuch they are; or we muſt renounce the *firſt Philoſophy* *.

So then, as what has hitherto been *Piety* is become *Blaſphemy*, we need not wonder that his Lordſhip turns the garb of old threadbare blaſphemy, and gives it the new gloſs of piety.

But now comes a ſcene indeed. The two REVELATIONS and their two FOUNDERS are brought upon the ſtage. And here, his *piety* pretends ſo much to the impulſe of conſcience, that you would ſuſpect he thought himſelf, like St. PAUL, under the malediction of a woe if he *preached not his new Goſpel*.

Of MOSES, he ſays, "It is impoſſible to excuſe all the puerile, "romantic, and abſurd circumſtances in the author of the Book of "Geneſis, which nothing could produce but the habit of dealing in "trifling traditions, and a moſt profound ignorance. It is impoſſible "to read what he has writ on this ſubject without feeling contempt "for him as a Philoſopher, and horror as a Divine †."

"The PENTATEUCH has ſuch evident marks of falſehood, as can "be objected to no other writings except to profeſſed Romances, "nor even always to them ‡."

* DIVINES HAVE IMPUDENTLY AND WICKEDLY ASSUMED THAT THERE IS A LAW OF RIGHT REASON COMMON TO GOD AND MAN. Vol. v. p. 77.—And again, TO PREACH UP THE OBLIGATION OF IMITATING GOD IS FALSE AND PROFANE. Vol. v. p. 65.

† Vol. iii. p. 233.

‡ Vol. iii. p. 271.

" We may laugh at Don Quixote, for reading Romances till he " believed them to be true hiſtories, and for quoting Archbiſhop " Turpin with great ſolemnity; but when Divines ſpeak of the " PENTATEUCH as of an Authentic Hiſtory, and quote Moſes as " ſolemnly as he did Turpin, are they much leſs mad than he " was *?" *Don Quixote* is his Lordſhip's favorite ſimile; and comes as often over as the *Aſs* and *Lion* in Homer. But *mocking* (as the proverb ſays) *is catching*. Whoever attentively conſiders his Lordſhip's ESSAYS, will, I dare ſay, be of my mind, That the much reading *his maſter* LOCKE, who was deeply engaged with School-divines and Metaphyſicians, had the ſame effect on his Lordſhip's temper, in an advanced age, and under a bilious habit, that the reading books of Chivalry had on the prudent Gentleman of La Mancha. And, by his own confeſſion, *a man's head is ſoon turned by complex and abſtract ideas*. From henceforth the enchantments of *Schoolmen* and the gigantic Forms of *Metaphyſical Divines* got entire poſſeſſion of his underſtanding. Conſider what you can make of the following remark, without ſuppoſing with me, that theſe fancies had made very deep havoc in his brain. " *That* THEOLOGY, " ſays he, which pretends to deduce the duties of a man from ſpe- " culations concerning the *moral attributes of God*, is to be reckoned " in the claſs with NATURAL MAGIC †." Now, if you ſeek, I do not ſay for the *elegance*, but for the *common propriety* of this obſervation, any where out of his Lordſhip's hurt and wounded imagination, you will ſeek for it in vain. Yet, allow him but his *Theological Magicians*, and you ſee, their *Theology* could be nothing elſe than *natural Magic*.

So again—*Clarke ſhall not force me into Atheiſm*; *no nor Wollaſton neither*. What is this, but *Don Quixote*, up and down? dreadfully afraid that theſe Necromancers would, at laſt, force him into their ENCHANTED CASTLE of a *future ſtate*; for ſo he calls it in a letter

* Vol. iii. p. 280. † Vol. iv. p. 621.

to

to Lord Bathurſt *, where he threatens to demoliſh it, as built upon unholy ground, by *Divines and Atheiſts in confederacy*.

No doubt, every Reader muſt have obſerved this unaccountable rage and horror whenever a DIVINE comes croſs his Lordſhip's fancy. One would think, they had ſerved him the ſame trick the Enchanters plaid Don Quixote; that they had run away with his *Library*, and walled up his *Study-door*. Moſt true it is, that not long before this immenſe Treaſure of the *firſt Philoſophy* was given to the world, certain of theſe wicked Magicians had turned it all into *fairie-favours:* And the Public, on its firſt appearance, found nothing in it better proved than the truth of the old Adage, *Pro Theſauro, Carbones*. And indeed, if I was not perfectly ſatisfied that no man in his ſenſes could miſtake the value of this *new Money*, I ſhould make a ſcruple of laying ſo much of it before him; eſpecially the following pieces, which have an uncommon glow, as if they came hot from the place where they were minted.

" THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MOSES, like the whole " ſyſtem of his conduct, WAS FOUNDED ON MURDER †."

" The *Jews* blended together, at once, in the moral character " of God, injuſtice, cruelty, and partiality.—They made him an " object of terror more than of awe and reverence; and their Reli- " gion was a Syſtem of the RANKEST SUPERSTITION ‡."

" The JEWS with more inconſiſtency, and not leſs profanation, " than the Pagans, dreſſed up the one ſupreme Being in all the " rags of humanity; which compoſed a kind of motley Character, " ſuch as fooliſh Superſtition and mad Enthuſiaſm alone could " aſcribe to him, and ſuch as no man, who believes him an all-per- " fect being, can hear without horror §."

* " To diſcover error in axioms, ſays he, or in firſt principles grounded on facts, is " like breaking of a charm. The ENCHANTED CASTLE, the ſteepy rock, and the *burn-* " *ing lake* diſappear." *On retirement and ſtudy*, Vol. II. p. 525.

† Vol. v. p. 183. ‡ Vol. v. p. 531.

§ Vol. v. p. 529.

" The Jews give ſuch notions of the ſupreme Being as no People " on earth, but this, would have aſcribed, I do not ſay to God, " but to the worſt of thoſe monſters, who are ſuffered or ſent by " God, for a ſhort time, to puniſh the iniquity of men *."

From MOSES and JUDAISM, his Lordſhip deſcends to PAUL and CHRISTIANITY. Let us ſee whether he gives Them better quarter.

" CHRISTIANITY abrogated the *Law*, and confirmed the *hiſtory* " *of Moſes*; from the times, at leaſt, when St. PAUL undertook, " like a true cabaliſtical Architect, with the help of type and figure, " to raiſe a new Syſtem of religion on the old foundations †." " The Goſpel of CHRIST is one thing; the Goſpel of St. PAUL " another ‡." " He preached a Goſpel in contradiction to CHRIST's, " and directly repugnant to it §."

On this account, I ſuppoſe, it was, that he dignifies PAUL, with the elegant appellation of the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF. But the immediate occaſion of giving him this new title of honour, was particularly happy. His Lordſhip was on a favorite topic; he was abuſing the firſt Meſſengers of the Goſpel, for their claim to maintenance. He was conſcious, PAUL came not within his cenſure. So that, leſt this ſhould give the Apoſtle too much credit; he informs the reader, in his polite way ||, that he had a *trade*, and could ſhift for himſelf. For it ſeems, nothing but downright ſtarving will acquit the Apoſtles of theft and extortion, at his Lordſhip's Tribunal.

" JESUS (in his opinion) had no intention of ſpreading his Re- " ligion further than amongſt the *Jews*; but PAUL, bred at the " feet of Gamaliel, ſaw further than that poor ignorant fiſherman " Peter."—The ſenſe requires you ſhould read, *that poor ignorant Carpenter Jeſus*: and ſo without doubt his Lordſhip deſigned his compliment. Well, but what did PAUL ſee further? It was this,

* Vol. v. p. 515. † Vol. iii. p. 288. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 313.
§ Vol. iv. p. 326, 327. || Vol. iv. p. 423.

" That

" That the contempt and averſion in which both the nation and " the Religion of the Jews were held by the reſt of mankind, would " make it much more eaſy to convert the Gentiles at once to Chriſ- " tianity, than to make them Jews firſt, in order to make them " Chriſtians afterwards *."

For it ſeems—" To DISSEMBLE was a fundamental principle of " apoſtolical conduct. PAUL practiſed it. We have his own word " for this; and he boaſts of it †." His Lordſhip lets us know, that *Paul* had aſſurance enough to do any thing. For ſpeaking of the Apoſtle's famous argument *ad modeſtiam*—*Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliеſt againſt God* ‡*? &c.* He ſays, " There is " ſomething ſo IMPUDENT, as well as abſurd in this proceeding, " that, common as it is, one can ſee no example of it without ſur- " priſe §."

" CAN he be leſs than mad, ſays his Lordſhip, who boaſts a " revelation ſuper-added to reaſon, to ſupply the defects of it, and " who ſuper-adds reaſon to revelation to ſupply the defects of this " too, at the ſame time? This is madneſs, or there is no ſuch " thing incident to our nature. And into this kind of madneſs, " ST. PAUL, profound in cabaliſtical learning, hath fallen ‖." And yet, as mad as it is, all Governments have matched it, when they *ſuper-added* civil Laws, to natural conſcience or Religion, *to ſupply the defects of it*; *and ſuper-added* natural conſcience or Religion to Civil Laws, *to ſupply the defects of thoſe too, at the ſame time.* But more of this in its place.

" St. PAUL carried into the Apoſtleſhip a great deal of that AS- " SUMING AIR, which is apt to accompany much learning, *or the* " *opinion of it*—a great profuſion of words, and of involved, and " unconnected diſcourſe, even on thoſe ſubjects which required to " be moſt clearly and diſtinctly developed —He was a *looſe para-* " *phraſer, a Cabaliſtical Commentator*, as much, *at leaſt*, as any an-

* Vol. iv. p. 306. † Vol. iv. p. 307. ‡ Rom ix. 20.
§ Vol. iii. p. 307. ‖ Vol. iv. p. 172.

" cient or modern Rabbin *." " St. PAUL's ſyſtem of Religion, is " an *intricate and dark Syſtem, with, here and there, an intelligible* " *phraſe, that caſts no light on the reſt, but is rather loſt in the gloom* " *of the whole* †."—" Having ſaid ſo much of the *intelligibility of* " *Paul's Goſpel*, TRUTH authoriſes me to add, that where it is in- " telligible, it is often ABSURD, or PROPHANE, or TRIFLING ‡."— " PAUL taught *predeſtination* and UNLIMITED PASSIVE OBEDIENCE : " the one abſurd, the other both abſurd and IMPIOUS §."

Was it allowable to laugh, amidſt all theſe horrors, what mortal could forbear? *Unlimited paſſive obedience*, quoth he! The noble Lord had been ſo long accuſtomed to the cant of his Faction, which made St. Paul the preacher of I cannot tell what nonſenſe under that name, that he ſeems now in good earneſt to believe he was ſo. A juſt judgment on the Politician; to come at laſt to give credit to his own Flams. However, in this inſtance, at leaſt, one would hope St. Paul might have been ſpared, if it were only for old-acquaintance-ſake; and the hard ſervice they had put the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF upon. But it is bad truſting, we ſee, to the gratitude of Stateſmen. Happy for us, PAUL has yet an able Defender; who will never be wanting in what he owes to gratitude and honour. I only take the liberty to drop a hint. It is well known to thoſe who were in the ſecret of his Lordſhip's paſſions and his party, that *Clarke* and *Wollaſton* found the worſe treatment for being the favorite Philoſophers of Q. C. Who knows whether St. *Paul* fared the better for being patronized by his learned Friend?

" CHRISTIANITY (ſays his Lordſhip) became FANATICISM in " the FIRST profeſſors of it. Men corrupted it by ARTIFICIAL " THEOLOGY. And ſome will be apt to think, that the firſt of " theſe men was PAUL—Divines will be FURIOUS to hear SUCH " LANGUAGE ||." Alas! No. He gueſſed ill of the mood, in which his Works were to find them. They laugh at his vanity;

* Vol. iv. p. 326, 327. † Vol. iv. p. 328. ‡ Id. ib.
§ Vol. iv. p. 510. || Vol. v. p. 275.

and

and pity the *fury* that inſpired *ſuch language*. Indeed he gives them ample exerciſe for all their pity: for, having done with PAUL, he now directs the poiſon of his tongue againſt JESUS CHRIST himſelf.

" The truth is, CHRISTIANITY preſerved, in many reſpects, a " ſtrong tang of the ſpirit of Judaiſm. The Supreme Being took " a milder appearance; his favour was confined no longer to one " people. The MESSIAH came and redeemed fallen Man. CHRIS- " TIAN THEOLOGY diſcovers in this myſterious proceeding the " love of God to Man; his infinite juſtice and goodneſs. BUT " REASON will diſcover the fantaſtical, confuſed, and inconſiſtent " notions of Jewiſh Theology, latent in it; and applied to another " ſyſtem of Religion. *This love will appear partiality*; *this juſtice* " *will appear injuſtice*; *this goodneſs will appear cruelty*. On the " whole, the moral character imputed to the Supreme Being by " Chriſtian Theology differs little from that imputed to him by " the Jewiſh. The difference is rather apparent than real *."

" The ſcene of Chriſtianity has been ALWAYS a ſcene of diſſen- " tion, of hatred, of perſecution, and of BLOOD †."

Speaking of CHRIST's *Sermon on the Mount*, he ſays—" Some [of " the precepts] are directed to the *Jews* only, and ſome more im- " mediately to the Diſciples of Chriſt. The ſecond ſort ſeem fit " enough for a *religious Sect*; but are by no means practicable in " the general Society of Mankind. *Conſidered as general duties they* " *are impracticable, inconſiſtent with* NATURAL INSTINCT, *as well as* " LAW, *and* QUITE DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY ‡."

" The CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY has derived from the *Jewiſh*, a " prophane licence, which *makes men blaſpheme without knowing* " *they blaſpheme, and makes their very devotion impious* §."

" I would ſooner be reputed, nay I would ſooner be, a Pagan " than a Chriſtian, or an Atheiſt than a Theiſt, if to be one or the

* Vol. v. p. 532. † Vol. iv. p. 511. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 299, 300.
§ Vol. v. p. 519.

" other

" other it was neceſſary to believe ſuch ABSURDITIES as theſe; " which, however diſguiſed and ſoftened by a *certain cant of expreſ-* " *ſion*, are directly PROPHANE; and indirectly, or by conſequence at " leaſt, *blaſphemous* *."

" ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD cannot match the abſur- " dities that have been propagated by Chriſtians, whether heretics " or orthodox, concerning the *making and governing of the world by* " *the miniſtration of inferior Beings*: Beings not eternal, but pro- " duced in time by *emanation, or ſome other inconceivable manner of* " *generation* †."

" We cannot believe the SCRIPTURES to be God's *word*, though " we know the phyſical and moral Syſtem are his *Work*, while we " find in them ſuch repugnancies to the Nature of an all-perfect " Being; not myſteries, but abſurdities; not things incompre- " henſible, but things that imply manifeſtly contradiction with " his Nature ‡."

In a word, he tells us, that " THE RELIGION OF NATURE HAS " BEEN TURNED ALMOST INTO BLASPHEMY BY REVELATION §." " To believe (ſays he) that *Jeſus was the Meſſiah* is ſaid by ſome " [meaning his *Maſter Locke*] to be the *unum neceſſarium* of FAITH; " but TO OBSERVE THE LAW OF NATURE IS THE UNUM NECESSA- " RIUM OF DUTY ||."

But now having expoſed MOSES, CHRIST, and PAUL; having decried the falſhood of the TWO REVELATIONS, and ridiculed the abſurdity of ſacred SCRIPTURE; he ſhews us, in mere charity, after the example of the WISE ALPHONSUS, how either Syſtem might have been mended, had his Lordſhip been conſulted while, like the WISE ALPHONSUS, he believes juſt as much of God's *Word*, as the Other did of his *Works*.

Firſt, he hints, how the LAW might have been better planned. " God purchaſed the obedience of the *Jewiſh* People by a mercenary " bargain. It was ill kept on their part. And the Law, with all

* Vol. iv. p. 34. † Vol. iv. p. 72. ‡ Vol. iii. p. 306, 307.
§ Vol. iii. p. 498. || Vol. iv. p. 112.

" its

" its ſanctions, was continually violated; ſometimes rejected; and " had, in no degree, a force ſufficient to maintain itſelf in obſerva- " tion and reverence. Now, one of the moſt conceivable perfections " of a Law is, that it be made with ſuch a foreſight of all poſſible " accidents, and with ſuch proviſions for the due execution of it, in " all caſes, that the *Law* may be effectual to govern and direct " theſe accidents, inſtead of lying at the mercy of them.—Another " the moſt conceivable perfection of a *Law* conſiſts in the clearneſs " and preciſion of its terms.—Theſe will be found, no doubt, and " ought to be expected, when God is the Legiſlator *."

He next ſhews us, how he could have improved the GOSPEL, " had he been of God's privy-counſel. Had the doctrine of future " rewards and puniſhments been taught by CHRISTIANITY in terms " *more general and leſs deſcriptive*; had the puniſhments been re- " preſented, for inſtance, like the rewards, to be, ſimply, ſuch *as* " *eye never ſaw, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man could conceive*, " it might have been maintained in credit, and had an univerſal " and real influence perhaps, to the great advantage of religion †."

An inattentive reader may be ſurprized perhaps, at this wantonneſs of his Lordſhip's pen, That when he had given it as his fixed decree, that all which the world hath hitherto called *Religion*, is a public miſchief, and a *future ſtate*, an abſurd fable; he ſhould with great formality deliver in a plan which would have given *credit* and *real efficacy* to nonſenſe and impiety. But we muſt conſider, He had been ſo long playing the PHILOSOPHER, that he had reaſon to apprehend we might forget the other part of his ſublime Character, the LEGISLATOR. He therefore deemed it expedient to give us a ſlight caſt of his office, in rectifying the blunders of MOSES and JESUS CHRIST.

With regard to MOSES and his *Law*, I have ſo much to ſay to his Lordſhip, that I ſhall reſerve it for an after-reckoning. The other is but a ſmall matter, and may be ſettled here.

* Vol iii. p. 292, 293. † Vol. v. p. 542.

I ſuſpect then, our LEGISLATOR, in this remark concerning the manner in which JESUS revealed a *future ſtate*, did not ſufficiently attend either to the nature of the human mind, or to the genius of the Goſpel. He would have, we ſee, the account of *future puniſhments as general*, and *as little deſcriptive*, as that of *future rewards*. He ſeems to think the latter well managed, and with propriety: which yet he meaſures on the imaginary impropriety of the other: He appears to have no idea of any poſitive excellency it has in itſelf. I ſhall endeavour therefore to explain *why* this method of repreſenting *future rewards* was right: By which it will appear, that the other, of repreſenting *future puniſhments*, was by no means wrong.

To grow *particular* and *deſcriptive*, whether of future rewards, or future puniſhments, the Speaker muſt borrow his images from *material and corporeal* things; becauſe the Hearer has no faculties of ſenſation proper to comprehend ideas taken from things *Spiritual*. Now when a follower of Chriſt is ſo far advanced as to have his Faith work by *hope*, his ſentiments grow refined, his ideas purify, and he is riſing apace towards that perfection which the Goſpel encourages him to aſpire after. But while *fear of puniſhment* chiefly operates upon him, he is yet in the loweſt ſtate of probation; his imagination is groſs, and his appetites ſenſual. Is it not evident, then, that a *deſcriptive* Heaven of delights would be ill ſuited to that purity and elevation of mind, ſolely fixed by *hope*, on happineſs; and as evident, that a *general undefined* denunciation of Hell would not have force enough to make the neceſſary impreſſion on a ſenſual fancy agitated by *fear*? Let not his Lordſhip's admirers, therefore, be offended, if we believe that, in this point, the Author of our Salvation went at leaſt one ſtep beyond their Maſter, in *true Politics*.

At length, for a concluding ſtroke, his Lordſhip comes from vilifying BOTH RELIGIONS, and their FOUNDERS, to rail againſt the GOD of *both Religions*. And with this I ſhall cloſe the horrid Scene.

"IF WE BELIEVE IN MOSES, AND HIS GOD, WE CANNOT BELIEVE "IN THAT GOD WHOM OUR REASON SHEWS US *."

* Vol. iii. p. 307.

"CAN

" CAN ANY MAN PRESUME TO SAY THAT THE GOD OF MOSES, " OR THE GOD OF PAUL, IS THE TRUE GOD? The God of Moses " is partial, unjuſt, and cruel; delights in blood, commands aſſaſ- " ſinations, maſſacres, and even exterminations of people. The " God of PAUL elects ſome of his creatures to ſalvation, and pre- " deſtinates others to deſtruction, even in the womb of their mo- " thers. And, indeed, if there was not a Being INFINITELY MORE " PERFECT than theſe, there would be no God at all, nor any true " Religion in the world *."

Who, that hears this dreadful language, without knowing from what quarter it comes, but will ſtrait call to mind the words of the Satyriſt?

" Not Danté, dreaming all th' infernal State,
" Beheld ſuch ſcenes of envy, ſin, and hate."

But when we underſtand them to be the ejaculations of this Noble Philoſopher, the Confeſſor of Truth, the Advocate of Virtue, and the Reſtorer of baniſhed Nature; employed, as he himſelf tells us, or rather *ſet apart*, TO PLEAD THE CAUSE OF GOD HIMSELF AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY †; when we conſider, I ſay, all this, What are we to think, but that they are the pious breathings of an over-heated zeal: and though expreſſed in no conſecrated terms (indeed ſuch as had been much worn in the ſervice of the CRAFTSMAN) yet when new-ſet in his Lordſhip's immortal Panoply of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, they may now prove as uſeful, to advance the *fear of God*, as before, to promote the *honour of the King*.

It is in HATE as in LOVE; hard to diſtinguiſh the *divine* from the *carnal* ſpecies; or rather to ſeparate the different ebullitions of what is but one and the ſame ſpecies. Hence it is, that the melting ſtrains of the *Myſtic*, the *Methodiſt*, and the *Moravian*, ſo often ſmell of the STEWS; and hence, by parity of reaſon, the thunder of his Lordſhip's eloquence may naturally re-echo, as it were, from BILLINGSGATE.

* Vol. v. p. 567. † Vol. v. p. 305.

But these things make You serious: and You ask, "Who, that hath ever heard Lord Bolingbroke's Story, would have suspected, that his GOD and his COUNTRY lay so near his heart? And yet his *Political* and *Philosophic* Writings, say you, are full of *Lamentations*; where, like another Jeremy, he bewails the dishonours which wicked PRIESTS, and wicked POLITICIANS, have brought upon the Church and State: Nay, in his extreme fondness for these his favourite Objects, he suffers himself to be alarmed with something less than panic terrors. He is afraid the *Whigs* will bring in the *Pretender*; and apprehends, the *English Clergy* have made large steps towards *Atheism*."

I know what you drive at. You would insinuate, that those who have nothing to fear, and a great deal to hope from Religion, are not wont to give it up so easily. For HOPE encourages men to *search* into the grounds of what Religion promises; though FEAR often hinders them from giving proper attention to what it threatens. You are ready to say to his Lordship,

"Si VIRTUTIS eras avidus, RECTIque BONIque
"Tam sitiens, quid RELLIGIO tibi sancta nocebat?
"Aspera quippe nimis visa est? Asperrima certe
"GAUDENTI VITIIS, sed non virtutis amanti." *Card. Polig.*

You are for applying to his right honourable Person, the old trite aphorism, *That wicked principles spring out of a wicked life.* But what says another noble Peer to this? "Fain would the Bigot, in "consequence of his *moral maxims*, and *political establishments*, con-"found *licentiousness in morals* with *liberty of thought*, and make the "*libertine*, who has the LEAST MASTERY OF HIMSELF, resemble "his direct opposite *."

It may be so, you will say. But Lord Bolingbroke, sure, could never object to the imputation which *bad morals* cast upon a *Teacher of Truth*: He, who sees it so clearly, and presses it so charitably, upon the whole body of the *Christian Clergy*. "How" (says his

* *Characteristics*, Vol. iii. Misc. 5. Chap. 3.

Lord-

Lordſhip) " can the CLERGY of your Church, or of ours, pretend " that they contribute now, or EVER DID CONTRIBUTE, to the re- " formation of mankind? No age can be pointed out, wherein " ALL THE VICES, that Tully imputes to moſt of the Heathen Phi- " loſophers, did not prevail AMONGST MOST of the Chriſtian Di- " vines with great circumſtances of aggravation. They have not " only ALL THE VICES incident to human nature in common with " other men, but they have had the peculiar Vices of their Order. " I WILL SAY BOLDLY, they are, in general, much fitter to hinder, " by their EXAMPLE, than to promote by their DOCTRINE, the " Advancement of Religion, natural or revealed."

We have, it is true, been favoured with very ample accounts of the immoral conduct both of antient Philoſophers and Modern Churchmen; and theſe, even by ſome of the more charitable of their own reſpective Bodies. FREE-THINKERS have been baſhful, and more on the reſerve: nay, they might have been thought Saints, for any thing their modeſty would have ſuffered, had it not been for the *Confeſſions* of one of them, the famous CARDAN; who, like another St. *Auſtin*, ſeems ſworn to leave nothing behind him in the inkhorn. The account he gives of himſelf deſerves tranſcribing.—" In- " diem viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, illatæ inju- " riæ memorem, invidum, triſtem, inſidiatorem, proditorem, ſuo- " rum oſorem, turpi libidini deditum, ſolitarium, inamœnum, " auſterum, obſcœnum, laſcivum, maledicum, varium, ancipitem, " impurum, calumniatorem *, &c." This was fair dealing: and he, who was ſo *free* with himſelf, might be excuſed if he ſpared nobody elſe. But men do not uſe to be wanton on ſo nice a ſubject; and *Freethinkers* have generally *more* MASTERY OF THEMSELVES, ſays the noble Author of the *Characteriſtics*: Whenever therefore we ſee it done, we muſt conclude it to be done for ſome good purpoſe; ſuch as, emulation of the Chriſtian Confeſſors; who, to diſplay the powers of *Grace*, did not ſcruple to tell the world, with great ſimplicity, what they were by *Nature*: And thus Cardan, to ſhew us

* *De vita ſua.*

that

that the FIRST PHILOSOPHY is as efficacious in all great changes, has fairly told us how well befriended he had been by his *Stars*. However, let his deſign, in preſenting us with this picture of his amiable turn of mind, be what it would, we are much beholden to him for ſetting the Example. Though, like all other good Examples, it may poſſibly end where it ſet out; and the *firſt Philoſophy* wait with patience for ſome leſs incommodious way of recommending itſelf. And indeed, while Infidelity, which is the *cure*, is unjuſtly ſuppoſed the *cauſe* of theſe Peccadillos, we need not wonder our Philoſophers ſhould ſoon think themſelves at liberty, and be as ſoon diſpoſed, to turn their view from their own morals to thoſe of the Clergy: and affirm *boldly*, with his Lordſhip, that *the order in general is much fitter to hinder by their* EXAMPLE, *than to promote by their* DOCTRINE, *the advancement of Religion.*

What ſhall we ſay then? May it not be better to leave the *Examples* of both to ſhift for themſelves; and to conſider only their *Doctrines?* I think it would; and will therefore proceed from his Lordſhip's TEMPER, to his PRINCIPLES. But this muſt be the ſubject of another Letter.—I am, *&c.*

LETTER

LETTER II.

IT has been obſerved, that uncommon bleſſings, whether civil or religious, ſeldom happen till hope grows deſperate, and long expectation has wearied out itſelf in vain. Then it is the criſis approaches, the ſuperiour Genius beſtirs himſelf, and the *admiring* world is taken in by ſurpriſe.

——Quod optanti Divûm, promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en! attulit ultro.

Never was this obſervation ſo well verified: for never was mankind in ſo deplorable a way as when his Lordſhip arrived from—what other Syſtem is not yet diſcovered; though his tuneful Friend was very poſitive he belonged not to this: Inſomuch, that when the laſt Comet appeared, and came pretty near the Earth, he uſed to tell his acquaintance, he ſhould not be ſurprized if in the event it proved, that it was ſent only to convey his Lordſhip home again; juſt as a Stage-coach ſtops at your door to take up a Paſſenger. Be this as it will: Bad indeed was our condition when Lord BOLINGBROKE arrived,—what ſhall I ſay, *to be a light to thoſe who ſat in darkneſs?* No, this is the work of meaner miſſionaries; but, to RESTORE MANKIND TO THEIR SENSES.

For his Lordſhip, in his account of the general DELIRIUM which had ſeized the *Clergy*, had given us but a *ſpecimen* of our condition:

tion: the MADNESS was UNIVERSAL. Inſomuch, that (as he well expreſſes it) ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD * were not ſufficient for theſe things. And indeed how ſhould they! For, to confeſs the truth, theſe viſions of what he calls an *over-heated imagination*, ſuch as, belief in the *moral Attributes of God, the immortality of the Soul, a particular Providence, and a future ſtate*, had infected all times and places.

"ALL EUROPE (ſays his Lordſhip) GREW DELIRIOUS †. Chriſtianity was left to ſhift for itſelf in the midſt of a FRANTIC WORLD ‡. And again, "OUR WORLD ſeems to be, in many re-"ſpects, THE BEDLAM OF EVERY OTHER SYSTEM OF INTELLI-"GENT CREATURES: and, with this unlucky circumſtance, that "they who are *moſt mad* govern, in things of the greateſt moment, "them who are *leaſt ſo* §." By what is here dropt in the concluding words you underſtand, why his Lordſhip choſe to make the *Clergy* lead up the *Brawls* in this mad dance: and the *Leather-dreſſing Pontiff* himſelf to preſide as Maſter of the Revels.

But to find all Mankind mad, is perhaps more than you expected. What then? Is the madneſs leſs real for being univerſal?—I think not: but ſurely, more deſperate. Tell us, therefore, what ſtrange diſaſter occaſioned this general inſanity. Was it ſome evil diſpoſition of the Stars?—So, indeed, it is reported ||. The WORLD, it ſeems, like the men of *Abdera* **, had ſeen a Tragedy in a very hot day: which left ſo ſtrong an impreſſion on their fancies, that they all thought themſelves concerned in the ſubject. Some ran about from Country to Country, to tell their ſtory; and the reſt have been ever ſince rehearſing and celebrating thoſe affecting Scenes, at home! till LORD BOLINGBROKE, like another HIPPOCRATES, came to their relief: and, having firſt well phyſicked them of their

* Vol. iv. p. 72.
† Vol. iv. p. 377.
‡ Vol. iv. p. 353.
§ Vol. iv. p. 316.
|| Vid. D. N. J. C. geneſeos thema, inter Cardani opera.
** See Lucian. de conſcr. Hiſt.

Faith

Faith and their Fancies, brought them to themſelves, by applying to their hurt imaginations, the ſovereign Reſtorative of his FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Of which, I am now, as I promiſed, to give you ſome account.

But to ſee this extraordinary Man in a juſt light, it will be proper to ſhew what *Man* was before him. A RELIGIOUS ANIMAL he is allowed to be, on all hands: And, till the coming of this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, *Religion* was underſtood to riſe on that wide baſis, on which the *fanatical Knave*, PAUL, had the art to place it; that "He who cometh to God muſt believe that he IS: and "that he is a REWARDER of them who diligently ſeek him *." For, men who ſuppoſed the infinite *goodneſs and juſtice* of God to be as demonſtrable as his infinite *power and wiſdom*, could not but conclude from his *moral attributes*, that he REWARDED; as well as from his *natural attributes*, that he CREATED.

On the more complex notion, therefore, of a MORAL GOVERNOR, all mankind ſuppoſed RELIGION to ariſe; while NATURALISM, the Ape of Religion, was ſeen to ſpring from the ſimpler notion of a PHYSICAL PRESERVER: which, however, they were ready to diſtinguiſh, on the other hand, from the *Unnaturaliſm* (if one may ſo call it) of *ranker Atheiſm*.

RELIGION, therefore, ſtands, and muſt, I think, for ever ſtand, on thoſe two immoveable Principles of PRESERVER and REWARDER, in conjunction.

The *length* or *ſhortneſs* of human exiſtence was not primarily in the idea of Religion, not even in the complete idea of it, as delivered in ST. PAUL's general definition. "The Religioniſt," ſays he, "muſt believe that God *is*, and that he *rewards*."

But when it came to be ſeen, that he was not always a *Rewarder* here, men concluded this life not to be the whole of their exiſtence. And thus a FUTURE STATE was brought into Religion; and from thenceforth became a neceſſary part of it.

* Heb. xi. 6.

To explain my meaning, if ſo clear a thing needs further explanation. GOD, under the *phyſical* idea of *Preſerver* and Creator, appears uniform, regular, and inſtant to his *Creatures:* Under the *moral* idea of *Rewarder* and Governor, he ſeems frequently to be withdrawn from his *Servants*. For though, in the moral diſpenſations of things here, good and evil be often proportioned to deſert; yet often, too, they are otherwiſe adjuſted. The Antient Religioniſt, therefore, confiding in his Demonſtration of the *moral* as well as the *natural* attributes of the Deity, concluded, That the *preſent* was not the only ſtate odained for man; but that in ſome other life theſe irregularities would be ſet right. Hence a FUTURE STATE became in all ages and countries (except one, where the moral adminiſtration of providence was different) inſeparable from, and eſſential to, the various Religions of mankind. Even the mere Vulgar, who did not reach the force of this Demonſtration, yet ſeeing the marks of moral Government, amidſt the frequent interruptions of it, embraced the doctrine of a *future State* as confidently as the Learned. For plain Nature had inſtructed them to reaſon thus,—If all were *regular*, nothing needed to be ſet right: and if all were *irregular*, there was no One to ſet them right.

Such was the ANTIENT RELIGION OF NATURE: To which, modern Divines have generally agreed to give the name of THEISM, when profeſſed by thoſe who never heard of *Revelation*; and the name of DEISM, when profeſſed by thoſe who would never give credit to it.

In this State our noble Philoſopher found the *religious World*; or, more properly, this was the language he heard re-echoed from one end of the Globe to the other; But it was a language, he tells us, he did not underſtand. It was to his ears, *like the choirs of birds, who whiſtle and ſing, or ſcream, at one another: or the herds of beaſts, who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another.* He rejects it, therefore, in the lump, as the inarticulate din of ENTHUSIASM and ABSURDITY; the brutal iſſue of *pride* and *ignorance*; and

and ſo, but with much greater of his own, erects the FIRST PHILOSOPHY on its ruins.

1. He permits us to believe, that an intelligent Cauſe made the world; and, by his *phyſical* and *general* Laws ſtill governs it; but not by *moral* or *particular*.

2. He bids us to underſtand, that this World was no more made for man than for every animal beſides: nor man made for any other World, nor conſequently (as Divines have dreamt) for happineſs.

3. That, by the *arbitrary conſtitution* of things in the human ſyſtem (which may have a contrary diſpoſition in other ſyſtems) Virtue promotes happineſs, and Vice brings on miſery.

4. That THIS CONSTITUTION, together with the coactivity of CIVIL LAWS, contain all the rewards and puniſhments attendant on Virtue and on Vice.

5. That prayer, ſupplication, and every other office of Religion in uſe amongſt men, to implore good, and to deprecate evil, are fooliſh and fanatical: for that all religious duty is comprized in *ſubmiſſion to the eſtabliſhed order of things*.

He ſums up his whole Syſtem in theſe words. "A ſelf-exiſtent Being the firſt cauſe of all things, infinitely POWERFUL and "infinitely WISE, is the God of natural Theology. And the whole "ſyſtem of natural Religion reſts on it, and requires NO BROADER "FOUNDATION *." That is, it is enough for *him who cometh* to this new Religion, *to believe that God* IS; and not that he is a REWARDER *of them who ſeek him*. And again, "When men have "proved the exiſtence of an all-perfect Being, the Creator and "Governor of the Univerſe, and demonſtrated his infinite POWER "and WISDOM, from his works, when they have done this, THEY "HAVE DONE ALL; *this includes the whole of natural Theology, and "ſerves abundantly to all the ends of natural Religion* †."

* Vol. v. p. 316. † P. 453.

What theſe *ends of natural Religion* are he tells us very plainly. They are, to fit us for *our ſtation here, and to ſupply our real wants in it* —" In like manner [that is, as he expreſſes it, *for the neceſſary uſes of human life and no more*] " the knowledge of the Creator is on " many accounts neceſſary to ſuch a creature as man: and there- " fore we are able to arrive, by a proper exerciſe of our mental fa- " culties, from the knowledge of God's works, to a knowledge of " his EXISTENCE, and of that infinite POWER and WISDOM which " are demonſtrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING " GOD GOES NO FURTHER *."

Now though we ſhould be ſo complaiſant to theſe *Principles* as not to call them ATHEISTIC, yet I am afraid the Profeſſor of them, whoever he be, muſt be content with no better a name. For though the *Principles* may be called NATURALISM, yet if *Scripture* has defined an ATHEIST right, to be one who HAS NO HOPE, and is WITHOUT GOD IN THE WORLD†, our Profeſſor of Naturaliſm comes within the deſcription. For though he acknowledges the being of a God, yet as he is *without a God in the world*, that is, a Being who preſides over it, as the moral Governor of it, which is the foundation on which all Religion ſtands, Religioniſts will think of no other title for him. And ſurely he will be properly defined. For though the abſtract term *Atheiſm* carries, as its principal idea, a relation to God's BEING: yet, *Atheiſt*, in the concrete, ſeems to have its chief relation to God's GOVERNMENT. This is not obſerved for any kind of conſequence it is to Religion, in what claſs the Public ſhall be pleaſed to rank his Lordſhip: but merely to ſet in a true light the honourable Perſon's ingenuity, in aſſuming the character of an *Advocate for Religion*, at the very time he is labouring to root it out of human Society.

Old NATURALISM, thus traveſtied in the garb of new *Religion*, his Lordſhip beſtows, as his laſt and moſt precious Legacy, on his own dear Country: if you will believe him, the only *reformed Re-*

* Vol. iv. p. 86.

† Epheſ. ii. 12.

ligion

ligion that can be called *pure*, and the only *revealed Religion* that has the mark of *truth*. What the World hath hitherto called by thoſe names being, as he aſſures us, an evil in itſelf; and miſchievous to man in its eſſential conſtitution. And he proves it, as they ſay, in mood and figure.——"To keep up the ſenſe of it [*i. e.* of "*Religion*] in the minds of men, there ſeem to be but two ways. "To STRIKE THE SENSES frequently, by public and ſolemn acts "of religious worſhip; and to HEAT THE BRAIN by notions of an "inward operation of the Spirit, and of a ſort of myſtical devotion, "independent of outward forms, and even INCONSISTENT with "them. One of theſe leads to SUPERSTITION, the other to EN-"THUSIASM. Both are ſilly——Superſtition is folly: Enthuſiaſm "is madneſs. It is good to be on our guard againſt both *."

Without doubt. But how ſhall it be done! *Religion* is an evil in itſelf, and ſo admits of no qualification. It neceſſarily requires, as his Lordſhip tells us, on man's part, public acts of worſhip; and on God's, the private operation of the Spirit: But theſe *lead* to *ſuperſtition* and *enthuſiaſm*; that is, to *folly* and *madneſs*; to the depravation, nay to the deſtruction of our reaſonable Nature. This is not all: theſe *neceſſary means* are not only hurtful but impracticable. You could not uſe them, was you fooliſh or mad enough to venture on them; for they are, he ſays, INCONSISTENT, and deſtroy one another. What then is to be done? To *be upon our guard*; to keep *Religion* at arms length, till his Lordſhip brings up his reſerve of *Naturaliſm*, to our relief. Let this be our Shield of Braſs. Under this we may repoſe in peace, undiſturbed by any frightful dreams of Hell and the Devil.

This, Sir, is the Enchiridion of his Lordſhip's FIRST PHILOSOPHY. How ſimple, you will ſay, how cloſe, how round, how full, is this *new Diſpenſation?* A diſpenſation *of Religion* ſhall we call it? No matter. The times are ripe for it under any name. Yet I can hardly agree to thoſe fancies, I told you of, which had

* Vol. iv. p. 310, 311.

poſſeſſed

poſſeſſed his poetical Friend; who, miſled perhaps by that obſcure hint, that *our World was only the Bedlam of every other ſyſtem of intelligent Creatures* *, ſuppoſed, in good earneſt, his *Philoſopher and Guide* to be ſent down from ſome ſuperior orb, as Phyſician to the Hoſpital. Without queſtion he was made for the Age, and the Age for him. And they may well congratulate one another on their happy meeting. Yet, if we muſt be doctrinated by a Poet (and, now-a-days, Milton is much oftener quoted by Divines, than Hooker), I ſhould be rather diſpoſed to give credit to the man who told me, that he heard the evil Genius of Britain addreſs his Lordſhip, on his firſt ſetting out, in ſtrains like theſe,

" Be as a planetary plague, when Jove
" Will o'er ſome high-vic'd City hang his poiſon
" In the ſick air."——

But to return to his Syſtem. It riſes on theſe four principles.

Firſt, That we have no adequate ideas of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of God, his *goodneſs* and his *juſtice*, as we have of his NATURAL, to wit, his *power* and his *wiſdom*.

Secondly, That a FUTURE STATE is a Fable.

Thirdly, That the JEWISH and the CHRISTIAN *Revelations* are falſe. And

Fourthly, That REVELATION ITSELF is impoſſible.

Indulge me with a few remarks on his Lordſhip's management, under each of theſe heads.

1. Divines, in their proof of the *moral attributes*, having of late much inſiſted on the arguments *à priori*, as they are called, his Lordſhip ſuſpected, and what he ſuſpects of ill he always takes for granted, that theſe attributes could not be proved *à poſteriori*, or from *God's works*; the way by which, he owns, his *natural attributes* may be demonſtrated. So that having pronounced the arguments *à priori* to be *jargon*, *nonſenſe*, *impiety and blaſphemy*; the

* Vol. iv. p. 353.

moral

moral attributes of God are fairly eraſed at once out of the *intellectual ſyſtem*. And he had no farther trouble on this head than to decorate CLARKE, who was chiefly converſant in the reaſoning *à priori*, with variety of abuſive names. As to the reaſoning itſelf, our great Man's reſpect for that is ſo profound and ſo diſtant, that I defy any one, unacquainted with metaphyſical arguments, even to gueſs what kind of things they are for which the famous Miniſter of St. *James's* is ſo ſeverely handled. For while the *Divine* ſuffers, the *Reaſoner*, as we ſay, always eſcapes. Now indeed you ſee him ſeized upon, and ready, as you would think, to be cut up alive, and immolated to the *firſt Philoſophy*; when a *fit of railing* ſhakes his Lordſhip; and the Storm falls upon the whole Body of *modern Schoolmen:* And ſo the Doctor eſcapes for that time. He is again laid hold on, and every thing ready for execution; when a *fit of learning* comes upon his Lordſhip; and *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Socrates*, and the whole band of *ancient Metaphyſicians*, paſs in review, and each receives a laſh as he paſſes: And ſo the Doctor eſcapes for the ſecond time. After all theſe victories without blood-ſhed, his Lordſhip, as is fitting, takes his eaſe, intent only on his future Triumphs: in the mean time, amidſt ſuch ſelf-applauſe, his ESSAYS end, and the *ſubtile* Doctor remains unhurt.

But when need requires, I would have you know, that nothing can keep him from his Logic. Marry, then, on ſome great occaſion indeed, as when the *novelty* of the ſubject invites him, or the true ſtate of it is *little underſtood*, you ſhall have no reaſon to complain of brevity: then you ſhall ſee him employ one half of his Volumes to prove the corruptions of the CHURCH OF ROME, and near another half, to expoſe the jargon of the SCHOOLMEN.

2. We come to the ſecond point, the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE; which being ſupported by the great moral argument of "the unequal diſtribution of good and evil amongſt men," his Lordſhip is as large in confuting this, as he was ſparing in his anſwer to the metaphyſical proofs of the *moral attributes*.

He

He firſt endeavours to ſhew the argument to be founded on a miſtaken fact, and that there is no ſuch *unequal* diſtribution: He is almoſt tempted to tell you, that every thing is exactly regular and in order. But this is a paradox too unmanageable even for his Lordſhip. He therefore comes down ſomewhat lower; and appears to be tolerably contented, if you will but take his word that the inequality is not near ſo great as *pulpit-Declaimers* would make you believe: that the diſorders which follow the abuſe of man's free-will are not to be placed to the account of that diſpenſation, which our ignorance and preſumption make us fancy God is obliged to alter and reform. However, *equal* or *unequal*, his capital maxim clears up all. WHATSOEVER IS, IS RIGHT: and therefore the argument of theſe *confederated* Divines, which goes upon a ſuppoſed WRONG, is *abſurd and blaſphemous*. Whatever *anſwer* this reaſoning may deſerve, I believe no man who underſtands the world will expect that a well-bred man ſhould give it.

But I cannot omit, on this occaſion, to do juſtice to his poetical Friend; by ſhewing the difference between Mr. POPE's Philoſophy and his Lordſhip's. They both employ the maxim of *Whatever is, is right*. But to know, with what propriety and judgment, we muſt conſider againſt whom they write. Mr. Pope's *Eſſay on Man* it a *real* vindication of Providence againſt *Libertines* and *Atheiſts*; who quarrel with the preſent conſtitution of things, and deny a future State. To theſe he anſwers that *whatever is, is right:* and the reaſon he gives, is, that *we ſee only a part of the moral ſyſtem, and not the whole*; therefore theſe irregularities ſerving to great purpoſes, ſuch as the fuller manifeſtation of God's goodneſs and juſtice, they are *right*. Lord Bolingbroke's *Eſſays* are a *pretended* vindication of Providence againſt an *imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts*; who uſe a common principle, namely, the *inequalities in God's moral government here*, for different ends and purpoſes; the One to eſtabliſh a *future State*; the other to diſcredit the *Being of a God*. His Lordſhip, who oppoſes their different con-

concluſions, endeavours to overthrow their common principle, by his Friend's maxim, that *whatever is, is right*; not becauſe the preſent ſtate of our *moral* world (which is part only of a more general ſyſtem) is neceſſary for the greater perfection of the whole, but becauſe our *moral world* is an entire ſyſtem of itſelf. His Lordſhip *applies* the maxim no better than he underſtands it. Mr. Pope urges it againſt Atheiſts and Libertines, who ſay the conſtitution of things is *faulty*: ſo that the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is pertinent. His Lordſhip directs it againſt Divines, who ſay, indeed, that this conſtitution is *imperfect*, if conſidered ſeparately, becauſe it is a part only of a whole, but are as far as his Lordſhip from calling it *faulty*: therefore the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is impertinent. In a word, the Poet directs it againſt Atheiſts and Libertines, in ſupport of Religion properly ſo called; The Philoſopher, againſt Divines, in ſupport of Religion improperly ſo called, namely NATURALISM: and the ſucceſs is anſwerable. Mr. Pope's argument is manly, ſyſtematical, and convincing. Lord Bolingbroke's, confuſed, prevaricating, and inconſiſtent. Thus, his Lordſhip will have nothing irregular or amiſs in the *moral world*; for this is impiety, the very bond of that *confederacy* ſealed between Divines and Atheiſts. In vain you tell him of a *future ſtate*, to vindicate the providence of God; this is viſionary nonſenſe. But if you talk of *phyſical evil*, he has his anſwer ready, *This world is but one wheel of a vaſt machine.* You will aſk, then, why Pope's ſolution is not to be admitted, who ſays the ſame of *moral* evil which his Lordſhip does of *phyſical?* For a plain reaſon; his Lordſhip can allow our *phyſical* ſyſtem to be only a part, without any hazard of his *firſt Philoſophy.* But when once you allow as much to the *moral*, you are in danger of bringing in *Religion.*

But why, you will aſk again, would his Lordſhip thus run himſelf a-ground; ſometimes by diſcrediting his reaſoning with a ſilly paradox; ſometimes by betraying it with an unwilling confeſſion; and, at beſt, by only giving it the poor ſupport of a miſunderſtood

and misapplied maxim; when his great and noble principle of NO MORAL ATTRIBUTES dissolves the CONFEDERACY at once. For if we have no ideas of God's moral attributes, the issue of our reasoning on his ways will be the same as if he had none. And if he has none, they need not, sure, be vindicated: which is the sole purpose of his reasoning on the state of the moral world. All I can say to this is, that his Lordship appears to have been so harrassed with this phantom of a FUTURE STATE, that no Charm, no Security, was to be neglected that could contribute to his ease or protection. Hence it is he will depend on neither of his arguments, of—*no inequality* or—*but a little:* and therefore, to make all sure, casts about for a third of more acknowledged efficacy.

This he finds in the SOUL'S MATERIALITY. From whence, he contrives to persuade himself that it can be no *substance* (which he calls *pneumatical madness)* but a mere *quality* of body, produced by the configuration of its parts, and perishing with that disposition of them. I say, he contrives to persuade *himself*; and I mean no more. Had his point been to persuade his Reader, we must suppose he would have ventured, at least, to confute the arguments of CLARKE and BAXTER: who, on the principles of the Newtonian Philosophy, have demonstrated *that the soul is a substance*, distinct from the body, and different from matter. Instead of this, he flies to his usual consolation, ABUSE. He calls them *impious* and *blasphemers* for presuming to limit the Omnipotent: when the highest of their Presumption amounts but to this, the supposing *God can exert no power, which implies a contradiction*; since this imaginary power is indeed impotency. Nay, he would willingly persuade himself there was no such arguments in being. For, speaking of the reasoning, which induced men to conclude, the soul to be a substance distinct from the body, he represents it thus: "Men "taking it for granted that they knew all the perceivable proper- "ties of matter, they concluded that such things as could not be "accounted for by these, were to be accounted for by the proper- "ties

" ties of ſome other ſubſtance *." And again: " Vanity and pre-
" ſumption determine Philoſophers to conclude, that becauſe they
" cannot account for the phænomena of the mind by what they
" know very ſuperficially of ſolid extended ſubſtance, this mind
" muſt be ſome other ſubſtance †." Such, indeed, was the ſtate of the controverſy when LOCKE ſkimmed over the argument. But CLARKE and BAXTER went deeper. They draw their concluſion, not on the preſumption that they knew all the knowable qualities of matter, and that between theſe and *Thought* there was no perceivable connexion; but from this clear and ſolid truth, that from the little we do know of body, we ſee a contradiction in ſuppoſing *intelligence* to be a quality of matter. For thus they reaſoned, though we know not all the powers of matter, yet we know certainly it cannot have *inconſiſtent* and *contradictory* powers. It is allowed to have eſſentially a *vis inertiæ*, or that it *reſiſts a change of its ſtate*; it is impoſſible, therefore, that it ſhould, at the ſame time, have ſpontaneous motion, or *effect a change of its ſtate*. If this be the caſe (and to deny that it is the caſe, is confounding all the principles of human knowledge), then it is *impoſſible the ſoul ſhould be material*.—But his Lordſhip feaſts us with the ſame fine argument on the *motion of body*. " They are unable (ſays he) to
" conceive how body can act at all, and therefore they ſuppoſe the
" immediate preſence and action of an incorporeal agent in every
" operation of corporeal nature ‡." Whereas the truth is, they fully conceive from the *vis inertiæ* of *body*, or its reſiſtance to a change of its ſtate, the abſolute impoſſibility that it ſhould act at all: and from thence ſee the neceſſity of an *incorporeal agent in every operation of corporeal nature*. You will think, perhaps, his Lordſhip knew no more of this queſtion than as it ſtood in his *Maſter Locke*; and that he had never heard of *Baxter*, who has carried it fartheſt, and treated it the moſt profoundly. I ſhould have thought ſo too, but that I find his Lordſhip, in one place, ſpeaking with

* Vol. iii. p. 502. † Vol. iii. p. 508, 509. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 108.

that contempt of *Baxter's* reaſoning which is his wont, whenever any thing he cannot anſwer bears hard upon the *firſt Philoſophy*. It is where he honours us with his own thoughts concerning ATTRACTION. "Attraction (ſaith his Lordſhip) may be, notwithſtanding all the *ſilly abſtract reaſoning* to the contrary, a REAL PROPERTY OF MATTER*." Now you are to underſtand that *Baxter*, when he has evinced the truth of NEWTON's idea of *attraction* (who makes it no *real*, or eſſential, *property of matter*), employs this idea to prove, that it implies a *contradiction* to ſuppoſe, the ſoul may be a quality of matter. This great truth, deep reflection, and a thorough comprehenſion of the Newtonian Philoſophy, enabled *Baxter* to demonſtrate. On the other hand, no reflection, no Philoſophy, nothing but mere *intuition* made his Lordſhip conclude that it is ſo far from being a *contradiction*, that the *ſoul is a quality of matter*, that it is a ſelf-evident fact. But, you ſhall hear his own marvelous words: "I am perſuaded that God can make "material ſyſtems capable of thought, becauſe I muſt renounce one "of the kinds of knowledge that he has given me, and the firſt, "though not the principal in the order of knowing, or admit that "HE HATH DONE SO †." Locke only contended for a bare *poſſibility*: His Lordſhip ſees the *neceſſity*: ſo much wiſer is the Diſciple than his Maſter.

3. But let us now go on with his Lordſhip's ſyſtem. His third great principle is the FALSHOOD of the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* REVELATIONS. And here you will find no argument omitted that bears with the leaſt force againſt either of them. It is true, they are none of his own. They are borrowed from the *Minute Philoſophers* that went before him: of whom it muſt be owned his Lordſhip is a very cloſe and humble imitator.

His attack on revealed Religion is in two parts. The *firſt* is a confutation of its truth, as it lies in its purity, in ſacred Scripture: the *ſecond*, an inſinuation of its falſhood, as it is ſeen in its corrupt ſtate amongſt modern churches.

* Vol. iii. p. 547.

† Vol. iii. p. 531.

Judaiſm

Judaism is attacked more fully and avowedly in the first way: and *Christianity*, in the latter.

1. All the arguments against Revelation, as represented in the Bible, are taken from BLOUNT, TOLAND, COLLINS, CHUBB, MORGAN, and their fellows. I must except, indeed, the atrocious terms in which they are always inforced. For the iniquity of the times would not suffer those Confessors of truth *to put forth more than half their strength*, as his Lordship assures us *. When I observe, his reasoning here is taken from these men, it is not spoken in disparagement of it: for, to say the truth, it is the best in all his *Essays*.

One thing, indeed, falls out unluckily. All his Lordship's great Originals, in common with the rest of Mankind, professed to believe the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity. And, on this principle, inforced their arguments against the truth of revealed Religion: indeed, what other principle is there that will afford any ground for an objection against it? It is doubted, whether a moral dispensation come from the Author to whom it is ascribed. The doubt arises from our knowledge of his moral character; between which and the dispensation there is a supposed discordancy: But take away the moral character, and the doubt ceases with it. Yet his Lordship professes to have no idea of these *moral attributes*. No matter. They were necessary to be taken into service here, for the sake of carrying on his schemes: and a Philosopher can drop his principle, as a Politician does his friend, when he is of no use, and renew his acquaintance again when he is. These discarded *Attributes* therefore are on this occasion taken into favour; soon indeed, to be dismissed again, and his OLD PRINCIPLE of *no morality* in the Godhead, reassumed, when he wants to guard against the terrors of a FUTURE STATE; in which, to do it justice, it performs true Knights-service. Much indeed is it to be lamented, that his *old principle* should ever grow capricious; and that when it had so effectually excluded God's moral Government, as recommended by

* Vol. iv. p. 163.

natural

natural Religion, it ſhould oppoſe itſelf to thoſe arguments which are for excluding God's moral government as recommended by *Revelation*. But after all, what if his Lordſhip played booty, and was for bringing in a *political Religion* by a ſide wind; juſt as Father Harduin eſtabliſhed *Church Tradition*. The Jeſuit, when he had deſtroyed all the monuments of antiquity, concluded we ſhould be glad to take refuge in an *infallible guide*: and the noble Politician could not but ſee that when he had taken away God's moral attributes, he had removed all grounds for doubting of the divine origin of the *Magiſtrate's Religion*, from *Amaſis* and *Mneves*, to *Thor* and *Odin*.

2. An hiſtorical deduction of the abuſes and corruptions of Chriſtianity in the CHURCH OF ROME, to advance ſuperſtition, fanaticiſm, and ſpiritual tyranny, makes the ſecond part of his Lordſhip's reaſoning againſt REVELATION; and the ſubject of the largeſt of his *four Eſſays*.

On this head he expatiates in all the forms of Piety, Patriotiſm, and Humanity. He bewails the diſhonours done to Religion; he reſents the violations of civil Liberty; and he vindicates the common ſenſe of mankind from the ſcholaſtic jargon of an ignorant, debauched, and avaricious Clergy.

" Felicia tempora, quæ te
" Moribus opponunt: habeat jam ROMA pudorem."

On ſo trite a topic, the triumph of every true Proteſtant from Fox to Mr. Chandler, that is, from the firſt to the laſt good writer upon the ſubject, his Lordſhip may be well excuſed for unloading his Common-place. Whatever there is of a better taſte, he has taken from Hooker, Stillingfleet, Barrow, and ſuch other of the Engliſh Clergy who have moſt ſucceſsfully detected the errors, and ſet bounds to the uſurpations of Popery. But as the object of our Divines in this detection was to recommend the Goſpel-truth; and of his Lordſhip, to diſcredit it; he had need of other helps: And theſe, too, were at hand; ſuch as Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, and Gordon;

Gordon; whom he faithfully copies, both in exaggerating the abuſes, and in drawing falſe conſequences from the reform of them. Thus, according to thoſe Divines who wrote *for truth*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY was modeſtly complained of as hindering the advancement of real knowledge; as keeping men buſied in trifling controverſies; and as making them often miſtake words for things. But with my Lord, and theſe his better guides, who wrote *againſt Revelation*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY is boldly accuſed to have blotted out all knowledge, and to have left nothing in its ſtead but *madneſs*, *frenzy*, and *delirium*. So again, The end of thoſe Divines in oppoſing Church-Tyranny was to introduce a RELIGIOUS SOCIETY on the principles of Goſpel-liberty: but the end of theſe Philoſophers in decrying Popery is to eſtabliſh a *civil*, in the place of a *religious* uſurpation, and to make the CHURCH A CREATURE OF THE STATE. In the mean time, he ſays *boldly* and well, "That ſome "men are IMPUDENT enough to *pretend*, others SILLY enough to "*believe*, that they adhere to the Goſpel, and maintain the cauſe "of God againſt infidels and heretics, when they do nothing better "nor more than expoſe the conceits of men *." But while he is thus buſy in obſerving what happens at one end of this common fallacy, where the *conceits of men* are miſtaken for the cauſe of God, he ſuffers himſelf to ſlip in, at the other: and does juſt the ſame *againſt* the Goſpel, which theſe *impudent* and *ſilly* men do *for* it. He expoſes the knavery of powerful Churchmen, and the folly of profound Divines; and then *pretends*, or *believes*, that he hath diſcredited Revelation itſelf.

However, to part friends with the DIVINES, after ſo many hard words, he teaches them how to prop up, in ſome *plauſible way*, their bungling ſyſtems of ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, juſt as he had before taught God Almighty himſelf to mend his *two Diſpenſations*. "Let us (ſays he) ſuppoſe a Theiſt objecting—the believer "might reply—he might add—he might add—and all this with "great *plauſibility* at leaſt †." You will ſay now, I envy my Lord

* Vol. iv. p. 385. † Vol. v. p. 279.

the

the glory of his inſtructions, ſo well calculated to defend *artificial theology*, or otherwiſe I, who am not ſparing of my quotations, would have given them at large. To tell you the truth, I ſuppreſſed them with deſign; and in order to excite the Reader's curioſity. I am told there is need of it; and that this *firſt Philoſophy*, this *phyſic of the ſoul*, is not ſwallowed with that eagerneſs which might be expected or hoped for, on the firſt appearance of ſo great a bleſſing. You will ſuſpect, by what you have obſerved in my former Letter, that the Public may poſſibly be over-doſed. But what if they be? It is only making it a little more palatable, and his Followers will ſoon reconcile them to their Phyſic.

4. His Lordſhip's fourth and laſt great Principle is the IMPOSSIBILITY of REVELATION in general.

He has refuſed no arms, we ſee, to combat the Revelations God hath *actually given*. He would ſeem to relax a little of his hoſtility, as to thoſe which God may *poſſibly give*: for in one place he ſays, *he will not abſolutely pronounce againſt the poſſibility of God's revealing his will to man*. But whether he equivocates, whether he altered his mind, or whether he ſimply forgot himſelf (a matter of little conſequence), moſt true it is, that he hath formally laid down, and largely inſiſted upon, certain Principles, which make revealed Religion a thing UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE.

Firſt, As to INSPIRATION, He not only denies all reality in the Thing, but will not allow ſo much as any meaning in the Word. And a MIRACLE, he holds amongſt matters impoſſible; what never did, nor ever can exiſt.—But now, Without the firſt, no divine Meſſenger could be ſent; for he muſt receive his Orders from God: and, without the ſecond, no divine Meſſenger would be believed: for he muſt have his Credentials to Man: and theſe credentials, on his Lordſhip's own principles, can be no other than *miracles*.

But here again you are to obſerve, that on this ſubject likewiſe, Infidelity is no more indebted to him than for his good will. All he urges againſt *Inſpiration* and *Miracles* having been firſt urged by HOBBES and SPINOZA: by the one, with more ſubtilty and exactneſs; by the other, with infinite more elegance.

Secondly,

Secondly, As to NATURAL RELIGION, His Lordſhip holds it to be full, perfect, and well underſtood. He holds, likewiſe, that the only conceivable purpoſe of *Revelation* muſt be to *republiſh* this *natural Religion*. The conſequence is, and this his Lordſhip gives us to underſtand, that the uſe of *Revelation* is ſuperſeded. For if it teaches *more* than natural Religion taught, or *different* from what it taught, the Revelation is evidently falſe; If only the *ſame*, it is evidently ſuperfluous.

Thirdly, As to a PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE, This, his Lordſhip utterly rejects. But *revealed* Religion is nothing elſe than the exerciſe of that very Providence, to ſome declared end and purpoſe in the moral Syſtem.

On all theſe accounts, he concludes, and conſequentially enough, that REASON HAS NOTHING FURTHER TO DO, WHEN REVELATION BEGINS *.

You have now, Sir, the whole of HIS LORDSHIP'S SYSTEM, together with his principal topics for the ſupport of it; both indeed very ſuccinctly delivered: enough however to ſhew you that theſe famous ESSAYS, which you have ſo often heard cried up as the very Mine and Treaſury of all divine and human truths, are indeed little other than a Magazine or Warehouſe of other men's lumber: or (not to diſhonour his Lordſhip by a low compariſon) like the mouth of your neighbouring SEVERN, turbulent and dirty: which, let fabling *Poets* ſay what they pleaſe, we are ſure never derived its ſource from the pure and perennial Urn of a *Demi-God*: but, if one may gueſs by the taſte and colour, became thus conſiderable from the confluence of ſhallow brooks and babbling rivulets, of ſtagnant ditches, common-ſewers, and yet ſtranger mixtures, ſcoured off and put into a ferment by the haſty rage of ſome peeviſh land-torrent.

* Vol. v. p. 274.

THE main pillar of his Syſtem, you ſee, is this extravagant paradox, *That we have* NO ADEQUATE *ideas of God's moral attributes, his* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE, *as we have of his natural, his Wiſdom and Power.* And here, let me obſerve once for all, that his Lordſhip uſes the words, *inadequate ideas*, and, *no ideas*, as terms of the ſame import. And, I think, not improperly. I have therefore followed him in the indifferent uſe of either expreſſion. For the reaſon of his calling our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, INADEQUATE, is, becauſe he denies that goodneſs and juſtice in God, and goodneſs and juſtice amongſt Men, are the ſame IN KIND. But if not the *ſame in kind*, we can have *no* idea of them; becauſe we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodneſs and juſtice.

As the reaſoning on this head, contrary to his uſual wont, is intirely his own, and extremely curious in itſelf, I will once more go a little out of my way to ſet it in a true light; that it may neither impoſe by its novelty; nor too much ſhock You and all good men by its unchecked atrocity.

His three Poſitions are,

1. That, by *metaphyſics*, or the reaſoning *à priori*, we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his *attributes* are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his *Works*, or by the reaſoning *à poſteriori*.

3. That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his *natural* attributes, not of his *moral*.

"IT is from the conſtitution of the world ALONE (ſays his Lord-"ſhip) and from the ſtate of mankind in it, that we can *acquire any* "*ideas* of the divine attributes, or a *right to affirm any thing about* "*them* *."

"The knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts neceſſary "to ſuch a creature as man: and therefore we are made able to "arrive by a proper exerciſe of our mental faculties, *from a know-*"*ledge of God's works to a knowledge of his exiſtence*, and of that

* Vol v. p. 331.

"infinite

" infinite POWER and WISDOM which are demonſtrated to us in them. " OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER *."

" Artificial Theology connects by very problematical reaſoning " *à priori*, MORAL *attributes*, ſuch as we conceive them, and ſuch " as they are relatively to us, with the *phyſical* attributes of God; " though there be no ſufficient foundation for this proceeding, nay, " though *the phænomena are in ſeveral caſes repugnant* †."

Having thus aſſured us that the ideas of God's *moral attributes* are to be got by no conſequential reaſoning at all, either *à priori* or *à poſteriori*, the only two ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath ſuch ideas, they were not found but invented by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the authors of the FICTION, and how ſtrangely the thing came about.

" Some of the Philoſophers (ſays his Lordſhip) having been led " by a more full and accurate contemplation of Nature to the " knowledge of a ſupreme ſelf-exiſtent Being of infinite *power and* " *wiſdom*, and the firſt Cauſe of all things, were not contented " with this degree of knowledge. They MADE A SYSTEM of God's " MORAL as well as *phyſical* attributes, BY WHICH TO ACCOUNT " FOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE ‡."

Theſe Philoſophers then, it ſeems, invented the ſyſtem of God's *moral attributes*, in order to account for the difficulties ariſing from the view of God's *moral government*. If the World till now had been ſo dull as to have no conception of theſe Attributes; his Lordſhip's Philoſophers, we ſee, made amends: who were ſo quick-witted to conceive, and ſo ſharp-ſighted to find out, the obliquities of a *crooked* line before they had got any idea of a *ſtraight* one. For juſt to this, neither more nor leſs, does his Lordſhip's obſervation amount, that—*they made a Syſtem of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence*. Till now, no

* Vol. iv. p. 86. † Vol. v. p. 316. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 48.

man could conceive how any doubts concerning *moral Government* could arise but on the previous ideas of the *moral attributes* of the *Governor*. This invention of his Lordship's old Philosophers puts us in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANCHA; who, as his historian tells us, was very inquisitive to discover the author of that very useful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magistrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the *First Philosophy*. Now the things sought after by Sancho and his Lordship were at no great distance: for if *Sleeping* began when men first shut their eyes, it is certain the *idea of God's Goodness* appeared as soon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the moral attributes *à priori*, I shall leave, as his Lordship is pleased to do, in all its force. If the Doctor's followers think their Master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a safe to shew their prowess. I rather chuse to undertake the noble Philosopher on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments *à posteriori*. For he is such a Champion for the good Cause, that he not only appoints his Adversaries the Field, but prescribes to them the use of their weapons.

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not easily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be seen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Aristotle's FIRST MATTER, *undressed, and without a rag of form*, however flaunting and fluttering in FRAGMENTS. To speak plainly, his Lordship's entire neglect of method betrays him into endless REPETITIONS: and in these, whether for want of precision in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his composition, the question is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new-covered by an equivocal expression. If you add to this, the perpetual CONTRADICTIONS into which he falls, either by defect of memory, excess of passion, or distress of argument, you will allow it to be no easy matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to represent him to the best advantage: in

none

none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the buſineſs is over; and his Lordſhip's reaſoning generally confutes itſelf.

When I reflect upon what this has coſt me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get poſſeſſion of a ſingle argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you loſe; which meets you full when you leaſt expect it; and ſlips away from you the very moment it promiſes to do moſt: when, I ſay, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the *Engliſh* CLERGY, who, though apparently leaſt fit, as being made Parties, certainly leaſt affected, as there is nothing that can impoſe on a Scholar, and a great deal that may miſlead the People, are likely to be the men moſt engaged with his Lordſhip in this controverſy. Time was, when if a Writer had a diſpoſition to ſeek objections againſt Religion, though he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digeſt his thoughts, and methodize his reaſoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to anſwer him, if they found themſelves able. But ſince this ſlovenly cuſtom (as Lord SHAFTSBURY calls it) has got amongſt our Free-thinkers, of *taking their Phyſic in public*, of throwing about their looſe and crude indigeſtions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not ſo much the *want*, as the *excluſion* of all *form*, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he muſt work them into conſiſtence, he muſt mould them into ſhape, before he can ſafely lay hold of them himſelf, or preſent them handſomely to the Public. But theſe Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman ſhould never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the ſaving the ſouls of thoſe committed to his care. He muſt now begin his work a great deal higher; he muſt firſt convince his flock that they have ſouls to be ſaved. And the ſpite of all is, that at the ſame time his kind Maſters have doubled his taſk, they appear very well diſpoſed to leſſen his wages.

WE

We have obſerved, that the DENIAL of God's *moral attributes* is the great barrier againſt Religion in general: but it is more eſpecially ſerviceable in his Lordſhip's idioſyncratic terrors; the terrors of a *future State*. To theſe we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, compoſed occaſionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each ſtronger than the other, to ſupport himſelf under his frequent paroxyſms. For, ſet the *moral attributes* aſide, and we can neither form any judgment of the *end* of man, nor of the nature of God's moral government. All our knowledge will be confined to our *preſent* ſtate and condition *. It is by theſe Attributes, we learn, that man was made for *happineſs*; and that God's diſpenſation to us *here* is but *part* of our moral ſyſtem: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, *Futurity*.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the queſtion of God's *moral attributes*, I hold it of much importance to prove againſt his Lordſhip, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the ſame way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's *natural attributes:* And the knowledge of *theſe*, his Lordſhip deduces from its original in the following words.

"All our knowledge of God (ſays he) is derived from his works. "Every part of the immenſe Univerſe, and the order and harmony "of the Whole, are not only conformable to our ideas or notions "of WISDOM and POWER, but theſe ideas and notions were im-"preſſed originally and principally by them, on every attentive "mind; and men were led to conclude, with the utmoſt certainty, "that a Being of infinite *wiſdom* and *power* made, preſerved, and "governed the ſyſtem. As far as we can diſcover, we diſcern theſe "in all his works; and where we cannot diſcern them, it is ma-"nifeſtly due to our imperfection, not to his. This now is real

* One of his Lordſhip's Corollaries therefore from the Propoſition of *no moral attributes*, is this, "Our Knowledge concerning God goes no further than for the neceſſary "uſe of human life." Vol. iv. p. 486.

"knowledge,

" knowledge, or there is no such thing as knowledge. We acquire " it immediately in the objects themselves, in God, and in Nature, " the work of God. We know what *wisdom* and *power* are: we " know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such " as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the Work: " and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the " Worker *."

All this is mighty well: and on these very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and precise ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone thus far, rather to *redress* all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the use of them; it will be proper to explain what true PHILOSOPHY means by GOD'S WORKS, whether *physical* or *moral*.

Now, it means, if I am not mistaken, that CONSTITUTION OF THINGS which God hath established, and directed to a plain and obvious end: no regard being had to those impediments or obstructions in its course, which the Author of nature hath permitted to arise from any part of the *material*, or *intellectual* Creation.

Thus, when we consider his *physical* works, in order to make our estimate of his *wisdom* and *power*, we conceive them as they are in themselves; and in the perfection of their constitution; though the greater portions of the *physical* system may, from the intractability of Matter, be subject to some *inconsiderable irregularities*; which, as the true PHILOSOPHER † observes, *will be apt to increase till this System wants a reformation*: and though the smaller Portions, such as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient formation and adaption of their parts, from the wonderful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the *wisdom* and *power* of the Workman.

* Vol. v. p. 524. † Newton.

Surely,

Surely, then, common ſenſe and all equitable meaſure require us to eſtimate God's *moral Works* upon the ſame ſtandard: to conſider what the *moral conſtitution is in itſelf:* and (when the queſtion is of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*) to keep that view diſtinct: and not ſuffer it to be diſturbed or broken by any interruptions occaſioned by the perverſe influence either of the paſſion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, here, Both concur to violate the Conſtitution: In the *natural* ſyſtem, man's *Free-will* has no place: in the *moral*, the abuſe of *Free-will* occaſions the greateſt of its diſorders.

In proſecuting this queſtion, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's *wiſdom* and *power*, we conſider the *natural ſyſtem* ſo far forth only as its order and harmony is ſupported by the *general Laws* of matter and motion: ſo, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, we ſhould regard the *moral ſyſtem* ſo far forth only as its order and harmony is ſupported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes *happineſs to virtue, and to vice, miſery.*

Thus much, and only thus much, is *God's work*, in either ſyſtem: and it is from *God's work* we are to demonſtrate his *Attributes.* The reſt, (where diſorders real or apparent obtrude themſelves to obſtruct our views in theſe diſcoveries) proceeds from *Matter* and the *human Mind.*

And it is not to be forgotten, that the concluſion we draw from hence, in ſupport of our *adequate* ideas of God's *moral* attributes, has the greater ſtrength upon his Lordſhip's own principles: who holds, that this Conſtitution ariſes *ſolely from the* WILL of God: For then we are ſure that the WILL, which annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice, muſt ariſe from God's *moral* rather than from his firſt *phyſical* nature.

Having premiſed thus much; no more, indeed, than neceſſary to obviate one continued SOPHISM, that runs through all his Lordſhip's reaſonings, againſt the *moral attributes* (where, the courſe and

and operation of that *moral* Conſtitution, as it appears under the diſturbances occaſioned by man's *free-will*, is perpetually put for the *Conſtitution itſelf)*, I now proceed to ſhew, from GOD'S WORKS, that we have as preciſe ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his *power* and *wiſdom*.

His Lordſhip obſerves, that *from every part of the immenſe univerſe, and from the harmony of the whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmoſt certainty, that a Being of infinite wiſdom and power made, preſerved, and governed the ſyſtem.* This, he obſerves in favour of the *natural* attributes. And what ſhould hinder men from making the ſame obſervation in favour of the *moral*, viz. That the happineſs and miſery, by the very conſtitution of nature, attendant on Virtue and on Vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite *goodneſs* and *juſtice* made, preſerves, and governs the ſyſtem?

The exiſtence of this *moral Conſtitution* his Lordſhip acknowledges. Let us conſider it, therefore, both as it reſpects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

That *Communities* are always happy or miſerable in proportion as their Manners are virtuous or vicious, his Lordſhip himſelf is the readieſt to demonſtrate. If ſuch a Conſtitution of things does not beſpeak the Author of it *good* and *juſt*, how is it poſſible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator from his Works? His Lordſhip thinks, that from the marks of wiſdom and power in the *phyſical ſyſtem* we learn with the utmoſt certainty that God is *wiſe* and *powerful*; and he ſays, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our ſenſes. Are there not the ſelf-ſame marks of goodneſs and juſtice in this part at leaſt of the *moral ſyſtem* that reſpects Communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our ſenſes, and as certainly by our reaſon, that God is *good* and *juſt*?

If we conſider the *moral Conſtitution*, as it reſpects *Particulars*, we ſee virtue and vice have the ſame influence on our happineſs

and misery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions in the means to the end than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Natures have here more power to disorder the harmony of the System. In *Communities*, it can rarely be disturbed, but by a Pestilence, or that other moral Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror: Amongst *Particulars*, indeed, physical evil and the abuse of free-will operate more strongly. But when once the demonstration of the *moral attributes* is clearly made from that part of the Constitution which regards *Communities*, it can never be shaken by the disorders in that which regards *Particulars*. The established truth is now a Principle for further discoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from these disorders is the CERTAINTY of a *future State*. But this by the way.

What I insist upon at present is, that, to decide the question concerning God's *Attributes*, we are to consider the Constitution of things, as it is in itself, simply. This is, properly, *God's work*. The disorders in it, occasioned by the abuse of man's *free-will*, is not *his* work, but *man's*. This, his Lordship too, upon another occasion, namely, when he combats the argument of a *future state*, from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that these disorders must, even on his Lordship's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we estimate God's Nature and *Attributes* from his *Works*.

"But we see not those disorders in the *natural* world, which we both see and feel in the *moral*." This would be some objection did God in the *moral*, as in the *natural* system, direct *immediately*, or constitute things *mechanically*; or had Free-will the same influence on the *natural* as on the *moral* system.—Did God direct in both Constitutions, *immediately* or *mechanically*; or did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither, and that yet the *moral* remained more subject to disorder than the *natural*; it might indeed follow that we had not so clear ideas of God's *goodness* and *justice* as of his *wisdom* and *power*: But since he has thought fit to leave man,

man, FREE; and has been pleaſed to ſuffer the abuſe of free-will to affect the *moral* ſyſtem, and not the *natural*; as this, I ſay, is the caſe, the ſuperiour irregularities in the *one* do not take off from the equal clearneſs of the demonſtration, which reſults from the nature of *both* Conſtitutions. "This difference" (to ſpeak in the words of a late writer) "is not to be aſcribed to a contrary conduct "in the Governor of the two Syſtems, but to the contrary natures "of the Subjects. Paſſive matter being totally inert, its reſiſtance "to the Laws impreſſed upon it muſt be extremely weak: and "conſequently the diſorders ariſing from that reſiſtance proportion- "ably flow and unheeded: while that active ſelf-moving principle, "the Mind, flies out at once from the centre of its direction, and "can every moment deflect from the line of truth and reaſon. "Hence moral diſorders began early, became exceſſive, and have "continued, through all ages, to diſturb the harmony of the "Syſtem *."

What is here ſaid will, I ſuppoſe, be ſufficient to confute the following aſſertions; and to detect the miſtake on which they ariſe.

"Every thing (ſays his Lordſhip) ſhews the *wiſdom* and *power* "of God conformably to our ideas of wiſdom and power in the "*phyſical* world and in the *moral*. *But every thing does not ſhew in* "*like manner the* juſtice *and* goodneſs *conformably to our ideas of theſe* "*attributes in either. The phyſical attributes are in their nature more* "*glaring and leſs equivocal* †."

And again, "There is *no ſufficient foundation* in the phænomena "of nature to connect the moral attributes with the phyſical at- "tributes of God. *Nay, the phænomena are in ſeveral caſes re-* "*pugnant* ‡."

* The Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in a courſe of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn. Vol. i. p. 66.

† Vol. v. p. 524.

‡ Vol. v. p. 316.

But since he goes so far as to talk of the *want of a foundation*, and even a *repugnancy*; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reasoning, I will just urge one single argument for the reality and full evidence of the *moral attributes*: and it shall be taken from himself, and shall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that such as he, "who apply themselves to the "*first Philosophy*, apply themselves to the noblest objects that can "demand the attention of the mind——To the signification of "GOD'S WILL, concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one "another *."

And again, "It is sufficient to establish our *moral* obligations that "we consider them relatively to our own system. From thence "they arise: and since they arise from thence, it must be the WILL "of that Being who made the system, that we should observe and "practise them †."

Let me ask then, How it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordship allows us to contemplate, namely, his WORKS *in this system?* He will say from certain *qualities* in those objects.—What are those qualities? He will reply, the *fitnesses* of means to ends.—Who was the Author of these fitnesses? He hath told us, the *God of nature*.—It was God's *will* then, that we should use the *means*, in order to obtain the *ends*. Now, in the *moral* System, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness. Virtue therefore must needs be pleasing to him; and Vice, as its contrary, displeasing. Well, but then, as to this *like* and *dislike*; it must be either capricious, or it must be regulated on the nature of things. *Wisdom*, which his Lordship condescends to give his Maker, will not allow us to suppose it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the nature of things be, as his Lordship holds it is, the constitution of God, and *dependent on his will*, then he who is pleased with virtue, and displeased with vice, must needs be himself *good* and *just*.

* Vol. v. p. 447. † Vol. v. p. 452.

To

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reasoning. His Lordship goes on thus. *But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and wisdom.*

I desire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordship philosophised at *Battersea*, and could *find no foundation, in the phænomena of nature, to connect the moral with the physical attributes of God*, that a Man, who believed God's infinite wisdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two sets of ideas, the *physical* and *moral* attributes of the Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steddy, and, till now, they were always inseparable.

He says, that *as far as we can discover, we discern infinite wisdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his.*

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be considered. A comparison is insinuated between our discovery of infinite power and wisdom from the *physical* works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness and justice from his *moral* works; in which, the advantage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to a just decision in this point (omitting at present the notice of his general Sophism, which operates in this observation, as in the rest), we must distinguish between the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of God's Attributes, and that *knowledge when acquired.*

As to the first (the *means of acquiring*) there seems to be some advantage on the side of God's PHYSICAL works. For, as his Lordship rightly observes, *where we cannot discern wisdom and power in the physical works, it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature we see more and more of wisdom and power.* And he insinuates, we cannot say the same concerning the difficulties in the *moral* system. It is true, we cannot. But

then

then let us tell him, neither can we ſay the contrary. The reaſon is, The phyſical ſyſtem lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our ſenſes to well tried experiments, we are able to make conſiderable advances in the knowledge of Nature. It is not ſo in the *moral* ſyſtem; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Conſtitution; and further than this, human wit or induſtry is unable to penetrate. Theſe general principles are, indeed, amply ſufficient to deduce and eſtabliſh the *moral attributes* from the *moral ſyſtem*; but not ſufficient to remove all difficulties that ariſe from what we ſee of the actual adminiſtration of that ſyſtem. So that, though *we* cannot ſay, that *as we advance in the knowledge* of the moral ſyſtem *we ſee more and more of goodneſs and juſtice*; So neither can *his Lordſhip* ſay (though his words ſeem to inſinuate he could) that as we advance, we ſee *leſs and leſs*. Whereas the truth is, beyond thoſe general principles, we cannot advance at all.

But then, as to the ſecond part in the diſtinction (the *knowledge of the attributes, when acquired)*, I hold the advantage, and a great one it is, lies altogether on the ſide of the MORAL. And this, I cannot better explain to you than in the words of the writer, quoted juſt before: "Though the idea (ſays this Divine) of God's *natural* "attributes be as clear in the abſtract, as that of his *moral*, yet the "idea of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more adequate "than that of his natural. The reaſon ſeems convincing. The "moral relation in which we ſtand to God, as free agents, is juſt "the ſame whether man exiſts alone, or whether he be but a link "in the chain of innumerable orders of intelligences ſurrounding "the whole Creation. Hence we muſt needs have a full know-"ledge of our duty to him, and of his diſpoſition towards us: on "which knowledge is founded the exactneſs of our conceptions of "his moral attributes, his *juſtice* and *goodneſs*. But the natural re-"lation in which we, or any of God's creatures, ſtand towards him, "as material Beings, is not the ſame when conſidered ſimply, as "when

" when a portion of a dependent and connected whole. Becauſe " whenever ſuch a whole exiſts, the harmony and perfection of it " muſt firſt of all be conſulted. This harmony ariſeth from the " mutual ſubſerviency and union of its parts. But this ſubſer- " viency may require a miniſtration of government, with regard to " certain portions of matter thus allied, different from what might " have followed had thoſe portions ſtood alone, becauſe that preciſe " diſpoſition, which might be fit in one caſe, might be unfit in the " other. Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which our " material ſyſtem is a Part, and yet are totally ignorant both of " its nature and extent, can have but a very confuſed idea of that " phyſical relation in which we ſtand towards God; ſo that our con- " ceptions of his *natural* attributes, his *power* and *wiſdom*, which " are founded on that idea, muſt in the concrete be proportionably " vague and inadequate *."

But you will aſk, perhaps, whence ariſes this reciprocal advantage which the *moral* and the *natural* attributes have over one another, in the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of them, and the preciſion of *that knowledge when acquired?* I will tell you in two words. Of *our own phyſical* ſyſtem, we know many particulars, (that is, we diſcover much of the *means*, but nothing of the *end)*; and of the *univerſal* phyſical ſyſtem we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of *our own moral* ſyſtem, (that is, we diſcover only the *end*, and not the *means)*; and of the *univerſal* moral ſyſtem we underſtand the general principles.

His Lordſhip proceeds. *This now* [the knowledge of God's *natural* attributes] *is real knowledge*; *or there is no ſuch thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themſelves*, IN GOD, *and in nature the work of God.*

What his Lordſhip means by, *in God*, in diſtinction from the *work of God*, I confeſs I do not underſtand: Perhaps it may be in-

* The Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in a courſe of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn, Vol. i. p. 58, & ſeq.

tended

tended to insinuate, in honour of the *natural attributes*, that they may be even proved *à priori*; for this is not the first time by many, when after having heartily abused a person or thing, he has been reduced to support himself on the authority, or the reasoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only used to round the period, and set off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is *real knowledge*. And so too, I think, is the knowledge of the *moral* attributes, so gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, *I do allow just so much goodness and justice in God as we see in that* CONSTITUTION, *which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice. But this*, says he, *I think, had better be called* WISDOM. I think so too; if by *so much*, he means no more than what concerns God's *natural government*: and that he means no more is plain from his making the *natural* consequence of vice and virtue the only sanction of the moral Law. But I will venture to go further, and say, that, from what we see in this *Constitution*, we may collect PERFECT goodness and justice. *Matter* and man's *Free-will* disturb the System: But if the *Constitution* be the effect of God's *Will*, as his Lordship holds it is; and the mark of his *Wisdom*, as all mankind hold with him; Does not that *Wisdom* require that his *Will* should not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perverseness of his Creatures were not remedied and set right? And is not A REMEDY the clearest mark of PERFECT *goodness* and *justice*?

Take it in another light. Free-will crosses the *Constitution*, which God, by establishing, shews he intended should take place. This *present* disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his Poet, it was necessary to the schemes of divine wisdom, that there should be such a creature as MAN:

> "For in the scale of reasoning life, 'tis plain
> "There must be, somewhere, such a rank as man."

The consequence is, that the disorder will be *hereafter* rectified.

Had

Had Man indeed been made *unneceſſarily*; and this Man had broke in upon God's general Syſtem, his Lordſhip might have had ſome pretence to ſay, as he does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER PURSUED; that is, that the ſcheme which annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice, ſhould remain in its preſent condition of an incomplete diſpenſation, to all eternity. But ſince Man is acknowledged to be a *neceſſary* part of a general Syſtem, complete in all its members, it is nonſenſe to talk of *God's not meaning the particular Syſtem ſhould be further purſued*, when that *further purſuit* is only to bring it to its natural period; ſhort of which, it would remain unfiniſhed, nay unformed.

He goes on. *We know what* WISDOM *and* POWER *are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the* WORK; *and therefore we know demonſtratively that ſuch they are in the* WORKER.

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE are? Do we not *intuitively*, and by the *help of our ſenſes know*, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the WORK, namely, in that *conſtitution of things* which, his Lordſhip tells us, annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice? And may we not *demonſtratively* collect from thence that ſuch they are in the WORKER, ſince this Conſtitution, his Lordſhip tells us again, is the effect of God's WILL? On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own ſtate of the reaſoning *à poſteriori*, it appears, that God is of *infinite goodneſs* and *juſtice*, as well as of *infinite wiſdom* and *power*.

But to give AUTHORITY to his partial reaſoning (the uſual ſupport of all partialities), He, in one place, puts it into the mouth of *Anaxagoras*. "Should you aſk Anaxagoras (ſays he) what *goodneſs* is, or "*juſtice*, he might bid you, perhaps, turn your eyes inward, firſt; "then, ſurvey mankind; obſerve the wants of individuals, the bene- "fits of ſociety, and, from theſe particulars, frame the general notions "of *goodneſs* and *juſtice*. He might go a ſtep further: and add, this "is *human* goodneſs and *human* juſtice, ſuch as we can comprehend,

" ſuch as we can exerciſe, and ſuch as the ſupreme mind has made " it both our duty and intereſt to exerciſe, by the conſtitution of " the human ſyſtem, and by the relations which ariſe in it: from " all which our notions of *goodneſs* and *juſtice* reſult, and are com- " pounded."

We know, then, what *goodneſs* and *juſtice* are, as well as what *wiſdom* and *power* are; *we know both intuitively and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the work.* For he bids us *turn our eyes inward*; then *ſurvey mankind*; and laſtly, obſerve how *reaſon*, from the *conſtitution of human nature*, confirms our *intuitive* knowledge, and that which we gain by the *help of our ſenſes.* But what does all this ſignify, if *Anaxagoras* or his Lordſhip be in an humour of concluding againſt their own premiſſes? Hear then how the ſpeech ends.—" Of *divine goodneſs* " and divine juſtice might this Philoſopher conclude, I AM UNABLE " TO FRAME ANY ADEQUATE NOTIONS *." What! Unable to *frame* thoſe notions which God, by his *moral* Conſtitution, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his WILL has taught us to *apply?*——This old *Philoſopher*, I ſuppoſe, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken Church-HELOTES †; yet he plays the fool to admiration.—*We* DO KNOW, ſays Anaxagoras, *what* Goodneſs *and* Juſtice *are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the* WORK; *and* THEREFORE *we* DO NOT KNOW *that ſuch they are in the* WORKER.

Might I be permitted to addreſs myſelf to this Renegado Sophiſt, I would ſay—Your brethren, the antient Philoſophers, reaſoned *à poſteriori* in this manner, " Can you think there is *wiſdom* and *power* in you, and none in your Maker?"—By no means. They reaſoned well.—Let me aſk you then, " Is there *goodneſs* and *juſtice* in you, and none in your Maker?" His anſwer, I ſuppoſe, would be the

* Vol. iv. p. 116, 117. † Vol. v. p. 446.

ſame.

ſame. But, prompted by his Lordſhip, into whoſe ſervice he is now entered, he perhaps might add, That, from *human goodneſs* and *juſtice* we cannot come to the NATURE of the *divine*. What hinders us, I pray you? Is it not from our *intuitive conception* of our own *wiſdom* and *power* that we gain an adequate idea of God's? Are *wiſdom* and *power* MORE PERFECT, as they are found in man, than *goodneſs* and *juſtice?* If therefore the IMPERFECTION of theſe attributes in Man hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of thoſe in God, we can have no adequate idea of his *wiſdom* and *power:* If the IMPERFECTION does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his *goodneſs* and *juſtice*.

But, the inference to God's *power* and *wiſdom*, his Lordſhip ſays, is ſupported by what men ſee of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the phyſical Syſtem. Do we not ſee likewiſe the effects of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, in the order and harmony of the *moral*, in the happineſs that naturally attends virtue, and the miſery conſequent on vice? And is not the *moral* Syſtem as much *God's Work*, as the *phyſical?*

Thus, Sir, you ſee, that by the *very reaſoning* his Lordſhip EMPLOYS to prove the *natural* attributes, and by the *very method* he PRESCRIBES to us for proving the *moral*, we have demonſtrated *theſe* with a preciſion and a certainty, at leaſt equal to the *other*. His Lordſhip ſeems to have been aware of the event; and therefore, when he had ſet us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us that the *moral attributes* ſhould be examined by or *applied to*, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT *. I had full as much reaſon to be aware of his Lordſhip. And therefore, in ſtating the queſtion, at my entrance on the ſubject, I obviated this miſerable Sophiſm. I call it by no better name, becauſe it is not *the conſtitution of the world, or the ſtate of mankind in it*, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, or the nature

* Vol. v. p. 331.

of Virtue and Vice, as they eſſentially operate to produce happineſs and miſery, by which God's *moral attributes* are to be tried and aſcertained. But this, which is a ſteddy, uniform view, he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obſcure, diſturbed, and ſhifting Scene, the actual ſtate of vice and virtue, of miſery and happineſs, amongſt men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the BREACHES in that conſtitution made by the abuſe of man's free-will: which yet (when he is arguing *for an equal Providence)* he again and again confeſſes ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently againſt the folly of thoſe who impute the effects of that abuſe to him. Though here (in his various attempts to blot out *the idea of God's moral attributes*) he be full of the diſorders of the moral Syſtem conſidered as part of God's deſign.

But ſince I have mentioned his arguments for an equal providence, I ſhould be unjuſt to You, who expect a fair *view* of his Lordſhip's Philoſophy from me, if I concealed another of his contradictions.—He had both Man's *future State* and *God's moral attributes* to throw out of the religious world; or, to ſpeak more properly, he had RELIGION to overturn, by taking away its very ESSENCE: and as the *irregularities* in the preſent adminiſtration of Providence ſtood in the way of his firſt attempt; and the *conſiſtency* of the moral Syſtem, in the way of the other; when he argues againſt a future State, You would think there were no *irregularities*; and when he argues againſt the moral attributes, You would think there was no *conſiſtency*.

We now come to his Lordſhip's particular objections againſt the *moral attributes*. One of them is, that they are BOUNDED.

"They [the Divines] go further. As God is perfect, and man "very imperfect, they talk of his *infinite goodneſs* and *juſtice*, as of "his infinite wiſdom and power; though the latter may preſerve "their nature without any conceivable bounds, and the former "muſt

" muſt ceaſe to be what they are, unleſs we conceive them BOUNDED. " Their nature implies neceſſarily a limitation in the exerciſe of " them. Thus then the *moral attributes*, according to this Theo- " logy, require infinitely more of God to man than men are able, " or would be obliged if they were able, to exerciſe to one another: " greater profuſion in beſtowing benefits and rewards, greater vigour " in puniſhing offences *."

You have here his Lordſhip's own words; and nothing leſs could induce any one to think ſo diſadvantageouſly of this Righter of wrongs and Redreſſer of grievances, as they neceſſarily imply. Let us conſider the *premiſſes*, and examine the *inferences* both *implied* and *expreſſed*.

He ſays, 1. That the *moral attributes are bounded*; 2. That the *natural are not bounded*. Let us ſee to what the firſt propoſition amounts; and how much truth there is in the ſecond.

1. The *moral attributes* are conſidered by us as relative to *intelligent* creatures: The *natural* are not ſo conſidered. Thus the goodneſs and juſtice, when relative to man, are greatly *bounded*; a certain low degree of reward ſuffices for his *good*; a certain low degree of puniſhment for his *evil* actions. Let God's goodneſs and juſtice reſpect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then *leſs bounded*; for greater rewards and puniſhments will be required: and ſo on, to the higheſt rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the higheſt is at infinite diſtance from the Creator, the exerciſe of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, muſt be ſtill *bounded*.

2. His ſecond propoſition is, that *the natural attributes are not bounded*. It is true, theſe cannot be conſidered as relative to God's *intelligent* creatures; yet ſince, in their exerciſe, they muſt be conſidered as relative to his Creation at large; and ſince Creation, however immenſe, is not infinite, the natural attributes conſidered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are *bounded*.

* Vol. v. p. 528.

difference therefore, in *the exercise* of God's attributes, between the *moral* and the *natural*, save only in the degree.

But if we consider God's *moral* and *natural* attributes more abstractedly, not as they are *in the exercise*, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both *unbounded*. Thus we see his Lordship's notable distinction is both imaginary and useless.

However, let us give him all he asks; and then see what he will be able to *infer* from it.

1. His first inference seems to be this: As the *moral* attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the *natural*, our idea of them must be obscure and inadequate. What! because they are better adapted, as things *bounded* certainly are than things *infinite*, to human contemplation? Our idea of such of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whose nature and properties we know, namely MAN, must needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of such attributes as bear relation to Beings, whose nature and properties we know not, namely the UNIVERSE.

2. His other *inference* is expressed in these words: *Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, require infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another.* To say, the moral attributes, according to Christian Theology, or, as he is pleased to call it, *artificial Theology*, requires INFINITELY *more*, is a wretched calumny. To say, it *requires more*, is true. And for this plain reason: the relation between Creator and Creature is very different from that between Fellow-creatures; therefore the *goodness* is more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is very different from that between Fellow-servants; therefore the *justice* is more severe. And if it would not be deemed too IMPUDENT to refer his Lordship to Scripture, for instruction (especially in a matter where the abuse of Scripture was chiefly intended), he might there have found a *Parable* which would have set him right: and has always kept *artificial Theology*, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But *infinite*,

finite, when applied to the *exercise* of a moral attribute in reference to man, is his Lordship's nonsense, with due reverence be it spoken, not the *nonsense of artificial Divines*. They were not ignorant that the rule, *infirmiorem vel deteriorem partem sequitur consequentia*, held as well in *Morals* as in *Logic*. Though God be infinite, man is finite; and therefore, with respect to him, the exertion of a *moral* attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordship himself saw something of this, as appears by his own words. *The nature of the moral attributes implies necessarily a limitation in the use of them.* And why would he suppose Divines could not see as far into this matter as himself?

But if there be an error in *artificial Theology* he is as sure, at one time or other, to espouse it; as he is, at all times, ready to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men, in their ill-advised zeal to defend the Scripture-doctrine of the Son's divinity, were not always sufficiently careful in selecting their arguments. Amongst such as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this; That as man's offence was against an infinite Being, it required an infinite satisfaction; which none but such a Being could give. Now his Lordship, we see, espouses this very principle, to discredit God's moral attributes, and the *artificial Theology* of Jesus Christ; which speaks, indeed, of infinite rewards; but not as matter of *due*, but of *grace*.

As the being *bounded* is one of his Lordship's objections against the *moral attributes*, so the being merely HUMAN is another.

"After Dr. CLARKE (says he) has repeated over and over that "all the *moral attributes* are the same in God as in our ideas; and "that he who denies them to be so may as well deny the divine "*physical attributes*, the Doctor insists only on two of the former, "on those of *justice* and *goodness*. He was much in the right to "contract the generality of his assertion. The absurdity of ascribing TEMPERANCE, for instance, or FORTITUDE, to God, would "have been too gross, and too visible even to eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But that, of ascribing *justice* and "*goodness*

" *goodneſs* to him, according to our notions of them, might be better " covered, and was enough for his purpoſe, though NOT LESS " REALLY ABSURD *."

Which ſhall we moſt admire: His *Knowledge* or his *Ingenuity?* Or ſhall we follow the advice of his Motto, and *Wonder at nothing* †.

When men contemplate what they call moral virtue, or the attributes of Humanity, they divide them into two claſſes, perfectly diſtinct from one another. In the firſt are comprized thoſe which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent Being, ſuch as *goodneſs* and *juſtice:* in the ſecond, thoſe which belong to him under the idea of a creature of his own imperfect ſpecies, ſuch as *temperance* and *fortitude.* The firſt belong to all free intelligent Beings; the latter, only to ſuch a Being as man: *Thoſe* ariſe out of the nature of free intelligence, and ſo are common to all: *Theſe*, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and ſo are peculiar to humanity; for we eaſily conceive a higher Order of free intelligences, in which the moral virtues of the ſecond claſs have no place. They are ſuperior to the impreſſions of fear, and ſo have no occaſion to exert *fortitude:* They are removed from the temptation of exceſs, and ſo have no room for the exerciſe of *temperance.* Now when CLARKE, or any other Divine, had ſaid, that *the moral attributes are the ſame in God as in our ideas*, What attributes could they poſſibly mean but thoſe of the *firſt claſs*; thoſe which belong to Beings under the idea of free intelligences? STUPID as his Lordſhip is pleaſed to make Divines, they could never *blunder* at ſuch a rate as to conceive that thoſe virtues or *moral attributes*, which proceed from the *imperfection* of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they ſuppoſed to be *all perfect.* They held, with his Lordſhip, and they will hold without him, that the great God is *infinitely* wiſe and powerful. Were they then in any danger to give him *temperance*, which implied his being obnoxious to *folly*; or *fortitude*, which argued *impuiſance?* Infinite

* Vol. v. p. 311. † *Nil admirari.*

wiſdom,

wiſdom, therefore, and infinite power, exclude from God the very ideas of *temperance* and *fortitude*. But do infinite wiſdom and infinite power exclude from God the ideas of *goodneſs* and *juſtice?* On the contrary, his Lordſhip, as we ſhall ſee preſently, is reduced to the poor ſhift of owning *goodneſs* and *juſtice* to be contained in infinite *wiſdom* and *power*.

At preſent I leave His Lordſhip's Admirers to their own meditations on their Maſter's IPSE DIXIT, *That the aſcribing goodneſs and juſtice to God is* NO LESS REALLY ABSURD *than the aſcribing temperance and fortitude to him?*

—But CLARKE *contracted the generality of the aſſertion to ſerve a purpoſe*. I think he did: and for one of the beſt purpoſes in the world, that of COMMON SENSE? Had his Lordſhip been pleaſed to *contract* himſelf on the ſame principle, he had paſſed, perhaps, for a greater Philoſopher; though he had certainly been a leſs Writer.

But then, if you aſk, *What purpoſe* his Lordſhip had *to ſerve*, when he uſed the equivocal word ALL (which may ſignify either *all* of one kind, or *all* of every kind), where he obſerves, Clarke holds, *that* ALL *the moral attributes are the ſame in God*, &c? I anſwer, it was to give himſelf the poor pretence to ſay, that Clarke afterwards *contracted his generality*, or, in other words, contradicted himſelf.

A third objection againſt the *moral attributes* is, "That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodneſs and juſtice; which therefore cannot be ſuppoſed to be *the ſame in kind* with God's; though our wiſdom and power, with which no paſſions or affections mix, muſt be the *ſame in kind* with his."

Were paſſion and affection *inſeparable* from human goodneſs and juſtice, the objection might ſeem to have ſome force; indeed, not much even then. But how miſerable muſt the objection appear to thoſe who ſee, as all men may, that they are *ſeparable?* Separable, I mean, in practice as well as ſpeculation. The true idea of human goodneſs and juſtice excludes all paſſion and affection.

What hinders then our rising, from that idea, to divine goodness and justice, any more than our rising, from the idea of human wisdom and power, to the divine wisdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the *moral*, as the *natural* attributes, are the same in kind, both in God and man?

But, this is not all that may be said in favour of our adequate idea of God's *moral attributes*, when compared with the *natural*. For though passion mixes not with the human attributes of wisdom and power, yet something else does, much more difficult to be separated than PASSION, from the human attributes of goodness and justice, I mean the INSTRUMENTALITY OF MATTER. We can conceive nothing of human POWER without the use of such an instrument: yet this, by his Lordship's own confession, does not hinder us from rising from the idea of our own wisdom and power, to the wisdom and power of God; and from seeing that they are the same in kind. Why then should the other foreign combination hinder us from seeing that goodness and justice are the same in kind?

Still, further. The MANNER *of knowing* in God, on which depends his natural attribute of WISDOM, is confessedly different from what it is in man; and, at the same time, is a thing of which we have no conception: yet this, according to his Lordship's account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of *divine wisdom*, though it rises from what we see of the *human*.

How happens it then, that, in both these cases, notwithstanding the foreign mixture of the *instrumentality of matter*, and the *manner of knowing*, we attain an adequate idea of God's wisdom and power? His Lordship will tell you, it is by separating what is foreign, from what is native to the ideas of wisdom and power. And shall not I have as much credit with You, when I tell you we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodness and justice, by separating from the idea of human goodness and justice the foreign mixture of *passion* and *affection*?

But

But his Lordſhip has a greater quarrel than all this with the *moral attributes*. They give riſe to embarraſſed queſtions, diſhonourable to God, and miſchievous to Religion.

"As they [the Divines] modeled God's government on a human "plan, ſo they conceived his perfections, *moral* as well as phyſi- "cal, by human ideas.—Thus God was ſaid to be the FIRST GOOD: "but then the general notion or abſtract idea of this *good* was not "only taken from human goodneſs, but was conſidered too with "little or no other relation than to man—A queſtion aroſe there- "fore on theſe hypotheſes, *How could evil come into a ſyſtem of* "*which God was the author?*—this queſtion made a further hypo- "theſis neceſſary; another firſt God, another coeternal and coequal "principle, was introduced to ſolve it; *a firſt cauſe of all evil*, as the "other was *of all good**."

The falſe repreſentation of this fact I reſerve for another occaſion: the falſe inference from it is what I now propoſe to conſider.

His Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that the notion of God's *moral attributes* gave birth to an inſoluble queſtion concerning *the origin of evil*; and that this occaſioned the invention of the miſchievous hypotheſis of the *two Principles*. Who would have ſuſpected all this evil to ariſe from the FIRST GOOD! Yet ſo it was: And therefore the notion of ſuch a GOOD muſt be *falſe*; or, at leaſt, very *hurtful*.

1. As to the firſt, if his Lordſhip's inference be right, it will unſettle all uſeful knowledge; becauſe there is no great principle, either in *phyſics*, or in *natural Theology*, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wiſe enough to ſtop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable embarras: As one might inſtance in a point that ariſes out of both theſe ſciences—*The agreement between free-will and preſcience*. This is a well-known caſe: And as one of the principal deſigns of this VIEW is to illuſtrate his Lordſhip's great talents, I choſe it before any other, becauſe he pretends to untie this knot, which hath ſo long kept the learned world intangled.

* Vol. iv. p. 88.

" Our ideas (ſays he) of divine intelligence and wiſdom may be " neither *fantaſtical* nor *falſe*, and yet God's MANNER of knowing " may be ſo different from ours, that fore-knowledge, as we call it " *improperly in him*, may be conſiſtent with the contingency of " events; although that which we call *properly* fore-knowledge *in* " *ourſelves*, be not ſo *."

I have two or three remarks to make on theſe words.

Our ideas of God's *moral* attributes, his goodneſs and juſtice, he makes *fantaſtical* and *falſe*, on account of difficulties ariſing from them: yet God's *natural* attributes, his intelligence and wiſdom, *may*, he ſays, *be neither fantaſtical nor falſe*, though a difficulty as great ariſes from them; namely, the apparent diſcordancy between free-will and preſcience.

My ſecond remark is, that his ſolution is more *fantaſtic* and *falſe* than the wildeſt chimera of School-metaphyſics. The difficulty in reconciling God's preſcience to man's free-will does not ariſe from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from God's ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

My third remark is, that his Lordſhip, who is here ſo penetrating, that he can eaſily reconcile *preſcience* and *free-will*, is yet, in another place, ſo cloudy, that he cannot ſee how an *equal providence* and *free agency* may ſtand together †."

My laſt remark is (and it riſes out of the foregoing) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordſhip ſees no difficulties in any part of the ſyſtem of Creation: But as ſoon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties ſtart up by dozens.

Of this, take an inſtance from the caſe in hand. Our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, he ſays, muſt needs be falſe, becauſe the conceiving of them by human goodneſs and juſtice leads to the queſtion of the *origin of evil*, conſidered *morally*. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's *phyſical attributes*, by human wiſdom and power lead to the queſtion of the *origin of evil*, conſidered *na-*

* Vol. v. p. 525. † See Letter iv.

turally?

turally? Yet our ideas of the phyſical attributes are neither *falſe nor fantaſtical.* But to this, his Lordſhip replies, Evil, conſidered *naturally*, is not real, but apparent only. Why ſo? Becauſe it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the ſame thing be ſaid of Evil, conſidered *morally?* Nay, hath it not been actually ſaid, and proved too, on the ſame principles? It follows then, that they are either both *real*, or both *fantaſtic.*

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Preſumptuous man knows not where to ſtop. He would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead.

"For Fools ruſh in, where Angels fear to tread."

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the abſurd hypotheſis of TWO PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the *moral attributes?* Ridiculous! We ſee its cauſe is in vanity and ſelf-conceit; paſſions that operate alike on all principles.

2. As to his Lordſhip's ſecond inference, that *this* idea is at leaſt productive of much *miſchief*, and therefore it would be better to have none at all; Let me obſerve, that the idea of God's very exiſtence is productive of miſchief, even all the miſchiefs of Superſtition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who, beſides his Lordſhip, would ſay ſo *? Why then ſhould we think it better to be without the idea of the *moral attributes*, even though the evils it produced were *neceſſary?* But that is not the caſe. They are *caſual* only: the iſſue of pride and preſumption; which this idea does not at all influence.

3. HOWEVER, theſe *moral attributes*, if not hurtful, are USELESS; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite *wiſdom* and *power* (ſays "his Lordſhip) have made things as they are: how *goodneſs* and "*juſtice* required they ſhould be made is neither *coram judice*, nor

* He indeed ſays, *he had rather be an Atheiſt than acknowledge the Chriſtian Theology*; and we may believe him. See Vol. iv. p. 34.

"to

" to any rational purpoſe to enquire *." To inquire how the *univerſe of things ſhould be made*, ſerves indeed to *no reaſonable purpoſe*. But to inquire concerning our own ſtate and condition in this Univerſe, is either *coram judice*, or we were ſent into the world to ſtare about us, and paſs judgment upon nothing. His Lordſhip's ſophiſtry ſeems to confound two things that common ſenſe has always diſtinguiſhed; *our own buſineſs from other men's*. When the King holds a bed of juſtice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his meaſures: But every Particular who is ſummoned to attend the Court, is much concerned to know how he himſelf ſhall be dealt with. His Lordſhip, indeed, is ready to ſay, We are not ſummoned; that is, we are not *accountable creatures*. But this is begging the queſtion.

Again, to *inquire*, much more to preſcribe *how things ſhould be made*, in any particular ſyſtem, has all the folly, preſumption, and impiety, which his Lordſhip charges upon it: Becauſe the Parts having a relation to the Whole, an all-wiſe Architect makes them in conformity to that Whole, of which we know nothing; and therefore our only concluſion ſhould be, that the Part we do know is conſtituted for the beſt. But it is another thing to ſay (which is all that Divines have ſaid, how differently ſoever his Lordſhip is pleaſed to repreſent the matter) that God will act equitably with his rational Creation, by diſtributing good and evil to them according to their deſerts; becauſe this does not depend upon any Whole, of which we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodneſs and juſtice, of which we know enough to determine with certainty concerning his final dealing with men. To paſs our judgment here is ſo far from folly or impiety, that not to do it would be ſtupidity or hypocriſy. To call this proceeding, as his Lordſhip does, the patching or botching up one Syſtem with another, is a groſs miſrepreſentation. It is fairly taking in the *Whole*, to determine concerning the deſtination of the *Parts*.

* Vol. v. p. 363.

At length, he ends juſt where he ſet out, That we have no ideas of the moral attributes at all. "Upon the whole matter "(ſays he) we may conclude ſafely from error, and in direct op- "poſition to Clarke, that *goodneſs and juſtice in God cannot be con- "ceived, without manifeſt preſumption and impiety, to be the ſame as "in the ideas we frame of theſe perfections when we conſider them in "men, or when we reaſon about them abſtractedly in themſelves*; but "that in the ſupreme Governor of the World they are ſomething "transcendent, and of which we cannot make any true judg- "ment, nor argue with any certainty about them *." And in this, his Lordſhip tells us he is juſtified by the authority of St. Paul and Dr. Barrow. *Theſe two great Divines* (ſays he) *are on my ſide* †. Who would have thought of two ſuch honourable Supporters for his Lordſhip's Atchievements? One thing I have obſerved, which may be worth reflecting on: a ſtrange propenſity in Free-thinkers to miſtake their enemies for their friends; and as ſtrange a propenſity in the Clergy to miſtake their friends for their enemies. The turn is odd enough on both ſides; and, at firſt view, ſeems a little myſterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this,—Free-thinkers have invented this trick, to amuſe the Clergy, in order to kindle their ſuſpicions, and inflame their jealouſy againſt their beſt friends: And, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and then, fallen into the ſnare.

But, after what has paſſed, who would expect that *the leather-dreſſing Pontiff*, of all men, ſhould have been thought worthy to ſupport the *firſt Philoſophy!* What has St. Paul done at laſt to deſerve this honour? Why, in anſwer to the objections againſt God's diſpenſations in the religious World, the Apoſtle refers us, "for "entire ſatisfaction, to the incomprehenſible wiſdom of God, who "frequently in the courſe of his providence ordereth things in me- "thods tranſcending our abilities to diſcover or trace ‡." This ſolution, which is here extolled for its great *modeſty*, is referred to,

* Vol. iv. p. 359. † Vol. v. p. 362. ‡ Vol. v. p. 360.

in

in another place, for its greater IMPUDENCE *. It may be either, juſt as his Lordſhip is in humour; who, notwithſtanding his long ſtudy of LOCKE, ſeems totally to have loſt all ideas of *moral modes*. How elſe was it poſſible, after having treated the whole body of Mankind in the manner he has done, he ſhould gravely tell his Friend, "That few men, he believes, have CONSULTED others "both *living* and the *dead*, with LESS PRESUMPTION, and in a "GREATER SPIRIT OF DOCILITY, than he has done ‡." I ſometimes thought a word was wrong printed; and that for *conſulted*, we ſhould read, *inſulted*; for in a great man, there is no *preſumption*, whatever meanneſs there may be, in *inſulting* his inferiors. And as for his *docility*, that will hardly be diſputed, it being certain that from the Author, whom he has *inſulted* moſt, he has condeſcended to ſteal more.

But St. PAUL ſays, *we muſt have recourſe to the incomprehenſible wiſdom of God*. In good time. But how does this prove that, in Paul's opinion, we have no adequate idea of the *moral attributes*, unleſs the *quality* of an Agent, and his *action*, be one and the ſame thing? You, Sir, have an *adequate* conception, I am ſure, of our gracious Monarch's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*; but you have a very imperfect comprehenſion of ſeveral of his State-meaſures. I frequently attempted to illuſtrate my reaſoning on divine matters from examples in human Rulers. This is a tickliſh point. And therefore I have been very careful that thoſe *regal* acts, by which I would illuſtrate the *divine*, be not ſuch as proceed from the weakneſs and imperfections of humanity. If they be, the inſtance is impertinent, and ſerves for nothing but to miſlead us. This was the more carefully to be obſerved, becauſe Writers have carried theſe illuſtrations into much abuſe. And no body more than this Noble Lord, ſo famous as he is likely to become with Poſterity, for every ſpecies of falſe reaſoning.

* Vol. iii. p. 307.

† Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope, Vol. iii. p. 320.

Dr.

Dr. BARROW, I preſume, will ſtand his Lordſhip in no better ſtead than St. Paul. "As the dealings of every wiſe man (ſays "the Doctor) are ſometimes founded upon maxims, and admit "juſtifications not obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit, ſo may "God act according to rules of wiſdom and juſtice, which it may "be quite impoſſible by our faculties to apprehend, or with our "means to deſcry. As there are natural modes of Being and "operation, ſo there may be prudential and moral modes of pro-"ceeding, far above our reach, peculiar objects of divine wiſdom "not to be underſtood by any creature, eſpecially by creatures who "ſtand in the loweſt form of intelligence; one remove from beaſts. "In fine, thoſe rules of equity and experience which we in our "tranſactions with one another do uſe, if they be applied to the "dealings of God, will be found very incongruous or deficient, the "caſe being vaſtly altered from that infinite diſtance in nature and "ſtate between God and us, and from the immenſe difference which "his relations towards us have from our relations to one another *." What now has all this, (which relates only to the *incomprehenſible nature of God's providence)* to do with our *inadequate ideas of his moral attributes?* At leaſt, if his Lordſhip will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence *incomprehenſible* muſt needs think our ideas of his moral attributes *inadequate*, he muſt go a ſtep further, and confeſs, that Barrow ſuppoſed our ideas of the *natural* attributes to be *inadequate* likewiſe, for he puts both on the ſame footing. *As there are* NATURAL *modes of Being and operation*, (ſays the Doctor), *ſo there may be prudential and* MORAL *modes of proceeding far above our reach.* But as this would be going too far, farther than the *firſt Philoſophy* will allow of, I ſuppoſe he would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpoſe.

AT LAST, and when you would leaſt expect it, Common-ſenſe and Common-ſentiments return. And God's *moral attributes*, after

* Vol. v. p. 361, 362.

much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. "Where Religions" (ſays his Lordſhip) "which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a new cha-"racter of God's *goodneſs* ariſes—an *artificial* goodneſs, which ſtands "often in the place of the NATURAL *." And this, after he had ſo often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any goodneſs at all. Well, but as aukwardly as God's *natural goodneſs* comes, and, in every ſenſe, *à poſteriori*, yet it comes, and deſerves to be made welcome. "All the knowledge (ſays he) that God has given "us the means to acquire, and therefore all he deſigned we ſhould "have of his phyſical and MORAL nature and attributes, is de-"rived from *his works*, and from the TENOUR OF THAT PROVI-"DENCE by which he governs them †." You will obſerve the words—*the tenour of that Providence*——I have detected the ſophiſtry of them before, where I have ſtated the meaning of the terms, *God's works*. I bid you obſerve them now, to judge of the following climax (if I may ſo call it), or walk down ſtairs. "The "wiſdom is not ſo often diſcernible by us [in God's works] as the "power of God, nor the goodneſs as the wiſdom ‡." As ſcanty and ſlender as the knowledge is of God's moral attributes, which his Lordſhip here allows us to collect from his works, yet it flatly contradicts what his Syſtem had obliged him over and over to maintain; particularly in the following words——*Of divine goodneſs and divine juſtice* (ſays his Lordſhip in the perſon of Anaxagoras) *I am unable to frame any adequate notions* §, *from God's works*.

This Mock-conceſſion is again repeated, and as carefully guarded. "By natural Theology (ſays his Lordſhip) we are taught to ac-"knowledge and adore the infinite *wiſdom* and *power* of God, which "he has manifeſted to us in ſome degree or other in every part, "even the moſt minute, of his Creation. *By that too, we are* "*taught to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to him, wherever he intended* "*we ſhould ſo aſcribe them*, that is, wherever either his works, or

* Vol. v. p. 431.
† Vol. v. p. 523, 524.
‡ Vol. v. p. 335.
§ Vol. iv. p. 116, 117.

"the

" the diſpenſations of his providence, do as NECESSARILY commu-
" nicate theſe notions to our minds, as thoſe of wiſdom and
" power are communicated to us, in the whole extent of both *."

What his Lordſhip would have you infer from this is, that we are NO WHERE taught to aſcribe *goodneſs* and *juſtice* to God; ſince the *diſpenſations of his providence* do NO WHERE, in his Lordſhip's opinion, NECESSARILY *communicate theſe notions*. But allow him his premiſes, that neither God's Works nor Diſpenſations do NECESSARILY communicate to us the notions of God's goodneſs and juſtice; Would his concluſion follow, that therefore we are no where taught in theſe works and diſpenſations to aſcribe thoſe attributes unto him? Suppoſe theſe works and diſpenſations did only PROBABLY communicate theſe notions to our minds; will not this probability teach us to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to him? God hath ſo framed the conſtitution of things, that man, throughout his whole conduct in life, ſhould be neceſſarily induced to form his judgment on appearances and probable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the reſt? or rather, why not in this, above the reſt, if ſo be that indeed God had not (as I have ſhewn he hath) neceſſarily communicated theſe notions?—But ſtill, what is this to our *adequate* idea of the moral attributes, the point in queſtion? God's not *neceſſarily communicating* affects only the *reality*, not the *preciſion* of the idea. All therefore we learn by the obſervation, which would thus put the change upon us, is, that his Lordſhip has a very ſtrong inclination, that God ſhould have neither *goodneſs* nor *juſtice*, ſo far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to *reward* or *puniſh*. For as to the Attributes *themſelves*, diveſted of their conſequence; and undiſturbed by our IMPIOUS IMITATION †, he has little or no quarrel with them. His Lordſhip certainly never intended to *teach* the common Reader more of the ſecrets of his Philoſophy than what NE-

* Vol. v. p. 527.

† OUR OBLIGATION TO IMITATE GOD IS A FALSE AND PROFANE DOCTRINE. Vol. v. p. 65.

CESSARILY arises from his professions. But to make God treat Mankind in this manner, communicate to their minds the appearance of Attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordship's own likeness; the very fault he so much censures in Divines. But if it must needs be that God is to be represented either after Them, or after his Lordship, I should chuse to have the Clergy's God, though made out of no better stuff than ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, because this gives him *goodness* and *justice*, rather than his Lordship's God, which has neither, although composed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he says, That men conceive of the Deity, *more humano*; and that his Lordship's God and the Clergy's God are equally faithful copies of themselves.

In a word, if God teaches, whether clearly or obscurely, he certainly intended we should learn. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordship's own principles. For if Truth be, as he assures us it is, of so precarious a nature as to take its Being from our own System, it must be *real* as far as it *appears*. "Our knowledge (says this great Philosopher) is so dependent on our own system, that a great part of it would not be *knowledge* perhaps, but *error* in any other *."

It is thus he involves himself in perpetual contradictions: And it is always thus, when men dispute (for believe they cannot †,) against common notices, and the most obvious truths; such as liberty of will; the certainty of knowledge, and this, which, I reckon, obtrudes itself upon us as forcibly as either, the MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

But the game is now on foot. Let us follow closely. We have unravelled him through all his windings; and we may soon expect

* Vol. iii. p. 356.

† Hear what he himself says of FREE-WILL. *The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without* LYING, *or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.* Vol. v. p. 406.

to

to ſee him take ſhelter in the thick cover of God's incomprehenſible Nature; and rather than allow, more than in jeſt, the *moral attributes* of the Deity, ready to reſolve all his Attributes, both *natural* and *moral*, into one INDEFINITE PERFECTION.

But ſoft. Not yet. We muſt come to it by degrees and regular advances. Firſt, the *moral attributes* are to be *reſolved* into the *natural*.

—"If they [the *natural* and *moral* attributes] may be conſidered "ſeparately, as we are apt to conſider them; and if the LATTER, "and every thing we aſcribe to theſe, are not to be RESOLVED *ra-* "*ther into the former*; into his infinite intelligence, wiſdom, and "power*." It is yet, we ſee, but a queſtion; and that only, whether the *moral* attributes are not to be reſolved into the *natural*. In the next paſſage the matter is determined. "I think" (and what he thinks, he holds it but reaſonable we ſhould all think) "that "the *moral* attributes of the Supreme Being are *abſorbed in his wiſ-* "*dom*; that we ſhould conſider them only as different modifications "of this *phyſical* attribute †."

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us ſet together his INCONSISTENCIES, as they appear in this ſituation. Sometimes *the ideas of divine wiſdom are better determined than thoſe of divine goodneſs* ‡: Sometimes *we have no ideas at all of divine goodneſs* §: And ſometimes again, (as in the place before us), the *divine goodneſs is the ſame as wiſdom*, and therefore, doubtleſs, the idea of it as well defined. Now, of all theſe aſſertions, to which will his Lordſhip ſtick? To which, do you aſk? To none of them, longer than they will ſtick to him: And ſtraggling, undiſciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to ſtick long to any ſide: As ſoon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them.——Come, if you will needs have it, you ſhall. The ſecret is this. The attributes are mere NAMES; and

* Vol. v. p. 523, 524.
† Vol. v. p. 535.
‡ Vol. v. p. 341. 526.
§ Vol. iv. p. 116, 117.

there

there is an end of them. All that remains, worth ſpeaking of, is one undefined ETERNAL REASON: and ſo the Farce concludes.

"The moral ATTRIBUTES (ſays he) are *barely* NAMES that we "give to various manifeſtations of the infinite wiſdom of one *ſimple* "*uncompounded being* *."

"Of divine goodneſs and divine juſtice I am unable to frame "any adequate notions; and inſtead of conceiving ſuch diſtinct "moral attributes in the Supreme Being, *we ought, perhaps, to con-* "*ceive nothing more than this*, that THERE ARE VARIOUS APPLICA- "TIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH IT BECOMES US LITTLE "TO ANALYZE INTO ATTRIBUTES †.

To this miſerable refuge is his Lordſhip reduced to avoid divine juſtice. But why, you ſay, did he not ſpeak out at firſt, and end his quarrel with the *moral attributes* at once? Your humble ſervant for that. Barefaced NATURALISM has not ſuch charms as to make her received when and wherever ſhe appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little diſguiſe, before you can get her admitted even to what is called *good company*.—But then, after he had reſolved to ſpeak out, Why, you aſk, does he ſtop again in his career; and, when his premiſſes are general againſt *all* attributes, his concluſion is particular, againſt the *moral* only? Not without reaſon, I aſſure you. He had need of the *natural* attributes, to ſet up againſt the *moral*: and therefore had himſelf *analyzed* this *eternal reaſon* into the ſpecific attributes of *wiſdom* and *power*. But when he ſaw his Adverſaries might, by the ſame way, analyze it into *goodneſs and juſtice*, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: But it was to be done obliquely: and hence ariſes all this embarras and tergiverſation. He would willingly, if his Reader be ſo pleaſed, analyze the *eternal reaſon* into *wiſdom* and *power*: but there he would ſtop: and leave the other ſide of the *eternal reaſon*, unanalyzed: and if *goodneſs* and *juſtice* ſhould chance to ſtart out, he has a trick to *reſolve* and *abſorb* them into wiſdom

* Vol. v. p. 453. † Vol. iv. p. 117.

and

and power, as only *different modifications of the phyſical attributes.* But if this revolts his Readers, and they expect equal meaſure; then, rather than give them back the *goodneſs* and *juſtice* which he has been at all this pains to proſcribe, he will throw *wiſdom* and *power* after them, and *reſolve* all into the ONE ETERNAL REASON.

Baſhful NATURALISM has now thrown aſide her Veil; and is, we ſee, ready to face down and defy her Rival; whom till now ſhe was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repreſs this laſt effort of her inſolence by another paſſage from the *Sermons* quoted once or twice already.

—" We have been told, and with airs of ſuperior knowledge, " that theſe pretended attributes, as they are commonly ſpecified, " and diſtinguiſhed into *natural and moral*, are a mere human fic- " tion; invented, by aid of analogy from the actions, paſſions, and " qualities obſervable in man: and that the ſimple nature of Deity " is one uniform perfection; of which, Infinity being the baſe, we " can have no diſtinct idea or conception.

" To this it will be ſufficient to reply, that it is indeed true, " that theſe ſpecific attributes, from which we deduce all our know- " ledge of the nature and will of God, are formed on analogy, and " bear relation to ourſelves. But then we ſay ſuch attributes are " not, on that account, the leſs real or eſſential. The light of the " SUN is not, in the orb itſelf, what we ſee it in the RAINBOW. " There it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze of glory: here, " we ſeparate its Perfection into the various attributes of red, yel- " low, blue, purple, and what elſe the ſubtle optician ſo nicely di- " ſtinguiſhes. But ſtill the *ſolar* light is not leſs real in the Rainbow, " where its rays become thus untwiſted, and each differing thread " diſtinctly ſeen in its effect, than while they remained united and " incorporated with one another in the Sun. Juſt ſo it is with " the divine Nature: it is one ſimple individual Perfection in the " Godhead himſelf: but when refracted and divaricated, in paſſing " through

" through the medium of the human mind, it becomes power, juſtice, " mercy; which are all ſeparately and ADEQUATELY repreſented to " the underſtanding *." But that his Lordſhip ſo frequently diſcards his own principles, I ſhould hope he would ſubmit to this Illuſtration, ſince he owns *that we ſee the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light* †.

It is a true light then and not a falſe: and the knowledge it conveys is real, not fantaſtic: For mirrors are not wont to reflect the ſpecies of the mind's viſions, but things exterior and ſubſtantial. To turn us, therefore, from God's *attributes*, (though the indirect, yet the well-defined, Image of him) becauſe they diſcover ſomething to us we may not like, a HELL and a FUTURE JUDGMENT; to turn us, I ſay, from theſe, to the *undefined eternal reaſon*, is doing like certain French Philoſophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the Priſm by which it was demonſtrated.

And now, Sir, to conclude my long Letter. Who is there that deſerves the name of MAN, and will not own, that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE; juſt as the *natural attributes* make him revered and adorable?—— What is his Lordſhip's quarrel with the GOD of MOSES and PAUL, but that he is made *unamiable*, and repreſented without *goodneſs* or *juſtice? Their God*, therefore, he expreſſly tells us, *ſhall not be his God.* Well then: He has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by ſuch a Workman, a God of infinite goodneſs and juſtice. No ſuch matter: Theſe qualities come not out of his Loreſhip's hands; ſo, cannot enter into the compoſition of his God: They are *barely* NAMES *that men give to various manifeſtations of the infinite wiſdom of one ſimple uncompounded Being.* The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews

* The Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in a courſe of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn. Vol. i. p. 57, 58. 8vo. [Vol. v. p. 34, 35. of this Edition.]

† Vol. v. p. 524.

afforded

afforded his Lordſhip a commodious cavil; for he had RELIGION to remove out of his way: But when he came to erect NATURALISM in its ſtead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own Idol.

Honeſt Plutarch, though a Prieſt, was as warm an enemy to PRIEST-CRAFT as his Lordſhip. He derives all the evils of Superſtition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God *infinitely good and juſt*. And propoſes this knowledge as the only cure for Superſtition. This is conſiſtent. But what would the ancient World have thought of their Philoſopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodneſs and juſtice at all.

NATURE tells us, that the thing moſt deſirable is the knowledge of a God whoſe goodneſs and juſtice gives to every man according to his works. His LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON or NATURAL RELIGION diſcovers to us no ſuch God. Now, if both ſpeak truth, How much are we indebted to REVELATION! Which, when *natural Religion* failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and juſt; and gives us an adequate idea of thoſe attributes! I ſay no more than his Lordſhip has confeſſed.—*Chriſtianity*, ſays he, DISCOVERS *the love of God to man*; *his infinite* JUSTICE *and* GOODNESS *.

Is this a bleſſing to be rejected? His Lordſhip has no room to ſay ſo, ſince the diſcovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own Principles, it only could be made. He pretends, "We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God but from his *works*. By theſe, *he ſays*, we gain the idea of his *phyſical attributes*; and if there be any thing in his *works* which ſeems to contradict thoſe attributes, 'tis only ſeeming. For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vaniſh. It is not ſo, he ſays, with regard to the *moral attributes*. There are ſo many *phænomena* which contradict theſe, and occaſion difficulties

* Vol. v. p. 532.

never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an *adequate* idea of the *moral attributes*." Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordſhip's aſſertions are ſo extravagant, that they will not even admit a ſuppoſition of their truth, though it be only for argument's ſake), What does it effect but this, *additional credit to Revelation?* The *phyſical difficulties* clear up as we advance in our knowledge of *Nature*, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the *moral difficulties* never clear up, becauſe they riſe out of the *Whole Syſtem* of God's moral diſpenſation; which is involved in clouds and darkneſs, impenetrable to mortal ſight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The aſſiſtance muſt come from another quarter. It muſt come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Diſpenſation. Well; *Revelation* hath drawn this veil, and ſo removed the darkneſs which obſtructed our attaining an *adequate* idea of the *moral* attributes. Shall we yet ſtand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordſhip's own principles, ſtill with-hold our aſſent? Undoubtedly you muſt. Beware (ſays he) of a pretended Revelation. Why ſo? "Becauſe the Religion of "nature is perfect and abſolute: and therefore Revelation can "teach nothing but what Religion hath already taught *." Strange! Why, *Revelation* teaches thoſe *moral* attributes; which you, my Lord, own, *natural Religion* does not teach—Here the dialogue breaks off.

"Dic aliquem ſodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem·
"Hæremus—"

And here, we are like to ſtick. His Lordſhip leaves us in a Riddle. Will you have the ſolution? It is fooliſh enough; as ſuch kind of things generally are. But if you kept your good humour, which, I confeſs, is difficult amidſt all theſe provocations of impiety, it is enough to make you laugh. I told you before, that his Lordſhip

* Vol v. p. 544.

borrowed

borrowed all his reaſoning againſt Revelation from ſuch as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This ſolemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the ſuperſeded uſe of Revelation, he delivers to us juſt as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who held, that natural Religion taught both the *moral attributes* and a *future ſtate*, had ſome pretence for ſaying that *it was perfect and abſolute*. But what pretence has his Lordſhip to ſay it after him, who holds that natural Religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refuſed no arms againſt REVELATION; and the too eager purſuit of this his old enemy through thick and thin has led him into many of theſe ſcrapes.

I have now conſidered all I could find urged by the Noble Writer in ſupport of his great principle of NO ADEQUATE IDEAS OF GOD'S MORAL ATTRIBUTES: on which the whole ſyſtem of NATURALISM is, and muſt be, founded: and you ſee to what this *all* amounts: If I ſhould ſay to juſt nothing, I ſhall ſpeak more favourably of it than it deſerves; for it tends, as I have ſhewn you, in many inſtances, to confirm the great TRUTH it is brought to overthrow. And now what I propoſed for the ſubject of this ſecond Letter is pretty well exhauſted. My firſt was employed in giving you a ſpecimen of his TEMPER; This undertakes to explain his SYSTEM; and I reſerve the two next for a diſplay of his marvellous TALENTS; though, it is true, I have a little anticipated the Subject. For you cannot but have conceived already a very uncommon idea of his abilities, on ſeeing him uſe TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS *againſt Revelation*, and *for the perfection of Natural Religion*, along with his OWN PRINCIPLES of *no moral attributes* and *no future State*. The firſt of which principles makes one entire abſurdity of all he borrows from Tindal againſt Revelation; and the ſecond takes away the very pretence for perfection in natural Religion.

His Lordſhip's friend, SWIFT, has ſomewhere or other obſerved, that no ſubject in all nature but Religion could have advanced Toland and Aſgill into the claſs of reputable Authors. Another of his

friends ſeems to think that no ſubject but Religion could have ſunk his Lordſhip ſo far below it: IF EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES (ſays Pope), IT WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINITY *. But this is the ſtrange fate of Authors, whether with wit, or without, when they chuſe to write on certain ſubjects. For it is with Authors, as with Men: Who can gueſs *which Veſſel was made for honour, and which for diſhonour*, when ſometimes one and the ſame is made for both? Even this choice Veſſel of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordſhip's ſacred pages, may be put to very different uſes, according to the different tempers in which they chance to find his few Admirers and the Public; like the *China Jordan* in the DUNCIAD, which one Hero piſſed into, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

I am, *&c.*

* Pope's Works, Vol. ix. Letter xiv.

LETTER

LETTER III.

LET me firſt claim your thanks for ſparing You ſo long on the chapter of Lord BOLINGBROKE; and then aſk, what You now think of this Paper-Meteor, which ſo flames and ſparkles, and, while it kept at diſtance (like a Comet, traverſing the celeſtial Orbs, and domineering over the eſtabliſhed Syſtem), drew after it the admiring Croud; divided in their opinions between the preſage of ſuperſtitious Divines who ſaw it threaten peſtilence and ruin to the world beneath, and the more philoſophic determination of his Followers who judged it was to recreate and revive the dryneſs and ſterility of exhauſted Nature.

But your love of Mankind makes you view this ſtrange Phænomenon with horror. Is it for this, you ſay, that ſuch a torrent of abuſe has been poured out upon every private Character, upon every public Order, upon every branch of Learning, and upon every Inſtitution of Religion?—They were not poured out at hazard, for all theſe Things ſtood in his way: they were not poured out in vain, for they are given for *Arguments*, and will, I make no doubt, be ſo received.

The wiſe Quintilian, it is true, has obſerved, *Propriam* MODERATIONEM QUÆDAM CAUSÆ *deſiderant*. And it muſt be confeſſed, that if ever *Moderation*, or temperance of expreſſion, became an Author, or was well ſuited to his Diſcourſe, it was when the purpoſe of his Work, like that of his Lordſhip's, was to overturn all

ESTAB-

ESTABLISHED RELIGION, founded in the belief of a Sovereign Maſter, ſupremely *juſt* and *good*; and all AUTHENTIC LEARNING, employed for the defence of ſuch Religion: and, on their ruins, to erect NATURALISM, inſtead of real Theiſm, and a FIRST PHILOSOPHY, inſtead of real Science. When, I ſay, a Writer had thought fit to inſult the common ſentiments of Mankind on points eſteemed ſo eſſential to their well-being, common policy as well as common decency required that it ſhould be done by the moſt winning inſinuation and addreſs; and not by calling MADMAN, KNAVE, FOOL, and BLASPHEMER, every man who would not take his Syſtem upon truſt.

But ſuperior Genius's have always thought themſelves above the reſtraint of rules. *Tully* obſerves that ARCESILAS, fitted by a turbulence of temper to confound the peace and overturn the eſtabliſhed order of things, had done that miſchief in PHILOSOPHY which TIBERIUS GRACCHUS had projected in the REPUBLIC *. But his Lordſhip, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and ſhine an *Arceſilas* and a *Gracchus* too.

His ill ſucceſs in buſineſs made him turn his great talents from POLITICS to PHILOSOPHY. But he had not yet mortified that Ambition which was always prompting him to aſpire at Superiority: and he carried with him that ſufficiency and thoſe reſentments which had proved ſo ill ſuited to the Cabinets of Princes, into the Cloſet of the Philoſopher. We may add, that he entered upon *Letters* in an advanced age; and this ſtill further viciated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully obſerves, theſe untimely adventurers are extremely ſubject. ΟΨΙΜΑΘΕΙΣ *autem homines ſcis* QUAM INSOLENTES *ſint:* "You know, ſays he, "how INSOLENT thoſe men generally are, who come late to their "book."

But now having given you *my* thoughts of his Lordſhip's aſſuming temper, it would be unfair not to give you *his own*. He had

* Tum exortus eſt, ut in Optima Rep. Ti. Gracchus qui etiam perturbaret, ſic Arceſilas, qui *conſtitutam* Philoſophiam everteret.

kept,

kept, it ſeems, ill company; and his natural candor and modeſty had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own ſtory: "I grow "very apt to assume, by converſing ſo much with Eccleſias- "tical Writers, who aſſume much oftener than they prove *."

But whatever cauſes concurred to form this over-bearing humour, certain it is, that his contempt of others was become ſo habitual to him, that it operates where no reaſonable provocation can be aſſigned. I have ſhewn you, in my firſt Letter, at what a rate, his diſguſt to the Morals, and his averſion to the Sanctions, of the Gospel diſpoſed him to treat all who had contributed to propagate or to ſupport *Revelation*. But how the honeſt Pagans of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a *future ſtate* than himſelf, is a little hard to conceive.

Yet Pythagoras, he tells you, was a turbulent Fellow, and a fanatical ſubverter of States.

Nor did Plato's *delirious brains* † ſecure him from becoming, on occaſion, a paultry Cheat, and a mercenary Flatterer. For almoſt all his *Madmen* are *Knaves* into the bargain. But Plato had made himſelf obnoxious to his Lordſhip, by the *blaſphemous* title he had given to the *firſt Cauſe*; in which his *delirious brains* could find nothing but a first good: ſo that he was to be ſtigmatized as the Ring-leader of that wicked Sect who aſcribe *moral attributes* to the Deity.

Even Socrates, whoſe glory it was, as Tully aſſures us, to take Philosophy out of the Clouds, and bring it down to dwell amongſt Cities and Men, *ſubſtituted* (in his Lordſhip's opinion) *fantaſtic, for real knowledge* ‡—*and entertained and propagated* theological *and* metaphysical *notions which are not, moſt certainly, parts of* natural theology §. We underſtand his Lordſhip very well. He means a *particular* Providence and a *future* State, the *moral* attributes of the Deity and the *ſubſtantiality* of the Soul.

* Vol. iv. p. 504. † Vol. iv. p. 88. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 112.
§ Vol. iv. p. 122.

This

This apparently is *the fantaſtic knowledge which makes no part of natural Theology.*

Nor could his own SENECA, though ſo ſerviceable * to him in his *Exile*, eſcape the nick-name of THE STOICAL FOP: A character indeed, which, in the diſcourſe referred to at the bottom, Seneca has enabled his Follower moſt admirably to ſuſtain.

When theſe Pagan Heroes fare no better, who would be concerned for Church-men? or think much to hear CYPRIAN called a *Liar and a Madman* †; JEROM a *ſurly foul-mouthed Bully*; *and* EPIPHANIUS, *an Idiot?*

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—PAUL and PLATO bear their crimes in their countenance: The *Goſpel of peace*, he tells us, diſcloſed nothing but *Murders*; and the idea of a *firſt Good* occaſioned all our complaints of *evil*. But what had SCIPIO done, or REGULUS, to incur his diſpleaſure? They were neither *artificial Theologers*, nor yet *crazy Metaphyſicians*; but plain, ſober, Stateſmen. His Lordſhip's quarrel, we know, is with DIVINITY in all its forms; but he profeſſes to admire the *moral Virtues*. And if there be any of higher dignity than the reſt, and in which his Lordſhip would be more deſirous to ſhine, they muſt needs be CHASTITY and GOOD FAITH,

"CUI, *Pudor*, *et* Juſtitiæ ſoror,
"INCORRUPTA *Fides*," &c. &c.

Yet he wreſts all his reading to deprive thoſe two brave Romans of their Glory; ſo nobly earned, and ſo generouſly paid, by the univerſal voice of all ages. I am not ignorant of that childiſh infirmity of our nature, the fondneſs of ingroſſing to ourſelves thoſe ſhining qualities, with which we happen to be dazzled; but every one will acquit his Lordſhip of ſo impotent a project: Much leſs would I ſuppoſe him capable of thinking, that SCIPIO and REGULUS may be ſtill the great men they have been accounted, though ſtained all over with *luſt* and *perfidy*.

* See his Lordſhip's tract, intituled, *Reflections on Exile*.

† Vol. iv. p. 407.

It

It is true, indeed, the new Hiſtorian of Great Britain, another of theſe *firſt philoſophy-men* (for the eſſence of the Sect conſiſting in paradox, it doth as well in *Hiſtory* as *Divinity*), he, I ſay, tells us, that it will admit of a doubt, whether *ſeverity of manners alone, and abſtinence from pleaſure, can deſerve the name of Virtue* *. But then he is as ſingular in his notions of *Religion*. He holds but two ſpecies of it in all Nature, *Superſtition* and *Fanaticiſm*: And under one or other of them, he gives you to underſtand †, the whole of *Chriſtian profeſſion* is, and ever was, included. On the Church of *England*, indeed, he is ſo indulgent, to beſtow *all* that Religion has to give: for when he ſets it againſt *Popery*, it is *Fanaticiſm*: but as often as it faces about, and is oppoſed to the *Puritans*, it then becomes *Superſtition*; and this as conſtantly as the occaſions return.

You will ſay I grow partial to his Lordſhip, in appearing ſo anxious for his reputation, while Your two favourite characters lye expiring under his pen. Never fear it. They have not lived ſo long to die of a fright. When his Lordſhip bluſters we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that *Antiquity* he has been abuſing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I ſhall have only the trouble of tranſcribing the defence of SCIPIO againſt his Lordſhip's ſuſpicions, as I find it in an expoſtulatory Letter to him, on his recent treatment of a deceaſed friend.——

"*The reputation of the firſt Scipio* (ſays his Lordſhip) *was not ſo* "*clear and uncontroverted in* PRIVATE *as in public life*; *nor was he* "*allowed by all to be a man of ſuch ſevere virtue as he affected, and as* "*that age required. Nævius was thought to mean him, in ſome verſes* "*Gellius has preſerved*; *and* VALERIUS ANTIAS *made no ſcruple to* "*aſſert, that, far from reſtoring the fair Spaniard to her family, he de-*"*bauched and kept her* ‡. One would have hoped ſo mean a ſlander

* *The Hiſtory of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 200. 4to, printed at Edinb. 1754.

† See his Hiſtory throughout.

‡ P. 204, of the *Idea of a Patriot King*.

" might have ſlept forgotten in the dirty corner of a Pedant's *
" Common-place. And yet we ſee it quoted as a fact by an In-
" ſtructor of Kings. Who knows but at ſome happy time or other,
" when a writer wants to prove that *real* FRIENDSHIP becomes a
" great man as little as *real chaſtity* †, this *advertiſement* ‡ of yours
" may be advanced to the ſame dignity of credit with the calumny
" of *Valerius Antias*. If it ſhould, I would not undertake to diſ-
" pute the fact on which ſuch an inference might be made; for, I
" remember, Tully, a great Stateſman himſelf, long ago obſerved,
" VERÆ AMICITIÆ *difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in Republica ver-*
" *ſantur*.—But the words of Nævius were theſe:

" *Etiam qui res magnas manus ſæpe geſſit glorioſe,*
" *Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud gentes ſolus*
" *Præſtat: eum ſuus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit.*

" Theſe obſcure verſes were, in *Gellius's* opinion, the ſole foundation
" of Antias's calumny, againſt the univerſal concurrence of Hiſto-
" rians §. And what Gellius thought of this hiſtorian's modeſty
" and truth, we may collect from what he ſays of him in another
" place. Where having quoted two tribunitial Decrees, which,
" he tells us, he tranſcribed from Records [*ex annalium monumentis*],
" he adds that *Valerius Antias* made no ſcruple to give them the
" lie in public ||. And Livy quoting this *Antias*, for the particu-
" lars of a victory, ſubjoins concerning the number ſlain **,—*but*
" *there is little credit to be afforded this writer, who, of all Hiſto-*
" *rians, is the moſt given to amplify*. And he who will enlarge on

* A. Gellius. † See p. 201, of the *Patriot King*.

‡ Advertiſement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the *Patriot King*.

§ *His ego verſibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem* ADVERSUM CETEROS OMNES *ſcriptores de* SCIPIONIS *moribus ſenſiſſe*.

‖ *Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc decretorum memoriam contraque auctoritates veterum annalium—dixit*, &c. L. vii. c. 19.

** *Scriptori parum fidei fit, quia in augendo non alius intemperantior eſt*. Lib. xxxvi.

" one

" one occaſion will diminiſh on another; for it is the ſame impo-
" tence of temper which carries him indifferently to either *."

REGULUS's virtue falls next under his Lordſhip's cenſure: " I
" know not (ſays he) whether Balbus would have called in queſtion
" the STORY OF REGULUS. Vid. *Au. Gellium.* It was probably
" fabulous, in many circumſtances at leaſt, and there were thoſe
" amongſt the Romans who thought it to be ſo †." Would not any one now imagine, by his bringing *Au. Gellius* again upon the ſtage, that there was another *Valerius Antias* in reſerve, to depoſe againſt REGULUS likewiſe? Juſt the contrary. The Grammarian, in the IVth Chapter of his VIth Book, confirms the common ſtory, with an addition of the teſtimonies of the Hiſtorians *Tubero* and *Tuditanus*. The truth however is, that his Lordſhip had his Voucher, though he was ſhy of producing him. It was the reſpectable Mr. TOLAND; to whom his Lordſhip is much indebted for better things. Amongſt the poſthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a *Diſſertation*, intitled, *The fabulous death of Atilius Regulus:* in which, from a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, preſerved by *Conſtantinus Porphyrogenitus*, he endeavours to prove, againſt all the Roman writers, with *Cicero* at their head, that *Regulus* did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to ſo ſevere a trial; but this was enough for his Lordſhip, to call in queſtion the whole ſtory; and to add, that *there were thoſe amongſt the* ROMANS *who thought it to be fabulous.* Unluckily, the *Roman* writers are unanimous for the truth of the ſtory. How then ſhall we account for his Lordſhip's aſſertion? Did he take Diodorus Siculus for a Latin writer, becauſe he had not ſeen him in Greek? Or did he underſtand *A. Gellius* as quoting *Tubero* and *Tuditanus* for doubters of the common ſtory?

* *A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotiſm, the Idea of a Patriot King, and the State of Parties*, &c.

† Vol. v. p. 406.

As we ſee little reaſon therefore to diſſent from the general opinion, and much leſs to join his Lordſhip againſt it, let SCIPIO and REGULUS ſtill preſerve their rank in our eſteem and admiration. For as an excellent French writer, in a Letter to his Lordſhip, well obſerves, "C'eſt être vertueux que de rendre à la beauté des mœurs "l'hommage d'amour et de reſpect, qui lui eſt dû."

His Lordſhip's ambition was uniform and ſimple: it was only, as we ſaid, *to be at the head of things*. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain Counterfeits and Pretenders, who had, ſomehow or other, got into the throne of Science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But theſe, as it was fitting, he unmaſks and depoſes.

"SELDEN, GROTIUS, PUFFENDORF, and CUMBERLAND (ſays "his Lordſhip), ſeem to be great writers, by much the ſame right "as he might be called a great traveller, who ſhould go from "London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope *." I can hardly think they took ſo large a compaſs. But let us truſt to the Proverb: They and his Lordſhip will prove it between them: He ſhews us a ready road indeed, but it leads to ATHEISM; whereas, if they take us a little *about*, they bring us the *neareſt way home* to RELIGION.

He profeſſes "a thorough contempt for the whole buſineſs of "the learned lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USHER, "and MARSHAM †." This was natural. He owed them nothing. But thoſe to whom he is moſt indebted have no better quarter.

MARCILIUS FICINUS, he calls the *beſt Interpreter of Plato*; but, at the ſame time, aſſures us, he was *perfectly delirious*. But why, you aſk, is *Ficinus the beſt Interpreter of Plato*, ſince *J. Scaliger*, who knew ſomething of the matter, ſays, that *he ſtript his Maſter of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags?* For a good reaſon; *Ficinus* taught his Lordſhip all he knew of Platoniſm. But

* Vol. v. p. 68. † Vol. ii. p. 261, 262.

why

why is he then *perfectly delirious?* For a better ſtill: he holds opinions already condemned by his Lordſhip.

His very favorite BARROW, he tells us, "goes on a long while "begging the queſtion, and talking in a theological cant MORE "WORTHY OF PAUL than of a man like him *—flimzy ſtuff, which "a man is obliged to vend, when he puts on a black gown and "band †."

LOCKE and NEWTON, he inſinuates, were the Men: Nay, ſuch is his humility, that he puts himſelf to ſchool to *Locke*. Yet this does not ſecure his Maſter from being mighty liable to a PHILOSOPHICAL DELIRIUM ‡. And as for NEWTON, the APPLICATION *of his Philoſophy is grown, or growing into ſome abuſe* §. Would you know how? By affording CLARKE and BAXTER the principles whereby to demonſtrate, *that the Soul is an immaterial ſubſtance*. An *abuſe* indeed!

But as for his Maſter—and BACON too, *as much as he admires them, he is not blind to their errors; but can, without being dazzled, diſcern* SPOTS IN THESE SUNS.——

Before I go any further, I dare venture a wager that I know what thoſe ſpots are. They are, or I am much miſtaken, the ſtains of *Faith* and the impurities of *Revelation*. But let us hear him. "I "can diſcern a tincture, and ſometimes more than a tincture, in "BACON, of thoſe falſe notions, which we are APT TO IMBIBE as "MEN, as INDIVIDUALS, as MEMBERS OF SOCIETY, and as SCHO-"LARS. I can diſcern in LOCKE ſometimes ill-abſtracted and ill-"determined ideas, from which a wrong application of words pro-"ceeds; and propoſitions to which *I can, by no means, aſſent*. I con-"feſs further, that I have been, and ſtill am at a loſs, to find any "appearance of CONSISTENCY in an author, who publiſhed a COM-"MENTARY ON THE EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL, and a treatiſe on the "REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY (which he endeavours to "prove by fact and by argument) AFTER having ſtated clearly as

* Vol. iv. p. 278. † Vol. v. p. 361. ‡ Vol. iii. p. 442.
§ Vol. iii. p. 374.

"he

" he has done the conditions and meaſures of hiſtorical probability;
" AND AFTER having written as ſtrongly as he has done againſt the
" abuſe of words *." Did not I tell you ſo!

——" This SUN's ſick too;
" Shortly he'll be an EARTH;"

as the Poet has it, in his deſcription of the peſtilence at Thebes; not more fatal to great Cities than this bloated Vapour of a *firſt Philoſophy*, which mimics, and, as it reflects, deſiles this SUN of Science, and turns Nature into Prodigy;

Et SOLEM geminum et duplices ſe oſtendere THEBAS, &c.

But his Lordſhip's account of his other *Luminary*, BACON, is ſtill more extraordinary—He *thinks he diſcerns in him a tincture, and more than a tincture of thoſe falſe notions, which we are apt to imbibe as* MEN, *as* INDIVIDUALS, as MEMBERS OF SOCIETY, *and as* SCHOLARS.—That is, as *Men*, we are apt to think we have a SOUL; as *Individuals*, we are in expectation of a FUTURE STATE; as *Members of Society*, we are inclined to reverence the ESTABLISHED RELIGION; and as *Scholars*, we are taught to *reaſon*, and not to HARANGUE. If any of his Lordſhip's Followers can give a better account of this Oracular paſſage, I am very ready to reſign the office of his Commentator.

In truth, his Lordſhip deals by RELIGION, and its Advocates, as a certain French Author, I have read, does by ALCHEMY and the hermetic Philoſophers: he brings almoſt every great name into the number; and, after having entertained his reader much at their expence, concludes each various eulogy alike,——" Now his folly " was in hoping to extract GOLD from *baſer metals*:" juſt as the folly of all his Lordſhip's *Alchemiſts* is the hope of bettering *human nature* by GRACE.

You now, Sir, may underſtand, how well the diſpoſition of his mind and temper was fitted to his Syſtem. It often happens, that

* Vol. iv. p. 166.

men

men who arraign Religion, have been firſt arraigned by it; and their defiance of Truth is only a repriſal upon Conſcience. Under theſe circumſtances it is no wonder they ſhould go to work much out of humour; though it be in an affair which requires perfect tranquillity, and freedom from all perturbations. But his Lordſhip has the miſerable advantage of being the firſt who has written under one unintermitting fit of rage and reſentment. In this ſtate, like a man in a fever whom no poſture can eaſe, whom no ſituation can accommodate, he is angry at PHILOSOPHERS for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at DIVINES for believing without explaining: Well then, they change hands; the *Philoſopher* believes, and the *Divine* explains. No matter. He is angry ſtill. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper ſubject of my Letter.

You would know, you ſay, with what abilities he ſupports his Syſtem.

The attacks upon Religion have been always carried on like War, by *ſtratagem* and *force*. I ſhall therefore firſt ſpeak of his *Arts*, and then of his *Powers* of controverſy.

It has been obſerved how cloſely, and how humbly too, he copies the FREE-THINKERS who went before him, even to the ſtaleſt of their paultry ſtratagems.

When FREE-THINKING firſt went upon its Miſſion, the PUBLIC were not diſpoſed to underſtand raillery on a ſubject of ſuch importance: ſo that it is poſſible there might be found, amongſt the more early of theſe our Anti-Apoſtles, a Confeſſor or two to the glorious cauſe of Infidelity. This put their Succeſſors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to affect it. From henceforth you hardly ſaw an Infidel-book which was not introduced with a myſterious reſerve; with the obligations the Reader had to theſe ſervants of truth, for venturing ſo far in his ſervice, while the Secular arm hung ſo fearfully over them; with the diſadvantages their cauſe now lay under, while it could be but half explained and half ſupported; and with the wonders they would do by Powers they had

had in reſerve, when a little more *Chriſtian Liberty* ſhould ſuffer them to be drawn out. This miſerable Crambe made ſo conſtant a part of our diet, and had been diſhed out from time to time with ſo little variety, that it grew both offenſive and ridiculous; for what could more provoke our ſpleen or our laughter than to feign an apprehenſion of the Magiſtrate's reſentment, after they had written at their eaſe for almoſt a whole century together, with the moſt uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In ſuch a ſtate of things, would you eaſily believe his Lordſhip could pride himſelf in cooking up this cold kitchen-ſtuff, and ſerving it again and again, amidſt ſo elegant an entertainment. "GASSENDI (ſays he) apprehended enemies much more formidable "than mere Philoſophers, becauſe armed with eccleſiaſtical and "civil power. It is this fear which has hindered thoſe who have "combated ERROR in all ages, and who COMBAT IT STILL, from "taking all the ADVANTAGES which a FULL EXPOSITION OF THE "TRUTH would give them. Their adverſaries triumph as if the "goodneſs of their cauſe had given them the Victory, when nothing "has prevented their ENTIRE DEFEAT, or reduced their conteſt to "a drawn battle, except this, that they have employed Arms of "every kind, fair and foul, without any reſerve; while the others "have employed their offenſive weapons with MUCH RESERVE, "and have even BLUNTED THEIR EDGE when they uſed them *."

"The adverſaries [of Religion] (ſays he again) ſeldom ſpeak out, "or puſh the inſtances and arguments they bring, ſo far as THEY "MIGHT BE CARRIED. Inſtead of which theſe ORTHODOX BUL-"LIES affect to triumph over men who employ but part of their "ſtrength †, &c."

What it is, which his Lordſhip, who affects to tread in the ſteps of theſe cautious men, keeps thus hid and is ſo ſhy of producing, is not eaſy to gueſs. But

"Sous cet air capable où l'on ne comprend rien,
"S'il cache un honnête homme, il ſe cache tres-bien."

* Vol. iv. p. 163. † Vol. iii. p. 273.

However,

However, having (after his Maſters) thus feigned a fear, he feigns all the obliquity and doubling, which fear produces. He profeſſes to believe the Miſſion of Chriſt, though founded on the Diſpenſation of Moſes, a Diſpenſation he ridicules and execrates: He profeſſes to believe the doctrines of Chriſt, though he rejects his gift of life and immortality: He profeſſes to believe him the Saviour of the world, though he laughs at the doctrine of Redemption which conſtitutes the eſſence of that character.

Well fare the New *Hiſtorian of Great Britain*; who having writ without controul againſt Miracles, and even the very Being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the bleſſing; and owns that *We now enjoy* TO THE FULL *that liberty of the Preſs which is ſo* NECESSARY *in every Monarchy confined by legal limitations* *. Nor is it, let me tell you, the worſt part of the obſervation, that though the *Monarch* ſhould be *confined by legal limitations*, yet the *Writer for the Preſs* ſhould not.

It would be endleſs to enter into his Lordſhip's ſmall Arts of controverſy; yet it may not be amiſs to touch upon one or two of them, ſuch I mean as are of more general uſe and beſt diſpoſed for ſervice.

The firſt is, *To honour the name when you have taken away the thing:* As thus, To expreſs the higheſt devotion to GOD, when you have deprived him of his moral attributes:—the greateſt zeal for RELIGION, while you are undermining a future ſtate;—and the utmoſt reverence for REVELATION, when you have ſtript it of Miracles and Prophecies.

2. A ſecond is, *To diſhonour* Perſons *and* Opinions *the moſt reſpectable, by putting them into ill Company, or by joining them with diſcredited follies.* Thus, Divines and Atheiſts; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always ſhewn together: In like manner, The Propoſitions, *that the world was made for man*, and *that man was made for happineſs*, are to be boldly repreſented as in-

* *The Hiſtory of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 213.

ſeparable parts of the ſame Syſtem. From whence, theſe advantages follow, that if an Atheiſt be odious, a Malebranchian mad, and the propoſition of the World's being made for man, abſurd; the odium, the madneſs, and the abſurdity fall equally on the Divines, on Dr. Clarke, and on the propoſition, that man was made for happineſs.

3. A third is, *To bring the abuſe of a thing in diſcredit of the thing itſelf.* Thus the viſions of the Rabbins are made to confute JUDAISM; Popery and School-learning, to decry the diſcipline and doctrine of CHRISTIANITY: and the dreams of Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Berkeley, to confute the waking thoughts of CUDWORTH, CLARKE, WOLLASTON, and BAXTER: For his Lordſhip is juſt ſuch a Confuter of *Metaphyſics*, as that Man would be of *Ethics* or *Chemiſtry*, who ſhould content himſelf with expoſing the abſurdities of the Stoics, and the whimſies of the Alchemiſts, and yet fraudulently forget that there are ſuch Authors as CICERO and BOERHAAVE.—To overturn a FUTURE STATE, he employs all the ſuperſtitious fables of the Poets and the People concerning it: To diſcredit REVELATION, he enumerates all the Impoſtors and Pretenders to revelation in all ages: And to diſhonour DIVINE WORSHIP, he is very particular in deſcribing the Rites and Ceremonies of the antient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of Rome. In a word, you are ſure to find, on theſe occaſions, every ſort of topic, but what a ſober and intelligent Reader would require; *Conſiderations drawn from the nature of the thing itſelf.*

You expect, however, that when the ABUSES of things have done him this ſervice, ſo as to ſtand, where he has placed them, for the *things themſelves*, He would for once, at leaſt, ſpare the AUTHORS of the abuſe, if it were only for the ſake of carrying on the fraud. But you expect more than you will find. His Lordſhip can, in the ſame breath, call the abuſes of Revelation and the Goſpel, by the names of Revelation and the Goſpel, and rail at that Divine, or at that Church, which has introduced thoſe abuſes.

Thus

Thus far, for a ſpecimen of his Lordſhip's *Arts of Controverſy*. But as a good Mimic is commonly a bad Actor, and a good Juggler a bad Mechanic; ſo an artful Caviller is as often a very poor Reaſoner.

You will not be ſurprized therefore, if, in examining his Lordſhip's Philoſophic Character, under the ſeveral heads of his INGENUITY, his TRUTH, his CONSISTENCY, his LEARNING, and his REASONING, you find him not to make ſo good a figure, as in the *profeſſed arts* of Controverſy.

1. Of his INGENUITY, which comes firſt, I ſhall be very ſhort: For his *Arts of Controverſy*, of which you have had a taſte, are one continued example of it.

1. Speaking of the Chriſtians of the Apoſtolic age, he thus repreſents their character and manners. "Notwithſtanding the *ſanctity* "of their *profeſſion*, the GREATEST CRIMES, even that of INCEST, "were practiſed amongſt them *." Is it poſſible (you aſk) that his Lordſhip ſhould give credit to the exploded calumnies of the Pagans and Apoſtates here alluded to? Think better of his ſenſe: he alludes to no ſuch matter. St. PAUL is his Authority: and on the Apoſtle's accuſation he grounds his Charge. This ſurpriſes you the more. It may be ſo: for Philoſophers, as well as Poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as *Bayes* expreſſes it) to *elevate and ſurprize*. Who would not conclude from this account that the firſt Chriſtians, notwithſtanding their ſanctity, began their *profeſſion* in a total corruption of manners; and, like the Magi of old, intermarried with their Mothers and Daughters? It would never be imagined, that the ſimple fact, as St. Paul ſtates it, in his firſt and ſecond Epiſtles to the Corinthians, was but barely this. That a certain man (whether before or after his converſion we know not) had married his Father's wife; and, on the Apoſtle's reprehenſion, convinced and aſhamed of his folly, had repented and made ſatisfaction to the Church for the ſcandal he had occaſioned.

* Vol. iv. p. 513.

2. Again, this *First Philosophy* tells us, that when JESUS speaks of *legions of Angels*, it is the language of *Paganism*; but when Lord BOLINGBROKE speaks of *numberless created intelligences superior to man*, it is the language of *Nature*: for, this doctrine of INTELLIGENCES, his Lordship assures us, *is founded on what we know of actual existence. We are led to it by plain, direct, unforced* ANALOGY. But the doctrine of ANGELIC LEGIONS, if you will believe him, *stands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a* MERE POSSIBLE *existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers* THEOLOGICAL USES *. But why this different measure for himself and his friends? The last words may let us into the secret. His *Philosophical Intelligences* are a very harmless race; but the *Gospel Legions* are much given to *theological* mischief. *Ministring Angels* bring in, what he can by no means away with, a particular and *moral* providence. God's *physical* Providence, and the *civil* Providence of the Magistrate, make the only Government he can relish. Now his *Intelligences*, like Epicurus's Gods, are still, as they should be, at an idle end; but *Angels* are busy and meddling; indeed, too head-strong to be trusted under his Lordship's Philosophic Administration.

You cannot, however, but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by *Analogy*, which you had cause to believe his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into favour, and now does wonders. For, it not only opens the door to his Lordship's *Intelligences*, by a *plain, direct, and unforced* application, but, as you will see under the next head, it shuts it against Jesus Christ's.

3. "I only intend to shew (says his Lordship) that since men "have not admitted, in favour of Revelation, a System of PHYSICS "that is inconsistent with philosophic truth, there is no reason for "admitting, in favour of the same revelation, a System of PNEU-"MATICS that is so too †."

* Vol. iv. p. 179.

† Vol. iv. p. 181.

Now

Now the Friends of Revelation ſay, this is a mere begging the queſtion. The reaſoning, when fairly repreſented, ſtands thus—"Divines reject the Scripture Syſtem of PHYSICS, which THEY hold to be falſe; therefore, they ſhould reject the Scripture-Syſtem of PNEUMATICS, which HIS LORDSHIP holds to be falſe."—Indeed, they conceive the argument to be no better than if one ſhould ſay, —becauſe Politicians, in ſpeaking of the firſt ſource of civil regimen, have called it the *primum mobile*, alluding to the old erroneous Syſtem of *Aſtronomy*; and becauſe they have talked too of *a balance of Power*, alluding to the true principles of *Mechanics*; therefore, if we reject their Syſtem of *Aſtronomy*, we ſhould reject their Syſtem of *Mechanics* likewiſe.

II. Thus much for this noble Philoſopher's *Ingenuity*. Give me leave to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of his TRUTH, the very Soul of Philoſophy.

1. "The Chriſtian Theology (ſays he) has derived a prophane "licence from the Jewiſh, which Divines have rendered ſo familiar "and ſo habitual, that Men BLASPHEME without knowing they "blaſpheme, and that their very devotion is IMPIOUS. The licence "I mean is that of reaſoning and of ſpeaking of the divine, as of "the human, nature, operations, and proceedings; ſometimes "with, and ſometimes without the ſalvo of thoſe diſtinguiſhing "epithets and forms of ſpeech, which can, in very few inſtances, "diſtinguiſh enough. The Jewiſh Scriptures aſcribe to God, not "only corporeal appearance, but corporeal action, and all the in-"ſtruments of it; eyes to ſee, ears to ear, mouth and tongue to "articulate, hands to handle, and feet to walk. DIVINES TELL "US INDEED that we are not to underſtand all this according to "the LITERAL ſignification. The meaning is, they ſay, that God "has a power to execute all thoſe acts, to the effecting of which, "theſe parts, in us, are inſtrumental. The literal ſignification is, "indeed, abominable, and the FLIMSY ANALOGICAL VEIL, thrown

"over

" over it, is ſtolen from the wardrobe of EPICURUS; for he taught, " that the Gods had not literally bodies, but ſomething like to " bodies, *quaſi corpus:* not blood, but ſomething like to blood, " *quaſi ſanguinem* *."

" DIVINES ſay, that God has no body nor any thing like to body, but is IMMATERIAL. Epicurus ſaid, that his God had not a groſs earthly body, but ſomething like to that body, and was MATERIAL. Yet " Divines have ſtolen their *flimſy analogical veil* from the wardrobe of *Epicurus*." Truly a very ſubtle theft; which extracts MATTER from *figurative expreſſion!* and well ſuited to his Lordſhip's leger-de-main, which draws an *analogical veil* out of a *metaphor*. Indeed, to fit it the better to *Epicurus's wardrobe*, he makes it but a *flimſy one*.

But let us now obſerve the various ſhifts he was reduced to, in order to ſupport his principal calumny, that *Divines ſtole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godhead*. He ſays, when the Jewiſh Scriptures had given GOD a Body, the Divines found out that it was not to be underſtood literally. They had been ſtrange Divines had they not found it out, when theſe Scriptures declare that GOD is a SPIRIT, or *immaterial*; in contradiſtinction to *body* or MATTER. And the beſt of it is, that in other places (as we have ſeen juſt before) his Lordſhip quarrels with the Scriptures on this very account, for their Syſtem of PNEUMATICS. Now what could theſe Divines conclude, but that where the Scriptures deſcribe God's actions, in accommodation to the groſs conceptions of men, they are to be underſtood figuratively? But this would not ſerve his Lordſhip's purpoſe; which was, to convict the Divines of nonſenſe and prevarication. He, therefore, turns, what every body elſe calls METAPHOR, which is a figure of ſpeech, into ANALOGY, which is a mode of reaſoning,—*a flimſy analogical veil:* and Epicurus's ANALOGY (that the Gods had not earthly bodies but ſomething like them, that is to ſay, *material*) he turns into a METAPHOR. *Epicurus* (ſays he) *taught that the Gods had not* LI-

* Vol. v. p. 519.

TERALLY

TERALLY *bodies*. Epicurus's queſtion was not about literal or figurative expreſſion; but about ſimilar and diſſimilar things.—— But You have enough, You ſay, of this great Reſtorer of TRUTH, and Reformer of REASON. I will therefore be as ſhort as poſſibly I can, on this head.

2. THE JEWS (his Lordſhip tells us) SUPPOSED CRUELTY TO BE ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY *.—Theſe very Jews themſelves ſay, That *the Lord is gracious and full of compaſſion; ſlow to anger, and of great mercy:* That *he is good to all; and his tender mercies are over* ALL HIS WORKS †: That *his mercy endureth for* EVER ‡: That *the* EARTH *is full of the goodneſs and mercy of the Lord* §: That *his mercy is from* EVERLASTING TO EVERLASTING ||. —Now, which of them will You believe?

3. "Superſtition (ſays his Lordſhip) impersonated *Chance* under "the name of FORTUNE: and this chimerical Divinity was ſup-"poſed to direct arbitrarily all the events, whoſe cauſes were not "apparent, or which exceeded in good or ill the expectations of "men. The Heathens accounted by it for paſt events; con-"ſulted it about future; and referred themſelves to it in doubtful "caſes. It is ſtrange that ſuch SUPERSTITIONS, inſtead of being "confined to the Heathen world, ſhould have been as PREVALENT "amongſt God's choſen People, both Jews and Chriſtians; and "ſhould be ſcarce exploded at this hour. It is ſtranger ſtill, that "a RECOURSE TO THE DECISION OF CHANCE ſhould be expreſsly "commanded in the Old Teſtament, and occaſionally countenanced "in the New, even on ſo important an occaſion, as the election "of an Apoſtle in the place of Judas Iſcariot **."

The aſſertion, you ſee, is, 1ſt, that the *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, as well as the *Heathens*, impersonated *Chance* under the name of *Fortune*: and, 2dly, that their having recourſe to Lots was having recourſe to the deciſion of *Fortune*.

* Vol. v. p. 507.
† Pſ. cxlv. ver. 8, 9.
‡ Chron. Jer. Eſdra, Pſalms, &c.
§ Pſ. xxxiii. ver. 5. cxix. ver. 64.
|| Pſ. c. ver. 5.—ciii. ver. 17.
** Vol. iii. p. 477.

As

As to the firſt, it is ſo remote from all truth, That the cuſtom of the Jewiſh People, in referring all events to *God* and to him only and immediately, has given a handle to Spinoza, Toland, and others, to bring in queſtion the very exiſtence of an *extraordinary* providence in the Moſaic Diſpenſation; in which, to obſerve it by the way, and with the abhorrence it ought to excite, they have had too many Followers amongſt the Divines who have written againſt *The Divine Legation*.

As to the ſecond, we muſt conſider that LOTS are of three diſtinct kinds.

One ſort is a civil ballotting: of general uſe in States to prevent intrigues and partialities. SORTEM *poſuiſſent*, ſays Tacitus, *ne ambitioni aut inimicitiis locus foret*.

Another, is a ſuperſtitious appeal to the imaginary Deity, *Chance* or *Fortune*.

And there is yet another, which is a reference of the event to Heaven; and this, by God's own direction and appointment.

Of the ſecond, and only reprehenſible ſort, Revelation, as we have juſt now ſhewn, is entirely innocent.

Of the firſt, his Lordſhip, as a Politician, will not diſallow the uſe.

His quarrel, as a Philoſopher, is with the third. And he has no way to ſupport his charge, but by ſophiſtically reducing it into the ſecond; that is, repreſenting it as having all the ſuperſtition of the ſecond. Now in this he begs the queſtion.——Are the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Revelations true or falſe? Falſe, ſays his Lordſhip, for ſeveral reaſons; and, amongſt the reſt, for this, they authorize the *Pagan ſuperſtition* of LOTS.—What made the Pagan ſuperſtition of Lots? Their being the inventions of men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment.—Very well: but the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Lots were of divine appointment. Pretended to be ſo, if you pleaſe, ſays his Lordſhip; and this puts them into the condition of Pagan lots.—Softly, my Lord; Your argument muſt not take that for granted, which your argument is employed to prove.

But

But his Lordſhip had his head full of that Maſter Sophiſm of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which concludes againſt the reaſon or juſtice of a DIVINE COMMISSION from the *abuſe* of it; and becauſe ſubſequent Impoſtors pretended to the like Authority. For, according to the Logic and Theology of theſe Gentlemen, GOD muſt not caſt out DEVILS, becauſe it afterwards gave a handle for Popiſh Prieſts to juggle with their *Exorciſms*. He muſt not direct a thing to be decided by LOTS, becauſe a village-conjurer would afterwards employ the *ſieve and ſhears*. He muſt not make uſe of HUMAN INSTRUMENTS in puniſhing a People abandoned to unnatural crimes, becauſe an *Arabian Impoſtor* would afterwards pretend to the like Commiſſion. He muſt not inſtitute a multifarious RITUAL, though it was to keep a People ſeparate, and to ſecure them from the contagion of Idolatry, becauſe wicked Prieſts or Politicians would eſtabliſh *ſuperſtitious ceremonies* to keep Communities enſlaved to civil or religious Tyrants. Theſe ſcrupulous Gentlemen, when their hand was in, had done well to tell us, that GOD ſhould not have given men Riches, Knowledge, and Power, becauſe there have been ſuch as CHARTRES, SPINOZA, and MULY MOLECH.

But to go on with his Lordſhip's *veracity*.

4. He aſſerts, that *they* [the Jews] *made beaſts* ACCOUNTABLE LIKE MORAL AGENTS *. He is aware that *to mitigate this abſurdity*, as he expreſſes it, both the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Commentators ſay, that the pain inflicted on beaſts was to ſhew the heinouſneſs of human crimes—to blot out the memory of a great ſcandal—to puniſh the owner for his negligence. But he deſpiſes all theſe ſolutions, as ſo many pitiful evaſions. Would you believe now that in the ſame breath, and merely to ſhew his reading, he ſhould confute his own falſe aſſertion? *I know nothing more abſurd* (ſays he) *than this, except a cuſtom or law at* ATHENS. *The* WEAPONS *by which a murder had been committed were brought into Court; as if they, too, were liable to puniſhment; and the* STATUE *that had killed*

* Vol. v. p. 7.

a man by its fall was, by a ſolemn ſentence of that wiſe people, the Thaſii, founded on a Law of DRACO, *caſt into the ſea.* Now what was his Lordſhip to prove? That Moſes was ſo ignorant a Law-giver, and the Jews ſo ſtupid a people, that *they made beaſts accountable like moral agents.* And he illuſtrates it by a law of the moſt celebrated Legiſlator and of the politeſt People upon Earth, Draco and the Athenians; who, juſt in the ſame manner, made even *weapons and ſtatues, moral agents.* The Athenians and Draco perhaps would have ſaid, that they enacted theſe laws to ſhew their abhorrence of murder, and to puniſh the careleſs erecter of a ſtatue at a time, when in ſome of their cities there were more ſtatues than men. Mere SHIFTS AND EVASIONS, ſays his Lordſhip.

But what I chiefly wonder at is, that when his Lordſhip was in ſo good a train, he had not told us, that the Stupidity of theſe *Jews* went ſtill further, even to imagine *Walls* and *Garments* * ſubject to human Diſeaſes. Here he would have had a little truth on his ſide, and a much better ſubject for his contempt. This is only a word to the Wiſe, and for his Followers to improve upon. Let them try what they can make of it, and then they may hear further of this matter.

5. Again, "God (ſays his Lordſhip) was FORCED to indulge the "Jews in ſeveral SUPERSTITIOUS prejudices †, as learned Divines "*ſcruple not* to affirm." Had *learned Divines* no more *ſcruples* in *affirming*, than his Lordſhip, I ſhould hardly have thought them worth my defending.

What they *ſcruple not* to ſay is this—That IDOLATROUS WORSHIP was never ſo entirely corrupt, but that ſome of its Rites were ſtill rational, or, at leaſt, continued innocent; and might be uſed in the ſervice of the true God *without ſuperſtition:* That the Iſraelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the uſe of ſuch as were harmleſs; and of no other. For this, his Lordſhip calls them, *bold Judges of the principles and views of*

* Levit. chap. xiv. † Vol. iv. p. 30.

God's

God's proceedings *. But in what does their temerity consist? In teaching that God always chuses to take the ordinary means, before the extraordinary, when either may be made indifferently to serve his purpose. And that, therefore, he saw fit to indulge the Jews in their fondness for old habits; and to turn their propensities for the Egyptian Rites, upon such only as were innocent; rather than to give them new habits, and new propensities, by a miraculous impression on their minds, which should over-rule their wills and affections.

6. We know (says his Lordship) that all their [the Jews] sacred Writings were compiled after their captivity †. Balzac speaks of a certain Critic who used to boast, that nobody, besides God and himself, knew the meaning of such or such a verse in Persius. His Lordship's [we know] is just such another revelation. Only the Critic's meaning might be true; but the Philosopher's knowledge is certainly false. A falsehood so notorious, that I am in some doubt whether this stricture belong properly to his dogmatic or to his laconic style. For *we know*, may signify—*We know that the* spurious Esdras *says so.* And then he gets the two things he most wanted; a very useful Truth, and a very noble Authority.

7. "The Justice [of the great day,] (says his Lordship) if it "may be called justice, most certainly requires that rewards "and punishments should be measured out, in every particular "case, in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual. "But instead of this, it is assumed, conformably to the doctrine of "Plato, that the righteous are set on the *right hand* of the "Judge, and the wicked, on the *left*; from whence, they are "transported into Heaven, or plunged into Hell. They are tried "*individually*, they seem to be rewarded or punished *collectively*, "without any distinction of the particular cases, which have been "so solemnly determined, and without any proportion observed be-

* Vol. iv. p. 32. † Vol. iv. p. 339.

" tween the various degrees of merit and demerit, of innocence and " guilt, in the application of theſe rewards and puniſhments *."

If it may be called Juſtice—Marry, well put in. For who knows but as this is the general day of reckoning, and that men ſee, ſuch a day will be wanted, rather than be without any, they might be fooliſh enough to take up with this?—*They ſeem to be rewarded or puniſhed collectively.* Should I ſeriouſly quote the Words of Jeſus,—*The ſervant which knew his Lord's will, neither did according to his will, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes. But he, that knew not, and did commit things worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes* †; Should I ſeriouſly, I ſay, quote theſe words, to confute the noble Writer's obſervation, that men at the great Tribunal *ſeem to be rewarded or puniſhed collectively*, he would, I ſuppoſe, have been amongſt the firſt to laugh at my ſimplicity; at leaſt, the intelligent Reader would not thank me for my diligence.

III. I proceed now to his Lordſhip's CONSISTENCY; the next feature in his philoſophic Countenance. You have ſeen with what bravery he contradicts all others: you ſhall now ſee with what greater bravery, he contradicts himſelf.

There be two things which characteriſe the reaſoning part of his Lordſhip's writings (if any part of ſo declamatory a work can be called *reaſoning*), and diſtinguiſh them from all other men's; His inceſſant REPETITIONS, and his inceſſant CONTRADICTIONS. Indeed, theſe beauties beget one another. For when a Writer can furniſh out no better an entertainment than a parcel of groundleſs flams, he will be much ſubject to repetition; and every repetition as likely to be graced with a variation; for his Tales having neither foundation in Fact, nor meaſure in Truth, what is produced for admiration will be always new-modeling for convenience, as beſt ſuits his preſent paſſions and purpoſes.

His REPETITIONS I leave for the refreſhment of thoſe who are diſpoſed to read him through: This ſhort ſpecimen of his

* Vol. v. p. 495. † Luke xii. 47, 48.

CON-

CONTRADICTIONS I propoſe for the amuſement of more curſory readers.

But as *profeſſed Anſwerers* never abuſe our patience and underſtandings more than in this kind of diſcoveries; it may not be amiſs, to ſay a word or two of a ſpecies of confutation, which ſuch men are always ready to urge, on the very ſlighteſt grounds, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author confute himſelf, when the Anſwerer is unable ſo to do.

Sometimes the imaginary inconſiſtence ariſes out of the ſlow conception or cloudy apprehenſion, of the Anſwerer, when the Author is too brief or too refined: ſometimes from the leſs accurate expreſſion of the Author, when the Anſwerer is too ſubtile or too captious. It ſometimes ariſes from the Anſwerer's prejudices, and ſometimes again from the Author's prevarication.

Nay, which is ſtranger ſtill, the very exactneſs of the diſtinctions, and correctneſs of the terms (and the corrector and exacter they will be in proportion to the Author's knowledge of words and things), the more ſhall the diſcourſe abound with theſe fancied contradictions. For a heavy or a precipitate Anſwerer will never be able to diſtinguiſh things SIMILAR from things IDENTICAL.

Prejudice for a ſet of Opinions may make an Anſwerer miſtake ſome things to be in Nature, what they are only in the combinations of the Schools; and finding them conſidered differently, that is, under other aſſociations, by his Adverſary, who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call theſe differences, by the more commodious name of *contradictions*.

Laſtly, the Author, if he be a FREETHINKER, has a right by ancient cuſtom * to two or three, or indeed, to two or three dozen of Characters, as may beſt ſuit his purpoſe, or errand: A practice, which, being begun amongſt us Moderns, under a want of Liberty, was continued out of Licentiouſneſs, and is ſtill kept up for the ſake of its Conveniencies. Now if ſuch a One be too lazy to aſſume

* See CELSUS and PORPHYRY.

a per-

a perſonated Character in form, then (as Lord Shafteſbury obſerves) *a dull kind of* IRONY, *which amuſes all alike*, becomes his favorite figure of ſpeech. But with ſuch a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Anſwerer may give himſelf much trouble, to collect his contradictions, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have honeſtly marked out theſe various deluſions, that You may have it in your power to detect me, ſhould I be tempted to impoſe upon You, myſelf. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordſhip's contradictions are ſo groſs and ſubſtantial, ſo frequent and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my ſpecimen by any thing doubtful or ambiguous.

1. "I could not (ſays his Lordſhip) have diſcovered, as NEWTON did, that *univerſal law* of corporeal Nature, which he has demonſtrated. But further than that, he could go no more than I; nor diſcover the ACTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE, BY WHICH THIS LAW WAS IMPOSED ON ALL BODIES, AND IS MAINTAINED IN THEM *." Here he owns ATTRACTION not to be a REAL or eſſential, PROPERTY OF MATTER, but *the action of the firſt cauſe* upon it. Yet in another place he obſerves, that "ATTRACTION MAY BE, notwithſtanding all the SILLY abſtract reaſoning to the contrary, A REAL PROPERTY OF MATTER †." The truth is, that, for any thing his Lordſhip knew of this *univerſal Law*, Attraction might be Action, Paſſion, Magic, or the Man in the Moon. He only followed his Leaders. Mr. COLLINS diſplayed the ſame Philoſophic ſpirit in ſpeaking of *gravity*, the effect of Attraction: And CLARKE's animadverſion on him will exactly ſuit his Lordſhip.—"Not content to have erred ſo very groſsly in the firſt foundation of all natural Philoſophy; you could not forbear profeſſing further, that *you have often admired that* GRAVITATION *ſhould be eſteemed a matter of ſuch difficulty amongſt Philoſophers; and that you think it to be ſo evident and neceſſary an effect of matter in conſtant motion perpetually ſtriking one part againſt another, that you*

* Vol. iv. p. 8. † Vol. iii. p. 547.

"*wonder*

" *wonder every body ſhould not ſee it.* I ſuppoſe the reſt of the world " will no leſs *admire* at *you*, for imagining that, by ſo ſlight an " admiration you could at once ſet aſide all the propoſitions in that " moſt excellent book [the *Principia* of Newton] wherein it is " made appear by ſtrictly mathematical demonſtrations, drawn from " the Laws of motion, now agreed on by Mathematicians, and " eſtabliſhed by experiments, and from the Phænomena of the hea- " venly bodies; that the preſent operations of nature, depending " upon gravitation, cannot poſſibly be mechanical effects of *matter* " *in conſtant motion perpetually ſtriking one part againſt another.*— " Upon the whole, all that you have advanced about *gravitation* is " ſuch marvellous reaſoning, to be made uſe of in the preſent age, " after ſo many great diſcoveries, founded upon experience, and " even mathematical demonſtration; that though I have no cauſe " at all to be diſpleaſed with you for arguing in ſuch a manner; yet, " I believe, your readers cannot but think you might very well have " forborn going out of your way, to give ſo very diſadvantageous a " repreſentation *of your own* Philoſophy *."

2. In one place, his Lordſhip tells us, *that the right of the Iſraelites to the Land of Canaan was founded on the* PROPHECY *of Noah:* in another, that *it was founded on the* PROMISE *to Abraham.* Second thoughts are beſt. He ſeems to come a little nearer the truth here. For though a *Promiſe* may intitle to a poſſeſſion, I do not ſee how a *Propheſy* can do more than foretell one: Unleſs his Lordſhip has ſome ethical engine of a new invention, to extend the grounds of *Obligation*, unknown to GROTIUS, SELDEN, and CUMBERLAND; yet they travelled for it; and, if we may believe his Lordſhip's account of their famous *Journey to Paris*, ſpared for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of the PROMISE, his Lordſhip *inſinuates* an untruth; which is a great deal meaner than to *tell* one: For he repreſents the favour as capricious, arbitrary, and without any reaſon aſſigned.

* Clarke's third defence of the immateriality and natural immortality of the Soul, againſt Collins.

3. " The

3. "The Jews (ſays his Lordſhip) as often as they made God "deſcend from Heaven, and as much as they made him reſide on "earth, were *far from cloathing him with corporeity*, and imputing "corporeal vices to him *." Yet two or three pages forward, ſo prevalent is his luſt of abuſe, that he expreſsly ſays, *they* DID *cloath him with* CORPOREITY. Theſe are his words: "The Jewiſh Scrip- "tures aſcribe to God not only corporeal appearance, but corporeal "action, and all the inſtruments of it; eyes to ſee, ears to hear, "mouth and tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to "walk †." You will ſay, perhaps, that his Lordſhip meant, the Scriptures indeed aſcribed all this to God; but in a figurative, not in a literal, ſenſe. I would have ſaid ſo too, but that his Lordſhip goes on rating the Divines for underſtanding this ſcripture-repreſentation in a figurative ſenſe. Which, too, he ſhews does not mend the matter; for this figurative ſenſe, it ſeems, was ſtolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus certainly believed the Gods to be CORPOREAL, if he believed any, though made of ſomewhat a finer ſtuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines" (ſays his Lordſhip) "tell us indeed, that we are not to underſtand all this "according to the literal ſignification, &c. But this *flimſy theological* "*veil* thrown over the literal ſignification is ſtolen from the ward- "robe of Epicurus ‡." His Lordſhip's wardrobe ſeems to be as rich as Epicurus's, in VEILS: a little after, we have a very curious one, *a thin and trite* VEIL *of analogy:* and he is ready to lend them to Divines, as Lucullus did his Cloaks to the Players, by the dozen.

But whenever his Lordſhip ſpeaks of CHRISTIANITY, a kind of fatality attends him; and then his contradictions have neither ſtop nor meaſure.

4. Speaking of the *laſt Supper*, he ſays, "The perſon by whom "it was inſtituted is repreſented ſometimes under under images, "that render it impoſſible to frame any, of the EFFICACY, or even

* Vol. iv. p. 515. † P. 519. ‡ Ibid.

"of

" of the INSTITUTION of this Sacrament. Chriſt is a *vine*, he " is a *rock*, nay he is a *coat*, according to St. Paul," &c. * And yet no further off than four pages, he ſays, " There is no one " [figurative expreſſion] perhaps in the whole Goſpel, leſs liable to " any equivocal ſenſe than that which Chriſt employed when he " ſaid, *This is my body*, and *This is my blood*, in the very act of giv- " ing bread and wine to his Diſciples, who were at ſupper with " him, juſt before his death, for a remembrance of which, this ce- " remony of a ſupper was then inſtituted by him. The figure " was eaſy, the application natural, and they could not underſtand " the expreſſion literally †."

His Lordſhip, as you may well think, has often different purpoſes to ſerve by his contradictions. Here his purpoſe is one and the ſame; to diſcredit a Goſpel-Inſtitution: which is equally done by ſhewing it to be myſterious, obſcure, and incomprehenſible, where it pretends to clearneſs and preciſion; and low, trite, and mean, where it pretends to ſomething auguſt, peculiar, and in the higheſt degree efficacious. All the fault in this caſe, except his Lordſhip's moſt profound ignorance of the nature of the Rite ‡, is his bringing theſe two curious obſervations ſo near to one another.

5. " Chriſtianity [ſays his Lordſhip] as the Saviour publiſhed " it, was full and ſufficient to all the purpoſes of it. Its ſimplicity " and plainneſs ſhewed that it was deſigned to be the religion of " mankind, and manifeſted likewiſe the divinity of its original §." This is very gracious. Yet the Scene changes with his Lordſhip's humour: and the *ſimplicity* and *plainneſs* now become *dark*, *ambiguous* and *incomprehenſible*. " That there are many ambiguous ex- " preſſions, many dark ſayings, in the Goſpel; MANY DOCTRINES,

* Vol. iv. p. 592. † P. 596.

‡ See what is ſaid of it, in the xth diſcourſe, On the Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, preached at Lincoln's Inn.

§ Vol. iv. p. 450.

" which reaſon could never have taught, nor is able to comprehend, " now they are taught, cannot be denied *."

But let him recover his temper, and Chriſtianity brightens up with it. " The ſyſtem of Religion (ſays he) which Chriſt pub- " liſhed, and his Evangeliſts recorded, is a compleat ſyſtem to all " the purpoſes of true Religion, natural and revealed. It contains " all the duties of the former, it enforces them by aſſerting the " *divine* Miſſion of the Publiſher, who proved his aſſertion at the " ſame time by his *miracles* †." But it is only reſtored to be as ſuddenly depoſed. Its birth is ſo far from being *divine*, that he inſinuates it to be *ſpurious*, and neither better nor worſe than a kind of Baſtard-Platoniſm. " It is aſtoniſhing to obſerve the ſtrange " conformity between PLATONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIANITY " itſelf, ſuch as it is taught in the original Goſpel. We need not " ſtand to compare them here: Particular inſtances of conformity " will occur often enough. In general, the *Platonic* and *Chriſtian* " Syſtems have a very near reſemblance, QUALIS DECET ESSE SO- " RORUM ‡." He then goes on to ſhew, that the common Parent of both was not REASON but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthuſiaſm, you will ſay, is now fairly brought to bed of twins, PLATONISM and CHRISTIANITY. No ſuch matter. *Genuine Chriſtianity was taught of God* §.—" As it ſtands in the Goſpel, it con- " tains a compleat ſyſtem of Religion: it is in truth the ſyſtem of na- " tural Religion ||." Well then, we ſhall hear no more of this *ſiſterly reſemblance* to *Platoniſm*. Perhaps not. But you ſhall hear, and that ſoon too, of as good a thing. This Chriſtianity is at laſt found to be derived from JUDAISM, that very JUDAISM, which he had told us, was itſelf raiſed on THEFT and MURDER—" On the Religion of " the Jews, and on the Authority of their Scriptures, Chriſtianity " was founded **." Again, " They who prefer the example and " doctrine of CHRIST to thoſe of PAUL, will find reaſon to think

* Vol. iv. p. 318. † Vol. iv. p. 314. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 340.
§ Vol. iv. p. 348, 349. || Vol. iv. p. 316. ** Vol. iv. p. 317,

" that

" that the Meſſiah intended rather to reform and to graft upon Ju-
" daiſm, than to aboliſh it *." And again; He accuſes PAUL for preaching a *new Goſpel*, called by the Apoſtle, *my Goſpel:* And this new, or peculiar Goſpel, his Lordſhip tells us, *was the Myſtery of God's purpoſe to* TAKE IN THE GENTILES, *ſo* INCONSISTENT *with the declarations and practice of* JESUS †. Yet for all this, had Chriſt's Goſpel " been propagated with the ſame ſimplicity with which it
" was originally taught by CHRIST, it would (he tells us) have
" been to the unſpeakable benefit of MANKIND ‡."

Let us now ſum up his Lordſhip's Inſtructions to his Diſciples, concerning the GOSPEL OF JESUS. " It is ſimple, clear, and of
" divine original:" But it is, at the ſame time, " dark, ambiguous,
" incomprehenſible; and like its Siſter Platoniſm, the Iſſue of
" Enthuſiaſm."—As Jeſus publiſhed it, the Goſpel is a *compleat Syſtem of Natural Religion*, and tends to the unſpeakable *benefit of mankind:* But as Jeſus publiſhed it, the Goſpel was only a *reform* of that Impoſture *Judaiſm*, on which it was *founded*, and was intended by Jeſus to be *confined to the Jewiſh People*; it being PAUL, who, in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practices of Jeſus, turned it into a compleat Syſtem of Natural Religion, and made it tend to the *unſpeakable benefit of mankind*, by extending it to the Gentiles." And thus he goes on contradicting his own aſſertions, as faſt as he advances them, from one end of his ESSAYS to the other.

The ſame ſelf-contradictions, which confute his calumnies againſt Chriſtianity itſelf, ſtill follow him when he comes to ſpeak of the PROPAGATORS of Chriſtianity.

6. " He [ſays this noble Lord] who compares the Epiſtles of
" JAMES, of PETER, and JOHN, ſuch as we have them, with thoſe
" of PAUL, and all theſe with the doctrines of the GOSPEL, will
" be perhaps of my opinion; at leaſt he will have no ground to ſay

* Vol. iv. p. 350.
† Vol. iv. p. 323.
‡ Vol. iv. p. 316.

" of the THREE FIRST, that they were authors of NEW GOSPELS, " as he will have grounds to say of the last, and as the last does " in effect say of himself*." What was this *new Gospel?* It was, as we have seen just before, *the Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles.* JAMES, PETER, and JOHN, therefore, according to his Lordship, taught not this Mystery; so inconsistent, as he says, with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet soon after he confesses, that JAMES, PETER, and JOHN, did teach this Mystery, and forsook CHRIST's for PAUL's NEW GOSPEL. For, speaking of the Council of Jerusalem, he says, *The* APOSTLES had *given no directions to insist that the* GENTILES *should or should not submit to circumcision, and to the yoaks of the Law* †: Which necessarily implies a concession that THEY too were Authors of this new Gospel, the *Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles.* The taking in the Gentiles, we see, he supposes a thing agreed on by all the Apostles: and that, what was yet undone, was the settling the precise *terms* of their admission.

Our Unbelievers look so monstrously asquint upon Religion, that prejudice with opposite rays is always disturbing and confounding its own malignant aims. Yet, in general, it requires pains to fix the contradictions which spring out of these fugitive cross lights. Commend me therefore to his Lordship, who brings his contradictions to a point: and requires nothing of you but eye-sight to see them in their full glare.

His *pro* and *con* then being so near neighbours, we shall not be surprized to find them at last incorporated, as it were, into one another! as in the following instances.

7. " I much DOUBT [says his Lordship] whether the EVANGE- " LISTS would understand the Epistles of St. PAUL, THOUGH ONE " OF THEM WAS HIS SCRIBE ‡."—It was said of somebody, that he " *believed against hope:* a matter of much mirth to our *first philosophy-Men.* But what is that, to his Lordship's greater strength

* Vol. iv. p. 320. † Vol. iv. p. 324. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 202.

of

of mind, who can doubt againſt certainty! PAUL and LUKE agreed to preach the Goſpel together: and not only ſo, but that LUKE's pen ſhould be employed to convey their common ſentiments and adventures to Poſterity. And yet he queſtions whether LUKE underſtood PAUL's EPISTLES. Somebody, I ſuppoſe, when he had pened this *doubt*, might tell him, that one of theſe Evangeliſts was Paul's Companion, his Amanuenſis and Hiſtorian. But the obſervation was too good to be thrown away; he therefore adds, with infinite dexterity and addreſs——*though one of them was his Scribe.*

8. Again, Speaking of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES, he obſerves, "We make God ſo much a copy of man, that we deſign the "worſt, as well as the beſt of our own features, if I may ſo ſay, in "our repreſentations of him: and, as common as it is, no unpre-"judiced thinking man can hear, without aſtoniſhment, our *per-"fections* and our *imperfections* imputed to the divine Being in the "ſame breath, and by the ſame men; with this difference at moſt, "that the former are imputed directly, and the latter ſometimes "under the THIN AND TRITE VEIL OF ANALOGY. In a Being "thus conſtituted, they may well imagine that the moral vir-"tues are the ſame as they are in our ideas: and Theology may "eaſily deduce, from his attributes, the characters Theology has "given them *."

We cannot, ſays his Lordſhip, *without aſtoniſhment, ſee our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the divine Being.* His aſtoniſhment is all a flam. His very words prove that he well knew *imperfections are not imputed.* For when he thus boldly affirms, *they are*, he was ſo twitched in conſcience, that he was forced to add, *under the thin and trite veil of analogy:* That is, *not imputed.* For when Scripture ſpeaks of *the out-ſtretched arm of God, and his all-ſeeing eye*, does it impute *arms* and *eyes* to God, in the ſenſe it imputes *juſtice* and *goodneſs* to him? Yes, ſays he—*under the thin*

* Vol. v. p. 89.

and

and *trite veil of analogy:* i. e. *Not* in the ſame ſenſe. As if we ſhould ſay, His Lordſhip AFFIRMS under the *thin and trite veil of a* DENIAL.

This, Sir, is a very ſcanty ſpecimen of his Lordſhip's CONTRADICTIONS. Yet no man appears to be more ſenſible of the diſgrace which contradictions bring upon a Writer. For, ſpeaking of the whole COLLEGE OF APOSTLES, he ſays, *Theſe inconſiſtent Writers talk often a different language on the ſame ſubject*; *and* CONTRADICT *in one place what they have ſaid in another* *.

IV. His Lordſhip's profound LEARNING comes next to be conſidered.

1. The firſt inſtance I ſhall give is fetched from the very penetralia of the *firſt Philoſophy*. "HUMAN knowledge is ſo entirely "and ſolely derived from actual BEING, that, without actual Being, "we ſhould not have EVEN ONE of thoſe ſimple ideas, whereof all "the complex and abſtract notions that TURN OUR HEADS are "compoſed †."

Here, his Lordſhip cried εὕρηκα, and ſhould have ſacrificed a Bull for his diſcovery: which informs us of no leſs a truth than this, that *if Men had had no Being they would have had no ſenſation:* in other words, that *qualities* cannot exiſt without a *ſubſtance:* For if, by *actual Being* he did not take in the Thinker's own, the obſervation is falſe: a rational Being, though exiſting ſingly, will have yet the idea of his own exiſtence. But the obſervation is every way extraordinary. He ſuppoſes our *ſimple* ideas to be real; he ſuppoſes our *complex* and *abſtract* notions to be compounded of the *ſimple* ideas; and yet he ſuppoſes that the compoſition has TURNED OUR HEADS. Till now, I underſtood it was *fantaſtic*, and not *real* knowledge, which *turned men's heads*. But I forget; His Lordſhip found the *whole World in a frenzy*; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what ſet them a-going.

* Vol. iv. p. 489. † Vol. iii. p. 411.

2. "The

2. "The PAGANS [ſays his Lordſhip] do not appear to have in-"terpolated the antient *Doctors* of Paganiſm; nor is there any "pretence to ſay that THEY have impoſed any ſpurious books on the "world, under the name of thoſe *Doctors* *."

ORPHEUS and MERCURIUS TRISMEGISTUS were certainly *Pagan Doctors*, if ever there were any: And did his Lordſhip never hear, that the Books, Hymns, and Poems, under their names, which are come down to us from times preceding Chriſtianity, were Pagan forgeries? I will not inſiſt upon the SIBYLLINE ORACLES, which CICERO aſſures us had been interpolated (for the Pagans interpolated their very forgeries), becauſe I do not know to what conditions his Lordſhip confines the *Doctorate* in the Pagan World, or whether he admits the fair Sex to the honour of the Hood. However, let us not think him ſo unlearned as not to have heard of theſe forgeries. He had both heard of them, and conſidered them well: And as he is always for putting the ſaddle on the right horſe (as where he loads Divines with *atheiſm*) he charges all theſe iniquities on the CHRISTIANS. "It was, ſays he, to promote the Opi-"nion, that all the Myſteries of their [the Chriſtian's] Religion, "had been revealed by the writings of *Pagan Philoſophers* many "centuries before Chriſt, that ſo many books were forged under "the names of *Mercurius Triſmegiſtus*, of *Hyſtaſpes*, of the SIBYLS, "and perhaps of others." We are got a good way towards Doctorating theſe old Women: They are become *Philoſophers*, we ſee. But whether the Chriſtians were the *only* forgers of *Sibylline Oracles* muſt be left to be decided between Tully and his Lordſhip. The truth is, and who, that underſtands Antiquity, ever doubted of it! that ſome paganized Chriſtians learnt this trade of forging Books, under antient names, from thoſe whoſe Superſtition they had left, but not that Spirit of impoſture which ſupported it.

3. "The [Greek] Hiſtorians, ſays his Lordſhip, obſerving how "fond their countrymen were of thoſe who writ Fables, turned

* Vol. iv. p. 195.

"Hiſtory

" Hiſtory into Romance; and ſtudied to make their relations mar-
" vellous and agreeable, with little regard to truth, in which they
" were encouraged, AFTER ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION INTO
" ASIA, by the DIFFICULTY of diſproving any thing they ſaid of
" countries ſo remote *." A vulgar man, and one of thoſe his Lordſhip calls, Pedants, would have ſaid—BEFORE ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION: becauſe the *difficulty* in a great meaſure ceaſed AFTER that Conqueror had opened, and his Succeſſors had kept open, a communication with thoſe *remote countries*.

4. He calls Ariſtotle's Logic, " the rules of a Dialectic that
" ſeemed to prove, and DID PROVE indifferently either in favor of
" truth or error †." Exaggeration is his Lordſhip's favorite figure of ſpeech: but here it ſeems carried a little too far; for, not content with ſaying that Ariſtotle's *rules of ſyllogizing* (for that is what he means by the *rules of a dialectic) ſeemed to prove*, he will needs add, and DID PROVE. Which ſhews ſuch a knowledge of Syllogiſm, as needed not the following words to ſet it off. " It muſt
" not (ſays he) be imagined, that he who reaſons, or ſeems, ra-
" ther, to reaſon cloſely and conſequentially, has therefore truth
" always on his ſide ‡." I deſire to know who ever thought he had, who did not miſtake, as his Lordſhip here ſeems to do, the art of *ranging* arguments, for the Art of *finding* them? " Nobody,
" his *Maſter Locke* would tell him, can hinder, but that SYL-
" LOGISM, which was intended for the ſervice of truth, will ſome-
" times be made uſe of againſt it. But it is NEVERTHELESS on
" TRUTH'S SIDE, AND ALWAYS TURNS UPON THE ADVERSARIES
" OF IT §."

5. Speaking of *Angels*, his Lordſhip thinks fit to hazard this Obſervation: " There is another cauſe of this PNEUMATICAL MAD-
" NESS [the belief of ſuch Beings] the fondneſs of making *man* paſs

* Vol. iv p. 137, 138. † Vol. iv. p. 158. ‡ P. 159.
§ Second Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter, p. 31, 32. 8vo Edit. 1697.

" for

" for one of thoſe Beings that participated of the *divine Nature*. " This had long poſſeſſed the heathen Theiſts; and IT POSSESSED " THE CHRISTIANS WITH MORE ADVANTAGE *."

This ſeems a demonſtration that his Lordſhip either never read, or at leaſt never underſtood, an antient Apologiſt. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganiſm, which afforded ſo much advantage to the primitive Chriſtians, as this fond opinion of the antient Philoſophers, that the human Soul was *part or portion of the divine nature*; nor was there any, which they were more ſolicitous, and for a very important reaſon †, to expoſe: They laboured, indeed, with ſo much warmth, and ſometimes with ſo little diſcretion, that it hath given a handle for ſome learned moderns to pretend, that all the antient Fathers believed the *natural mortality of the Soul* ‡. Well, but if the Chriſtians were not *poſſeſſed with this fondneſs*, his Lordſhip will ſhew you, at leaſt, they might have been poſſeſſed with it, and *to more advantage* too. But this part of his Lordſhip's philoſophic Character, his *Argumentation*, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders of it, you may not think it amiſs to have it uſhered in with this curious reaſon, which is to ſhew, that the impious notion of the human Soul's *participating of the divine nature, poſſeſſed*, or at leaſt *might have poſſeſſed*, the Chriſtians with *more advantage*, than it did the heathen Theiſts. Now, what do you think it is? You will hardly gueſs. It is, becauſe *Chriſtians are wont to* ASSUME *that man is compounded of body and* SOUL §.

Well, it muſt needs be allowed, that till we *aſſume*, man has a *Soul*, we can never be *poſſeſſed* with an opinion that his Soul participates of the divine Nature. So much then is admitted, that ſince Chriſtians hold, *man is compoſed of ſoul and body*, they may be *poſſeſſed with advantage*. But how it ſhould be with *more advantage*, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did not the Hea-

* Vol. iv. p. 478.

† See Divine Legat. Vol. I. part ii. p. 206. 8vo. [Vol. II. p. 115. of this Edition.]

‡ See Dodwell on this Subject. § Vol. iv. p 478.

thens as well as Chriſtians hold that man was compoſed of ſoul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion of *participation*, imputed to them: For they could not, ſure, be ſo abſurd to hold that *nothing might participate of ſomething*. However, of this I will not be over-poſitive, ſince his Lordſhip tells us, they all laboured under an incurable PNEUMATICAL MADNESS.

V. Such an eſcape of his Lordſhip's Logic muſt needs awaken us to expect great things from this laſt capital accompliſhment of the *Philoſopher*, his ART OF REASONING: to which we are now arrived.

1. He will prove againſt LOCKE, that *the notion of Spirit involves more difficulty or obſcurity in it than the notion of body*. Nay, he ſays *he will* MAKE LOCKE PROVE THIS AGAINST HIMSELF, *that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body than we have of thoſe belonging to immaterial ſpirit*. And thus he argues: "Primary "ideas are the ideas of ſuch qualities as exiſt always in the ſub- "ſtance to which they belong, whether they are perceived or no. "They are therefore eſſential to it, and productive, by their ope- "rations, of thoſe ſecondary qualities which may be ſaid only to "exiſt in our perceptions of them. Of the firſt ſort are ſolidity "and extenſion, to mention no others, the primary qualities, and "in our ideas the eſſence of Matter, of which we can frame no "conception excluſively of them. THESE NOTIONS I HAVE TAKEN "FROM Mr. LOCKE, and they lead me to aſk what the primary "ideas are of ſpirit or immaterial ſubſtance? The Primary idea, "or the eſſence of it, is THOUGHT; as body is the *extended*, this "is the thinking ſubſtance, SAYS DES CARTES. THOUGHT then, "ACTUAL THOUGHT, is the eſſence of the ſoul or ſpirit, and, by "conſequence, ſo inſeparable from it, that we cannot conceive the "Soul or Spirit to exiſt ſeparately from, or excluſively of, thought. "But this I know to be untrue: and I may well own, ſince Locke "has owned the ſame, that I have *one of thoſe dull Souls that does not* "*perceive itſelf always to contemplate ideas* *."

* Vol. iii. p. 510, 511.

You

You will naturally ſuſpect him of foul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philoſopher, to confute the ſentiment of another. He is confuting LOCKE's aſſertion concerning the equal evidence of the primary qualities of *Body* and *Spirit*; and he takes DES CARTES's DEFINITION of the primary qualities of *Spirit*, to make good his point. In plain truth, he puts the change upon us: he uſes *thought*, or *actual thinking*, for the *faculty of thinking*. It is this laſt, which is *eſſential* to the ſoul, and inſeparable from it: It is this laſt, which being a *power*, is fitly predicated of an *Agent*; as *extenſion*, which is a *property*, is fitly predicated of a *Patient*. It is this laſt, which Locke underſtood to be the *primary idea of a ſpirit or immaterial ſubſtance*, when he ſaid that *the notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty nor obſcurity in it than that of body:* And it is this laſt, of which it may be truly ſaid, that *we cannot conceive the ſoul or ſpirit to exiſt ſeparately from, or excluſively of it.*

2. His Lordſhip owns, that *it is above humanity to comprehend that virtue, whatever it be, whereby one Being acts upon another, and becomes a cauſe.* "Whatever knowledge (ſays he) we acquire of "*apparent cauſes*, we can acquire none of *real cauſality:* by which, "I mean, that force, that power, that virtue, whatever it be, by "which one Being ACTS on another, and becomes a cauſe. We "may call this by different names, according to the different effects "of it; but to know it in its firſt principles, to know the nature "of it, would be *to know as God himſelf knows*, and therefore this "will be always unknown to us *in cauſes that ſeem to be moſt under* "*our inſpection*, as well as in thoſe that are the moſt remote from "it *."

Would you believe, now, that it was but juſt before, in this very *Eſſay*, that for want of this knowledge (which yet to affect even *in cauſes that ſeem to be moſt under our inſpection*, would be to affect *knowing as God himſelf knows*) he denies the SOUL to be a ſubſtance diſtinct from body. "They (ſays he) who hold the hy-

* Vol. iii. p. 551.

" potheſis of two diſtinct ſubſtances MUST EXPLAIN in ſome tole-
" rable manner, *which they have not yet done*, the union and MUTUAL
" ACTION ON ONE ANOTHER, of unextended and extended Beings,
" or elſe deny the abſolute exiſtence of any thing extrinſical to the
" mind *." That is, thoſe who hold the hypotheſis of two diſ-
tinct Subſtances muſt either do that which he holds no Being but
the Omniſcient can do; or they muſt run mad; or (which I think
is ſomething worſe) they muſt give themſelves up to his Lordſhip's
direction.

He employs the ſame arms to combat INSPIRATION; and with
the ſame advantage. The Notion of *Inſpiration* is idle and viſionary,
becauſe " He has *no more conception of this ſuppoſed* ACTION *of the*
" *divine, on the human mind*, than he has of the inſpiration by
" which the Holy Ghoſt proceeds from the Father and Son, ac-
" cording to the deciſion of the council of Florence." That is, he
rejects *Inſpiration* becauſe he does not comprehend that virtue *by*
which one Being acts upon another, and becomes a Cauſe; although he
owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument againſt the *exiſtence* of the SOUL, and the *reality*
of INSPIRATION, is doubly faulty. For, as it is the height of
extravagance to reject a *revealed truth*, becauſe the propoſition in
which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of
the *cauſe*, of which our faculties are INCAPABLE; ſo is it no ſmall
degree of unreaſonableneſs and folly to reject ſuch truth, becauſe the
propoſition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that ex-
planation of which our faculties are CAPABLE.

3. His Lordſhip endeavours to ſhew, that a *future State was not*
the Sanction of the Law or Religion of Nature. And thus he ſets
about it. " Sanctions muſt be contained in the Law to which they
" belong; they muſt be a part of it. In their promulgation, they
" muſt precede, as the Law does, neceſſarily, all acts of obedience,
" or diſobedience to it—they muſt be as public—Theſe conditions

* Vol. iii. p. 521, 522.

" are

" are eſſential, there can be no ſanction without them. And " therefore the rewards of a *future State*, which have not theſe con- " ditions, are no ſanctions of the natural Law. Reaſon and expe- " rience, that taught men this Law, ſhewed them the ſanctions " of it. But neither of them pointed out *theſe*. Have we any " grounds to believe, that they were known to the antediluvian " World? Do they ſtand at the head or tail of the SEVEN PRECEPTS " GIVEN TO THE SONS OF NOAH? Were they ſo much as men- " tioned by MOSES *?"

Can you forbear laughing? Had he found a *future ſtate* in the *ſeven precepts of Noah*, or in the *books of Moſes*, be aſſured he would have employed this lucky circumſtance to prove, that a *future ſtate* was not the Sanction of the *Law of Nature*, but of a *poſitive Law*, or of a *pretended Revelation*, only. For in the beginning of this very ſection, he has attempted to prove it was the ſanction of poſitive Law, from its being found in the GOSPEL. " God (ſays he) " has given a Law, the *Law of Nature and Reaſon*, to all his hu- " man Creatures: the SANCTIONS of it are a NATURAL TENDENCY " of virtue to the happineſs, and vice to the miſery, of mankind— " They are imperfect— To ſupply the imperfection [Revelation pre- " tends that] there muſt be neceſſarily ſome FURTHER SANCTIONS " of this Law, and theſe are the rewards and puniſhments reſerved " to a FUTURE STATE. Here is ample room for *reflexions* †."— In truth there is: but as they would make ſo little for the credit of his Lordſhip's *learning*, his followers will not be offended with me for not purſuing them.

4. He tells us, *that the worſhip of the one true God was not the firſt Religious Worſhip*.—The BIBLE ſays it was. No matter for that. The BIBLE is a farrago of inconſiſtencies ‡. " *Methuſalem* " ſaw both *Adam* and *Noah*, to both of whom God revealed him- " ſelf in his Unity. *Shem*, the Son of *Noah*, lived even to the " days of *Abraham*. Need I ſtay to ſhew HOW IMPOSSIBLE it is for

* Vol. v. p. 512, 513. † Vol. v. p. 511, 512 ‡ Vol. iv. p. 19.

" any

" any man IN HIS SENSES to believe that a tradition derived from " God himſelf, through ſo *few generations*, was loſt amongſt the " greateſt part of mankind; or that Polytheiſm and Idolatry were " eſtabliſhed on the ruins of it in the days of *Serug*, before thoſe " of *Abraham*, and ſo ſoon after the Deluge? I ſhould think it " IMPOSSIBLE even for the Jews themſelves to ſwallow ſo many " fables and ſo many anachroniſms. Since the unity of God was " not univerſally taught in thoſe early days, it was not ſo *revealed*, " nor preſerved in the manner aſſumed *." This account, therefore, he tells us, is INCONSISTENT with itſelf †. Now the utmoſt that Prejudice in its ſenſes can make of it is an IMPROBABILITY: and this *improbability*, his Lordſhip himſelf, but two pages afterwards, is ſo good to remove. He delivers it as a general Truth, that " the Vulgar EASILY embrace Polytheiſm and Idolatry, even AFTER " the true doctrine of the divine unity has been taught and re- " ceived; as we may learn from the example of the *Iſraelites:* and " ſuperſtitions GROW APACE, AND SPREAD WIDE, where *Chriſti-* " *anity* has been eſtabliſhed and is DAILY TAUGHT, as we may " learn from the example of the Roman Churches ‡."

Now, Sir, I argue thus, If amongſt the *Iſraelites*, Idolatry and Superſtition ſo *eaſily*, ſo frequently, and ſo inſtantaneouſly *ſucceeded*, to the worſhip of the true God, and needed ſuch ſevere puniſhments to bring men back again to reaſon, in a place where many extraordinary helps were provided to keep them in their duty; and if, amongſt *Chriſtians*, Idolatry and Superſtition *grow apace and ſpread wide* where the *true doctrine of the unity* is *daily taught*; how can we wonder that, in the *few generations* from *Adam to Serug*, Polytheiſm and Idolatry ſhould *eſtabliſh themſelves on the ruins* of the Unity; as this happened in an Age, where we hear of no other proviſion for the Truth than the *long lives* of the Patriarchs; and *Mathuſalem's ſeeing both Adam and Noah?* If You deny this to have been the caſe of *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, his Lordſhip tells you, You are

* Vol. iv. p. 20. † Vol. iv. p. 19. ‡ Vol. iv. p. 22.

out

out of your ſenſes: If you own this to have been the caſe of the *Antediluvians*, You are *out of your ſenſes* ſtill. What is to be done? There is but one way; which is, ſubſcribing to his Lordſhip's unerring Wiſdom.

But I have ſomething more to ſay of this pretended INCONSISTENCY.—*Can any man in his ſenſes believe that a Tradition, derived from God himſelf, ſhould be left in ſo few generations, and ſo ſoon after the Deluge?*"—How *few*, and how *ſoon*, I beſeech your Lordſhip? I am not captious: I have a ſpecial reaſon for aſking. The Chronology of this period is not uniform or conſtant; there is a wide difference in the ſeveral Bible-accounts: ſo that I ſuſpect foul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, *ſo few*, and, *ſo ſoon*.

To be plain, though the HEBREW Copy make it no more than *three hundred* years from the Deluge to Abraham; yet the SEPTUAGINT, and JOSEPHUS, reckon about a *thouſand:* time more than ſufficient to ſink *the greateſt part of Mankind into Idolatry and Polytheiſm, ſo early as the days of Serug.* And here lies the difficulty: the beſt Chronologers agree in preferring the *Septuagint* and *Joſephus*, to the *Hebrew Copy*—But I forget myſelf: His Lordſhip has "a thorough contempt for the whole buſineſs of the Learned lives "of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USHER, and MARSHAM *:" *to whom* (he ſays) *the whole tribe of ſcholars bow with reverence*, and conſequently he muſt have the ſame contempt for CHRONOLOGY; which, indeed, he has ſhewn on more occaſions than one; but never to ſo much advantage, as where he ſeems to have ſuppoſed that LIVY and TACITUS flouriſhed before VIRGIL †.

But this by the way only. My buſineſs with his Lordſhip at preſent lies in another quarter. For, having, in his attempt to ſhew that the worſhip of the one true God was not the firſt religious worſhip, thrown the BIBLE out of the account, he goes on in this

* Vol. ii. p. 261, 262.

† See Dr. NEWTON's learned and judicious *Diſſertations on the Prophecies*, p. 33.

manner:

manner: "If the *inconſiſtency* of this account makes us reject it, we "ſhall find leſs reaſon to believe, on the Authority of *prophane tra-* "*ditions*, that the UNITY OF GOD WAS THE PRIMITIVE FAITH of "mankind. Revelations to the Father and to the Reſtorer of the "whole human race might have eſtabliſhed this Faith univerſally: "but without Revelation it could not be that of any one people, till "obſervation and meditation—till a full and vigorous exerciſe of "Reaſon made it ſuch *." The reaſoning is truly admirable. The ſuppoſed Fact, as we find it in ANTIQUITY, ſtands thus. The BIBLE tells us, that the worſhip of the true God was the firſt religious worſhip: GENERAL TRADITION ſays the ſame. Between theſe two Teſtimonies there is a natural and ſtrong connection; the *Tradition* appearing to riſe out of the truth of the *Written word*; for, as his Lordſhip well obſerves, *nothing but a Revelation could eſtabliſh this Faith univerſally, not even among ſt one people, till obſervation and meditation had made it familiar to them.* Here you have the Fact proved in the ſtrongeſt manner a Fact can be proved; by the concurrence of two Witneſſes, coming from different quarters, and ſtrangers to each other's evidence; which yet not only agree, but mutually ſupport one another. What would you more?—Hold a little, ſays his Lordſhip. This boaſted connection is not real, but imaginary: *ſacred Hiſtory* concerning a Revelation is not to be believed, becauſe *inconſiſtent: prophane Tradition* is not to be believed, becauſe without Revelation the unity of God could not be the firſt faith of any one people. Thus ſtands his Lordſhip's reaſoning, or thus, at leaſt, it would ſtand, had he urged it to the beſt advantage. And to this, I reply, firſt, that his Lordſhip, in calling the Bible account *inconſiſtent*, is guilty of an abuſe of words: that, all which his own premiſſes infer is only an *improbability*; and this *improbability* likewiſe, he himſelf fairly contradicts and confutes. Secondly, He infers inconſequentially in ſuppoſing that from the inconſiſtency of a certain relation concerning revelation, there never

* Vol. iv. p. 20.

was

was any revelation at all. But though this be no proof that revelation WAS NOT, yet an univerſal Tradition that the *primitive faith* was the doctrine of the *unity* (which doctrine, in his Lordſhip's reckoning, could come in no other way than by *Revelation*) may be a very good proof that IT WAS. But I go farther, and, in defence of the Bible-account, obſerve, That, if what he ſays be true, that *obſervation and meditation, and a full and vigorous exerciſe of reaſon*, are neceſſary for the gaining the knowledge of the UNITY in a *natural* way, and that theſe qualities are long a coming, then it is highly probable, that the want of this *obſervation and meditation*, when the *unity* was revealed to the *firſt Man*, might have been the occaſion of the ſpeedy loſs of it. He expreſſly tells us, that this Truth has been ſubject to as ſudden revolutions, in the times of *Judaiſm* and *Popery*, when men were in full poſſeſſion of it, with all their *obſervation, meditation, and vigorous exerciſe of reaſon*, at the height; and twenty other advantages to boot.

But his Lordſhip's *general management* of this queſtion, of the FIRST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, ſhould not be overlooked, though it belong properly to another Head. He diſcuſſes the point at large, in two ſeveral *Diſſertations*: each of which is ſo well qualified, and ſo fitly accommodated to the orher, that the ſecond is a complete confutation of the firſt. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordſhip does things in order. He had it firſt of all in his purpoſe to diſcredit the Moſaic account of the Creation: And MOSES repreſenting the *worſhip of the true God* as the *original Religion*, he ſet himſelf to prove that Moſes was both a *fool* and a *liar*. Soon after, he had another Prophet to bring into contempt, the Prophet ISAIAH, who informs us, that the Jews were the only nation under heaven which had the worſhip of the one God. A truth which EUSEBIUS has taken upon his word*. His Lordſhip will ſhew that neither do they deſerve any credit. And then he ranſacks all the dark corners, not of Antiquity, but of thoſe

* See Divine Legat. Vol. i. Part i. p. 165. [Ed. 4to. vol. I. p. 192, 193.]

Moderns who have rendered Antiquity ſtill darker: in which he ſucceeds ſo well, as to perſuade himſelf that the World, many ages before the foundation of the Jewiſh Republic, had the knowledge of the one God; nay, that there was no time ſo early in which the one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as we ſaid, and very completely too, every thing he had written on the ſame ſubject, in the other Diſſertation, againſt MOSES. But as all this is directly levelled at the Author of *The Divine Legation*, I leave that Writer to do his own argument juſtice as he ſhall find himſelf able.

5. In the mean time, I proceed to give you one of his Lordſhip's *palmary* arguments againſt REVELATION.

" Can he be leſs than MAD who boaſts a REVELATION ſuperadded " to REASON, to ſupply the defects of it, and who ſuperadds REA- " SON TO REVELATION to ſupply the defects of this too, at the " ſame time? THIS IS MADNESS, OR THERE IS NO SUCH THING " INCIDENT TO OUR NATURE *."

Now as every man, who believes REVELATION, was in theſe circumſtances, his Lordſhip (and reaſon good) concluded the MADNESS to be *univerſal*; and none but himſelf in his ſenſes: and ſtanding thus alone he has thought proper to give us frequent notice of this extraordinary caſe †, *Inſanire me aiunt, ultro cum ipſi inſaniant.* But if he will needs reduce us to this ſad alternative, I ſhall make no ſcruple to vindicate our common nature, be it never ſo much at his Lordſhip's expence. For, as to the body of mankind, who " hold that Revelation was ſuperadded to Reaſon, to " ſupply the defects of Reaſon; and that Reaſon was at the ſame " time ſuperadded to Revelation, to ſupply the defects of Revelation;" I am ſo far from ſeeing in them any of thoſe unfavourable ſymptoms, his Lordſhip ſpeaks of, that I think, whoever had done otherwiſe, had deſerved (at leaſt, on the principles of his Lordſhip's rigid juſtice) to be ſent to Bedlam. Indeed ſome, for ſo doing,

* Vol. iv. p. 172.

† Vol. iv. p. 316. 353. 377.

have

have been actually ſent thither. For what, for the moſt part, are the *religious* inhabitants of that place, but ſuch, who, having ſuperadded Revelation to ſupply the defects of Reaſon, WOULD NOT SUPERADD REASON to ſupply the defects of Revelation; but were for making the *Laws of the Goſpel* the ſole rule of all *civil* as well as of all *religious* meaſures: in other words, ſuch as were grown outrageouſly FANATICAL.

Let us conſider how the caſe truly ſtands. The Religioniſt, his Lordſhip ſays, boaſts, that *Revelation* was *ſuperadded to Reaſon*, to *ſupply the defects* of Reaſon. Very well. Reaſon then is the foundation, and Revelation the Superſtructure. Revelation meddles not with the work of Reaſon, but ſupplies us with new Truths, where Reaſon ſtops ſhort. And why was this done?—For the ſake of an ADEQUATE RULE OF LIFE. Is Reaſon *alone* this rule?—Then the ſuperſtructure of Revelation was not wanted. Is Revelation *alone* the rule?—Then Reaſon was built upon to no purpoſe. The ADEQUATE RULE therefore is compoſed of BOTH. But if ſo, When Revelation has been added to Reaſon to ſupply the wants of Reaſon, muſt not Reaſon be added to Revelation to ſupply the wants of Revelation? Muſt not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to the aid of one another's inſufficiencies? Reaſon is the Baſe; Revelation is the Upper-building. It is owned, the Upper-building is neceſſary to *perfect* the Baſe: Muſt it not be owned, that the Baſe is as neceſſary to *bear* the Upper-building?

But, (what is more) it is the GOSPEL itſelf, and not *artificial Theology*, as his Lordſhip pretends, which gives us this direction. For the *Goſpel* being to ſerve (as is confeſſed) for a ſuperaddition to the firſt building of *Natural Religion*, it delivers no complete ſyſtem of moral Law (for which it is ſo often reproached by his Lordſhip), becauſe the general parts of that ſyſtem are to be found in *Natural Religion*. To ſupply this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out an expedient; the ſtudy of *natural Religion*; from whence, together with the *Goſpel*, ſuch a complete ſyſtem may be collected.

" Finally, Brethren, whatſoever things are true, whatſoever things " are honeſt, whatſoever things are juſt, whatſoever things are pure, " whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good re- " port; if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe, think on theſe " things *." This then is the Scheme of TRUE CHRISTIANITY. It *ſuperadds Revelation to Reaſon, to ſupply the defects of it*; *and ſuperadds Reaſon to Revelation, to ſupply the defects of this too at the ſame time.* And can any thing be more rational than ſuch a ſcheme?

Indeed, was REVELATION only a REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE, his Lordſhip's charge, though extravagantly urged, would appear to have ſome foundation. For then *Revelation* muſt be ſuppoſed to be the *Religion of Nature*, reſtored and perfected: and then to recur back to *Natural Religion* to rectify *Revelation*, after Revelation had been introduced to rectify Natural Religion, would have, though none of the marks of *madneſs*, which conſiſts in arguing conſequentially from *falſe* principles, yet great ſymptoms of *folly*, which conſiſts in arguing like his Lordſhip, from the *true*. But he owns Chriſtianity to be founded on the Principle of REDEMPTION. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in moſt other points, and as often repreſents it to be a *republication of the Religion of Nature:* When he chuſes to employ the gentler method of extirpation, the *explaining it away*, it is then a *republication:* when, the rougher and directer method of *expoſing it to contempt*, it is then founded in the *doctrine of Redemption*. Therefore, as We have all along made the beſt of his *Contradictions*, e'en let Him do the ſame; for it ſeems not fit, he ſhould be deprived of any advantages of his own procuring.

Let us ſet his Lordſhip's argument in another light; and turn from his *Philoſophic* to his *Legiſlative* Character; and ſuppoſe him to reaſon thus, (for change but the terms, and the reaſoning will hold juſt as well in *civil* as in *theologic* matters). " Can he be leſs " than mad who boaſts a *ſyſtem of civil Laws* ſuperadded to the *na-*

* Phil. iv. 8.

" *tural*,

" *tural*, to ſupply the defects of it; and who ſuperadds the *na-*
" *tural* to the *civil*, to ſupply the defects of this too, at the ſame
" time ?" Now look, what figure the Politician would make, who ſhould thus inſtruct his Pupils, even ſuch does our noble Theologian make in dictating to all Mankind.

Amongſt the numerous abſurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the *expreſſion*; for as it ſeems not to be committed with deſign, it hardly deſerves the name of a ſophiſm; and that is, the repetition of the word SUPERADDS; for though Revelation may be *ſuperadded* to Reaſon, yet Reaſon can never be ſaid to be *ſuperadded* to Revelation, how cloſely ſoever it may be joined with it; becauſe the two ſyſtems can never become top and bottom in their turns, after it has been owned that One is the *foundation*, and the Other, the *ſuperſtructure*.

6. Another of his Lordſhip's *general* objections to *Revelation*, is as follows:

" It is not, in any degree, ſo agreeable to the notions of infinite
" wiſdom that God ſhould deal out his Revelations BY PARCELS,
" inſtead of making a ſyſtem of moral Law, when he created moral
" agents, that might anſwer his WHOLE purpoſe, in all circum-
" ſtances of time, place, and perſons; JUST AS HE MADE a phyſical
" ſyſtem of Laws for the other part, the inanimate part of his
" Creation *."

Now with his Lordſhip's good leave, I am bold to think the contrary the more probable; and that too, on thoſe very principles of Analogy, which his Lordſhip employs, to prove it leſs ſo. He argues againſt the likelihood of God's giving the *moral Law* IN PARCELS, becauſe the *Phyſical Law was given* AT ONCE. This plainly proceeds on a ſuppoſition that the nature of the two ſyſtems is the ſame; and that there is the like conſtancy and regularity in the *Moral* as in the *Phyſical*; or the like irregularity in the *Phyſical* as in the *Moral*; For unleſs there be the ſame tendency to

* Vol v. p. 544.

order,

order, or to disorder, in two general systems, the means of governing them can hardly be the same. But in these two systems, obedience to their respective Laws is far unlike: *Passive* MATTER (the subject of the *physical*) obeys, with small irregularities, the Laws impressed upon it by its Creator; but an *active* MIND (the subject of the *moral*) is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the world prescribed for its observance. The method therefore of governing in the two Systems must needs, according to all our ideas of wisdom, be very different. And this difference, which our senses tell us *has* been observed, is that which natural reason teaches us to conclude, *should* be observed; namely, to a *physical* system (whose subject would constantly and invariably obey) a Law given AT ONCE: and to a *moral* system (whose subject inclined it to frequent deviations) a Law given IN PARCELS; which might, from time to time, reform the disorders as they arose.

But the folly, in thus embarrassing ourselves about the fit ordinance of God's dispensations, has its source in a MADNESS that his Lordship perhaps least suspected, and which yet he was most concerned to guard against; the madness of supposing, that Eternal Wisdom needed the aid of our contrivance to make things as they should be.

7. I shall conclude my specimen with some of his Lordship's *more particular* objections to the BIBLE.

Speaking of the civil punishment of Idolatry, under the Jewish Theocracy, he says, "God himself was the LEGISLATOR. The "Citizens, therefore, of that commonwealth, who apostatized, "were proceeded against as traytors and rebels, guilty of no less "than high-treason. Let it be so. *The objections of injustice and* "*cruelty to those Laws will remain in their full force*, and be of more "weight to prove them HUMAN, than all these hypotheses to "prove them *divine*. God was KING, and idolatry was no less "than high treason; no objection therefore can lye against the "Punishment of it. None certainly, but every objection to the

"MANNER

" MANNER and DEGREE in which this puniſhment was to be in-
" flicted, ſtands good *."

Here his Lordſhip, to make amends, as it were, for his frequent *denial of the truth*, without underſtanding the queſtion, has for once ventured to *agree to it*, upon the ſame terms. It had been ſaid, " that as God was KING of the Jews, idolatry was high treaſon." To this, his Lordſhip condeſcends. But to ſhew us how well he underſtood the principle on which it ſtands, he affirms that God's being their LEGISLATOR made Idolatry high treaſon. As if the barely giving Laws to a people conferred the MAGISTRACY on the Giver: or as if there could be *high treaſon* againſt any but the MAGISTRATE. But you ſhall ſee more of his talent for PHILOSOPHIC POLITICS, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to ſpeak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his *reaſoning* on the ſubject, not his general *knowledge* of the caſe (things rarely to be found together in his Lordſhip's *Eſſays*) that I now propoſe to examine.

You obſerve then, he owns Idolatry, in Judea, to be high Treaſon; and the Puniſhment of it (which is every where *capital)* to be juſt. But the *manner* and *degree* of that puniſhment he pronounces, both *unjuſt* and *cruel*. Was this like a philoſophic Legiſlator!— When the queſtion is of the *juſtice* or *injuſtice* of a public Law, every man of common ſenſe, and endowed with the inſtinctive knowledge of *right and wrong*, may paſs a true judgment on it; becauſe it ſtands on the unalterable nature of things; in *human* Laws, on the relation between Magiſtrate and Subject; in *divine* Laws, on the relation between God and man; and in a Syſtem of Laws, like the Moſaic, both on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his Lordſhip, in paſſing judgment on the caſe upon theſe principles, pronounces the Law againſt Idolatry to be right and equitable. What can be more honourable for this part of the Jewiſh Syſtem? It is Lord Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is here aided, which he rarely is, by the plaineſt and

* Vol. v. p. 193.

cleareſt

cleareſt principles of common ſenſe. Hold, ſays his Lordſhip; take this along with you, *Though no objection can lie againſt the* PUNISHMENT, *yet every objection lies againſt the* MANNER and DEGREE of it.

Let us ſee then whether this ſtands upon the ſame plain and clear principles with the other.

To judge truly of the *manner* and *degree* of a puniſhment, I apprehend, more is required than to judge of the puniſhment itſelf. It requires an intimate acquaintance with the People to whom this Law againſt idolatry was given; a knowledge of their manners, tempers, diſpoſitions, prejudices, and ſituation; in a word, of a thouſand other circumſtances, which none but the Lawgiver himſelf could perfectly underſtand; certainly, not this Politician of Yeſterday. So that, it appears, the juſtice or injuſtice of the *manner* and *degree* of a puniſhment is not determinable on thoſe ſimple and obvious Principles which ſhew the juſtice or injuſtice of the *puniſhment* itſelf, but on other conſiderations which determine of *right and wrong* from many ſhifting circumſtances; from the degree of *temptation* in the Object; from the degree of *prejudice* in the Subject; of *propenſity* to the Crime; of *malignity* to the Syſtem; and from other various connexions, of which only Thoſe who are perfect in the knowledge of antient Manners in general, and of the Jewiſh People's in particular, can form any reaſonable ideas.

This is enough to ſhew the folly of cavilling at the *manner* and *degree* of the puniſhment of Idolatry, after the puniſhment itſelf is allowed to be juſt and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the *puniſhment* implies a preſumption in favour of the *manner* and *degree*. The Puniſhment of Idolatry, a puniſhment which could take place in no ſyſtem of Government but the Moſaic, is, when examined on plain and clear principles, found to be juſt: admit now, the *manner* and *degree* of it to be doubtful for want of knowledge ſufficient to ſhew us the *neceſſity*, and conſequently the *juſtice* of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the Lawgiver, who

who ſo wiſely and equitably obſerved the rule of juſtice in the puniſhment itſelf, obſerved it likewiſe in the *manner* and *degree* of the puniſhment?

This, as to the general meaning, of the *manner* and *degree* of a Puniſhment. But, if I be not miſtaken, this *manner* and *degree* here inſiſted on have a peculiar reference to his Lordſhip's own Syſtem of divinity and politics. I ſuppoſe, his principal objection to the *manner* might ariſe from the puniſhment's being inflicted by the civil juſtice of the ſtate, and not by the immediate hand of God. But he ſhould have conſidered, that the LAW all along diſtinguiſhes between the crimes capable of legal conviction, and ſuch as were inſcrutable to all but Omniſcience. The latter God reſerves for his own Inquiſition *: But the crime in queſtion was an overt-act of idolatrous worſhip, and therefore came reaſonably and equitably before the Civil Tribunal. His cavil at the degree comes next to be conſidered. Its being ſimply CAPITAL was not, I believe, that for which his Lordſhip imputed *injuſtice and cruelty* to it. The being attended with CONFISCATION, as in the caſe of Naboth, was what ſeems principally to have incurred his diſpleaſure. But in a caſe, where his Lordſhip was perſonally prejudiced, he ſhould have miſtruſted his own judgment; he ſhould have examined the force of thoſe arguments, by which a great Lawyer had lately evinced, that *forfeiture for high treaſon* is perfectly juſt and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, haranguing on the conditions of *Hiſtorical Authenticity*, delivers this, for one of the chief, "That the facts, "the principal Facts at leaſt, be confirmed by COLLATERAL TES-"TIMONY. By collateral teſtimony (ſays he) I mean the teſti-"mony of thoſe who had no common intereſt of Country, of Re-"ligion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe or falſify the truth †."

This condition of *hiſtorical Authenticity* will be eaſily agreed to; as well as his definition of *collateral teſtimony*: And the quotations of JOSEPHUS and EUSEBIUS, from *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chal-*

* See Div. Legat. † Vol. iii. p. 281.

deans, and *Greeks*, will without doubt be urged by the defenders of Religion, as SUCH *collateral teſtimony*, where the witneſſes *had no common intereſt of Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe or falſify the truth.*—Pardon me, ſays his Lordſhip, "JOSEPHUS in-"deed attempts to ſupport his hiſtory [the Bible] by *collateral teſ-*"*timonies*, thoſe of *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans*, and even "*Greeks*. But theſe teſtimonies, were they never ſo full to his "purpoſe, would CEASE TO BE COLLATERAL teſtimonies, by COM-"ING THROUGH HIM, who had a common intereſt of Country and "Religion to diſguiſe and to falſify the truth *."

This ſeems a little hard, that, when our advàntages of defence are, in his Lordſhip's opinion, ſo rare, the few we have ſhould be loſt the very moment they are gained. JOSEPHUS has no ſooner ſeized this important mark of *hiſtorical authenticity*, but it ſlips through his fingers as he is urging it: and, what is ſtill more extraordinary, BECAUSE he urges it. The *Book of life* and the *Seat of life*, it ſeems, have this property in common—

"Like following LIFE through Creatures you diſſect,
"You loſe it in the moment you detect."

For, as Tully well obſerves, all human things are given to change. "Corpora noſtra non novimus. "Itaque *Medici* ipſi, quorum "intererat ea noſſe, aparuerunt ut viderentur: nec eo tamen aiunt "EMPIRICI notiora eſſe illa, quia poſſit fieri ut patefacta et detecta, "MUTENTUR."

But to canvas this wonderful reaſoning a little cloſer; Let us make a ſuppoſition, or rather, let us lay down a *fact*, that APION, like his Lordſhip, had inſiſted on this very *condition of hiſtorical authenticity*; and that JOSEPHUS, who defended the Bible againſt his cavils, took him at his word, and agreed to put the iſſue of the debate on that circumſtance; and thereupon produced the teſtimony of *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*, to ſupport

* Vol. iii. p. 281.

the

the ſacred Story. Thus far, his Lordſhip will allow, matters went glibly on, and the argument had its proper efficacy. JOSEPHUS quoted from the Works of *Pagan* writers, tranſmitted to him through the hands of *Pagan* readers; and being engaged with a clear-ſighted Adverſary, without doubt, quoted fairly. The *hiſtorical authenticity* of the BIBLE therefore was eſtabliſhed on the terms his Adverſary required. How then comes it to paſs, that an argument which was once concluſive, has now loſt its force? What was truth in that Age muſt be allowed to be truth in this; or not only the *Authenticity*, but the very *being* of Hiſtory will become precarious. Do theſe pagan teſtimonies, in running through the channel of JOSEPHUS, become *polluted*, as ſoon as the original Books ceaſe to exiſt? No, ſays his Lordſhip; but they may be *ſuſpected*. On what account, I pray? Could he prove that JOSEPHUS burnt them; or was aiding in their deſtruction; or had a fore-knowledge of their loſs; his Lordſhip might then indeed have ſome reaſon to *ſuſpect*. But to talk of ſuſpicion, merely becauſe JOSEPHUS was *intereſted* that the quotation ſhould be to his purpoſe, is ſo vague a cavil, as ſhews the objector will never be at a loſs for an evaſion. Were the Originals ſtill in being, he would then *ſuſpect* that theſe paſſages had been foiſted in by ſome Jewiſh or Chriſtian Impoſtor; at leaſt, by ſome body or other, who *had a common intereſt of Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe or falſify the truth*. In ſhort, he would *ſuſpect* all the World ſooner than his own power to impoſe upon us.

To ſhew you, this is ſaid neither at random nor in malice, conſider his Lordſhip's conduct where this *collateral teſtimony* is circumſtanced in the manner he himſelf requires. The defenders of Religion ſay that the PENTATEUCH, which repreſents MOSES as the Leader and Legiſlator of the Iſraelites, is ſupported by that *evidence* which his Lordſhip calls *collateral*. What ſays his good Lordſhip to this? "Be it ſo, that the Iſraelites had a Leader and Legiſlator "called Moſes is proved by the conſent of *Foreign*, whom I call

" *collateral Evidences*. But ſurely it will not follow, that this man " CONVERSED WITH THE SUPREME BEING FACE TO FACE, which " theſe *collateral* Witneſſes do not affirm*." Thus, you ſee, theſe *collateral evidences* will always be rejected, whether they tell their ſtory *viva voce*, or whether their depoſitions be taken down by ſuch who avail themſelves of their Teſtimony.——But, *they do not ſay that this man converſed with the Supreme Being face to face.* Would his Lordſhip have believed them, if they did? Why, no, ſays he, my faith goes no further than to civil facts; and I muſt needs reckon ſuch Tales amongſt the Miracles of the Greek and Roman Hiſtorians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this ſhew, that if the *collateral evidence* ſpeak but to Moſes's Legiſlation and civil rule, they ſpeak to every thing they are called for, in ſupport of Scripture againſt ſuch Writers as your Lordſhip. To illuſtrate the caſe: It is doubted, for inſtance, whether Livy gives us a true account of ſuch or ſuch a Campaign between Hannibal and the Roman Generals. Polybius, Plutarch, and Appian, being Greeks, are produced as *collateral evidences*; but they ſpeak not a word of thoſe *Prodigies* which the Roman Hiſtorian relates at large.

9. BUT his hate to MOSES is immortal: Notwithſtanding all his Lordſhip's pretended contempt of him, as a Legiſlator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a very formidable Rival. Archbiſhop TILLOTSON had attempted to defend the *Authenticity* of his writings, on this Poſtulatum, *that the Unbeliever would only give the ſame credit to them which he gives to every civil Hiſtory.* His Lordſhip owns the demand to be reaſonable; and is willing to try his Brother Legiſlator, on theſe terms. In order to this, he obſerves, " That one condition of the Authenticity of any human " Hiſtory, and ſuch alone (ſays he) we are to conſider in this place, " is, that it contains nothing *repugnant to the experience of mankind.* " Things repugnant to this experience are to be found in many that " paſs however for authentic; in that of LIVY, for inſtance: but

* Vol. iii. p. 282.

" then

" then these incredible anecdotes stand by themselves, as it were, " and the history may go on without them. But this is not the " case of the Pentateuch, *nor of the other Books of the Old Testa-* " *ment.* Incredible anecdotes are not mentioned seldom and occa- " sionally in them: THE WHOLE HISTORY IS FOUNDED ON SUCH, " it consists of little else; and IF IT WERE NOT A HISTORY OF THEM, " IT WOULD BE A HISTORY OF NOTHING *."

The Unbeliever's objection to the *Authenticity* of the Bible as a *civil history*, is, that it is full of *Miracles:* and, supposing the Defender of Revelation ready to reply, " So likewise is the History of " *Livy*; and yet that does not destroy its credit;" his Lordship obviates the reply extremely well. " There is an essential difference," (says he) " between the *incredible anecdotes* of MOSES and of LIVY. " The Roman Historian's Miracles are detached pieces; they make " no part of the subject, and are extraneous to it: But the Mira- " cles of the Jewish Writer are intimately related to all the civil " affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part; *the whole his-* " *tory is founded on them.* Take away LIVY's miracles, and the " train of civil events *goes on* just as well *without them:* Take " away MOSES's, and his history becomes a heap of confusion, or, " more properly, *it is a history of nothing.*"

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the obligations which Learning or Religion have to his Lordship; I only wish the occasions had been more frequent.

In a word, his Lordship's observation on the *difference* between the MIRACLES in MOSES and in LIVY is solid and masterly. And *this difference*, let me observe, is a certain mark, though not of that *civil authenticity* which the good Archbishop's argument requires, Yet of that *divine original* which the SCRIPTURES arrogate to themselves.

It is the specious, but trite, objection of Infidelity against the *Miracles* recorded in the Bible, that those remote ages were full of

* Vol. iii. p. 279.

prodigies

prodigies and portents. "Why then, says the Freethinker, should "we believe the *incredible anecdotes* of MOSES, rather than those "of LIVY?" For a very good reason, replies his Lordship, we find them in a history essentially different from that of *Livy*. Take away *his* miracles, together with all those of the other Pagan Historians, and the Story stands just as it did. But take away the BIBLE-MIRACLES, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a state of inexplicable confusion.

Again, one of the least hacknied, and indeed least futile observations, I have ever heard urged against the Bible (and it has been urged to me), is the WANT OF A NECESSARY CONNEXION between the *civil* and the *miraculous* parts of that History. Here again his Lordship comes in, in support of Revelation, and says, that this *necessary connexion* is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the *civil* part if you take away the *miraculous*. Which sure is a *connexion* of some strength.

Thus has his Lordship, before he was aware, in attempting to destroy the *civil authenticity* of the Bible, supported its *divine original*. And this good, though undesigned, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance is not here sufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long story; and as I pretend to have supplied this DESIDERATUM, *The want of a connexion between the miraculous and civil part of the sacred History*, I shall refer you to the proper place, where it is to be found.

In the mean time, give me leave to go on with his Lordship; and proceed to the proposition itself, That the *Miracles recorded* in the BIBLE *destroy its credit as a civil history*. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece of chicane. Let us see how the matter stands between the Archbishop and his Lordship.

BELIEVERS say, the Bible-History is the history of a Dispensation really divine: UNBELIEVERS say, it is the history of one only pretended; and endeavour to support their assertion, by shewing it to

to have the *civil marks* of falſehood and impoſture. Here the Archbiſhop ſteps forward, and offers to try the authenticity of the Bible on the Standard of a CIVIL HISTORY. Agreed, replies his Lordſhip; And what ſay you to MIRACLES? Say? Why, that *Miracles* are out of the queſtion; and come into conſideration till the DIVINE authority be contended for. When we agreed to conſider the Bible as a *civil hiſtory only*, it was not for truth's, but for argument's ſake. If we held the Writers of it to be mere civil Hiſtorians, the miracles, recorded in it, might be fairly urged againſt us; and urged with advantage, if indeed there be that difference between them and Livy's, which is pretended. But we hold the Writers were indeed inſpired: and You, my Lord, have ſhewn us, by that difference, to juſtify the *miraculous part*, whenever their inſpiration becomes a queſtion between us. In the mean time, ſtick to your point; and never fancy you can make our Divines the dupes of ſo pitiful a Sophiſm. You have drawn us (while we debate a particular queſtion with you) to exclude for argument's ſake one of our principles *; and then urge againſt that queſtion, a FACT †, which ſtands, and is to be defended on the excluded principle; and ſo cannot be maintained while the principle remains excluded: Which is juſt as if, when you had perſuaded us to tye our hands, on promiſe that the queſtion ſhould be only about the uſe of our feet, You ſhould object to us our inability of laying faſt hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you puſh this imaginary advantage, beſt detect the fraud and impoſture of your proceeding. "The Old Teſtament (you ſay) is founded in incre-"dibility. Almoſt every event contained in it is incredible in "its cauſes and conſequences; and I muſt except or reject the "whole, as I ſaid juſt now. No one, EXCEPT HERE AND THERE "A DIVINE, will preſume to ſay, that the hiſtories of the Old Teſ-"tament are *conformable to the experience of Mankind*, and the na-"tural courſe of things."——*Except here and there a Divine*, do

* The divine authority of the Bible. † Miracles.

you

you ſay? Nor they neither, I aſſure your Lordſhip. What they ſay is this, That every thing of a mere civil nature in the Old Teſtament has all the marks of civil authenticity. This is all they ſaid, and all they meant to ſay. And, on what good grounds they ſaid it, give me leave to ſhew your Lordſhip a little more at large.

The Bible tells us, the world was created in time; and that time at no immenſe diſtance, as ſeveral fabulous relations of Pagan Antiquity had pretended.—And does not the late invention of Arts prove that the Bible ſays nothing but what appears very probable?

It ſays, the Earth was overflowed by a deluge of waters.—And do not the contents of its ſurface demonſtrate that it has ſuffered this Cataſtrophe?

The Bible ſays, again, that the *Founders of Cities* were the *inventors of arts*; and that the firſt *civil* Governments compoſed of ſmall Monarchies aroſe from the *Domeſtic*. And do not experience and the natural courſe of things ſupport ſo *credible* an *anecdote?*

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Iſraelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went out as a great People, and in a hoſtile manner, to ſeek new habitations.—And of this, have we not both external and internal evidence? The external in the Egyptian, Phœnician, Chaldee, and Greek Writers, quoted by Joſephus and Euſebius: the internal in the whole Jewiſh RITUAL.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to Idolatry; their tranſportation to a foreign land; and the re-peopling that part of Judea with a new Colony of Idolaters—And of the truth of all this, we ſay, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet exiſting, is a ſtrong and amazing Teſtimony.

Theſe, my Lord, are a very few of the numerous inſtances which might be produced to ſhew the *civil Authenticity* of the Bible. And on theſe and ſuch as theſe, the Clergy's challenge ſtood, when they undertook to prove that Authenticity, on the common principles of hiſtoric credit. Further, or other than this, they neither ſaid nor meant to ſay. They underſtood, as well as your Lordſhip, the

the difference between Moſes's *incredible anecdotes* and thoſe of Livy; and that the Jewiſh Hiſtory, unlike to all other, is *wholly founded on miracles*. But they diſtinguiſhed better than your Lordſhip, of Moſes's *civil Hiſtory*: which conſiſts of two parts; the peculiar Diſpenſation to that People; and the occaſional ſtory of the reſt of Mankind.

It is the *peculiar Diſpenſation* only to which his Lordſhip's obſervation can be applied, *viz.* that the *civil* cannot be ſeparated from the *miraculous* part: Nor did the Clergy attempt to do it. It was the *occaſional ſtory* of the human race, we muſt needs ſuppoſe, to which the Archbiſhop's challenge referred: And I have ſhewn juſt above, that we are able to make his challenge good.

Thus would I have reaſoned with his Lordſhip; and thus, in fact, was he reaſoned with (as I may have occaſion to tell you in my next Letter): but he was deaf to all advice, though it was given in private, and to ſave his memory from the diſgrace of theſe portentous Essays. What remained was to expoſe them as they deſerved to the laughter and contempt of Mankind.

And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well diſcharged my general promiſe to You. When one looks back upon this poor collection of meagre, diſjointed reaſoning, tacked together by his Syſtem, and ſwelled up to the ſemblance of a body by the tumor of his Rhetoric, one ſees revived in theſe *Eſſays* the old ſtory of Prometheus; his Lordſhip inſulting the ſanctity of the Public, juſt as that moſt antient of Freethinkers did the Altar of Jupiter; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of Gods and Men, A HEAP OF DRY BONES COVERED WITH FAT.

I am, *&c.*

LETTER IV.

YOU will wonder to hear again from me on ſo trifling a ſubject as this FIRST PHILOSOPHY. And had not Lord Bolingbroke reduced us to this alternative, either to give up the BIBLE or his LORDSHIP to contempt, I ſhould willingly have left him in poſſeſſion of his Admirers.

My laſt Letter examined his Lordſhip's value in every point of *view*, in which a PHILOSOPHER would deſire to ſhine. I ſhall now puſh my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own Province. I ſhall crave your patience while I try his talents in his POLITICAL capacity, as an Analyſer of States, a Balancer of Power, and a Diſtributer of Civil and Religious Sanctions.

But now we muſt recede a little from the method hitherto obſerved, which was to defend againſt his Lordſhip's calumnies, not this or that body of Divines, but the general Principles of natural and revealed Religion. Here I ſhall have occaſion to patroniſe a ſingle Clergyman; and not ſuch a one neither as I could have wiſhed; a CUDWORTH, a CLARKE, a CUMBERLAND, or a TILLOTSON (eſtabliſhed Names! which the Public are ready to make their own quarrel); but a Writer of very ambiguous fame, the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moſes*, and, of *The Alliance between Church and State*: Of whom, I pretend to know little but from the talk of his Adverſaries; his Friends poſſeſſing him, as they do a good Conſcience, in ſilence and complacency; and from his Adverſaries

Adverſaries I learn—"But hold, you cry, let us drop both his Friends and his Enemies, and hear what the Learned abroad ſay of him; for his works are well known, and have been frequently tranſlated and criticiſed both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from Strangers who are without ſelfiſh partialities or perſonal prejudices."—Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that deciſion: Foreign Critics of the greateſt name have ſpoken ſo differently of him from the Scriblers at home, that, was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would ſuſpect their encomiums for the civilities of his moſt partial Friends. So to his Adverſaries, I ſay again, I commit him: And, from them I learn that he abounds in Paradoxes, that he delights in Refinements, and would fain paſs upon the World a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digeſted learning: that, on his firſt appearance, he was ſhrewdly ſuſpected of infidelity; but that (nobody knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a ſort of friend to Religion; indeed, in his own way: I ſuppoſe he ſees it for his Intereſt to ſtick to the eſtabliſhed Church; for I know no other reaſon why there ſhould have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the repreſentation of his Enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, *The Dunces, of all denominations, being in Confederacy againſt him.* Indeed, ſince his Lordſhip's diſcovery of a *Confederacy* between *Divines* and *Atheiſts*, the word *confederacy* is likely to become as ridiculous as the word *Ode*, which, our Laureate foretells, nobody for the future will hear ſpoken of without laughing. However, it ſhall paſs; for were there no more in this *confederacy*, than in his Lordſhip's, and that every individual Blockhead only followed the bent of his own natural bias, it would but make the wonder ſtill more.

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with: In truth, I could not find another, ſo proper for my purpoſe; which was, as I ſaid, to diſplay Lord Bolingbroke's *political* talents. For though his Lordſhip be very profuſe in his ill Language to All who have

undertaken the defence of *Religion* and *Church Government*; yet the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* is the only one whom he does more than rail at and abuſe on theſe accounts. For while he keeps at a reſpectful diſtance from the *Arguments* of others, he comes, boldly, up to this Writer's, and ſits down before them in form. He diſputes with him, the Knowledge of the *Unity*—the ſenſe and reaſon of a *ſelect people*—of a *tutelary Deity*—of *compliance with human prejudices*, and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This ſeems not greatly for his Lordſhip's honour after he had defied all the mighty Chieftains of Literature, to decline the combat, and think himſelf quit by accepting the Gauntlet from this puny Writer.

His Lordſhip begins his attack on that capital circumſtance in the Jewiſh Oeconomy, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE: He pretends to account for it independently of the EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL PROVIDENCE, which Moſes aſſured his people was to be adminiſtered under a *Theocracy*; and which the Author of *The Divine Legation* attempts to prove, from this very circumſtance of the *Omiſſion*, was actually adminiſtered.

But to make this intelligible to the common Reader, it will be neceſſary to give a ſummary View of that famous Argument purſued at large through two volumes of *The Divine Legation*, and yet conceived by many of the Learned, to be left imperfect; marry, by ſome, if you were to judge from the knowledge they ſeem to have of it, hardly to be begun.

RELIGION has been always held neceſſary to the ſupport of CIVIL SOCIETY; and (under the common diſpenſation of Providence) a FUTURE STATE, as neceſſary to RELIGION; becauſe, nothing but a *future ſtate* can remove the objections to God's moral Government, under ſuch a Providence: whoſe phænomena are apt to diſturb the ſerious Profeſſors of Religion, as it is of the eſſence of religious profeſſion, to believe that *God is a rewarder of thoſe who diligently ſeek him.*

Moſes,

Moses, who inſtituted a *Religion* and a *Republic*, and incorporated them together, ſtands ſingle amongſt ancient and modern Lawgivers, in teaching a *Religion* WITHOUT the ſanction, or even the mention, of a *Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*. The ſame Moses, by uniting the Religion and the Republic of the Jews into one ſyſtem, made God by conſequence their ſupreme civil Magiſtrate, whereby the form of Government became truly and properly THEOCRATICAL.

The natural conſequence of a *Theocratic* rule is an *extraordinary* or EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And ſuch, indeed, the Jewiſh Lawgiver has every where repreſented it to be.

Now, the queſtion between Infidels and Believers is, whether this extraordinary Providence was REAL or only PRETENDED?

Here the Author of *The Divine Legation* interpoſes; and undertakes to prove, from the circumſtance of the *omiſſion of a future ſtate*, that it was REAL. His Argument ſtands thus:

If Religion be neceſſary to Civil Government, and if Religion cannot ſubſiſt, under the common diſpenſation of Providence, without a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, ſo conſummate a Lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of ſuch a ſtate, unleſs he had been well aſſured that an *extraordinary Providence* was indeed to be adminiſtered over his People: or were it poſſible he had been ſo infatuated, the impotency of a Religion wanting a future ſtate, muſt very ſoon have concluded in the deſtruction of his REPUBLIC; But his Republic nevertheleſs continued flouriſhing and Sovereign, for many ages.

This is the plain and ſimple ARGUMENT of *The Divine Legation*; which the firſt and the ſecond Volumes of that Work are employed to explain and illuſtrate. And it muſt be owned, Lord Bolingbroke ſaw it in its force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. This praiſe it would be unjuſt to deny him, when others have underſtood ſo little of the *Argument*, as to imagine that the two firſt Volumes had left it unfiniſhed; and that the Third was to complete the *Syllogiſm*; though the Author had told us, more than

once,

once, that the purpoſe of the laſt Volume was only to INFORCE the various parts of the foregoing ARGUMENT, by many new conſiderations.

To evade, as we ſay, this Argument, his Lordſhip caſts about for a reaſon, independent of the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for Moſes's OMISSION of a future ſtate. And his firſt ſolution is this, "MOSES DID NOT BELIEVE THE IMMORTALITY OF "THE SOUL, nor the rewards and puniſhments of another life, "though it is poſſible he might have learnt theſe Doctrines from "the Egyptians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EARLY, perhaps as "they taught that of the Unity of God. When I ſay, *that Moſes* "*did not believe the immortality of the ſoul*, nor future rewards and "puniſhments, my reaſon is this, that he taught neither, when *he* "*had to do with a people whom a Theocracy could not reſtrain*; and on "whom, therefore, terrors of Puniſhment, *future* as well as preſent, *eternal* as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too ſtrongly inculcated *."

This reaſoning is altogether worthy of his Lordſhip. Here we have a *Doctrine*, plauſible in itſelf, and therefore of eaſy admittance; Moſt alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; Of higheſt account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Iſraelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners; Of ſtrongeſt efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indiſpenſable uſe; Yet, all this notwithſtanding, *Moſes did not believe it, and, on that account, would not teach it.*— But then, had MOSES's integrity been ſo ſevere, How came he to write a Hiſtory which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at leaſt, a fiction of his own? Did he *believe* that? How came he to leave the Iſraelites, as my Lord aſſures us he did, in poſſeſſion of many of the ſuperſtitious opinions of Egypt? Did he *believe* them too? No, but they ſerved his purpoſe; which was, The better governing an unruly People. Well, but his Lordſhip tells us, the doctrine

* Vol. iii. p. 289.

of

of a future ſtate ſerved this purpoſe beſt of all; for *having to do with a People whom a Theocracy could not reſtrain, terrors of puniſhment,* FUTURE *as well as preſent,* ETERNAL *as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too ſtrongly inculcated.* No matter for that. MOSES, as other men may, on a ſudden grows ſcrupulous; and ſo, together with the maxims of common politics, throws aſide the principles of common ſenſe; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which beſt ſerved his purpoſe; was moſt innocent in itſelf; and was moſt important in its general, as well as particular, uſe.

In his Lordſhip's next Volume, this *Omiſſion* comes again upon the ſtage; and then we have *another* reaſon aſſigned for MOSES's conduct in this matter. MOSES would not teach the Doctrine of "the immortality of the ſoul, and of a future ſtate, *on account of the* "*many ſuperſtitions* which this Doctrine had begot in Egypt, as we "muſt believe, or *believe that he knew nothing of it*, or ASSIGN SOME "WHIMSICAL REASON FOR HIS OMISSION *."

We have ſeen before, that MOSES omitted a future ſtate, becauſe he did not believe it. This reaſon is now out of date; and one or other of the three following is to be aſſigned; either becauſe it *begot ſuperſtitions*; or becauſe *he knew nothing of it*; or becauſe HE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* providence; that being what he means, by the *whimſical reaſon aſſigned* [by the Author of The Divine Legation] *for its omiſſion.*

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting however that he will ſtand to it, and having ſhewn his two firſt reaſons not worth a ruſh, leave the laſt eſtabliſhed even on his own conceſſions.

1. *Moſes*, ſays he, *omitted a future ſtate on account of the many ſuperſtitions, which this doctrine had begot in Egypt.* But if the *omiſſion* ſtands upon this principle, MOSES muſt have omitted an infinite number of Rites and Doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke

* Vol. iv. p. 470.

ſays,

ſays, he borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordſhip's opinion, were thoſe very ſuperſtitions, which this *Doctrine had begot*; ſuch as the notion of *tutelary Deities*; and part, ſuch as aroſe out of thoſe; in which number were *diſtinction between things clean and unclean*; an *hereditary Prieſthood*; *ſacerdotal habits*; and *Rites of ſacrifice*.

2. However, he has another reaſon for the omiſſion: MOSES *might know nothing of it*. To which if I only oppoſed his Lordſhip's own words in another place (where, giving us the reaſons why MOSES did *know ſomething* of a future ſtate, he obſerves, there are *certain rites, which ſeem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine* *) it might be deemed ſufficient. But I go further, and obſerve, that, from the very LAWS of MOSES themſelves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongſt the Laws againſt Gentile Divinations, there is one concerning that ſpecies of them, called by the Greeks NECROMANCY, or *invocation of the dead*; which neceſſarily implies, in the Lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uſes it, the *knowledge of a future ſtate*.

3. This being the fate of his Lordſhip's two reaſons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own inventions, and to take up with SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR THE OMISSION; that is, to allow that, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* Providence, MOSES in quality of Lawgiver had NO OCCASION for the doctrine of a *future ſtate*.

However, his Lordſhip diſſatisfied, as well he might, with the ſolutions hitherto propoſed, returns again to the charge; And in his *Cauſa ſperii*, the book of FRAGMENTS, more openly oppoſes the doctrine of *The Divine Legation*; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reaſon, before given, for the *omiſſion*; namely, *the many ſuperſtitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt*.

* Vol. v. p. 259.

"ONE

" ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE (ſays his Lordſhip) a " doctrine ſo uſeful to ALL Religion, and therefore incorporated " into ALL the Syſtems of Paganiſm, left wholly out of that of " the JEWS. Many probable reaſons might be brought to ſhew, " that it was an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode, and this par- " ticularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, ſo ſoon, at leaſt, " afterwards, by all thoſe who were inſtructed like MOSES, in the " wiſdom of that people. He tranſported much of his Wiſdom " into the ſcheme of Religion and Government, which he gave the " Iſraelites; and, amongſt other things, certain Rites, which may " ſeem to allude, or have a remote relation, to this very doctrine. " Though this doctrine therefore had not been that of ABRAHAM, " ISAAC, and JACOB, He might have adopted it with as little " ſcruple, as he did many cuſtoms and inſtitutions merely Egyp- " tian. He had to do with a rebellious, but a ſuperſtitious, people. " In the firſt Character, they made it neceſſary that he ſhould " neglect nothing which might add weight to his ordinances, and " contribute to keep them in awe. In the ſecond, their diſpoſition " was extremely proper to receive ſuch a doctrine, and to be in- " fluenced by it. *Shall we ſay that an hypotheſis of future rewards* " *and puniſhments was uſeleſs among a People who lived under a The-* " *ocracy*, and that the future Judge of other People was their im- " mediate Judge and King, who reſided in the midſt of them, and " who dealed out rewards and puniſhments on every occaſion? Why " then were ſo many precautions taken? Why was a ſolemn Co- " venant made with God, as with a temporal Prince? Why were " ſo many promiſes and threatenings of rewards and puniſhments, " temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the " book of Deuteronomy, moſt pathetically held out by MOSES? " Would there have been any more impropriety in holding out " thoſe of one kind than thoſe of another, becauſe the Supreme " Being, who diſpoſed and ordered both, was in a particular man- " ner preſent amongſt them? Would an addition to the catalogue

" of rewards and punishments more remote, but eternal, and in all " respects far greater, have had no effect? I think neither of these " things can be said.

" What shall we say then? How came it to pass, this addition " was not made? I will mention what occurs to me, and shall " not be over sollicitous about the weight that my reflexions may " deserve. If the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of " a future state had been revealed to MOSES, that he might teach " them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most cer- " tainly. But he did not teach them. They were therefore not " revealed to him. Why they were not so revealed some PERT " DIVINE or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not " presume to guess. But this I may presume to advance, that " since these Doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant " MOSES, it is highly probable that this Legislator made a scruple " of teaching them to the Israelites, how well soever instructed he " might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to Government " he might think them. The superstitious and idolatrous rites of " the Egyptians, like those of other nations, were founded on the " Polytheism and the Mythology that prevailed, and were suffered " to prevail, amongst the Vulgar, and that made the sum of their " Religion. It seemed to be a point of policy to direct all these " absurd opinions and practices to the service of Government, in- " stead of attempting to root them out. But then the great dif- " ference between rude and ignorant nations and such as were " civilized and learned, like the Egyprians, seems to have been " this, that the former had no other system of Religion than these " absurd opinions and practices, whereas the latter had an inward " as well as an outward Doctrine. There is reason to believe that " natural Theology and natural Religion had been taught and prac- " tised in the ancient Theban Dynasty; and it is probable that they " continued to be an *inward* doctrine in the rest of Egypt, while " Polytheism, Idolatry, and all the MYSTERIES, all the impieties, " and all the follies of Magic, were the *outward* doctrine. MOSES

" might

" might be let into a knowledge of both; and under the patro-
" nage of the Princeſs, whoſe Foundling he was, he might be
" initiated into thoſe *Myſteries*, where the ſecret doctrine alone was
" taught, and the outward exploded. But we cannot imagine that
" the Children of Iſrael, in general, enjoyed the ſame privilege,
" nor that the Maſters were ſo laviſh, to their Slaves, of a favour
" ſo diſtinguiſhed, and often ſo hard to obtain. No. The Chil-
" dren of Iſrael knew nothing more than the outſide of the Reli-
" gion of Egypt, and if the doctrine we ſpeak of was known to
" them, it was known only in the ſuperſtitious rites, and with all
" the fabulous circumſtances in which it was dreſſed up and pre-
" ſented to vulgar belief. It would have been hard therefore to
" teach, or to renew this Doctrine in the minds of the Iſraelites,
" without giving them an occaſion the more, to recall the poly-
" theiſtical fables, and practiſe the idolatrous Rites, they had learnt
" during their Captivity. Rites and Ceremonies are often ſo equi-
" vocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But
" when they are ſo cloſely connected with one Doctrine that they
" are not applicable to another, to teach the Doctrine is, in ſome
" ſort, to teach the Rites and Ceremonies, and to authorize the
" fables on which they are founded. MOSES therefore being at
" liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards and puniſhments in a
" future ſtate, or not to teach it, might very well chooſe the latter,
" though he indulged the Iſraelites, on account of the hardneſs of
" their hearts, and by the divine permiſſion, as it is preſumed, in
" ſeveral obſervances and cuſtoms which did not lead directly,
" though even they did ſo perhaps in conſequence, to the Polytheiſm
" and Idolatry of Egypt *."

What a Babel of bad reaſoning has his Lordſhip here accumulated out of the rubbiſh of falſe and inconſiſtent Principles! And all, to inſult the Temple of God and the Fortreſs of Mount Sion! Sometimes, he repreſents MOSES as a divine Meſſenger, and diſtin-

* Vol. v. p. 238—241.

guiſhes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, *a future ſtate not being revealed to* MOSES *was the reaſon he did not teach it.* Sometimes again, he conſiders him as a mere human Lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of Religion and Politics from the Egyptians, in whoſe ſecret Learning he had been intimately inſtructed; and then, the reaſon of the *omiſſion* is, *leſt the Doctrine of a future ſtate ſhould have drawn* the *Iſraelites into thoſe Egyptian ſuperſtitions*, from which it was MOSES's purpoſe to eſtrange them. All theſe inconſiſtencies in *Fact* and *Reaſoning*, his Lordſhip delivers in the ſame breath, and without the leaſt intimation of any change in his Principles or Opinions.

But let us follow him ſtep by ſtep, without troubling our heads about his real ſentiments; which this *View* of his talents regards with indifference. It is enough that we confute all he ſays, whether under his own or an aſſumed Character.

He begins with confeſſing, that ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE *a doctrine ſo uſeful to* ALL *Religions, and therefore incorporated into* ALL *the Syſtems of Paganiſm, leſt wholly out of that of the Jews.*

It ſeems then, this OMISSION is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by MOSES's *diſbelief* of the doctrine; his *ignorance* of it; or the *imaginary miſchiefs* it might poſſibly produce. So that we may be allowed to think it deſerved all the pains, the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* has beſtowed upon it: whoſe *whimſical reaſoning*, if it ended in a demonſtration of Revealed Religion, ſufficiently atoned for its going a little out of the way.

His Lordſhip proceeds to ſhew, in direct oppoſition to what he ſaid before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future ſtate, becauſe the Egyptians taught it: His knowledge of it (my Lord tells us) further appears from an *internal* circumſtance, *ſome of his rites ſeeming to allude, or to have a remote relation, to this very doctrine.* This I obſerve, to his Lordſhip's credit. The remark

mark is juſt and accurate. But we are in no want of his *remote relation*; I have ſhewn juſt above, that the Jewiſh Laws againſt *Necromancy* neceſſarily imply Moſes's knowledge of the Doctrine.

He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly ſpeaking, the Iſraelites muſt have received from this Doctrine, in the temper and circumſtances with which they left Egypt. MOSES, ſays he, *had to do with a rebellious and a ſuperſtitious People.* This likewiſe I obſerve to his credit: It has the ſame marks of ſagacity and truth; and brings us to the very verge of the *Solution*, propoſed by the Author of *The Divine Legation*; which is, that the Iſraelites were indeed under an *extraordinary Providence*, which ſupplied all the diſadvantages of the *Omiſſion*. Under a *common and unequal* Providence, RELIGION cannot ſubſiſt without the doctrine of a future ſtate: for Religion implying a juſt retribution of reward and puniſhment, which under ſuch a Providence is not diſpenſed, a future ſtate muſt needs ſubvene, to prevent the whole Edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the *fact*, which his Lordſhip ſo amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future ſtate was moſt uſeful to* ALL *Religions, and therefore incorporated into* ALL *the Religions of Paganiſm.* But where an *extraordinary* Providence is adminiſtered, good and evil are exactly diſtributed; and therefore, in this circumſtance, a future ſtate is not neceſſary for the ſupport of Religion. It is not to be found in the Moſaic Oeconomy; yet this Oeconomy ſubſiſted for many ages: Religion therefore did not need it; or, in other words, it was ſupported by an *extraordinary Providence.*

This is the argument of *The Divine Legation.* Let us now conſider his Lordſhip's preſent attempts to evade it.

Shall we ſay, that an Hypotheſis of future rewards and puniſhments was uſeleſs amongſt a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, *and that the future Judge of other People was their immediate Judge and King, who reſided in the midſt of them, and who dealt out rewards and puniſhments on every occaſion?* WHY THEN WERE SO MANY PRECAUTIONS *taken?* &c.

Firſt,

First, let me observe, that the PRECAUTIONS here objected to are intended for an insinuation against the truth of Moses's Promise of an extraordinary Providence. A kind of SOPHISM which his Lordship advances and only holds in common with the rest who have written against *The Divine Legation:* and which I shall here, after much forbearance on the Author's part, expose as it deserves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his People were under an extraordinary Providence. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a self-evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the Unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumstance in the Jewish Law or History, which may seem to bring the reality of that Providence into question: The same liberty too has the Believer, if, at least, he can persuade himself to make use of it; as many, so professing themselves, have done both in their Writings and Discourings against *The Divine Legation.* Things were in this train, when the Author of that book undertook the defence of MOSES: And to obviate all objections to the Legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful or unfavourable circumstance in the Law or History of the Jews concerning this extraordinary Providence, he advanced the INTERNAL ARGUMENT of the OMISSION; an argument which necessarily inferred that an extraordinary Providence was in fact administered in the Jewish Republic. What change did this make in the state of the case? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty, and Believers too, if so perversely inclined, to oppose, and, as they could, to confute the Argument of *The Divine Legation:* But by no rules of good Logic could they come over again with those scripture difficulties to Moses's credit, which the argument of *The Divine Legation* had entirely obviated, and which it still continued to exclude so long as it remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties arising from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common sense, would

would be to unſettle many a *phyſical* and *mathematical* demonſtration, as well as this *moral* one.

I ſay therefore, as things now ſtand, To oppoſe *difficulties* againſt the adminiſtration of an extraordinary Providence, after that providence has been *proved*, and before the *proof* has been confuted, is the moſt palpable and barefaced impoſition on our underſtanding. In which, however, his Lordſhip is but one of a hundred: and, indeed, the leaſt indecent and inconſiſtent of the hundred; as his declared purpoſe is to deſtroy the credit and authority of the Jewiſh Lawgiver.

I ſhall not however decline to examine the weight of theſe objections, though they be ſo fooliſhly and ſophiſtically obtruded.

If there was this EXTRAORDINARY Providence adminiſtered, ſays his Lordſhip, *Why ſo many Precautions taken? Why was a ſolemn covenant made with God as with a temporal Prince? Why were ſo many promiſes and threatenings of rewards and puniſhments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, moſt pathetically held out by Moſes?* This difficulty is not hard to be reſolved. We find throughout, what *we* Believers are wont to call the *Hiſtory of Providence*, but which *his Lordſhip* is pleaſed to entitle, *Tales more extravagant than thoſe of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral Government of the World, always makes uſe of human means, as far as thoſe means will go; and never interpoſes with his *extraordinary* Providence, but when they will go no further. To do otherwiſe, would be to make an unneceſſary waſte of Miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of NATURE, by obſcuring the harmony of order, than to manifeſt its Lord and Sovereign, by controlling its delegated Powers. This method in God's moral Government, all our ideas of Wiſdom ſeem to ſupport. Now when He, the great Maſter of the Univerſe, had decreed to rule the Jewiſh People in an extraordinary way, he did not propoſe to ſuperſede any of the meaſures of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be eſteemed a ſufficient anſwer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But would

you

you ſee it drawn out more at large, you may conſult the Author's *remarks* on the ſame kind of Sophiſtry employed by Dr. SYKES againſt *The Divine Legation.*

But (ſays his Lordſhip) *would the hypotheſis of a future ſtate have been uſeleſs, &c? Would there* (as his Lordſhip goes on) *have been any more impropriety in holding out thoſe* [ſanctions] *of one kind than thoſe of another, becauſe the Supreme Being, who diſpoſed and ordered both, was in a particular manner preſent amongſt them? Would an addition of rewards and puniſhments (more remote, but eternal, and in all reſpects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of theſe things can be ſaid.* His Lordſhip totally miſtakes the drift of the Author's Argument. The *Divine Legation* infers no more from the fact of the *omiſſion* than this, That the Jewiſh Oeconomy, adminiſtered by an extraordinary providence, could do without the ſervice of the *omitted* Doctrine; not that that Doctrine, even under ſuch a Diſpenſation, was *of no uſe*, much leſs that it was IMPROPER. But then one of his Followers, or, what is as good, one of the Adverſaries of *The Divine Legation*, will be ready to ſay, "If a *future ſtate* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *uſe*, under an extraordinary diſpenſation, How came MOSES not to give it? For great and wiſe ends of Providence vaſtly countervailing the uſe of that Doctrine, if you will believe the Author of *The Divine Legation:* Who, if he did not impoſe upon us, when he promiſed a third volume (as his Lordſhip conſtantly believed he did) will there explain thoſe ends at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to Him, concerning the REASONS of the *omiſſion*; And previouſly aſſures us, he is *not over ſolicitous about their weight.* This, I ſuppoſe, is to make his Counters paſs current: For then, as Hobbes expreſſes it, they become the *money of fools*, when we ceaſe to be *ſolicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their Rhetoric, and not their Logic. But this muſt be ſaid with exception to the firſt, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining.

If

If (says his Lordship) *the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state had been revealed to Moses, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.* It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in *The Divine Legation:* Though as the Author of that book certainly believed, *the doctrines were not revealed*, 'tis ten to one but he thought Moses was not at liberty to teach them; unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of Revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of *The Divine Legation*, who held Moses's pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his Commission. Thus far, then, these two Writers may be said to agree: But this good understanding lasts not long. His Lordship's *modesty* and the other's *pertness* soon make the breach as wide as ever.—*Why they were not so revealed* (says his Lordship) *some* PERT DIVINE *or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to guess.* The forwardness of the one and the backwardness of the other, are equally well suited to their respective principles. Should his Lordship have guessed, it might have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine original of the Jewish Religion: Had his Adversary forborn to guess, he had betrayed his cause, and left those data unemployed which enabled him, I do not say to guess, but to discover, and to *demonstrate the Divine Legation of Moses.*

However, *This*, his Lordship *will presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant* MOSES, *it is highly probable, that the Legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to Government he might think them.*

Here, you see, he personates a Believer, who holds MOSES to be an inspired Lawgiver: But observe how poorly he sustains his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive the LAW from God, or he did not.

If he did not, Why are we mocked with the diſtinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *Law* from God, Why are we ſtill worſe mocked with the diſtinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for omitting *a future ſtate*, as the direction to *inculcate the Unity of the Godhead?* Why was all this mockery, you ſay? For a very good purpoſe: it was to draw us from the TRUE object of our inquiry, which is, What GOD intended by the *omiſſion*, to that FANTASTIC object, which only reſpects what MOSES intended by it. For the intention of GOD ſuppoſes the miſſion and inſpiration of a Prophet; but the intention of MOSES, when conſidered in contradiſtinction to God's, terminates in the human views of an ordinary Lawgiver; which leads us back again to Infidelity.

But he ſoon ſtrips Moſes of his Miſſion, and inveſts him again with his civil Character: And here he conſiders, What it was, which, under this character, might induce Moſes to *omit* a future ſtate; and he finds it to be, leſt this doctrine ſhould have hurt the doctrine of the Unity, which it was his purpoſe to inculcate amongſt his People, in oppoſition to the Egyptian Polytheiſm.

Moſes (ſays his Lordſhip), *it is highly probable, made a ſcruple of teaching theſe Doctrines to the Iſraelites, howſoever well inſtructed he might be in them himſelf, and howſoever uſeful to Government he might think them. The People of Egypt, like all other nations, were Polytheiſts, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward Doctrine: Natural Theology and natural Religion were the inward Doctrine; while Polytheiſm, Idolatry, and* ALL THE MYSTERIES, *all the impieties and follies of magic, were the* OUTWARD *Doctrine. Moſes was initiated into thoſe Myſteries where the ſecret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded.*—For an accurate Divider commend me to his Lordſhip. In diſtinguiſhing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the Myſteries*

Myſteries amongſt the *outward:* though if they had an *inward*, it muſt neceſſarily be part of thoſe *Myſteries*. But he makes amends preſently (though his amends to truth is as it ſhould be, always at the expence of a contradiction), and ſays, that *Moſes learnt the inward doctrine in the Myſteries*. Let this paſs. He proceeds—*Moſes had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not ſo the Iſraelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outſide of the Religion of Egypt. And if a future ſtate was known to them, it was known only in the ſuperſtitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumſtances, in which it was dreſſed up and preſented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Iſraelites, without giving them an occaſion the more to recall the Polytheiſtical fables, and practiſe the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their Captivity.*

The Children of Iſrael, it ſeems, *knew no more of a future ſtate, than by the ſuperſtitious rites and fabulous circumſtances with which it was dreſſed up and preſented to the public belief.* What then? Moses he owns, *knew more.* And what hindered Moses from communicating of his knowledge to the People, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new Law and a new Religion? His Lordſhip lets us underſtand that this People knew as little of the Unity; for he tells us, it was amongſt the inward Doctrines of the Egyptians: yet this did not hinder Moſes from inſtructing his people in the doctrine of the Unity. What then ſhould hinder his teaching them the inward doctrine of a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances? He had diveſted *Religious worſhip* of the abſurdities of Demi-Gods and Heroes; What ſhould hinder him from diveſting a *future ſtate* of Charon's boat and the Elyſian fields? But the notion of a future ſtate would have recalled thoſe fabulous circumſtances which had been long connected with it. And was not Religious worſhip, under the idea of a *tutelar Deity*, and a *temporal King*, much more apt to recal the polytheiſm of Egypt? Yet Moſes ventured upon this inconvenience, for the ſake of great advantages:

Why ſhould he not venture on the other, for the ſake of greater? for the doctrine of a future ſtate is, as his Lordſhip confeſſes, even neceſſary both to civil and religious Society. But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and ſuperſtitions concerning the ſoul (ſuperſtitions, which, though learnt indeed in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of Polytheiſm) when in other places he aſſures us, that Moſes indulged the Iſraelites in the moſt characteriſtic ſuperſtitions of Egypt?

However, let us ſee how he ſupports this wiſe obſervation. *Rites and Ceremonies* (ſays his Lordſhip) *are often ſo equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are ſo cloſely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine is,* IN SOME SORT, *to teach the rites and ceremonies.——In ſome ſort,* is well put in, to ſoften the deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to ſhew that a ſuperſtitious Rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain Doctrine, will obtrude itſelf whenever that Doctrine is taught: and his reaſoning is only calculated to prove, that where the Rite is practiſed, the Doctrine will ſoon follow. This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the reverſe that the Rite follows the Doctrine: becauſe a Principal may ſtand without its Dependent; but a Dependent can never ſubſiſt without its Principal.

Under cover of theſe groteſque ſhapes, into which his Lordſhip has traveſtied the Jewiſh Lawgiver, he concludes, that MOSES *being* AT LIBERTY *to teach this doctrine of rewards and puniſhments in a future ſtate, or not to teach it, he might very well chuſe the latter*— Yet it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, *Moſes was* NOT AT LIBERTY *to teach or not to teach.* His words are theſe, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his ſervant Moſes, it is highly probable that this Legiſlator* MADE A SCRUPLE *of teaching it.* But his Lordſhip well knows that Stateſmen ſoon get the better of their *ſcruples*; and then, by another fetch of political caſuiſtry, find themſelves more at liberty than ever.

I had

I had obſerved above that our noble Diſcourſer, who makes Moſes ſo *ſcrupulous* that he would on no terms afford a handle for one ſingle ſuperſtition of Egypt to get footing among his people, has, on other occaſions, charged him with introducing them by wholeſale. He was ſenſible, his Inconſiſtency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it.—*Though he* [Moſes] *indulged the Iſraelites, on account of the hardneſs of their hearts, and by the divine permiſſion, as it is preſumed, in ſeveral obſervations and cuſtoms, which did not* LEAD *directly, though even they did ſo perhaps* IN CONSEQUENCE, *to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of Egypt.* And could the teaching the doctrine of a future ſtate poſſibly do more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE (as his Lordſhip elegantly expreſſes it) *to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of Egypt*, by drawing after it thoſe *ſuperſtitious Rites and fabulous circumſtances* which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of ſuch a State? If, for the *hardneſs of their hearts*, they were indulged in *ſeveral obſervances and cuſtoms*, which only *led in conſequence* to Polytheiſm and Idolatry; Why, for the *ſame* hardneſs of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future ſtate, which did not lead, but by a very remote conſequence, to Polytheiſm and Idolatry? Eſpecially ſince this *hardneſs of heart* would leſs bear the denial of a DOCTRINE ſo alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a RITE, to which habit only and old cuſtom had given an occaſional propenſity. Again, thoſe Rites, indulged to the People, for the *hardneſs of their hearts*, had, in themſelves, little uſe or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewiſh Diſpenſation; but rather retarded them: Whereas a future ſtate, by his Lordſhip's own confeſſion, is moſt uſeful to all Religions, and therefore incorporated into all the Syſtems of Paganiſm; and was particularly uſeful to the Iſraelites, who were, he ſays, both a *rebellious* and a *ſuperſtitious* people: diſpoſitions, which not only made it neceſſary to omit nothing that might inforce obedience, but likewiſe facilitated the reception and ſupported the influence of the doctrine in queſtion.

You have here the whole of his Lordſhip's boaſted ſolution of this important Circumſtance of the OMISSION. And you ſee how vainly he ſtrives to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of ſo irreſiſtible a Power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but ſo maimed and broken, ſo impotent and fretful, that all his remaining ſtrength is in his venom. And this he now ſheds in abundance over the whole Moſaic Oeconomy. It is pronounced to be a groſs impoſture; and this very circumſtance of the OMISSION is given as an undoubted proof of the accuſation.

—" Can we be ſurpriſed then" (ſays his Lordſhip) " that the " Jews aſcribed to the all-perfect Being, on various occaſions, ſuch " a conduct and ſuch Laws as are inconſiſtent with his moſt ob- " vious perfections? Can we believe ſuch a conduct and ſuch Laws " to have been his, on the word of the proudeſt and moſt lying " Nation in the world? Many other conſiderations might have their " place here. But I ſhall confine myſelf to one; *which I do not re-* " *member to have ſeen nor heard urged on one ſide, nor* ANTICIPATED " *on the other.* To ſhew then, the more evidently, how ABSURD, " as well as IMPIOUS, it is to aſcribe theſe Moſaical Laws to God, " let it be conſidered, that NEITHER the people of Iſrael, nor their " Legiſlator perhaps, KNEW ANY THING OF ANOTHER LIFE, " wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be puniſhed. " Although he might have learned this Doctrine, which was not " ſo much a ſecret doctrine as it may be preſumed that the Unity " of the Supreme God was, amongſt the Egyptians. Whether he " had learned both or either, or neither of them in thoſe ſchools, " cannot be determined: BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH " ASSURANCE; If MOSES knew, that crimes, and therefore Ido- " latry, one of the greateſt, were to be puniſhed in another life, " he deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his inter- " vention, with God. If he did not know it, I ſay it with horror, " the conſequence, *according to the hypotheſis I oppoſe*, muſt be, that " God

" God deceived both him and them. In either caſe, a covenant " or bargain was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and " diſobedience were not fully, nor by conſequence, fairly ſtated. " The Iſraelites had better things to hope, and worſe to fear, than " thoſe which were expreſſed in it: and their whole hiſtory ſeems " to ſhew how much need they had of theſe additional motives to " reſtrain them from Polytheiſm and Idolatry, and to anſwer the " aſſumed Purpoſes of divine Providence *."

This argument, *advanced with* ſo much *aſſurance*, his Lordſhip ſays, he does *not remember to have ſeen, or heard urged on one ſide, nor anticipated on the other.* A gentle reproof, as we are to underſtand it, of the Author of *The Divine Legation:* for none but He, I think, could *anticipate* an objection to an Argument which none but He had employed. Give me leave then to ſupply his defects: I am the firſt good-natured Animadverter on him that has done ſo; the reſt have contented themſelves with their beſt endeavours to expoſe them. And as his Lordſhip is ſo generous to invite an anſwer to it, he ſhall not be diſappointed.

Let it be conſidered (ſays his Lordſhip) *that perhaps Moſes* KNEW NOTHING *of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be puniſhed.—Conſidered* by whom? Not by his Lordſhip, or his kind Readers: for his reaſoning has brought them to *conſider* the contrary. " Many probable reaſons (ſays he) might be brought to " ſhew, that this was an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode; and " this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, ſo ſoon at " leaſt afterwards, by all thoſe who were inſtructed LIKE MOSES " in the wiſdom of that People. He tranſported much of this wiſ- " dom into the ſcheme of Religion and Government which he gave " the Iſraelites: and, among other things, certain Rites, which " SEEM TO ALLUDE, OR HAVE A REMOTE RELATION, TO THIS " DOCTRINE †." This poſſibly might have recurred to his Lordſhip, while he was boaſting of this new and *unanticipated* argu-

* Vol. v. p. 194, 195.

† Vol. v. p. 328, 329.

ment;

ment; and therefore, in the tricking it up amongſt his *Fragments*, to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very happy corrective, *although Moſes might have learnt this Doctrine, which* WAS NOT SO MUCH A SECRET *doctrine, as it may be preſumed that the Unity of the Supreme God was amongſt the Egyptians.* But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have truſted to the rare ſagacity of his Readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; ſo in the caſe before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here ſpeaking of a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances; *Perhaps*, ſays he, MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE. *Which was*, NOT SO MUCH A SECRET *doctrine as that of the Unity.* Now, Sir, turn back a moment to the long quotation from his 239th page, and there you will find, that a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET *Doctrine, as that of the Unity.*— "There is reaſon to believe, that natural Theology and natural Religion were INWARD doctrines amongſt the Egyptians. MOSES "might be let into a knowledge of BOTH by being initiated into "thoſe *Myſteries* where the *ſecret* doctrine alone was taught. But "we cannot imagine, that the Children of Iſrael in general enjoyed "the ſame privilege. No, *they knew nothing more than the outſide* "of the Egyptian Religion: and if the *Doctrine we ſpeak of* [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, it was known only in the ſuperſtitious Rites, and with all the fabulous circumſtances in "which it was dreſſed up and preſented to vulgar belief."—Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a *future ſtate*, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances, *was as much a ſecret Doctrine as the doctrine of the Unity?*

But his Lordſhip's contradictions are the leaſt of my concern. It is his Argument I have now to do with. And this, he ſays, he *advances* WITH ASSURANCE. It is fit he ſhould. *Modeſty* would be very ill beſtowed on ſuch opinions.

He thinks he can reduce thoſe, who hold no future ſtate in the Jewiſh Oeconomy, to the neceſſity of owning, that MOSES, *or that*

that God *himſelf, acted unfairly by the Iſraelites.* How ſo, You aſk? Becauſe One or Other of them concealed that *ſtate.* And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of the actual Sanctions of moral conduct, *future puniſhment.* But who told him, that this, which was no ſanction of the *Jewiſh Law,* was a Sanction to the moral conduct of the *Jewiſh People?* Who, unleſs the *artificial Theologer?* the man he moſt deſpiſes and decries.

And, even in *artificial Theology,* there is nothing but the Calvinistical tenet of *Original Sin,* which gives the leaſt countenance to ſo monſtrous an opinion; every thing in the Gospel, every thing in the Natural Theology, exclaims againſt it.

Jesus, indeed, to prove that the departed Iſraelites ſtill exiſted, quotes the title God was pleaſed to give himſelf, of *the God of Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob*; and this, together with their *exiſtence,* proves likewiſe the *happineſs* of their condition: for the relation they are ſaid to ſtand in with God, ſhews them to be of his Kingdom. But we muſt remember, that the queſtion with his Lordſhip is, not of *reward,* but *puniſhment.* Again, Jesus ſpeaks (indeed in a parable) of the deceaſed *rich man,* as *in a place of torment.* But we muſt remember that the ſcene was laid at a time when the Doctrine of a *future ſtate* was become national. To know his ſentiments on the queſtion of *ſubjection to an unknown Sanction,* we ſhould do well to conſider the following words, "The ſervant "which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himſelf, nei- "ther did according to his will, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes; "but he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of ſtripes, "ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes *." Now the will of a Maſter or Sovereign, declared in his Laws, always includes in it the *Sanctions* of thoſe Laws. The Author of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* expreſsly diſtinguiſhes the ſanction of the Jewiſh law from that of the Goſpel; and makes the difference to conſiſt in this, that the one was of *temporal* puniſhments, and the other of *future. He that deſpiſed Moſes's Law died without mercy under two or three witneſſes.*

* Luke xii. ver. 47, 48.

Of how much ſorer puniſhment, ſuppoſe ye, ſhall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God?* Which appeal is without common ſenſe or honeſty, on ſuppoſition that the apoſtle held the Jews to be ſubject to *future* puniſhments, before that Sanction was promulged unto them. From the GOSPEL therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Iſraelites, while only following the Law of Moſes in which the ſanction of a *future ſtate* is not delivered, were liable or ſubject to the puniſhments of that ſtate.

Let us ſee next, Whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or *natural Religion* (as his Lordſhip is pleaſed, for ſome reaſon or other, to diſtinguiſh the terms), hath taught us, that a people, living under an *extraordinary providence* or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a Law and revealed a Religion, both ſupported by *temporal* ſanctions only, could be deemed ſubject to thoſe *future* puniſhments, unknown to them, which *natural* Religion before, and *Revealed* Religion ſince, have diſcovered to be due to bad men living under a *common Providence.*

NATURAL RELIGION ſtandeth (as has been already ſhewn) on this Principle, "that the Governor of the Univerſe REWARDS and "PUNISHES moral Agents." The length or ſhortneſs of human exiſtence come not primarily into the idea of Religion: not even into that compleat idea of Religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The Religioniſt, ſays he, *muſt believe that God is, and that he* IS A REWARDER *of thoſe who ſeek him.*

While God exactly diſtributed his rewards and puniſhments *here*, the light of Nature directed men to look no further for the Sanctions of his Laws. But when it came to be ſeen, that He was *not always* a rewarder and a puniſher *here*, men neceſſarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be ſo, *hereafter*: and conſequently, that this life was but a ſmall portion of human duration. They had not yet ſpeculated on the permanent nature of the Soul; And when they did ſo, that conſideration, which under an *ordi-*

* C. x. v. 28. 29.

nary

nary providence came ſtrongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency under the *extraordinary* to open to them the proſpects of *futurity:* becauſe, though they ſaw the Soul unaffected by thoſe cauſes which brought the body to deſtruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the Creator's Will; who, amongſt the various means of its diſſolution, of which they had no idea, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more than one for that purpoſe.

In this manner was a FUTURE STATE brought, by natural light, into Religion: and from thenceforth became a neceſſary part of it. But, in the Jewiſh THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and puniſher, *here*. Natural light therefore ſhewed that under ſuch an adminiſtration, the ſubjects of it did not become liable to future Puniſhments till that ſanction was known amongſt them.

Thus both natural and revealed Religion ſhew, that his Lordſhip calumniated them, when he affirmed, that, *according to the hypotheſis he oppoſed*, MOSES *Deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: Or that, if Moſes did not know the doctrine of a future ſtate, then* GOD *deceived both him and them.*

Should it be aſked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the Moſaic Diſpenſation? give me leave to anſwer, in the words of Dr. CLARKE, on a like occaſion. He had demonſtrated a ſelf-moving Subſtance to be immaterial, and ſo, not periſhable like Bodies. But, as this included the Souls of irrational animals, it was aſked "How theſe were to be diſpoſed of, when they had left their reſpective habitations?" To which he very properly replies, "Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wiſe God "may, without any great difficulty, be ſuppoſed to have more "ways of diſpoſing of his Creatures" [I add, with perfect juſtice and equity, and with equal meaſure to all] "than we are, at pre-"ſent, let into the ſecret of *."—But if the Author of *The Divine Legation* has not promiſed more than he can perform (as his long

* Octavo Tracts againſt Dodwell and Collins, p. 105.

delay gives us too much cauſe to ſuſpect), this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his laſt Volume.

Nothing now remains of this objection but the ſanction of *future rewards:* And I would by no means deprive the faithful Iſraelites of theſe. His Lordſhip therefore has this to make his beſt of: and, in his opinion, even an unclaimed *reward* is foul dealing; for he joins it with *puniſhment*, as if his conſequence, againſt God's juſtice and goodneſs, might be equally deduced from either of them. —*A covenant*, ſays he, *was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and diſobedience were not* FULLY, *nor, by conſequence*, FAIRLY *ſtated. The Iſraelites had* BETTER THINGS TO HOPE, *and worſe to fear than thoſe which were expreſſed in it.* Though it be hard on a generous *Benefactor* to be denied the right of giving more than he had promiſed; it is ſtill harder on the poor Debtor, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this caſe, the *conditions* are not FULLY *ſtated*; and therefore, according to his Lordſhip's Logic, BY CONSEQUENCE NOT FAIRLY. To ſtrengthen this *Conſequence*, his Lordſhip concludes in theſe words—*And their whole Hiſtory ſeems to ſhew how much need they had of theſe additional motives* [future Rewards and Puniſhments] *to reſtrain them from Polytheiſm and Idolatry, and to anſwer the* ASSUMED *purpoſes of Divine Providence.*

Whoever puts all theſe things together—"That Moſes was himſelf of the race of Iſrael—was learned in all the wiſdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his People from their Yoke—that he brought them within ſight of the promiſed Land; a fertile Country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he inſtituted a ſyſtem of Laws, which has been the admiration of the wiſeſt men of all ages—that he underſtood the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE, and, by his experience gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy of it in general; and, by his perfect knowledge of the rebellious and ſuperſtitious temper of his own People, could not but ſee how uſeful it

was

was to them in particular"—Whoever, I ſay, puts all theſe things together (and all theſe things are amongſt his Lordſhip's conceſſions), and at the ſame time conſiders, that MOSES, throughout his whole ſyſtem of Law and Religion, is entirely ſilent concerning a *future ſtate* of Rewards and Puniſhments, will, I believe, conclude, that there was ſomething more in the OMISSION than Lord BOLINGBROKE could fathom, or, at leaſt, was willing to diſcover.

But let us turn from MOSES's conduct (which will be elſewhere conſidered at large) to his Lordſhip's, which is our preſent buſineſs.

1. Firſt, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *Omiſſion*, excluſive of MOSES's *Divine Legation:* but, as if diſſatisfied with them himſelf (which he well might be, for they deſtroy one another),

2. He next attempts, You ſee, to prove, that the *Legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumſtance of the *omiſſion*.

3. But now he will go further, and demonſtrate that an *extraordinary providence* in general, ſuch a one as is repreſented by Moſes, and which the Author of *The Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumſtance of the *omiſſion*, was actually adminiſtered in the Jewiſh Republic, could not poſſibly be adminiſtered, without deſtroying free will; without making Virtue ſervile; and without relaxing univerſal benevolence.

4. And laſtly, to make all ſure, he ſhuts up the account by ſhewing, that an *extraordinary* providence could anſwer no reaſonable end or purpoſe.

In his firſt and laſt order of evaſions, he ſeems to be alone; but, in the ſecond and third, he had the pleaſure of ſeeing many an orthodox Writer againſt *The Divine Legation* (to uſe his Lordſhip's language) in *confederacy* with him.

I have examined his Lordſhip's firſt and ſecond order. The third and fourth remain to be conſidered; it is the laſt refuge of his infidelity;

infidelity; and then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of *The Divine Legation*, to give us a freſh VIEW of him; if ſo be he think it worth his while to defend the other principles of his book againſt him.

1. His firſt objection to the adminiſtration of an extraordinary providence, ſuch as MOSES promiſed to his people on the part of GOD, is, that it would DESTROY FREE-WILL. But here let me obſerve, that he affects to diſguiſe the immediate Object of his attack; and, in arguing againſt an extraordinary Providence, chuſes to conſider it in the general, as the Point ariſes out of an imaginary diſpute between Him and the Divines; who, he pretends, are diſſatisfied with the preſent order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquieſcence in God's government, the adminiſtration of an equal Providence, *here*. But this obliquity in diſguiſing the true object of his attack not being of itſelf ſufficient to embarras his adverſaries, he further ſupports it by a prevarication: for it is not true, that Divines are diſſatisfied with the preſent order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordſhip for imputing this ſcandal to them being only this aſſertion, "That if the preſent ſtate be the whole of Man's exiſtence, then the Juſtice of God would have more exactly diſpenſed good and evil *here*: but, as he has not done ſo, it follows, that there will be a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments *hereafter*."

This premiſed, I proceed to his firſt objection. — "In good "earneſt (ſays his Lordſhip), is a ſyſtem of particular providences, "in which the Supreme Being, or his Angels, like his Miniſters to "reward, and his Executioners to puniſh, are conſtantly employed "in the affairs of mankind, much more reaſonable" [than the *Gods* of EPICURUS or the *morals* of POLEMO]? "Would the JUS-"TICE of God be more MANIFEST in ſuch a ſtate of things than "in the preſent? I ſee no room for MERIT on the part of Man, "nor for JUSTICE on the part of God, in ſuch a ſtate *."

* Vol v. p. 425, 426.

His

His Lordſhip aſks, *whether the Juſtice of God would be more manifeſt* in ſuch a ſtate of things, where good is conſtantly diſpenſed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, *than in the preſent*, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordſhip, by *the preſent ſtate of things*, includes the rectification of them in a future ſtate, I anſwer, that the *juſtice of God would not be more manifeſt*, but equally and fully manifeſt in either caſe. If his Lordſhip does not include this rectification in a future ſtate, then I anſwer his queſtion by another; Would the Juſtice of the Civil Magiſtrate be more manifeſt, where he exactly diſpenſes rewards to good men, and puniſhment to evil, than where he ſuffers the Cunning and the Powerful to carve for themſelves?

But *he ſees no room for merit on the part of Man, nor Juſtice on the part of God.* If he does not ſee, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himſelf and his Reader; to the turning his view from the Scripture-repreſentation of an equal Providence, to the iniquity of Calviniſtical election, and to the partialities of Fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit; and to his giving theſe to the reader, in its ſtead. How dextrouſly does he ſlide *Enthuſiaſm* and *Predeſtination* into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal Providence!—*If ſome men were* DETERMINED TO GOODNESS *by the ſecret workings of the ſpirit*, &c. Yes indeed, if you will be ſo kind to allow him, that under an equal providence the will is over-ruled, he will be able to ſhew you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this ſubſtituting *artificial theology* (as he calls it) in the place of *bible-theology*, is his uſual leger-de-main. So again—*I can conceive ſtill leſs, that individual Creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual exiſtence, can be the objects of predilection or averſion, of love or hatred, to God.* Who, of the Goſpel-Divines, againſt whom he is here writing, would have him *conceive* any thing of this at all? It is the *artificial Theologer*, the depraver, as he ſays, of the Goſpel, who would draw him into ſo abſurd a ſyſtem. But what has this exploded *Theology*, that abounds only in human inventions,

ventions, to do with the extraordinary Providence, repreſented in holy Writ! To ſay, that this Providence takes away man's merit and God's juſtice, is confounding all our ideas of right and wrong. Is it not the higheſt merit of a rational creature to comply with that motive which has moſt real weight? And is not God's juſtice then moſt manifeſt when the order of things preſent feweſt difficulties and obſcurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordſhip was plainly of theſe ſentiments, when, arguing againſt God's compliance with the Jewiſh *hardneſs of heart*, he thought it more becoming the Maſter of the Univerſe, to bend the perverſe ſtiffneſs of their Wills: and, when arguing againſt a *future ſtate* from the preſent good order of things, he pretends to ſhew, againſt Divines and Atheiſts in conjunction, that there is little or no irregularity in the preſent diſpenſations of Providence; at leaſt, not ſo much as the World commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a conſciouſneſs that the more exact the preſent adminiſtration of God's providence appeared, the more manifeſt it made his Juſtice? But now his Lordſhip's followers may be apt to pretend, that their Maſter has here done no more, indeed ſcarce ſo much, at leaſt not in ſo expreſs terms, as a celebrated Prelate, in one of his *diſcourſes* at the *Temple*; who tells us, "That an immediate and "viſible interpoſition of Providence in Behalf of the righteous, and "for the puniſhment of the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH THE "FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, AND NOT LEAVE ROOM FOR "THEIR TRIAL *." But they who object this to us, have not conſidered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well obſerves, *A little experience may convince us, that the ſame thing, at different times, is not the ſame* †. Now if *different times* may make ſuch alterations in identity, what muſt *different men* do? The *thing ſaid* being by all candid interpretation to be regulated on the *purpoſe of ſaying*.

* Vol. ii. p. 258, 259.

† *Scripture vindicated from the miſrepreſentations of the Biſhop of Bangor*, p. 165.

2. Lord

2. Lord Bolingbroke's ſecond objection againſt an equal Providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE SERVILE.—"If the Good, "beſides the enjoyment of all that happineſs which is inſeparable "from Virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil, and if the "wicked, beſides all thoſe evils which are inſeparable from Vice, "and thoſe which happen to all men in the ordinary courſe of "events, were expoſed to others that the hand of God inflicted on "them in an extraordinary manner, ſuch Good men would have "VERY LITTLE MERIT; they would have, while they continued "to be good, no other merit than that of children who are cajoled "into their duty; or than that of Galley-ſlaves who ply at the "oar, becauſe they hear and ſee and fear the laſh of the boat-"ſwain *."

If the perfection of a rational Creature conſiſts in acting according to reaſon; and if his merit riſes in proportion as he advances in perfection; How can that ſtate, which beſt ſecures him from acting irrationally, leſſen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of leſs worth for his moral incapacity of being unjuſt or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or leſs *excellent* according to the dignity or nature of the Agent: But the queſtion here is not concerning the *excellence*, but the *power* of the motive to turn action into paſſion; which is the only way I can conceive of deſtroying *merit* in the ſubject. Now I hold, that this fancy, That motives exterior to the Being on which they work, may be able to turn an Agent to a Patient, is one of the greateſt of Phyſical abſurdities; and therefore commonly goes about diſguiſed, in the garb of *metaphyſics*. For while agency remains, merit ſubſiſts: the degrees of which do not depend on the leſs or greater force the motives have on the affections, but on the more or leſs reaſon of the choice. In a word, there is no means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, but by taking away agency, and making man paſſive, or, in other terms, a Machine.

* Vol. v. p. 428.

But, to expoſe in a more popular way the futility of this reaſoning, it will be ſufficient to obſerve that the objection holds equally againſt all religious Sanctions whatſoever. And ſo indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shafteſbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF tended to ſervilize Virtue. Without doubt, one ſort, juſt as much as another; a *future ſtate*, juſt as well as an *equal Providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would ſeem, that *a future ſtate without an equal Providence* (for they are alway to be conſidered ſeparately, as they belong to different ſyſtems) would more ſtrongly incline the Will, than *an equal providence without a future ſtate:* as the value of *future* above *preſent* good is immenſely great. But the human mind being ſo conſtituted, that the *diſtance* of a good takes off proportionably from its influence, this brings the force of the two ſanctions nearer to an equality; which at length proves but this, That the objection to the *merit of Virtue* holds againſt all religious ſanctions whatſoever. In the uſe of which objection Lord Shafteſbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it againſt them *all*, but more conſiſtent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect *diſintereſtedneſs* in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongſt thoſe who hold, that *ſelf-love* and *ſocial*, though coincident, are two eſſential principles in the human frame.

> "That two conſiſtent motions act the Soul,
> "And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE."

But we might go further, and retort upon both theſe noble Adverſaries of Religion, that the charge of *making virtue ſervile* affects all *moral*, as well as all *religious* ſanctions; as well that, whoſe exiſtence they allow, as thoſe, which they would perſuade us to be viſionary; both theſe illuſtrious Patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral ſanction which ariſes from *God's making the practice of virtue our* INTEREST *as well as duty* *. Now *intereſt* and *ſervility* is, it ſeems, the ſame thing, with theſe generous Spirits.

* Vol. v. p. 429.

His

His Lordſhip's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

—— "But would there not be, at the ſame time, ſome further "defects in this ſcheme? I think there would. It ſeems to me, "that theſe good men being thus diſtinguiſhed by particular pro- "vidences, in their favour, from the reſt of mankind, might be "apt either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GENERAL BENEVO- "LENCE, which is a fundamental Principle of the Law of Nature, "and that PUBLIC SPIRIT, which is the life and ſoul of Society. "God has made the practice of morality our intereſt, as well as "our duty. But men who found themſelves conſtantly protected "from the evils that fell on others, might grow inſenſibly to think "themſelves unconcerned in the common fate: and if they relaxed "in their zeal for the Public good, they would relax in their vir- "tue; for public good is the object of Virtue. They might do "worſe, ſpiritual pride might infect them. They might become, "in their own imaginations, the little Flock, or the choſen Sheep. "Others have been ſo by the mere force of Enthuſiaſm, without "any ſuch inducements as thoſe which we aſſume, in the ſame "caſe; and experience has ſhewn, that there are no Wolves like "theſe Sheep *."

The *caſe aſſumed*, to which his Lordſhip objects, and againſt which he pretends to argue, is that of an *equal Providence which exactly diſtributes good to Virtue, and to Vice, evil.* Now the preſent objection to ſuch a ſtate is, an' pleaſe you, that this *favourable diſtinction* of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to *deſtroy his general benevolence and public ſpirit.* Theſe, in his Lordſhip's account, and ſo in mine too, are the moſt ſublime of all Virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, will be moſt highly rewarded: But the tendency of this *favourable diſtinction*, if you will believe him, may prove *the loſs of general benevolence and public ſpirit.* As much as this ſhocks common ſenſe, his Lordſhip has his reaſons. *God has made*

* Vol. v. p. 429.

the practice of morality our INTEREST *as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.*

God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST *as well as duty.* Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our *interest*, under an equal, as well as under an unequal Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that *the practice of morality is our* INTEREST *as well as duty?*

—*But men, who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the* COMMON FATE. What are those *evils*, under an equal Providence, which *fall on others*, and from which the good man is *protected?* Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in Virtue? It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the *common fate*, when he sees his *interest* and his duty so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of *common fate*, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal Providence, yet slurs in upon us, in its stead, a *Providence which only protects good men*; *or rather one certain species of good men*; *and leaves all other to their* COMMON FATE. But admit it possible for the good man to *relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible to the common fate:* there is, in *the state here assumed*, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that fall on others:* for when men *relax in their benevolence*, his Lordship tells you, *they relax in their virtue:* and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However,

However, *ſpiritual pride* (he ſays) *might infect the virtuous, thus protected:* And this he will prove *à fortiori*, from the caſe of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we ſhould ſay, it is this very *enthuſiaſtic ſpirit* itſelf, and not the viſions of *Protection* it is apt to raiſe, which is the true cauſe of *ſpiritual pride?* ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this diſordered ſtate of things, Enthuſiaſm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: and this, in its extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favorites of Heaven. Now, every one ſees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the cauſe, and not the effect, of the diſorder. For what but ſpiritual pride ſpringing out of preſumptive holineſs, could bring the Fanatic to fancy himſelf exalted above the common condition of the Faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him hither, might carry him further; and then, all to come would be indeed the effect of his diſorder. But ſuppoſe it was not the enthuſiaſtic Spirit, but the viſions of protection it is apt to raiſe, which is the cauſe of ſpiritual pride; Is there no difference between a viſion and a reality? Fancy may occaſion thoſe diſorders which fact may remove. This, I perſuade myſelf, is the caſe here: The real communication of Grace purifies thoſe paſſions, and exalts them into virtues, which the ſtrong deluſion of ſuch a ſtate only renders more groſs and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice that his Lordſhip, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, ſeems to have had the *Jewiſh People* in his eye; who, in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the reſt of mankind: a fact, which though it makes nothing for his purpoſe, makes very much for mine, as it furniſhes me with an example to ſupport what is here ſaid of Fanaticiſm; an infirmity pretty general amongſt the Jews of thoſe Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence;

but

but not the memory, nor even the effects of it; Nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceased. This filled them with spiritual pride, as the elect of God; a disposition which, it is confessed, tends readily to destroy or to *relax* general benevolence. But what now are the natural consequences, which the actual administration of an equal Providence would have on the human mind? In this case, as in the other, a warm temper, whose object was Religion, would be obnoxious to the common weakness of our nature, and too apt to disgrace itself by spiritual pride: but as this is one of the vices which an equal Providence is always at hand to punish, the cure would be direct and speedy. The recovered Votary, we will now suppose to be received again into the number of the Good; and to find himself in the *little flock and chosen sheep*, as they are nick-named by this noble Writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity might revive, in a warm temper, the still unmortified seeds of spiritual pride. Admit this to be the case; what follows? His pride revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal Providence, effectually does its work; it purifies the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the Will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow creatures.

What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an equal Providence? That which supports all his other insults on Religion; his sophistical change of the question. He objects to an equal providence (which Religionists pretend has been administered during one period of the Dispensation of Grace) where good men are constantly rewarded, and wicked men as constantly punished; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a *favoured elect* (which never existed but in over-heated brains), where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions

tions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of juſtice.

But now, Sir, keep the queſtion ſteddily in your eye, and his Lordſhip's reaſoning in this paragraph will diſcloſe ſuch a complication of abſurdities as will aſtoniſh you. You will ſee an equal Providence, which, in and through the very act of rewarding benevolence, public ſpirit, and humility, becomes inſtrumental in producing, in thoſe ſo rewarded, ſelfiſhneſs, neglect of the public, and ſpiritual pride.——

His Lordſhip's laſt objection to an extraordinary Providence is, that it would NOT ANSWER ITS END.

" I will conclude this head (ſays he) by obſerving, that we have " *example* as well as *reaſon* for us, when we reject the hypotheſis " of particular providences. God was the king of the Jewiſh Peo- " ple. His preſence reſided amongſt them, and his juſtice was " manifeſted daily in rewarding and puniſhing by unequivocal, ſig- " nal, and miraculous interpoſitions of his power. The effect of " all was this, the People rebelled at one time, and repented at " another. Particular providences, directed by God himſelf im- " mediately, upon the ſpot, if I may ſay ſo, had particular tem- " poral effects only, none general nor laſting: and the People were " ſo little ſatisfied with this ſyſtem of Government, that they de- " poſed the Supreme Being, and inſiſted to have another King, and " to be governed like their neighbours *."

In ſupport of this laſt objection, you ſee his Lordſhip was forced to throw off the maſk, and fairly tell us what he aimed at; that is to ſay, to diſcredit the extraordinary Providence mentioned by Moſes. An equal Providence, ſays he, will not anſwer its *end*. What is its end? Here, his prevarications bring us, as uſual, to our diſtinctions.—When this Providence is adminiſtered for the ſake of *Particulars*, its firſt end is to diſcipline us in virtue, and keep us

* Vol. v. p. 432.

in

in our duty: When adminiſtered for the ſake of a *Community*, its firſt end is to ſupport the Inſtitution it had erected. Now his Lordſhip, proceeding from reaſon to example, gives us this of the Jewiſh Republic, to prove that an equal or extraordinary Providence does not anſwer one or other or both theſe ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that here, where he employs the example, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberleſs other places of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter.—*How long this Theocracy may be ſaid to have continued* (ſays he) *I am quite unconcerned to know, and ſhould be ſorry to mis-ſpend my time in inquiring.* The example then is only an argument *ad hominem.* But the misfortune is, that no laws of good reaſoning will admit an argument *ad hominem* on this queſtion, *Of the* EFFECTS *of a* REAL *extraordinary Providence*; becauſe the nature of the effects of REAL providence can never be diſcovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To ſay the truth, his Lordſhip is at preſent out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be *real*, his own repreſentation of the caſe would, on his own principles, have proved it but *pretended.* For it is a principle with him, that where the means do not produce the end, ſuch means (all pretences notwithſtanding) are but human inventions. It is thus he argues againſt the Divinity of the Chriſtian Religion; which he concludes to be an impoſture for its not having effected that laſting reformation of manners, which he ſuppoſes was its principal deſign to accompliſh.

So far as to the CHOICE of his example. He manages no better in the APPLICATION of it.

We have diſtinguiſhed concerning the *ends* of an extraordinary providence. Let us ſuppoſe now, that his Lordſhip takes the principal end of the Jewiſh Theocracy to be the reformation of *Particulars.* He refers to their hiſtory, and pretends to ſhew they were not reformed. Now whatever other conſequences may attend this ſuppoſed Fact, the moſt obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordſhip, in proceeding from reaſon to example, has given us ſuch an

an example as overturns or ſuperſedes all his reaſoning. According to his reaſoning, an extraordinary providence would tye virtue and good manners ſo faſt down upon every Individual, that his very Will would be forced, and the merit of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, abſolutely deſtroyed. You would now perhaps expect his example ſhould confirm this pretended fact? Juſt otherwiſe. His example ſhews his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordſhip's bad reaſoning. For, when we ſee it conſtantly oppoſed to truth, it is ſo far from being an additional diſcredit to it, that it is as conſtantly oppoſed to himſelf.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOCRACY was to keep that People a ſeparate nation, under their own Law and Religion, till the coming of the MESSIAH; and to prepare things for his reception by preſerving amongſt them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether the Theocracy or extraordinary Providence compaſſed its end, we have only to conſider, Whether this people, to the coming of Chriſt, did continue a diſtinct Nation ſeparated from all the other tribes of Mankind, and diſtinguiſhed from them by the worſhip of the one true God. And on inquiry, we ſhall find, they not only did continue thus diſtinct and diſtinguiſhed, but have ſo continued ever ſince. A ſingularity which has had no example amongſt any other People: And is ſufficient to convince us, that there muſt have been ſome amazing power in that Theocracy, which could go on operating for ſo many ages after the extraordinary adminiſtration of it had ceaſed. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge againſt the due efficacy of this extraordinary providence, but that, *the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects*, is the moſt ample confeſſion of his defeat. And ſo much for his Lordſhip's exploits in ANTIENT POLITICS.

Let us now come a little nearer to him, and conſider him in his capacity for the Modern.

Here his Lordſhip ſhines without a Rival.

" Whether to *ſettle peace*, or to *unfold*
" The drift of hollow States—beſides to know
" Both spiritual power and civil, what each means,
" What ſevers each ——"

as was ſaid by a Poet * of the laſt age of *his* turbulent Friend; who if he did not ſerve his country better than this Politician of later date, had much more to anſwer for, as by all accounts his talents were vaſtly ſuperior.

His Lordſhip however, with the beſt he has, proceeds to overturn the Principles of the Alliance between Church and State. But the pains he had taken, and the oppoſition he had found from the argument of the Divine Legation, had, by the time he came upon this ſecond Adventure, ſo ruffled his temper and diſcompoſed his manners, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language, not only againſt the Syſtem, but even againſt the perſon of the Author.

To underſtand the nature of his Lordſhip's provocation, if at leaſt it aroſe from this treatiſe of the *Alliance*, it may not be improper to ſay a word or two of the occaſion of that Book, and of the Principles on which it is compoſed.

After the many violent convulſions our Country had ſuffered ſince the Reformation by the rage of religious Parties (in which, at one time, liberty of Conſcience was oppreſſed; and at another, the eſtabliſhed Church overturned and deſolated), it pleaſed Divine Providence to ſettle our religious Rights on ſuch fundamental principles of juſtice and equity, and to ſecure the civil peace on ſuch maxims of wiſdom and true policy, as moſt effectually guarded both againſt the return of their reſpective violations: and the means made uſe of were the giving, on proper terms of ſecurity to the

* Milton.

national

national Religion, a free toleration to all who diſſented from the eſtabliſhed Worſhip. This ſeemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious Communion as the long diſtracted ſtate of the Chriſtian World would ſuffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in poſſeſſion of this bleſſing before they grew weary of it, and ſet on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old diſorders. For it is to be obſerved with ſorrow, that this reform of the Engliſh Conſtitution happened not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of Truth, and carried on upon the principles of Charity: but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE; at one time, vainly perhaps, anxious for the eſtabliſhed Religion *, at another, wiſely provident for the ſupport of civil Liberty †. So that when ſucceeding diſſentions in Church and State had made this newly reformed Conſtitution the ſubject of enquiry, the Parties who managed the debate being thoſe who before had both perſecuted and ſuffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the diſcuſſion of the queſtion were not ſuch perhaps as were beſt fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their partialities. *One* ſide ſeemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itſelf, and only a temporary expedient to prevent a worſe; while their conduct ſhewed, they lay at watch for the firſt occaſion to break in upon it. This was enough to miſlead the *Other* to conſider the TEST LAW, which covered and ſecured the eſtabliſhed Religion, as no better than a new ſpecies of perſecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this ſhadow of a grievance; "To have divine Worſhip "really free, they ſaid, no religious profeſſion ſhould be attended "with civil incapacities: a TEST had made that diſtinction amongſt "God's Worſhippers: it was therefore to be ſet aſide." But every man ſaw (and perhaps the enemies of the *Teſt* were not amongſt the laſt who ſaw it) that to ſet aſide this Law, which, under a general

* Ch. II. † Will. III.

Toleration, was the only ſecurity of the *eſtabliſhed* Church, was expoſing the National worſhip, to all the inroads of a ſectarian rabble. This miſchievous project, ariſing out of abuſed liberty, was at firſt entertained, as we may well ſuppoſe, by the tolerated Churches only. Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of fear, on the diſcovery of that bigoted principle in their Adverſaries, which conſidered *Toleration* as only a temporary expedient. And where was the wonder if thoſe who believed, they had no ſecurity for what they had got, while ſuch principles prevailed, ſhould endeavour to put it out of the power of their adverſaries to do them harm? Others of a more politic turn cheriſhed it from views of ambition, and in hopes of ſharing the emoluments of the eſtabliſhed Church. It was ſome time before any Member of the Church of England joined with Diſſenters in their clamours againſt a *Teſt Law*, or, more properly ſpeaking, againſt *their own Eſtabliſhment*. This monſtrous coalition did not happen till a warm diſpute on certain metaphyſical queſtions* (if conſidered in one light, too ſublime to become the ſubject of human wit; if in another, too trifling to gain the attention of reaſonable men) had ſtarted new ſcruples concerning Church-Subſcription. And to get rid of this neceſſary engagement to PEACE, and acquieſcence in the eſtabliſhed Religion, theſe wiſe and faithful Miniſters of the National Worſhip were amongſt the foremoſt to diſcredit it, and the buſieſt to trample down all its fences and ſecurities.

BIGOTRY, you ſee, was at the bottom of the firſt ſet of principles; and FANATICISM, at the top of the other. In their ſeparate appeals to the experience of Mankind, there was this remarkable difference; All ages had felt the miſchiefs of religious reſtraint and perſecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Chriſtian times, of the evils attending the WANT *of an eſtabliſhed Religion.* The Fanatics, therefore, were perpetually urging their experience againſt perſecution, ſecure in not having the argument retorted on

* The Trinitarian controverſy.

them.

them. But, in this imaginary triumph they deceived themſelves; and the very *want* of examples was the greateſt Advantage the Bigots had over them: Who if they had no inſtance of the evils attending the *want* of an Eſtabliſhment, to retort upon their adverſaries, it was becauſe ſuch *want* was never known: The neceſſity of a national Religion for the ſupport of Society, being ſo indiſpenſable, that Men even in the wildeſt times, the ſworn Enemies of religious Eſtabliſhments, and *leagued* together for their deſtruction, were no ſooner become able to effect their purpoſe, than they found, in beginning to new model the ſtate, which they had ſubdued by the ſuperiority of their arms, that there was even a neceſſity of ſupporting an eſtabliſhed Church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the INDEPENDENT *Republic*, and in the *Protectorſhip* of OLIVER; both of which, under their ſeveral Uſurpations, were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the Religion they moſt hated, into a NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed; The diſtempers of the State ſtill further contributed to inflame thoſe of the Church: And, on the Acceſſion of the preſent royal Line to the Throne, a long, a famous, and a regular diſpute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, was begun and carried on by two parties of Churchmen. But as the ſeveral diſputants had reciprocally aſſigned too much, and allowed too little to the two Societies, and had erected their arguments on one common fallacy; the Maintainers of an Eſtabliſhment ſupported a Teſt-law on ſuch reaſoning as deſtroyed a Toleration; and the Defenders of religious Liberty argued againſt the juſtice of that ſecurity on ſuch principles as concluded equally againſt a national Church.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the Author of *The Alliance between Church and State* found the ſentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and Eſtabliſhments when he propoſed his *Theory* to their conſideration: a Theory calculated to vindicate our preſent happy Conſtitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjuſting

adjuſting the preciſe bounds of either Society; by ſhewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their Union: and from thence, by natural and neceſſary conſequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, ſecured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who diſſented from the National Worſhip.

He firſt ſhewed the uſe of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all Ages: He inquired from whence the uſe aroſe, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very eſſence and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the nature of Religion; and ſhewed how, and for what cauſes, it conſtituted a Society: And then, from the natures of the *two Societies*, he collected, that the object of the Civil is only the *Body* and its intereſts; and the object of the Religious, only the *Soul*. Hence he concluded, that both Societies are Sovereign, and Independent; becauſe they ariſe not out of one another; and becauſe, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to claſh; the ſameneſs of *original*, or the ſameneſs of *adminiſtration*, being the only cauſes which can bring one, of two diſtinct Societies, into natural ſubjection to the other.

To apply Religion therefore to the ſervice of Civil Society, in the beſt manner it is capable of being applied, he ſhewed it was neceſſary that the two Societies ſhould UNITE: For each being ſovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the ſervice of Religion in any ſolid or effectual manner. But no ſuch union could ariſe but from *free compact* and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unleſs each Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two Societies, explained what thoſe motives and advantages were. Whence it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the two Societies, thus united, with the Civil Magiſtrate at their head, were indeed thoſe very rights,

rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find eſtabliſhed and enjoyed under our preſent happy Conſtitution in Church and State: The reſult of this was, that an ESTABLISHED CHURCH and a free TOLERATION, are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a TEST LAW. This Law therefore the Author, in the laſt place, proceeded to vindicate, on the ſame general principles of the Law of Nature and Nations.

You have here, Sir, a true though ſhort analyſis of *The Alliance between Church and State*; with the Principles on which the Theory is conducted.

Let us now conſider the account his Lordſhip has been pleaſed to give of it. I ſhall take him paragraph by paragraph, in his native diſorder, as he lies: And for the ſame reaſon that I followed a different method in confuting his Arguments againſt the *moral attributes*, which I choſe to methodize and digeſt. For when a diſorderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him ſtill clearer, and ſhew his arguments to advantage, by bringing them into order. But when ſuch a one is beyond remedy cloudy and confuſed, as our noble Writer is here where he reaſons againſt the book of the *Alliance*, this aſſiſtance would be ſuſpicious: for the Reader might come to fancy that as well the *obſcurity* as the *order* were of the Anſwerer's making. Therefore the ſafeſt, as well as faireſt way in this caſe is to take the Writer as you find him. The obſcurities in thought and expreſſion will be then ſeen to be his own; and nothing can be objected to his Adverſary, but a few repetitions, which in this method of anſwering can never be avoided.

His Lordſhip preludes his attack upon the Book and the Author with this curious Narrative.

"I have heard of a Sermon preached by one Doctor SENIOR, a "Fellow of Trinity College, in Cambridge, before King Charles "the Second, at New-market, *in the days of paſſive obedience and* "*non-reſiſtance*, and afterwards printed. His text was taken from "the 14th, 15th, and 16th verſes of the fourth Ch. of Exodus,

"or

" or ſome of them; wherein God directs MOSES to take AARON " the Levite, becauſe he knew that AARON could ſpeak well to " the People, and joins them together in Commiſſion, that they " might aſſiſt one another mutually; that AARON might be inſtead " of a mouth to MOSES, and that MOSES might be inſtead of God " to AARON. What other applications the good Doctor made of " theſe texts, I know not. But I am informed by Mr. LEWIS, who " has read the Sermon, that he eſtabliſhed on them a ſuppoſed " *Alliance between the Church and the State:* or rather between the " Church and the King. By this *Alliance* the well-ſpoken Levite " was to inſtil paſſive obedience to the King, in the minds of the " People, and to inſiſt on it, as on a Law of God; The King, on " the other hand, was to be the nurſing Father of the Church, to " ſupport her Authority, to preſerve, at leaſt, if not increaſe, her " immunities, and to keep her in the full poſſeſſion of all the ad- " vantages ſhe claimed. The Church performed her part, and had " a right, by virtue of this alliance, if the King did not perform " his, to teach this doctrine no longer, and to reſume her inde- " pendency on the State and on him. This was the purport of the " ſermon, at leaſt: and WARBURTON took his hint, POSSIBLY, " from it, and turned it to ſerve his purpoſe; that is, to lay down " the ſame principles and TO BANTER MANKIND IF HE COULD, by " NOT drawing directly, and avowedly, from them the ſame con- " cluſion. Dr. SENIOR's authority is, no doubt, as good in this " caſe, as that of DE MARCA or even of BOSSUET. The firſt, a " time-ſerving Prieſt, intereſted, and a great flatterer, if ever there " was one, and who made no ſcruple to explain away whatſoever " he had found himſelf obliged to ſay in favour of the State. The " latter was as wiſe, if not as cunning, as learned, and a much " better man, though not ſo much in the favour of Mr. WAR- " BURTON, who gave them Characters in his aſſuming ſtyle, with- " out knowing any thing of them; and who has the *impertinence* " *to pronounce* of the greateſt Scholar, the greateſt Divine, and the greateſt

" greateſt Orator of his age, that *he was a good ſenſible man.* He " was all I have ſaid of him: but he was an Eccleſiaſtic, and a " ſubject of France *."

As to this account of Dr. SENIOR, I ſcarce know what to make of it, or what credit it deſerves: For he who will falſify a Book in every body's hands, will hardly be very ſcrupulous of what he ſays of a Sermon, which nobody has heard of, but his Friend Mr. LEWIS. At leaſt if Doctor SENIOR was ever a man of this world, I ſhould fancy he muſt be later than where his Lordſhip, who is no great Chronologer, has placed him. He tells us it was *in the days of paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance*, and that the doctrine of his ſermon was calculated for the ſervice of popery and arbitrary power. May we not ſuppoſe then, that he flouriſhed under his Lordſhip's *Auſpices*, when the Church was laſt in danger? If this were the caſe, his Lordſhip uſes Dr. SENIOR juſt as he uſed St. PAUL †, firſt ſets him upon preaching *paſſive Obedience*, and then abuſes him for his pains.

But let Dr. SENIOR live when and where he will, he thinks it POSSIBLE that WARBURTON *might have taken the hint of the Alliance from him.* Yes, juſt as *poſſible* as that LOCKE took the hint of the *original compact* from FILMER.

He aſſures us, however, that *the Authority of Dr.* SENIOR *is as good as that of* DE MARCA, *or even of* BOSSUET. The authority of Dr. SENIOR! For what?—To ſupport Mr. WARBURTON's *doctrine of the Alliance.* But where is it to be had? Suppoſe this difficulty to be got over; and Dr. SENIOR as ready at hand as DE MARCA or BOSSUET, and as willing to declare againſt the incroachments of the Church; yet the Author of the *Alliance*, perhaps, would not think it altogether ſo fit for his purpoſe: For he tells us, that his

* Vol. iv. p. 515.

† " By this *Alliance* of the Hierarchy and the Monarchy, Religion, that ſhould ſup- " port good government alone, was employed to ſupport good and bad government " alike, AS IT HAS BEEN BY ST. PAUL." Vol. iv. p. 516.

purpoſe in ſo frequently quoting the acknowledgments of DE MARCA and BOSSUET, in favour of the State, was to ſhame thoſe *Proteſtant* Divines who had contended for the *independency* of the Church, after it became eſtabliſhed; and even for its *ſuperiority* before.

But, of theſe two famous Frenchmen, *The firſt* (he ſays) *was a time-ſerving Prieſt, intereſted, and a great flatterer—the latter was as wiſe if not as cunning, as learned and a much better Man, though not ſo much in the favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them Characters, in his aſſuming ſtyle, without knowing any thing of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greateſt Scholar, the greateſt Divine, and the greateſt Orator of his age*, that HE WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN.

The Author of the *Alliance*, in the *Advertiſement* to the laſt Edition of his Book, ſpeaking of the French Tranſlator, has theſe words—"He ſupported them [the concluſions] all along with quo-"tations from the two famous works of DE MARCA and BOSSUET; "the one the wiſeſt, and the other the MOST SENSIBLE DIVINE "THAT NATION EVER PRODUCED*."

From theſe words, I leave you, Sir, to reflect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble Writer's repreſentation, that BOSSUET is *not ſo much in Mr. Warburton's favour* as DE MARCA; and that Mr. Warburton has *the impertinence to pronounce* that BOSSUET was A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN. In the heavy diſtreſſes of Controverſy, many a Writer has been found to miſrepreſent. But to do this out of mere wantonneſs and gaiety of heart, and then, on the credit of his own falſe quotations, to abuſe and call names, is altogether in his Lordſhip's manner.

But you will ſay, perhaps, that the IMPERTINENCE was not in the familiarity of the commendation, but in the choice of the topic. It may be ſo; and then we get another Rule of good writing from his Lordſhip, who has already ſupplied us with ſo many: "That

* P. 13. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 11. of this Edition.]

when

when the authority of an Author is urged in a point concerning Civil and Religious Rights, his *learning*, his *divinity*, and, above all, his *eloquence* ſhould be inſiſted on, rather than his GOOD SENSE."

All this is but a prelude to the Combat. "The notion (ſays this "great Politician) of a FORMAL ALLIANCE between Church and "State, as between two independent diſtinct powers, is a very "groundleſs and WHIMSICAL notion. But a fraudulent or ſilent "compact between princes and prieſts became very real, as ſoon as "an eccleſiaſtical order was eſtabliſhed *." The latter part of this period is but too true; and the Theory of the *Alliance* (miſrepreſented in the former part) was propoſed to remedy theſe miſchiefs. It is this Theory only, which I ſhall undertake to vindicate againſt his Lordſhip's Objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what ſhould he mean elſe?) one actually executed in form; and ſuppoſes that the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State*, aſſerted the actual execution of ſuch a one, we may, with more juſtice, perhaps, apply to his Lordſhip what he ſays of the Author, concerning DE MARCA and BOSSHET, *That he gives a Character of the book called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it.* Give me leave to quote the Author's own words—"From all this it appears, that our plan of "Alliance is no precarious arbitrary Hypotheſis, but a Theory "founded in reaſon, and the invariable nature of things. For "having, from the eſſence, collected the *neceſſity* of allying, and "the *freedom* of the compact; we have from the ſame *neceſſity*, "fairly introduced it; and from its *freedom*, conſequentially eſtab-"liſhed every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if "the reader ſhould aſk, where this Charter or treaty of convention "for the union of the two Societies, on the terms here delivered, "is to be met with? we are able to anſwer him. We ſay, it may "be found in the ſame Archive with the famous ORIGINAL COM-"PACT between Magiſtrate and People; ſo much inſiſted on, in

* Vol. iv. p. 515, 516.

" vindication of the common rights of Subjects. Now when a " ſight of this *compact* is required of the Defenders of Civil liberty, " they hold it ſufficient to ſay, that it is enough for all the purpoſes " of fact and right, that ſuch original compact is the only legiti- " mate foundation of Civil Society: That if there were NO SUCH " THING FORMALLY executed, there was, *virtually:* That all dif- " ferences between Magiſtrate and People ought to be regulated on " the ſuppoſition of ſuch a Compact; and all Government reduced " to the principles therein laid down; for that the happineſs, of " which Civil Society is productive, can only be attained by it, " when formed on thoſe principles. Now ſomething like this we " ſay of our *Alliance between Church and State* *."

Let this ſerve too, for an anſwer to his Lordſhip's inſulting queſtion in another place—" But where ſhall we look for the conditions " of that *original contract which was made between the religious and* " *the civil Society*, I know not; unleſs we ſuppoſe them written " on the back of Conſtantine's grant to Sylveſter †." Does his Lordſhip know where to look for the *original contract which was made between the prince and people*, in any place of eaſier acceſs? Or will he, when at a loſs, ſend us to the *back of Conſtantine's grant to Sylveſter*, for this contract likewiſe?

But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverſe uſe of words, his Lordſhip means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* between King and People; This indeed, the Author of the *Alliance* does venture to ſay, and not only to ſay, but to prove likewiſe.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordſhip's opinion, ſtands upon a WHIMSICAL principle: ſo did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moſes, from the Omiſſion of a future State ‡. Indeed his Lordſhip ſeems to have been as much diſtreſſed by WHIMSICAL *Divines*, when he turned Philoſopher, as he was by WHIMSICAL *Politicians*, while he continued a Stateſman §. How-

* Alliance, third Edit. p. 165, 166, 167. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 271, 272. of this Edit.]

† Vol. iv. p. 419. ‡ See p. 204. 12mo. [Vol. IV. p. 742. of this Edition.]

§ See his Letter to Sir W. Windham.

ever,

ever, the *whimsical* principle in question is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

This principle, his Lordship rejects: and it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly: For he who makes Religion itself a Fantom, can surely have little or no idea how it should become embodied.

"Neither NATURE nor REASON (says his Lordship) could ever "lead men to imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT SOCIE-"TIES IN THE SAME SOCIETY. This imagination was broached "by ecclesiastical ambition *."

A grave sentence! which to me seems equivalent to this, That *neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine that* ONE *was* TWO. In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how such a thing could ever come to be *broached* (as his Lordship says it was) by any *imagination* not more disordered than it usually is by *Ecclesiastical Ambition*. School-Learning, indeed, might do much; for there his Lordship has fixed his theological-Bedlam: But *Church Ambition*, he assures us, is of another mould; which, as it never failed, he says, to *aim at*, so, it never failed to *obtain*, *immoderate Wealth and exorbitant Power*. What then are we to think? That his Lordship meant, that *neither Nature nor Reason could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent Societies in the same* COMMUNITY? for *Community* being the genus, several *Societies*, as the species, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to suppose, merely for my own ease; because when his Lordship is well understood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph then are contained these two propositions:

1. That the Church does not compose a *Society*.

2. That it does not compose a Society *independent and sovereign*.

* Vol. iv. p. 412.

Let

Let us examine his reaſoning on theſe points as it lies in his works; for as diſorderly as it lies, it is intended, I aſſure you, to overturn the whole Theory of the *Alliance*.

"A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (ſays his Lordſhip) BY WHICH IS "MEANT, ON THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY, is, or is not, a creature "of the State. *If the firſt*, it follows, that this Order no more "than others, which the State has inſtituted for the maintenance "of good government, can aſſume any rights, or exerciſe any "powers, except ſuch as the State has thought fit to attribute to "it, and that the State may, and ought to keep a conſtant con-"troul over it, not only to prevent uſurpations and abuſes, but to "direct the public and private influence of the Clergy, in a ſtrict "conformity to the letter and ſpirit of the Conſtitution; the ſer-"vants of which, in a much truer ſenſe, they are, than what they "affect ſometimes to call themſelves, the Ambaſſadors of God to "other men. *If the laſt* is ſaid, if it be aſſerted, that the Church "is in any ſort independent on the State, there ariſes from this "pretenſion the greateſt abſurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of "Imperium in Imperio; an Empire of divine, in an Empire of hu-"man inſtitution *."

Thus far his Lordſhip, who is here reaſoning againſt the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his Dilemma with telling the Reader, that the Author of that Book has defined a *religious Society*, to be the *body of the Clergy*.——*A religious Society, by which* (ſays he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, *is, or is not, a Creature of the State* †.

You cannot, I believe, ſee this aſſertion without ſome ſurprize, when you obſerve, that the Author of the *Alliance* has defined a religious Society to be A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS CREATURES ASSO-

* Vol. iv. p. 413.

† So again, *This order of men which we* CALL *the Religious ſociety*—Vol. iv. p. 440. And again, *The Religious Society, as we have accuſtomed ourſelves to* CALL *the Clergy*. Vol. iv. p. 561.

CIATED.

CIATED *.—When you obſerve, that He makes it one of the principal cares of a religious Society, to provide an Order of men, to be ſet apart for miniſtering in holy things, or in other words, a CLERGY.—" The greateſt care is to be had, that the acts of reli-" gious worſhip be preſerved ſimple, decent, and ſignificative. But " this can be done only by providing perſons ſet apart for this " office; whoſe peculiar employment it ſhall be to preſide in, di-" rect, and ſuperintend the Acts and Services of Religion †," &c.—When you obſerve, he makes the *end* of religious Society to be, *ſalvation of ſouls*, and one of the *means*, the Order of the *Clergy*.—Laſtly when you obſerve, he oppoſes the *Church* and the *Clergy* to each other. " It is unjuſt in the CHURCH to aim at the Propaga-" tion of Religion by force, and impertinent to aim at riches, " honours, and powers. But what motives the CLERGY OF A " CHURCH might have, is nothing to the purpoſe of our inquiry. " We have only to conſider what the CHURCH had, WHICH, as a " religious Society, conſiſts of the whole body of the Community, " BOTH LAITY AND CLERGY ‡."

In a word, the Author of the *Alliance* was at much pains to prove that a religious Society or *Church* does not mean the *Clergy*, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reaſons, for the ſake of truth in general, and of his own ſyſtem in particular.

1. It ſhocks common Senſe to call one Order or rank in Society, by the name of the Society: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a Subſtance, by the name of the Subſtance.

2. It ſubverted the Theory of the *Alliance* to make the *Clergy* conſtitute the *Church:* for then the Church could neither be a diſtinct Society, nor independent; both of which it muſt be to make it ca-

* Alliance, p. 55. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 274. of this Edition.]

† Ibid. p. 61. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 275. of this Edition.]

‡ Ibid. p. 112. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 275. of this Edition.] The very Popiſh Clergy, nay DE MARCA himſelf, that *time ſerving Prieſt and great Flatterer*, was more honeſt (as his Lordſhip might have ſeen by the quotation at the bottom of this very page of the *Alliance*—ECCLESIÆ CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OMNIUM COMPAGE CONSTITUITUR) than he chuſes to repreſent the body of the Engliſh Clergy.

pable

pable of an Alliance with the State. It could not be a diſtinct Society; for an Order of men, as I obſerved juſt before, is the ſame in politics, as a quality in phyſics; the one muſt inhere in a *Society*, the other in a *Subſtance*: and theſe being the ſubſtrata of the other, to talk of a diſtinct, much more, of the independent exiſtence of an *order*, or of a *quality*, is the profoundeſt nonſenſe in Politics and Phyſics. But admitting that ſuch a Church, which, like *Trinculo's* kingdom, conſiſts only of *Viceroys and Viceroys over them*, were capable of allying with the State, the Author has ſhewn, in the place quoted above, that its *motives* for allying would be ſuch as the State could never comply with, either in juſtice or policy.

Extreme neceſſity (to do his Lordſhip all the right we can) forced him upon this bold and violent falſification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He ſaw no other way of diſcrediting the opinion of an *independent religious Society*, than by making it believed that ſuch a Society would be an "*Imperium in Imperio, an Empire of divine, in an Empire of human Inſtitution*;" a miſchief, againſt which the State is always on its guard. And if a religious Society ſignified the Church, and the Church only the CLERGY, the claim to Independency would imply ſuch an Imperium. But the Author of the *Alliance* goes upon other principles; he holds that the Church ſignifies the whole body of the Faithful; that though this Society be independent, yet, from its independency, no ſuch ſoleciſm in Politics can ariſe as an Imperium in Imperio. This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large, the noble perſon, in the following words, miſrepreſents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

"An *Imperium in Imperio* (ſays he) is in truth ſo expreſsly con-
"tained in the very terms of the aſſertion, that none of THE TE-
"DIOUS SOPHISTICAL REASONINGS, which have been employed for
"the purpoſe, can evade or diſguiſe it. One of theſe I will men-
"tion, becauſe it has a CERTAIN AIR OF PLAUSIBILITY, that im-
"poſes on many; and becauſe, if it cannot ſtand a ſhort and fair
"examination,

" examination, as I think it cannot, the whole edifice of eccleſiaſti-
" cal independency and grandeur falls to the ground. It has been
" ſaid then, that religious and civil ſocieties are widely diſtinguiſhed
" by the diſtinct ends of their inſtitutions, which imply neceſſarily
" diſtinct powers and a mutual independency; that the end of the
" one is the Salvation of Souls, and that of the other the ſecu-
" rity of temporal intereſts; that the ſtate puniſhes overt acts, and
" can puniſh nothing elſe, becauſe it can have cognizance of
" nothing that paſſes in the mind, and does not break out into
" criminal actions; but that the Church employing her influence
" to temper the paſſions, to regulate the inward diſpoſitions, and
" to prevent ſins, as well as crimes, is that tribunal at which even
" intentions are to be tried, and ſins, that do not ripen into crimes,
" nor immediately affect civil Society, are to be puniſhed *."

This, I will ſuppoſe, his Lordſhip intended as a fair repreſentation of the Author's argument for the *independency* of the Church. But the Argument, as it ſtands in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different *powers* belonging to the two Societies; as thoſe *powers* are deduced from their different *ends*. But different powers implying different adminiſtrations, they create a mutual independency; and different adminiſtrations, implying an incapacity of their claſhing with one another, ſhew plainly that ſuch an independency can never produce an *Imperium in Imperio*. This is the natural order of the argument, as it ſtands in the *Alliance*. Let us ſee now, how his Lordſhip repreſents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of Souls*, and *Security of temporal intereſts*: But, proceeding to ſpeak of the different *powers*, adapted to thoſe different *ends*, *viz. Coercion* in the State, and *Perſuaſion* only in the Church (from whence ariſes a mutual independency), he miſtakes the *conſequences* of theſe powers, which are *puniſhment of overt acts*, and *ſubdual of the paſſions*; he miſtakes them, I ſay, for the *powers themſelves*; from which *conſequences* indeed no independency enſues;

* Vol. iv. p. 413, 414.

becauſe *ſubdual of the paſſions* may, in his Lordſhip's opinion at leaſt, be obtained by coercive power, as well as *puniſhment of overt acts*. And if both Societies have *coercive power*, one muſt needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this miſtake only to ſhew you, what a poor and imperfect conception his Lordſhip had of the Argument of the *Alliance*. Had he told us, though in fewer words, that the Author's reaſoning againſt the pretence of an *Imperium in Imperio* ariſing out of a mutual independency, was this, That the State having coercive power, and the Church having none, the adminiſtration of the two Societies could never claſh; ſo as to induce the miſchief of an *Imperium in Imperio*; Had he told us this, I ſay, we ſhould have ſeen, that at leaſt he *underſtood* his Adverſary.

But let us conſider how he goes about to anſwer what he ſo ill repreſents.

"Now in anſwer to all this (ſays his Lordſhip) WE MAY DENY, "with truth and reaſon on our ſide, that the avowed ends of reli- "gious, and the real ends of civil Society, are ſo diſtinct as to re- "quire diſtinct powers, *and a mutual independency*. The Salvation "of Souls is not the immediate end of civil Society, and I wiſh it "was not rather the pretence, than the end of eccleſiaſtical policy; "but if to abſtain from evil and to do good works be means of ſal- "vation, the means of ſalvation are the objects of civil government. "It is the duty of Princes and Magiſtrates to promote a ſtrict obſer- "vation of the Law of Nature, of private and public morality, and "to make thoſe who live in ſubjection to them good men, in order "to make them good citizens. For this purpoſe, the balance and "the ſword are put into their hands, that they may meaſure out "puniſhment to every one, who injures the Community, or does "wrong to his neighbour; and a rigorous puniſhment of crimes, "eſpecially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements "to virtue, *for both are intruſted to the ſame men* *, is the ſureſt way "not

* This is ſaid, I ſuppoſe, in oppoſition to what is aſſerted in the Book of the *Alliance* (to

" not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an ha-
" bitual inward diſpoſition to the practice of Virtue *."

We may, ſays his Lordſhip, *deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil Society, are ſo diſtinct.*—Here he contradicts his maſter LOCKE. This indeed is a ſmall matter. I ſhall ſhew he contradicts Truth, and the whole ſyſtem of human affairs, both in the conſtitution of Laws, and in the adminiſtration of Juſtice.—But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.—*We may*, ſays his Lordſhip, *deny that the* AVOWED *ends of religious, and the* REAL *ends of civil Society, are ſo diſtinct, as to require diſtinct powers and a mutual dependency.* The *avowed ends*, does he ſay? *Avowed* by whom? Common ſenſe requires he ſhould mean, *avowed* by thoſe who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have ſaid *real*; for the *avowed* and the *real* ends are the ſame: He *ſhould* have ſaid *real*; for the fair uſe of the propoſition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require this word. But by what he predicates of theſe *avowed ends*, *viz.* their *not requiring diſtinct powers*, we ſee, he means *avowed* by corrupt Churchmen. *(The ſalvation of ſouls* (ſays he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of eccleſiaſtical policy).* And theſe *ends* are Church Uniformity for the ſake of ſpiritual dominion. Now theſe *avowed ends*, we readily confeſs, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordſhip, after all his declamation againſt ſpiritual tyranny, coming at laſt, in the true ſpirit of a free-thinking politician, to profeſs that religious perſecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as juſtly and reaſonably employed in matters of conſcience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now though this be altogether upon principle (for what ſhould reſtrain a Stateſman, who believes no-

(to ſhew the imperfection of the plan of civil power) that *reward* is not (as it is generally underſtood to be) one of the Sanctions of civil government, in the ſenſe that *Puniſhment* is ſo. But as this is all his Lordſhip has to ſay againſt it, I ſhall here let the matter reſt between them.

* Vol iv. p. 414.

thing of the truth of religion, and ſees all the miſchiefs of diverſity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) Yet you would not have expected it in this place, where his Lordſhip is defending religious Liberty, againſt the Prieſt-craft of the *Alliance:* Nor would you have found it, had not the diſtreſſes of controverſy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle, that the Church was a Society, independent of the Civil, as not having coercive power like the Civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordſhip was forced to deny the minor, and ſo unawares has brought in PERSECUTION as one of the natural powers of the Church. But to compaſs this matter neatly, and without noiſe, he has recourſe to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expreſſion, the *abuſe* of the thing for the thing itſelf.—*The avowed ends of religious—the real ends of civil ſociety.*——But it was ſo evident a truth, that the *ſalvation of ſouls* was the real end of religious Society, and *the ſecurity of temporal intereſts*, the real end of the Civil, that he muſt have loſt his ſenſes who could be brought to believe that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the firſt as the ſecond; or that *inſtruction and exhortation* was as proper to promote the ſecond as the firſt: one or both of which things, his aſſertion, *that the Church and State have not diſtinct powers*, neceſſarily implies: To diſguiſe this abſurdity therefore for *real*, which fair argument required, he ſubſtitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cauſe required: And under this cover, he denies, that the two ſocieties are *ſo diſtinct as to require diſtinct powers.*—Well, this however we underſtand; and have thoroughly canvaſſed. But what mean the words that follow?—AND A MUTUAL INDEPENDENCY. The author of the *Alliance* indeed had ſaid, that the ends of the two ſocieties were ſo diſtinct as to require *diſtinct powers.* But he was not ſo abſurd to add—*and a mutual independency*; becauſe *independency* was not the *mean* of attaining an end, like *diſtinct powers*, but a *conſequence* of thoſe powers: for if the powers, by which two ſocieties

are

are adminiſtered, be different, thoſe ſocieties (ſeeing their adminiſtrations can never claſh) muſt needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a freſh inſtance of the cloudy apprehenſion this great Stateſman had of a plain argument, the argument of the *Alliance*, built on the firſt principles of Law and Politics.

Let me now proceed with his reaſoning. He is to prove, what he had aſſerted, that the two Societies *are not ſo diſtinct as to require diſtinct powers*. He is writing againſt the book, or rather againſt the Author, of the *Alliance*; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the Religious is *ſalvation of Souls*; the end of the Civil, *ſecurity of temporal intereſts*. To this his Lordſhip replies, that ſalvation of ſouls is only the *pretended* end of the Religious; but it is the *real*, though not *immediate* end, of the Civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all diſtinction between the two Societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the firſt part of his aſſertion. I come now to the other, *that ſalvation of ſouls is the real, though not immediate, end of civil Government*. Here the meanneſs of his ſophiſtry is ſtill more apparent, than in the former part. It ſtands thus—"The *immediate* end of civil government is confeſſed, on all hands, to be *ſecurity of temporal intereſts*.—This is done by keeping men *to abſtain from evil*, and exciting them *to good works—Good works are the means of ſalvation*—Therefore the *means of ſalvation are the objects of civil government*; or, in other words, the ſalvation of ſouls is at leaſt the *real*, though *mediate* end of civil Society."

The Author of the *Alliance* had obviated all this paultry Chicane in the following words: "Civil Government, I ſuppoſe, will be "allowed to have been invented for the attainment of ſome certain "end or ends, excluſive of others: and this implies the neceſſity of "diſtinguiſhing this end from others. Which diſtinction ariſes "from the different properties of the things pretending. But "amongſt all thoſe things which are apt to obtrude, or have in fact "obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil Government, there is "but one difference in their properties, as ENDS: which is this, *that*

"*one*

" *one of theſe is attainable by civil Society only, and all the reſt are* " *eaſily attained without it.* The thing then with the firſt mentioned " property muſt needs be that *genuine end* of civil Society. And " this is no other than *ſecurity to the temporal liberty and property of* " *man* *."

But his Lordſhip's ſophiſm conſiſts in the ambiguity of the word END; which either ſignifies the conſequence or iſſue of a *mean*, ſimply; or, the conſequence and iſſue, with intention and fore-thought. In the firſt ſenſe it may be true, that ſalvation is the mediate end of civil Society; but then it is nothing to the purpoſe. In the ſecond ſenſe it is to the purpoſe, but not true. The civil Magiſtrate, all men ſee, had not this conſequence or iſſue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his puniſhments to the various ſpecies of unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinouſneſs of the offence, as eſtimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* Religion, but to their malignant influence on civil Society. A plain indication, that, when he meaſured out puniſhments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* conſiderations in his view. But you ſhall hear what the Author of the *Alliance* has ſaid on this ſubject, who had confuted his Lordſhip's ſophiſm even before he had conceived it.

" We have ſhewn (ſays this writer) that it was the care of the " *Bodies*, not of the *Souls* of men, that the Magiſtrate undertook to " give account of. Whatever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his " juriſdiction; whatever to the ſoul, is not. But, and if there " be that which refers equally to both (as *Morals* plainly do) ſuch " thing muſt needs be partly within, and partly without his pro- " vince; that is, it is to be *partially* conſidered by him; his care " thereto extending ſo far only as it affects Civil Society. The " other conſideration of it, namely, as it makes part of Religion, " being in the Hands of thoſe, who preſide in another kind of " Society. Again, with regard to civil practice; if we caſt our eye

* Alliance, p. 32, 33. 8vo, [Vol. IV. p. 37. of this Edition.]

" on

" on any Digeſt of Laws, we find that evil actions have their an-
" nexed puniſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* not
" in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right;
" nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation
" from the extraordinary revealed will of God: which two things
" indeed coincide: but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to
" their malignant influence on civil Society. But the view in
" which the *State* regards the *practice of Morality* is evidently ſeen,
" in its recognition of that famous maxim, by which penal laws
" in all Communities are faſhioned and directed, THAT THE
" SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PRO-
" PORTION TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME. A maxim evi-
" dently *unjuſt* were actions regarded by the State, as they are in
" themſelves only; becauſe the *Law of Nature* enjoins only in pro-
" portion to the ability of performance; and human abilities abate
" in proportion to the contrary propenſities: evidently *impious*,
" were actions regarded by the State as they refer to the will of
" God, becauſe this State-meaſure directly contradicts his method
" and rule of puniſhing. But ſuppoſe the Magiſtrate's office to be
" what is here aſſigned, his aim muſt be the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*,
" or of thoſe actions which malignantly affect ſociety; and then
" nothing can be more reaſonable than this proceeding; for then
" his end muſt be the good of the *whole*, not of *particulars*, but as
" they come within that view. But the good of the whole being
" to be procured only by the *prevention* of crimes, and thoſe to
" which there is the greateſt propenſity being of the moſt difficult
" prevention, the full ſeverity of his Laws muſt of neceſſity be
" turned againſt theſe *."

But, his Lordſhip goes on to inform us, What thoſe *means* are which Princes and Magiſtrates employ to procure this *mediate end* of civil Society, the *Salvation of Souls*; and they are, he ſays, COERCIVE force.—*For this purpoſe, the balance and the ſword are put into*

* Alliance, p. 35, 36, 37. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 38, 39. of this Edition.]

their

their hands, that they may meaſure out puniſhment to every one, who injures the community, or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous puniſhment of crimes, eſpecially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the ſureſt way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue.

Who would have expected that it ſhould come at laſt to this, ſo contrary to his Lordſhip's aſſertion in the caſe of an *extraordinary providence*, That a vigorous and exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments under the MAGISTRATE'S PROVIDENCE (which indeed is the only one his Lordſhip thinks worth a ruſh) ſhould be ſo far from *taking amay merit and making virtue ſervile*, that it is the *ſureſt way of creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue!* i. e. the ſureſt way of making virtue *free* and *meritorious*. But there is ſomething marvelouſly perverſe in his Lordſhip's conduct. The exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by Heaven makes virtue worthleſs and ſervile, though the adminiſtration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way, if any, of *creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will continue to believe him, the exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by the civil Magiſtrate makes virtue free and meritorious, though the Magiſtrate's adminiſtration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any be) to make virtue worthleſs and ſervile.

But to come to the point, which theſe obſervations naturally lead to. The very means his Lordſhip aſſigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely *coercive force* for *ſalvation of ſouls*, entirely ſubverts his principle, and ſhews that ſalvation of ſouls could be no end of civil Society, ſince the means are in no wiſe calculated to promote the end; it not being action ſimply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now with theſe (which reſult into what we call Conſcience), force, or coercion, is abſolutely inconſiſtent: Force may make hypocrites, but nothing

nothing but the rational convictions of Religion can make men lovers of Virtue.

Now if it be by ſuch kind of reaſoning as this that the *whole edifice of eccleſiaſtical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground* (to uſe his Lordſhip's big language), Church Power was never worth the rearing.

To proceed. His Lordſhip with much gravity, tells us next, that "A Clergy might co-operate with the civil Magiſtrate very "uſefully, no doubt, by exhortations, reproofs, and example.— "This they might do as aſſiſtants to the civil Magiſtrate, in con- "cert with him, and in ſubordination to him. *To what purpoſe* "*therefore do they claim and affect independency on him?* Greater power "never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they "erect a tribunal to *puniſh intentions?* The very pretence is imper- "tinent. Would they erect it to *puniſh where no injury is offered, nor* "*wrong done?* The deſign is unjuſt and arbitrary. The ideas of "crimes are determinate and fixed. The Magiſtrate cannot alter "them. The ideas of Sins are more confuſed and vague; and "we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the "minds, or at leaſt in the writings of caſuiſts. Would they erect "ſuch a tribunal *to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Such a one is "erected in ſome countries, under the name of the Inquiſition, "and is juſtly deteſted in all. To what end and purpoſe then "can SPIRITUAL COURTS and COERCIVE POWERS ATTRIBUTED "TO THE CLERGY ſerve, unleſs it be to make them Judges "and Parties in their own cauſe, when matters of intereſt are con- "cerned * ?"

His Lordſhip, it muſt be remembered, is here reaſoning with the Author of the *Alliance*, againſt his notions of the rights of a Clergy in an eſtabliſhed Church. And the noble perſon's firſt miſrepreſen- tation, you ſee, is, that amongſt theſe rights, the claim of inde- pendency on the State during their eſtabliſhment, is one; and that

* Vol. iv. p. 415, 416.

the coercive power exercised by them, under the Alliance, is exercised as *inherent* in their order. *To what purpose* (says his Lordship) *do they* [the Clergy] CLAIM AND AFFECT *independency on him, the civil Magistrate?* And again, *To what end and purpose can spiritual Courts, and coercive powers,* ATTRIBUTED *to the Clergy, serve?* And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addressing himself to POPE, he says, "Amongst all the fallacies "which have been employed by Churchmen, one of the most ab-"surd has been advanced, though not invented *, by a paradoxical "Acquaintance of yours; and it is to maintain the INDEPENDENCY "of the Church, and to suppose, AT THE SAME TIME, a sort of "original Contract between the Church and State, the terms of "which, every whimsical Writer, EVEN THIS SCRIBLER, adjusts "as he pleases †." Falsehood and ill language commonly go together. But let them go.

You shall now hear what the Author of the *Alliance* holds on these two points, and from his own mouth. First, as to the *independency*.—"Let us see next (says he) what the STATE gains by it "[the *Alliance*]. These [advantages] in a word may be comprized "in ITS SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL. THE CHURCH "RESIGNING UP HER INDEPENDENCY, and making the Magistrate "her SUPREME HEAD, without whose approbation and allowance, "she can administer, transact, or decree nothing ‡."

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. "The third and last PRIVI-"LEGE THE CHURCH GAINS, by this Alliance, is the being IN-"TRUSTED WITH A JURISDICTION, INFORCED BY COACTIVE "POWER §."

His Lordship assures us, the Author of the Alliance holds, that the *independency* of the Church is *retained* in an establishment: the Author himself says, that it is *given up*. His Lordship assures

* It was invented, it seems, by his friend Dr. Senior.

† Vol. iv. p. 417.

‡ Alliance, p. 147. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 130, of this Edition.]

§ Ibid. p. 134. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 131, of this Edition.]

us,

us, the Author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the Church; the Author himſelf ſays, that *coercive power is a grant of the State*, during the Alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordſhip has improved upon his Maſters, the Authors of the *Rights of the Chriſtian Church*, and of the *Independent Whig*. They had ventured indeed to charge both theſe doctrines on the body of the Engliſh Clergy: But as one can never be ſure what an indiſcreet or corrupt member of ſo large a body may have ſaid, the confutation of their calumny was not ſo eaſy. His Lordſhip is more bold; he charges theſe opinions on a particular member of the eſtabliſhed Church, by name: but then he is more fair, he puts it in the power of the perſon injured to do himſelf juſtice; for it ſo happens, that this perſon not only denies the independency of the Church under an eſtabliſhment, and all claim to inherent coercive power whatſoever, but has laid down principles to diſcredit, and rules to prevent the return of thoſe uſurpations. The Author of the *Alliance* has vindicated * the Engliſh Clergy from the prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON; It had been hard, had he found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the ſame calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As, therefore, no independency in alliance is either claimed or affected; and no inherent coercive power is attributed to the Clergy; We will ſuppoſe his Lordſhip's ſimple queſtion to be, "For what "end is that tribunal, called a *Spiritual Court*, erected?" And had he been ſo candid to let the Author of *Alliance*, to whom he directs his queſtion, ſpeak for himſelf, he had not waited for an anſwer. For the Author tells us, in the moſt conſpicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* †. But, as if the Author had entirely left us to ourſelves to conjecture how he intended to employ this *ſpiritual tri-*

* Alliance, p. 81, & ſeq. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p 63, of this Edition.]

† Ibid. p. 134. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 127, of this Edition.]

bunal, his Lordſhip falls a gueſſing: and there is no kind of abſurdity, he does not propoſe, as favoured by his Adverſary, though they be ſuch as his Adverſary had already exploded.

To what purpoſe, (ſays his Lordſhip), *do the Clergy claim and affect independency on the Magiſtrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to* PUNISH INTENTIONS? *The very pretence is impertinent.*

Before I come to his Lordſhip's *conjecture*, give me leave, Sir, to ſay one word of the happineſs of his *induction*. This *Tribunal*, or this coercive power, which he makes to follow independency, is ſo far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the Church till it has given up its independency. The Author of the *Alliance* aſſigns a plain reaſon. "The State (ſays he) "having, by this Alliance, beſtowed upon the Clergy a Juriſdic- "tion with coactive power, ſuch privilege would create an IMPE- "RIUM IN IMPERIO, had not the *civil Magiſtrate* in return, the *ſu- "premacy of the Church**."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, ſays he, *to puniſh intentions?* The Author of the *Alliance* ſays, No, it is for *reformation of manners only*. But you underſtand not half his Lordſhip's drift, unleſs you conſider theſe queſtions as propoſed to inſinuate, that the Author of the *Alliance* held the Abſurdities contained in them. So here, for inſtance, you are to underſtand that Mr. W. held this Tribunal was to *puniſh intentions*. However, I will acquit his Lordſhip of malice; it ſeems to be an innocent blunder. The Author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a *Tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and, by ill luck, the noble Perſon miſtook this tribunal for a *ſpiritual Court*. The Author's words are theſe—"The effectual cor- "rection of ſuch evils [as ariſe from the *intemperance of the ſenſual* "*appetites*] muſt be begun by moderating and ſubduing the Paſſions "themſelves. But this, civil Laws are not underſtood to preſcribe, "as puniſhing thoſe paſſions only when they proceed to act: and

* Alliance, p. 149. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 131, of this Edition.]

"not

" not rewarding the attempts to ſubdue them. *It muſt be a tri-*
" *bunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal which can do this*;
" *and that is no other than the tribunal of Religion.* When this is
" done, a coactive power of the civil kind may have a good effect,
" but not till then. And who ſo proper to apply this coactive
" power, in ſuch caſes, as that Society, which fitted and prepared
" the ſubject for its due reception and application *?" This *tri-bunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*, the Author calls the *tribunal of Religion (Forum conſcientiæ)*, and diſtinguiſhes it from that other tribunal which is inveſted with *coactive power of the civil kind*, called *ſpiritual Courts:* he makes the firſt a preparative to the other. Yet, ſtrange to believe! his Lordſhip miſtook this *tribunal of Religion*, ſo deſcribed and diſtinguiſhed, for a *ſpiritual Court:* and upbraids the Author of the *Alliance* for ſupporting a *tribunal with coercive powers, to* PUNISH INTENTIONS. But we ſhall ſee more of his Lordſhip's acumen, as we go along.

His ſecond charge againſt the principles of the *Alliance* is in theſe words—*Would they erect this tribunal to puniſh, where* NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE? *The deſign is unjuſt and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The Magiſtrate cannot alter them. The ideas of ſins are more confuſed and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the writings of Caſuiſts.*

To puniſh where no injury is offered nor wrong done, is his Lordſhip's periphraſis for the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, which the Author of the *Alliance* makes one branch of the reformation of manners, and conſequently an object of ſpiritual Courts. But his Lordſhip's own opinion of the *quality* of vague luſt, intimated in this periphraſis, is but a ſecond conſideration. His principal purpoſe in giving it, was to diſcredit the tyranny of ſpiritual Courts, in puniſhing where no fault is committed. To forget his BIBLE is nothing: but to forget his HORACE is a diſgrace indeed. Now this honeſt

* Alliance, p. 99, 100. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 80, of this Edition.]

Pagan:

Pagan reckoned the prohibition of *vague luſt*, as one of the chief objects of *civil laws*;

" Fuit hæc ſapientia quondam
" Publica privatis ſecernere, *ſacra prophanis*;
" CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO; dare jura maritis."

All this is ſo very extraordinary, that you will not readily believe his Lordſhip could deſign the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, by the words—*puniſhing where no injury is offered nor wrong done*; nor would I neither, did he not ſo clearly explain himſelf, in his curious diſtinction between *crimes* and *ſins:* which, becauſe it was occaſioned by, and alludes to, a paſſage in the *Alliance*, it may not be amiſs previouſly to tranſcribe that paſſage: " If we caſt our eye " on any digeſt of Laws, we find that evil actions have their " annexed puniſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* " in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right: " nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their devia- " tion from the extraordinary revealed will of God; which two " things indeed coincide; but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in pro- " portion to their malignant influence on civil Society *." The Author of the *Alliance* ſaid this, to ſhew that the civil Magiſtrate does not concern himſelf with Religion, *as ſuch.* His Lordſhip borrows the ſame diſtinction between *crimes* and *ſins*, to ſhew, that it is arbitrary and unjuſt to puniſh *ſins*, as *ſpiritual Courts* undertake to do: for, ſays he, *the ideas of* CRIMES *are determinate and fixed: The ideas of* SINS *are more confuſed and vague.* From this, it appears, that his Lordſhip miſtook *vices*, *ſins*, *and crimes*, for different actions; whereas they are the ſame actions under different conſiderations: either as they reſpect *natural light*, *revealed Religion*, or *civil laws*; and ſo have different names impoſed upon them. The *ideas* therefore of theſe three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally *determinate and fixed*, or all equally *confuſed and vague.*

* Alliance, p. 35, 36. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 38, 39, of this Edition.]

But

But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordſhip to object to the *confuſed and vague idea of* SINS, ſince this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Goſpel, which, in a hundred places of his ESSAYS, he tells us, coincides with the eternal rule of right; a rule, which he acknowledges to be the moſt determinate and fixed of all things.

But he ſays, *the Magiſtrate cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the Caſuiſt may the idea of ſins.* That is, the Magiſtrate cannot give the Name of Crimes to innocent actions. What ſhould hinder him? He had two advantages above the Caſuiſt: Firſt, *coercive power:* ſecondly, the *vague and confuſed* meaſure to which crimes refer; namely, to the influence of actions on Society. Matter of fact confirms this obſervation. Look round the World; enquire through antient and modern Times, and you ſhall find, that the *Magiſtrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuſe in ranging actions under the idea of *Crimes*, than the *Caſuiſt*, in ranging actions under the idea of *Sins*. This was not improper to be obſerved in anſwer to his Lordſhip's EXPERIENCE, which uſhers in his old ſophiſm, ready at every turn to help him out, the *abuſe* of the thing itſelf—*We know*, ſays he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of ſins vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the* WRITINGS *of caſuiſts.* By which it would ſeem, the noble Author knows as little of *Caſuiſts*, as of any other ſort of learned men, whoſe characters he has treated ſo Lordly. For corrupt caſuiſtry does not ſo much conſiſt *in varying the ideas of Sins*, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the puniſhment denounced againſt them.

His laſt conjecture about the uſe of an eccleſiaſtical Tribunal, on the principles of the *Alliance*, is, that it is erected for the puniſhment of Opinions. *Would they erect*, ſays he, *ſuch a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, ſays the Author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain terms as he can ſpeak;—NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION *: And he

* Alliance, p. 136. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 124, of this Edition.]

not

not only says it, but proves it too *.—*To what end and purpose then*, (says his Lordship), can *spiritual courts and coercive powers serve, unless it be to make the Clergy judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned?—To what end?* The Author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But such an answer did not serve his Lordship's turn. He will make the Author say as he would have him; or injoin him silence, and answer for him, himself. He insinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the Clergy is concerned, and where they become Judges in their own cause. Hear then what the Author of the *Alliance* says upon this head likewise; "CIVIL MATTERS, which temporal Courts may convenientiy inspect, can never belong to an ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. "It hath been shewn, that this Court was erected as a succedaneum to the Civil, to take cognizance of such actions as the Civil "could not reach, or could not remedy: which shews, the State "could never intend to put those things under the ecclesiastical Jurisdiction that fall most conveniently under its own. Besides, for "ecclesiastical Courts to ingross matters that belong to the civil jurisdiction, as it can possibly have no good use, may very possibly "be attended with this evil, of inviting and encouraging the Church "to aim at more power than is consistent, either with her own "good, or the good of the State. The great Founder of our Religion said, *Who made me a Judge or Divider between you?* And "what he would not assume to himself, he would hardly bestow "upon his Church: and that the State should ever intend to give "her what was the peculiar right of temporal Courts, is as difficult "to suppose. We must conclude then, that such practice, wherever "it is found, was derived not from the reasonable Laws of this "*Alliance*, but from the authority of old papal usurpations †." Thus

* Alliance, p. 137, 138. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 124, et seq. of this Edition.]
† Ibid. p. 138, 139, 140. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 125, 126, of this Edition.]

far

far the Author of the *Alliance*; where you may find a great deal more to the same purpose.

But his Lordship goes on with his confutation.—"By admitting "the independency of the Church on the State, the State acknow- "ledges an original independency in the Church, derived from a "greater authority than her own: and the supposed terms of *Union* "may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious So- "ciety to the civil, for the sake of order and peace, than grants "of the civil to the religious Society. Thus Religion and the "Church are set on the same foot: no human authority can alter "one, but must receive it in *the terms* in which it has been re- "vealed; and so may a good Casuist prove on this hypothesis, that "no human authority can measure out any conditions of Esta- "blishment to the other. Thus the State becomes no better than a "coordinate, but inferior power *." I once met with a Philosopher of deep thought, who professed the same reverence for artificial Nonsense, that the Turks pay to naturally Folly. His System on this point was very singular. He supposed that, as in the *material* World there was an universal, though very subtile fire, diffused in secret through all bodies; which, by a late contrivance, might be allured or drawn out from the most inanimate or lumpish Matter, even from the dirty shoes of the Chronologer of Leicester, the Man who makes Time of Eternity; So, in the *intellectual*, that there was a certain witty Spirit, which lay dormant in the most inexplicable Nonsense; and only wanted the application of some Engine of analogous invention to rouse it, and set it free. Till such a one be discovered, we can but guess at his Lordship's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the Church on the State (says he) *the State acknowledges an original independency in the Church derived from a greater Authority than her own.* If, by *Church*, he means the Christian Church, in general, it is confessed that its independency is derived from a greater authority than what the State claims

* Vol. iv. p. 417.

for any of its rights. The Church holding of God immediately and in an extraordinary manner; the State, only mediately, and in a common way. But what are the conſequences his Lordſhip would deduce from thence? The firſt is, that *then the ſuppoſed terms of union may be conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious Society to the civil, for the ſake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious Society.* The *ſuppoſed terms* are terms of Alliance between two independent Societies. Theſe terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than *mutual conceſſions* and *mutual grants.* What then does he mean, by their being *conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious Society than grants of the civil?* By the *ſuppoſition* on which his Lordſhip condeſcends to reaſon: When the Church in Alliance gives up its original independency it is without doubt a *conceſſion*; becauſe it is giving up a right: And when the State in Alliance confers a coercive power on the Church, this is certainly a *grant*; becauſe an original independent religious Society can have no inherent coercive power. However, ſome meaning, it is likely, his Lordſhip had. And it ſeems to be this, "That if the Church have an original independency, no ſuch *Alliance* as is ſuppoſed, could be made: for that the terms on the ſide of the Church would not be conditional but voluntary conceſſions, the State having nothing to give, in return." This would be talking ſenſe at leaſt, though not truth. But, firſt to *ſuppoſe* the fact, that the terms of this Union are mutual grants and mutual conceſſions, and then to deny mutual grants and mutual conceſſions, is giving ſuch a form to his argument as will need a *firſt Logic* to turn into ſenſe, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *firſt Philoſophy* to turn into truth. Thus much however You may ſee; Some cloudy conception his Lordſhip plainly had, that a Society of *divine* original could never enter into Alliance with another, only of *human.* When the Sons of God came down amongſt the Daughters of Men, we are told they begot Giants. His Lordſhip betrays his apprehenſions, that this coalition between the civil and religious Societies would produce an iſſue altogether

as

as monſtrous, a kind of STATE LEVIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the Author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a Pander or Procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehenſions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a Philoſopher and a Stateſman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath ſhewn from the nature of things, that Religion compoſes an independent ſociety: The GOSPEL, by divine inſtitution, hath declared the Chriſtian Religion to be an independent ſociety. His LORDSHIP hath ſhewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent ſociety of the civil kind: And the LAW, by divine inſtitution, hath declared the Jewiſh Republic to be an independent civil ſociety. Now I would aſk his Lordſhip, if nothing hindered this *civil Society of divine original*, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reaſons, excepted by name, what ſhould hinder this *religious Society of divine original* from entering into Alliance with the State?

Another Conſequence his Lordſhip draws from an original independency in the Church is, that RELIGION *and the* CHURCH *are ſet on the ſame foot.* That is, as I underſtand him, for he might have expreſſed himſelf better, the DISCIPLINE of the Church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE: The inference from which is, that the *State muſt receive the* CHURCH *on the terms in which it was revealed:* From whence his Lordſhip draws another conſequence, that *no human Authority can meaſure out any conditions of eſtabliſhment to the Church:* and, from thence another (for his Lordſhip's falſe conceptions are always attended with ſuperfetations), that the *State becomes an inferior Power, or Creature to the Church.* All theſe brave conſequences, we ſee, ariſe out of this principle, "That, in "a Church of Divine Original, the *Diſcipline* is as unalterable as "the *Doctrine.*" And of the truth of this principle his Lordſhip is ſo confident, that he calls his Adverſary a *ſtupid Fellow* for not owning it. "The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this Paradox

" in Engliſh, did not ſee how ill the parts of it hang together, nor " that if eccleſiaſtical Government was, by divine appointment, in- " dependent of civil, no ſuch contract as he ſuppoſes could be " made. The religious ſociety, notwithſtanding their known mo- " deration, could not have parted from that independency AND " SUPERIORITY over the civil power, which God had given " them *."

It is true, this STUPID FELLOW did not ſee it. And I don't well know how he ſhould: ſince, on the other hand, he ſaw it to be impoſſible that any *ſuch contract as he ſuppoſes* could be made, unleſs the Church or religious Society were *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which this Author ſuppoſes to have been made between Church and State? He tells us, in expreſs words, it is a *mutual compact by* FREE CONVENTION †. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleaſure of the contracting parties. But Parties who have this liberty, muſt needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reaſon, ſuch as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The Religious Society* (ſays he) *could not have parted from that independency*, AND SUPERIORITY, *over the civil Power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flouriſhing, we are come to the point; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT? This is in truth a queſtion worth debating. But as his Lordſhip rarely ſuffers an important propoſition, which he is ſet either upon denying or depraving, to paſs through his hands without firſt perplexing it, in the expreſſion with an abſurdity or an equivocation, I ſhall be obliged, before we can paſs forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarraſs. *The religious Society* (ſays he) *could not have parted from that independency* AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil*

* Vol. iv. p. 418.

† Alliance, p. 87. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 85, of this Edition.]

power

power which God hath given them. Now as the Author of the *Alliance* contends only for the independency of the Church *before Alliance*, and as his Lordſhip's reaſoning acknowledges that the queſtion is only concerning independency *before Alliance*, he muſt needs ſuppoſe, by adding, AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil*, that this *ſuperiority* is a conſequence of *independency.* And ſo, indeed, he ſpeaks of it more plainly juſt before.—*Thus* [i. e. from the *independency* of the Church] *the State becomes no better than a coordinate*, BUT INFERIOR, *Power.* Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, *ſuperiority* is ſo far from following *independency*, that it cannot conſiſt with it. For why is religious Society by nature *independent* (as the Author of the *Alliance* ſhews it is) but for the reaſon that Author gives, that it is *eſſentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* *." But there is no ground for ſuperiority of one Perſon or Society over another, but where ſome natural relation or connexion exiſts between them: none exiſts in this caſe; therefore a pretence of ſuperiority on the one ſide, and of dependency on the other, is abſurd. However, as I am verily perſuaded his Lordſhip did not know enough of theſe matters even to prevaricate neatly in the point in queſtion, I conſider it as an innocent blunder, ariſing from the following words of the *Alliance*, ſhamefully, indeed, miſunderſtood.—" Such then is the nature of Chriſt's kingdom [*i. e.* " the Chriſtian Church] it is eſſentially framed to compoſe a firm " and laſting Society; it is made ſuch by divine appointment, and " in order to fit it for public ſervice, it is both by nature and inſti- " tution declared SOVEREIGN, and independent of civil Government, " that it may adapt itſelf by *free Alliance* to the various kinds of " human Policies †." Now *ſovereign in itſelf and independent of civil government*, this great Writer hath paraphraſed to ſignify, *independency and ſuperiority over the civil*,

* Alliance, p. 65. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 54, of this Edition.]

† Ibid. p. 180. [Vol. IV. p. 147, of this Edition.]

—" Thalem

—" Thalem talento non emam Mileſium :
" Nam, ad ſapientiam Hujus, nimius nugator fuit."

But, to come to the queſtion ; which is WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the Nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT. His Lordſhip determines in the negative. *For if*, ſays he, *eccleſioſtical Government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the Religious Society could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, made free and independent; therefore, according to this reaſoning, he could not part with his *independency*, and become ſubject to civil Laws. Hold, ſays his Lordſhip, Man was made free, that he might be ſubject to no laws but thoſe to which he had given his conſent; and as he needed protection from Laws, he had a right to part with his independency if he could get protection upon no other terms. And is not this the very caſe of the religious Society in queſtion, which is only an artificial perſon, by nature and inſtitution free, and ſtanding in need of protection ?

But his Lordſhip's aſſertion, you will find, bottoms at laſt upon this Principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL ITS LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES : An Error which *Bigots* and *Fanatics* indeed are equally fond of indulging; and has been indulged by them to the infinite diſſervice both of civil and of religious Society : But that a *Philoſopher* and a *Stateſman* ſhould know ſo little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly aſtoniſhing. The firſt elements of his profeſſion might have taught him, " That the Au-
" thority by which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in
" the eſſence of the thing." Natural and poſitive duties retain their reſpective natures in the Code of Religion. Natural duties are eternal ; Poſitive duties are revocable. Of theſe latter, ſome are laſting as the Diſpenſation to which they belong; others only temporary. Of the temporary, ſome ceaſe not till they are expreſsly

preſsly revoked; others ceaſe with the occaſion that enjoined them. Theſe laſt are again to be diſtinguiſhed into Privileges and Duties; privileges may be receded from at pleaſure; but duties muſt either be revoked, or the occaſion muſt be plainly ſeen to ceaſe. Now the INDEPENDENCY in queſtion, is one of thoſe inſtitutions in the divine Law, which ceaſes with the occaſion; and is, beſides, a privilege, which may be receded from at pleaſure. Again, In the divine Laws, ſome things are enjoined to be believed as Truths; others to be practiſed as Utilities. Of utilities ſome are general; others particular: The firſt of theſe are permanent and conſtant; the ſecond variable. Of the firſt, is the Church's compoſing a *Society*: of the ſecond, is its *particular form*. Thus, Jeſus ſeemed to inſtitute an equal Miniſtry; the Apoſtles, epiſcopal Government; and modern Churches have choſen one or the other, as beſt ſuited to the various civil Governments with which they had allied.

As Chriſtianity was, by divine inſtitution, a *Society at large*, to authorize and to enable the ſeveral Churches to give particular forms to eccleſiaſtical Government; ſo the *independency* was beſtowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free Alliance with the State. When God himſelf allied the Jewiſh Church with the State, he did not leave that Religion a *ſociety at large*; neither did he ordain it *independent*: he preſcribed, in the minuteſt manner, the form of Church Government; and made it dependent on the State. But the Author of the *Alliance* tells his ſtory better. "The Chriſtian "religion (ſays he) was not only left *independent* of the State by not "being united to it like the Jewiſh (and being ſo left it muſt "needs by the Law of Nature be independent; but its indepen- "dency was likewiſe ſecured by divine appointment, in that fa- "mous declaration of its founder, *My kingdom is not of this world*; "which bears this plain and obvious ſenſe, *That the kingdom of "Chriſt, to be extended over all Mankind, was not, like the king- "dom of God, confined to the Jewiſh people, where Religion was "incorporated with the State*; *and therefore*, of this world, *as well*

"*in*

" *in the exercise of it, as in the rewards and punishments by which it* " *was administered: but was independent of all civil communities*; *and* " *therefore, neither* of this world, *as to the exercise of it, nor as to* " *the rewards and punishments by which it was administered.*—But " whoever imagines that, from this *independency by institution*, the " Church cannot convene and unite with the State, concludes " much too fast. We have observed, that this property in the " *Kingdom of Christ* was given as a mark to distinguish it from the " *kingdom of God*, that is, it was given to shew that this Religion " extended to all mankind; and was not, like the Mosaic, confined " to one only people. Consequently, that very reason which " made it proper for the Mosaic Religion to be united by divine " appointment to the State, made it fit, the Christian should be " left free and independent. But for what end, if not for this, " To be at liberty to adapt itself to the many various kinds of " civil policies, by a suitable union and alliance.—An alliance then " we must conclude the Christian Church was at liberty to make, " notwithstanding this declared nature of *Christ's kingdom*. So far " is indeed true, that it is debarred from entering into any such *Al-* " *liance* with the State as may admit any LEGISLATOR in Christ's " kingdom but himself [that is, a power in the Magistrate to " alter DOCTRINES]. But no such power is granted or usurped " by the *supremacy* of the State *." [Which extends only to DISCIPLINE.]

From all this it appears, that the *unalterable* part of the Law of Christ is the DOCTRINE: and the only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE: but it is the latter, with which Society, as such, is chiefly concerned, when it enters on *Alliance* with the Church. Therefore, when his Lordship says, *Religion and the Church being set on the same foot, no human authority can alter one, but must receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed*, if he means, there can be no alteration in *discipline*, I have shewn he is mistaken: if

* Alliance. p. 178, 179, &c. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 146, 147, of this Edition.]

he

he means, there can be no alteration in *doctrine*, he is certainly right; and I conſider his Lordſhip's obſervation as a complaint, that, by the conſtitution of the Chriſtian Church, the Magiſtrate cannot tyrannize over Conſcience.

In the mean time we ſee to what little purpoſe this great Philoſopher and Stateſman had read his HOOKER; of whom he confeſſes ſomething might be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have ſhewn him, that divine authority does not reduce all its Laws to one and the ſame ſpecies.—"Poſitive Laws (ſays this truly great Man) are "either permanent or elſe changeable, according as the matter it-"ſelf is, concerning which they were firſt made. Whether GOD "or MAN be the maker of them, ALTERATION they ſo far forth "admit, as the MATTER doth exact. Wherefore, to end with a "general rule concerning all the Laws which God hath tied men "unto: thoſe Laws divine, that belong, whether naturally or ſu-"pernaturally, either to men as men, or to men as they live in "politique Society, or to men as they are of that politique Society "which is the Church, without any further reſpect had unto any "ſuch variable accident as the State of men, and of Societies of "men, and of the Church itſelf in this world, is ſubject unto; all "Laws that ſo belong unto men, they belong for ever, yea although "they be poſitive Laws, unleſs, being poſitive, God himſelf which "made them, alter them. The reaſon is, becauſe the ſubject or "matter of Laws in general, is thus far forth conſtant: which "matter is that for the ordering whereof, Laws were inſtituted, "and being inſtituted are not changeable without cauſe, neither "can they have cauſe of change, when that which gave them their "firſt inſtitution remaineth for ever one and the ſame. *On the other "ſide, Laws that were made for men, or Societies, or Churches, in "regard of their being ſuch as do not always continue, but may per-"haps be clean otherwiſe a while after, and ſo may be required to be "otherwiſe ordered than before; the Laws of God himſelf which are "of this nature*, NO MAN ENDOWED WITH COMMON SENSE *will ever*

" *deny to be of a different conſtitution from the former, in reſpect of* " *the one's conſtancy, and the mutability of the other* *."

So much for this Country Parſon. And how poorly does his Lordſhip figure before him with his aſſertion, that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the Church, equally unalterable?* Yet this noble Haranguer, thus ignorant of the very firſt elements of Law, can dictate with the authority of an Oracle, and be received with the reverence due to one, concerning *civil liberty, Church uſurpations, a Patriot King*, and the *balance of power*. But Maſter Hooker will tell you, how eaſily all this may be done without knowing more than our neighbours.

—" Thus far therefore (ſays he) we have endeavoured in part " to open, of what nature and force Laws are, according unto " their ſeveral kinds: the Law which God himſelf hath eternally " ſet down to follow in his own works; the Law which he hath " made for his creatures to keep; the Law of natural and neceſſary " Agents; the Law which angels in Heaven obey; the Law " whereunto, by the light of reaſon, men find themſelves bound, " in that they are men; the Law which they made by compoſition " for multitudes and politique Societies of men to be guided by; " the Law which belongeth unto each nation; the Law that con- " cerneth the fellowſhip of all; and laſtly the Law which God " himſelf hath ſupernaturally revealed. *It might peradventure have* " *been more* POPULAR AND MORE PLAUSIBLE TO VULGAR EARS, *if* " *this diſcourſe had been ſpent in* EXTOLLING THE FORCE OF LAWS, " *in ſhewing the* GREAT NECESSITY OF THEM, *when they are* GOOD, " and in AGGRAVATING THEIR OFFENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS " ARE INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. *But foraſmuch as with ſuch kind* " *of matter* THE PASSIONS OF MEN *are rather ſtirred one way or* " *other, than* THEIR KNOWLEDGE *any way ſet forward* unto the " trial of that whereof there is doubt made, I have therefore " turned aſide from that BEATEN PATH, and choſen, though a

* Eccl. Pol. L. i. Sect. 15.

" LESS

" LESS EASY, yet a more profitable way, in regard of the end we " propoſe *."

Great Names, however, are ſtill of good uſe to his Lordſhip; for though he cannot profit by their lights, he can ſhine at their expence: and, having well chicaned their expreſſions, can afterwards convert the truths contained in them to his own uſe. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind. HOOKER and LOCKE have been ſuppoſed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil Government. Alas; *nil ſine Theſeo.* There is nothing ſo well done, which his Lordſhip cannot mend. He reproves Both of them, with much ſolemnity, for *repreſenting mankind to themſelves, like a number of ſavage individuals out of Society, in their natural State, inſtead of conſidering them as members of families from their birth.* " This (he ſays) has made them reaſon INCONSIS- " TENTLY, and on a FALSE FOUNDATION. Inconſiſtently, becauſe " they ſometimes acknowledge paternal Government to have pre- " ceded civil, and yet reaſon about the inſtitution of civil, as if " men had then firſt aſſembled in any kind of ſociety, or had been " ſubject to any kind of rule; for to ſay that the Law of nature " was of itſelf ſuch a rule, and that every one of theſe independent " inhabitants of the earth did or might exerciſe Juſtice for himſelf, " and others on thoſe who violated the Law, was language un- " worthy of Mr. LOCKE, and unneceſſary to his Syſtem.—Falſely, " becauſe it is *eaſy to demonſtrate* that mankind never was in ſuch " a State †."

To ſay the truth, *eaſy* enough, and like *demonſtrating* day-light. A man need only open his eyes to ſee that a Mother does not abandon her infant as ſoon as ſhe has dropt it, nor the Father renounce the care of it and her. Is it poſſible then that HOOKER, LOCKE, and their Followers, ſhould want to be told by his Lordſhip ſo obvious a truth, That, before civil Society, mankind did not ſtart up like muſhrooms, a number of ſavage individuals at once,

* Eccl. Pol. L. i. Sect. 16. † Vol. v. p. 125, 126.

but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then, you aſk, did not HOOKER and LOCKE ſo conſider them, when they were deducing the origin of civil Society? For very important reaſons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

Firſt, becauſe the real origin of civil Society being equally ſhewn on either ſuppoſition, the truths which followed from it, were clearer ſeen, as they were leſs embarraſſed, by conſidering Mankind before civil Society, as individuals.

But this was not all. Had They conſidered men before civil Society as ranked under tribes, the *rights* belonging to the Heads of families, thus brought into view, though neither relative to, nor connected with, thoſe of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that abſurd Syſtem, which derives political Rule from the *Patriarchal*; a ſyſtem which, both for its abſurdities and miſchiefs, it was the purpoſe of LOCKE and HOOKER to expoſe and diſcredit. The former therefore did judiciouſly, to aſſert, as he might do it truly (for the *exerciſe of juſtice* no more belonged to Fathers of Families, as ſuch, than the *exerciſe of Regal prerogative*); that, before the inſtitution of Civil Society, *every one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exerciſe juſtice for himſelf and others, on thoſe who violated the Law.* Yet this, his Lordſhip calls language unworthy of his Maſter. Nay, ſo great a ſtranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the repreſentation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we ſee it was done to keep the unwary from the ſight of circumſtances of no uſe to aſſiſt their judgment, and eaſily abuſed by deſigning men, to miſlead them.

—But to proceed with our Subject. His Lordſhip goes on againſt the Book of the *Alliance* in this Manner. "This imaginary Con-"tract, in ſhort, whether well or ill made, never exiſted at any "time, nor in any Country; though, to have been real, and really "authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all "Countries where Chriſtianity was propagated. Political Societies "make

" make and alter and break their *Alliances*, as the varying reaſon " of ſtate ſuggeſts. Different orders of civil Government in the " ſame Society change, and with them the whole Conſtitution of " ſuch Governments, as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or the diſ- " poſitions of men determine them. *But a Religion given by God " is in its nature invariable.* And therefore if a Religious Society " with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be neceſſary " to preſerve it ſo, the *order and conſtitution* of ſuch a Society muſt " be *invariable* too. The CHURCH muſt be eſtabliſhed by the ſame " divine Authority as the RELIGION, and be by conſequence inde- " pendent of the State. But nothing of this kind has been. " Chriſt's *kingdom was not of this World.* He ſent out his Apoſtles " to teach, and to baptize; and the utmoſt power he gave them, " beſides that of working Miracles to convince and to convert, was " to ſhake off the duſt of their feet, and to proteſt againſt the in- " fidelity of thoſe who refuſed to receive them, and the Goſpel " they publiſhed. The Apoſtles ordained others to accompany and " to ſucceed them in the ſame office, the office of teaching and " baptizing. The Apoſtles could give no more power than they " received; and no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing " that paſſed, or from any thing that theſe Men did for the Main- " tenance of their Sect, while Chriſtianity was a Sect *."

This imaginary Contract (he ſays) *never exiſted at any time or in any country.* If he means, a *Contract* actually and formally executed, I have anſwered that already, and ſhewn, that the objection holds equally againſt *the original contract between King and People*; which I ſuppoſe his Lordſhip allows not to be ſo *imaginary* but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the conditions of it. But You ſhall hear the Author of the *Alliance* on this matter.

" † When I ſay that *all* regular policied States had *an Eſtabliſhed " Religion*, I mean no more than He would do, who, deducing

* Vol. iv. p. 419, 420.

† Alliance, p. 114—117. 8vo, [Vol. IV. p. 84—86. of this Edition.]

" Civil

" Civil Society from its true Original, ſhould, in order to perſuade " Men of the Benefits it produces, affirm that all Nations had a " *Civil Policy*. For as this Writer could not be ſuppoſed to mean " that every one conſtituted a free State, on the Principles of pub- " lic Liberty, which yet was the only Society he purpoſed to prove " was founded on Truth, and productive of public Good; becauſe " it is notorious, that the far greater Part of Civil Policies are " founded on different Principles; or abuſed to different Ends: ſo " neither would I be underſtood to mean, when I ſay all Nations " concurred in making this *Union*, that they all exactly diſcrimi- " nated the Natures, and fairly adjuſted the Rights of both Socie- " ties, on the Principles here laid down; though an *Eſtabliſhment* " reſulting from this Diſcrimination and Adjuſtment be the only " one I would be ſuppoſed to recommend. On the contrary, I " know this Union has been generally made on miſtaken Princi- " ples; or, if not ſo, hath degenerated in length of Time; by " which means the national Religion in the Pagan World hath " been moſt commonly a Slave to the State; and in the Chriſtian " Syſtem, the State ſometimes a Slave to the Eſtabliſhed Church. " And as it was ſufficient for that Writer's Purpoſe, that thoſe So- " cieties, whether good or bad, proved the Senſe all Men had of " the Benefits reſulting from Civil Policy in general, though they " were oft miſtaken in the Application; ſo it is for Ours, that this " univerſal Concurrence in the two Societies to *unite*, ſhews the " Senſe Mankind had of the Uſefulneſs of ſuch an *Union*. And " laſtly, as that Writer's Principles are not the leſs true on ac- " count of the general Deviation from them in forming Civil So- " cieties; ſo may not the plain ones of *Alliance* here delivered; " though ſo few States have ſuffered themſelves to be directed by " them in Practice; nor any Man before delivered them in Specu- " lation; eſpecially if, as in that Caſe, ſo in this, we can derive " ſuch *Miſtake* and *Degeneracy* from their Cauſes. It would draw " me too far out of my Way to explain diſtinctly the Cauſes of " the

" the *Miſtake*; and the intelligent Reader, who carefully attends " to the whole of this Diſcourſe, will not be at a Loſs to diſcover " the moſt conſiderable of them; ſome of which I have already " hinted at; and others, I may poſſibly, in the Sequel of this Diſ- " courſe, take occaſion to mention. As for the *Degeneracy*, we " have obſerved, that the *Alliance* is of the Nature of the FOEDERA " INÆQUALIA: Now, the common Iſſue of ſuch, *Grotius* acquaints " us with, in theſe Words: *Interim verum eſt accidere plerumque, " ut qui ſuperior eſt in fœdere*, SI IS POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECEL- " LAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET: PRÆ- " SERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT *."

But if by *never exiſted* his Lordſhip means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either Society, which naturally follow ſuch an *Alliance*, were never actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two Societies, his aſſertion is falſe. They are at this preſent actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two Societies, in ENGLAND, under our happy Conſtitution of Church and State. And it was a principal purpoſe of the Book of the *Alliance* to ſhew they are ſo, in order to realize the Theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words: " We ſee how unreaſonable and " even how impolitic our Adverſaries are, when in their ill humour " with *Eſtabliſhments*, they chuſe to pick a quarrel with their own; " where the national Religion is on a footing exactly agreeable to " the nature of a *free Convention between Church and State*, on the " principles of the Laws of Nature and Nations. A felicity they " ſhould have known, that ſcarce any other People on the face of " the earth can boaſt of. In *England* alone the original terms of " this *Convention* are kept up to ſo exactly, that this account of " the *Alliance between Church and State* ſeems rather a copy of the " Church and State of *England*, than a Theory, as indeed it was, " formed ſolely on the contemplation of Nature, and the unvariable " reaſon of things †."

* *De jure Belli & Pacis*, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

† Alliance, p. 167, 168, 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 141, of this Edition.]

To

To make this contract (ſays his Lordſhip) *real, and to be really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all countries where Chriſtianity was profeſſed.* In plain terms, *Right* waits to receive its nature from Man's acceptance of it: or, in ſtill plainer, Right becomes *Wrong* when rejected. How would this political aphoriſm of his Lordſhip's ſound when applied to the ORIGINAL CONTRACT between Prince and People?—*to make it real and to be really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.*

But *political Societies* (he ſays) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reaſon of ſtate ſuggeſts.* If he would be here meant to ſpeak of ſuch which make theſe *alterations* juſtly, the ſame may be ſaid of the *Alliance between Church and State.* The Author has ſhewn that, in this reſpect, the Alliances of political Societies with one another, and the Alliance of the political with the religious, ſtand juſt upon the ſame footing. "If there be" (ſays the Author) "more religious Societies than one at the time of Con-"vention, the State allies itſelf with the largeſt of thoſe religious "Societies. It is *fit* the State ſhould do ſo, becauſe the larger the "religious Society is, where there is an equality in other points, "the better enabled it will be to anſwer the ends of the Alliance. "It is *ſcarce poſſible* it ſhould be otherwiſe, becauſe the two Socie-"ties being compoſed of the ſame individuals, the greatly prevail-"ing Religion muſt have a majority of its members in the aſſemblies "of State, who will naturally prefer their own Religion to any "other. Hence we ſee the reaſon why the *Epiſcopal* is the eſtab-"liſhed Church in *England*; and the *Preſbyterian* the eſtabliſhed "Church in *Scotland.* Hence too we ſee the reaſon of what was "before obſerved, concerning the duration of this Alliance: that "it is *perpetual* but not *irrevocable:* i. e. it ſubſiſts juſt ſo long as "the Church thereby eſtabliſhed maintains its ſuperiority of extent; "which when it loſes to any conſiderable degree the Alliance be-"comes void. For the united Church being then no longer able

"to

" to perform its part of the Convention which is formed on reci-
" procal conditions, the State becomes disengaged; and a *new Al-*
" *liance* is of course contracted with the now prevailing Church,
" for the reasons which made the *old*. Thus formerly the Alliance
" between the *Pagan Church* and the Empire of Rome was dis-
" solved; and the *Christian* established in its place: and of late,
" the Alliance between the *Popish Church* and the Kingdom of Eng-
" land was broken; and another made with the *Protestant*, in its
" stead *."

Different orders of civil government, in the same Society, change (says his Lordship); *and with them the whole Constitution of such Governments, as reason or passion, the interests or dispositions, of men determine them.*—And is it not the same in Church-Government? It is here Episcopacy; there Presbytery; and in another place Independency.

But, *a Religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* In its DOCTRINE it is. Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewise (says his Lordship) and thus I prove it. *If a religious Society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it so, the order and constitution of such a Society must be invariable too.* The inference is just. But what principle of the *Alliance* (against which his Lordship is here arguing) supposes, that *one certain set of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, is necessary to preserve a religious Society in that State and Condition? This Theory says, Religion composed a Society before it had any of those *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*; and will remain a Society when it has lost them. For it had none of them till it came into Alliance with the State, and will hold none of them longer than that Alliance continues. But if, by a strange liberty of expression, his Lordship means, by *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, so far forth as it is a Society; I own that this is *necessary to preserve a religious Society* in the State and Condition

* Alliance, p. 197, 198. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 203, 204. of this Edition.]

of a Society: But then, give me leave to ſay, it does not follow from thence, that *the order and conſtitution of ſuch a Society muſt be invariable too:* Becauſe Church Government may be adminiſtered by an Epiſcopacy, a Preſbytery, or an Independency. The ſpecific form of Church-Government amongſt the Jews was preſcribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, becauſe Moſes united the Religion to the State, under the collective name of LAW: The ſpecific form of Church-Government amongſt Chriſtians was not preſcribed, and therefore none ſeems intended to be invariably followed, becauſe Jeſus did not unite his Religion to the State, but left it to particular Churches to follow ſuch as were moſt agreeable to the forms of thoſe civil Societies, in which they were to be eſtabliſhed. For this purpoſe it was ſufficient that he inſtituted his Religion, a *Society*, by directing the members of it to *hear the Church*, and by appointing Officers as its organs to convey its deciſions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the *Alliance*, who, ſpeaking of the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* Churches, ſays, "This, Both had in common, to be political So-"cieties by divine appointment; but different in this, that GOD, "for *wiſe ends*, minutely preſcribed the whole mode of Jewiſh "policy: and CHRIST, on the contrary, with the ſame divine "wiſdom only conſtituted his Church a policied Society at large, "and left the mode of it to human diſcretion *."

Thoſe *ends*, the Author thus explains, in another place. "The "*Jewiſh* Religion was, like the true *natural*, which it ratified, "eſſentially fitted to compoſe a Society; and like the *Chriſtian*, of "which it was the firſt rudiment, made ſuch by divine appoint-"ment. But then unlike the Chriſtian, in this, that it was not "left independent of civil Government, to unite with it at its plea-"ſure, on terms agreed upon; but was for great and wiſe reaſons "at once united to it, by God himſelf. Which alſo he was pleaſed "to do, not by way of *Alliance* as between two bodies that were to

* Alliance, p. 164. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 138, 139. of this Edition.]

"continue

" continue diſtinct, and might be ſeparated, but by mutual con-
" verſion into one another, and perfect incorporation *."

His Lordſhip then owns, that if *the Church be eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the religion* (that is, if religion be formed into a Society) *it is by conſequence independent of the State*. I am apt to ſuſpect, he here grants more than he is aware of: For it follows from this conceſſion, that if the Chriſtian Religion even compoſes a Society by nature, though not by divine appointment, it muſt be *independent* of the State: becauſe the *independency* does not ariſe from the *Authority* which formed it, but from the *nature* it poſſeſſes: And the Author of the Alliance has ſhewn † that Religion compoſes a Society by natural right. His Lordſhip's endeavour therefore to avoid the *conſequence* of *independency*, by affirming that *the Church was not eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the Religion*, would be to no purpoſe even though he could prove it. However, let us hear how he ſupports his aſſertion.

His firſt argument is the declaration of Jeſus himſelf, that *his Kingdom was not of this World*. The queſtion is, Whether Chriſt's Religion compoſes a Society, and a Society independent? And his Lordſhip quotes a declaration of Jeſus to prove it does *neither*, which in the very terms imply that it does *both*. For what is a *Kingdom* but a *Society?* And what is the *not being of this World*, but a declaration of *independency?* Indeed the Author of the *Alliance* employed the *ſubject* of the propoſition, *Chriſt's Kingdom*, to prove it was a SOCIETY; and the *attribute*, its not being of *this World*, to prove, that Church and State are INDEPENDENT of one another. For was Chriſt's Religion a *Kingdom of this World*, the conſequence would be, that either the State is *dependent* on the Church, or the Church on the State; becauſe, in that caſe, both having COERCIVE POWER (as all *kingdoms of this World* have), a mutual *independency* would make that ſolecifin in Politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, *Chriſt's Kingdom not being of this World*, and *his*

* Alliance, p. 176. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 145. of this Edition.]

† Book i. c. 5.

Apoſtles, as his Lordſhip rightly obſerves, having *no power (beſides Miracles) but that of teaching, exhorting, and proteſting againſt infidelity*, i. e. having no *coercive* power, there remained no pretence for its *dependency* on the State.

His Lordſhip's ſecond Argument againſt the *independency* of the Church is, that Jeſus *ſent out his Apoſtles to teach, and to baptize; and the utmoſt power he gave them, beſides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to ſhake off the duſt of their feet, and to proteſt againſt the infidelity of thoſe who refuſed to receive them, and the Goſpel they publiſhed. The Apoſtles ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them in the ſame Office of teaching and baptizing. The Apoſtles could give no more power than they had received.*

1. He is to prove that the Chriſtian Religion did not compoſe a Society by inſtitution. And how does he ſet to work? With an argument which ſhews it to be a Society by *inſtitution*, and without *coercive* power; the very Society which the Author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jeſus ſent out his Apoſtles—they ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them.* Here a Society is plainly inſtituted; for you find officers appointed; and they provide for a Succeſſion.——*The utmoſt power they had was to teach and baptize thoſe who willingly received the Goſpel.* Here all *coercive* power is excluded; and that excluſion makes the Society *independent*. What more may be inferred from this account (and which his Lordſhip ſhould have inferred) is, that though a Society was inſtituted, yet the particular form of Church-Government was left to human diſcretion: But he could find no Society of Chriſt's appointment, where he ſaw no particular form of Church-Government minutely marked out, as in the Moſaic Diſpenſation. Though, had he found any ſuch, it would, when he leaſt ſuſpected it, have been moſt to his purpoſe; for of ſuch, and only of ſuch, he might have ſaid truly, that being *given by God, it is in its nature invariable.*

2. His obſervation, that the *Apoſtles could give no more power than they had received*, inſinuates that the Author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the Church; which is a groſs miſ-

misrepresentation of his Adversary, who expressly affirms that the Church has no such power, while *unallied*; and when *allied*, receives it, in a very limited manner, from the State; and enjoys it no longer than the *Alliance* continues. But these misrepresentations are things essential to his Lordship's polemics. So again, "To "pretend (says he) that the Church has a right to the former [*i. e.* "wealth and grandeur] by *compact* or by virtue of an *Alliance* with "the State, would be to say whatever comes uppermost in a WHIMSICAL HEAD *." This is to insinuate that the Author of the *Alliance pretends* that the *wealth and grandeur* of the Church necessarily arises from its *alliance* with the State. But let him speak for himself, and you shall hear him saying the direct contrary—— *the acquisition of honours, riches, and power, could not be a motive for Alliance.* His reason is, *that it would be impertinent in a Church to aim at them, because they are things a Church could neither use nor profit by* †."

His Lordship concludes this long paragraph in these words—*No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that passed, nor from any thing that these men* [the Apostles] *did for the maintenance of their Sect, while Christianity was a Sect.* His Lordship here forgets, as usual, the personage he assumes, which is that of a Believer, who supposes, the Apostles acted, in all things, by the direction of their Master: consequently, *an argument of* RIGHT MAY *be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a Sect.* It is true, if we suppose the Apostles to be Politicians like his Lordship, a sort of men who put in practice all kind of means to support and maintain their Cause or Party, no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing they did or said. But when God directs the actions and organs of his Ministers in the propagation of Religion, we know from the knowledge of his Attributes, that no rights of Humanity

* Vol. iv. p. 604.

† Alliance, p. 112. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 87. of this Edit.]

or

or Society will be violated; and conſequently, that from every ſuch action *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his Lordſhip meant no more by his profound obſervation than this, That, from what the Apoſtles did, to aſſert and maintain the *independency* of Chriſt's Religion while it remained a Sect, *no argument of right can be drawn* to prove it muſt *continue* independent when it becomes eſtabliſhed, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the underſtanding him in ſo reaſonable a ſenſe, which is, that it ſupports the Theory of the *Alliance*; which, I preſume, was not in his Lordſhip's intention. Beſides, it contradicts what he ſo much labours to prove, That, if the independency of the Church was of divine inſtitution, the Church could not give it up, when it entered into Alliance.

In a word, the whole of his Lordſhip's reaſoning againſt an *Alliance between Church and State* from the nature of a *Church*, may be reduced to theſe four propoſitions:

1. If Chriſtianity be not a Society by divine inſtitution, it is no Society at all.

2. If Chriſtianity be an independent Society by divine inſtitution, it could not give up its independency to the State.

3. If Chriſtianity be a Society by divine inſtitution, a certain form of Church government muſt be explicitly preſcribed.

4. If ſuch a form be explicitly preſcribed, then that Form, and the Diſcipline which belongs to it, muſt be as unalterable as the Doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of this ſuppoſed Alliance.

Now I have ſhewn, that every one of theſe four propoſitions is utterly void of all truth and reaſon.

After theſe exploits, nothing was wanting to make his Lordſhip's victory compleat againſt *Alliances* and *Eſtabliſhments*, but to diſcredit that firſt and moſt famous one of all, made by CONSTANTINE. "This great Revolution (ſays he) was effected in part by "circumſtances

" circumſtances I have mentioned, and by others that favoured the " growth of Chriſtianity. The imperial Authority did the reſt, but " did it ill; ſo ill, that the chief of thoſe political views which " CONSTANTINE had in making this ESTABLISHMENT were de- " feated by it, and the admiſſion of a religious Society into the " State, in the manner in which he admitted it, was the cauſe of " all the eccleſiaſtical and theological evils that have followed from " his time to ours, and that are ſo falſly imputed to Religion itſelf. " We may be aſſured, that the SOCIETY co-operated with the " COURT, to bring about a Revolution ſo much to their advan- " tage; and thought themſelves happy enough to be *dependent*, " not *independent*, on the Emperor; his *inſtruments*, not his *allies*, " whatever appearances he might give, or ſuffer them to aſſume, " in thoſe ſolemn eccleſiaſtical Farces, wherein he condeſcended to " act, in ſome reſpects, a ſecond part.—But while he recalled to " his mind, as he did moſt probably, the great ſervice Religion was " of to ancient Rome, he ſeemed to forget, that when that Reli- " gion flouriſhed, and was of ſo much ſervice to the State, it was " under the immediate inſpection of the State. There was no " Council but the Senate, to define Doctrines, nor to regulate Diſ- " cipline. And men were at the head of the religious, becauſe " they were at the head of the civil, adminiſtration; inſtead of being " at the head of the latter, becauſe they were at the head of the " former.—He [*Conſtantine*] meaned that this [ſpiritual power] " ſhould be diſtinct from the civil; THAT THEY SHOULD BE IN- " DEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER, and both dependent on him *."

That nobleſt part of Legiſlation, the adjuſting the rights and privileges, and ſettling the bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIE- TIES, his Lordſhip, as we ſaid before, ſeems much a ſtranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph makes his ignorance but the more conſpicuous by his endeavouring to diſguiſe it; as his attempts are generally made at the expence of a Contradiction.

* Vol. iv. p. 432—445.

In the Eſtabliſhment of Religion under CONSTANTINE, the Church, he ſays, became dependent on the ſupreme civil Magiſtrate. *They thought themſelves happy enough to be dependent, not independent, on the Emperor; his inſtruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the ſame breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to *act a ſecond part* to theſe his *inſtruments*, or, in other words, to become *theirs:* Nay, he expreſsly affirms, that Chriſtianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganiſm had been in the old: Now Paganiſm, he tells us, was the *inſtrument* of the ſupreme Magiſtrate. Chriſtianity, then, muſt be an *Ally*, not an *inſtrument* to the ſupreme Magiſtrate. His Lordſhip ſays, this Eſtabliſhment was *ill, very ill made:* However that be, every body ſees it is *very ill* repreſented.——*It defeated all Conſtantine's political views, all the good he intended.* It is not unlikely. We have an example before us, in his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* throughout, that his *contradictions* can *defeat* all the evil *intended*; this is doing ſomething more, for malice is not ſo eaſily defeated as benevolence.

But if you aſk, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's Eſtabliſhment, the Church is one while made the *Inſtrument*, and another, the *Ally* of the civil Magiſtrate? I will tell you. His Lordſhip had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was, he ſays, in FACT, ſuch an Alliance. To countenance this aſſertion, CONSTANTINE's Eſtabliſhment is repreſented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the Church became the tool and inſtrument of the civil Magiſtrate. But then again, he was to ſhew that ſuch an Alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very miſchievous to the State: This turns the Tables; and then CONSTANTINE *meaned, that the ſpiritual power ſhould be diſtinct from the civil, and that they ſhould be* INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER (for he all along miſrepreſents the Theory of the *Alliance*, as making the Church keep its independency after the Union); indeed he ſays,—and *both dependent on himſelf* *; but this was only added to ſoften the abſurdity. To ſuch wretched ſhifts do his Principles

* Vol. iv. p. 445.

ever

ever and anon reduce him:—The Religious and the Civil Society are independent of one another; yet the Religious is dependent on the ſupreme Magiſtrate; *i. e.* on him who repreſents the civil Society, and is at his head.

But now let us examine the ground-work of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He ſays, *the Church was happy enough to be dependent*, NOT INDEPENDENT, *on the Emperor*; *his Inſtruments*, NOT HIS ALLIES. This ſentence is made up of a falſe inſinuation, and a miſtaken conſequence. The inſinuation is, that the Author of the *Alliance* holds the independency of the Church, on the Magiſtrate, during an Eſtabliſhment. The miſtaken conſequence is, that if the Church be dependent, it is the Inſtrument, not the Ally, of the State. But GROTIUS, as he is quoted in the book of the *Alliance*, might have ſet his Lordſhip right in this matter. "This (ſays the Author) "is what GROTIUS calls *fœdus inæquale*. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic "intelligo quod ex ipſa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆLATIONEM "quandam alteri donat: Hoc eſt ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium "ac majeſtatem conſervare, ut POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, infe"riori plus auxilii deferatur. *De Jur. B. & P.* L. i. c. iii. Sect. "21 *." Hence, in the opinion of this great Lawyer, alliance and dependence are very conſiſtent things.

In ancient Rome (ſays his Lordſhip) *there was no Council, but the Senate, to* DEFINE DOCTRINES, *nor to* REGULATE DISCIPLINE. Now in antient Rome it ſo happened, there were no Doctrines to define †. And as to Diſcipline, this was regulated not by the Senate, but by the Colleges of the Prieſts. When the Senate imagined the neceſſities of State required the obſervance of religious Rites, they ſent to the Prieſts for their directions concerning the choice and regulation of them. The Senate were the Maſters whether they

* Alliance, p. 88. 8vo. [Vol. IV. p. 75. of this Edition.]

† See Div. Legat. B. II. Sect. 6.

would have any celebrated; but if of that they had determined, they were tied down to the rules and directions of the Sacred Books, as the ſenſe of them was repreſented and interpreted by the Prieſts *.

On the whole, his Lordſhip aſſures us, that CONSTANTINE *eſtabliſhed the Church very ill*; and ſo ſays the Author of the *Alliance*. Nay, which is more, he proves he did ſo, and explains the cauſes of his miſtakes.

His Lordſhip's account of *Conſtantine's* Eſtabliſhment, and the Author's account of that by an *Alliance*, ſtand thus,

1. CONSTANTINE *made the Church his Inſtruments, not his Allies.* The ALLIANCE makes the Church the Ally, and not the Inſtrument, of the Civil Magiſtrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil Adminiſtration, becauſe they were at the head of the religious.* The ALLIANCE

* When the Romans entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti Conſules majoribus hoſtiis rem divinam facerent *quibus Diis ipſis videretur*, cum precatione ea: Quam rem, &c. He then tells us that the Conſuls made their report to the Senate; and there we find the part their Prieſts had in this matter.—Quum pronunciaſſent Conſules; rem divinam RITE perfectam eſſe, et precationem admiſiſſe Deos ARUSPICES RESPONDERE, *lætaque exta eſſe* et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi.—L. xxxi. c. 5. But the State further ordered that the Conſul, to make the Gods propitious, ſhould according to old cuſtom make a Vow: and on this occaſion we have a more explicit account of the Share the old Pagan Church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the Senate, but the College of Prieſts which regulated Diſcipline, or, if his Lordſhip will have it ſo, *defined Doctrine*. Civitas religioſa (ſays the Hiſtorian) ne quid prætermitteretur, quod aliquando factum eſſet; ludos Jovi, donumque *vovere Conſulem* juſſit *moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit*, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non poſſet in bellum uſui eſſe; reponi ſtatim debere, nec cum alia pecunia miſceri. *Quod niſi factum eſſet, Votum* RITE *ſolvi non poſſe*. Quanquam et res, et *auctor movebat*; tamen ad COLLEGIUM PONTIFICUM *referre* Conſul juſſus, ſi poſſet *recte* votum incertæ pecuniæ ſuſcipi. Poſſe rectiuſque etiam eſſe, *Pontifices decreverunt*. Vovit in eadem verba Conſul, *præeunte maximo Pontifice*.—— L. xxxi. c. 9.

places

places men at the head of the religious, becauſe they were at the head of the civil adminiſtration.

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himſelf the title of ſupreme head of the Church under God and Chriſt.* The ALLIANCE makes the ſupreme Magiſtrate head of the Church under God and Chriſt.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the Church without aſſuming this ſupremacy or headſhip.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the Church, conferred the Supremacy on the civil Magiſtrate.

His Lordſhip's concluſion from this long ſtory of CONSTANTINE is this, that "He and his Succeſſors raiſed that ſpiritual tyranny, "which was eſtabliſhed and grown into full ſtrength before "CHARLES THE GREAT *." And what could we expect leſs when every term in rhe *Alliance* was violated or neglected? This was juſt as natural as that civil Tyranny ſhould grow to a head, when the terms of the *original contract* between prince and people had not been adverted to or obſerved? In a word, the miſchiefs, which, his Lordſhip tells us, followed from *Conſtantine's eſtabliſhment* are the beſt recommendation of the *theory of the Alliance*; a theory formed, as it were, and fitted to avoid and guard againſt them: It has in fact done ſo, and rendered our preſent Conſtitution of Church and State the moſt happy and proſperous of any upon the face of the Earth.

At laſt, as if on ſet purpoſe to recommend the *Theory of the Alliance*, his Lordſhip concludes his Section concerning CONSTANTINE in theſe words: "Thus it ſeems to me that the great and "fundamental error, from whence ſo many others proceeded, and "which CONSTANTINE COMMITTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "CHRISTIANITY, was this, *he admitted a Clergy into an eſtabliſh-"ment, on the ſame foot, on which this order had ſtood, while Chriſ-"tianity was the Religion, and theſe men were the heads, the directors,*

* Vol. iv. p. 446.

" *the governors, and magiſtrates of a Sect, by no authority, but that* " *of the Sect itſelf.* He admitted them veſted with this authority, " which might be neceſſary as long as Chriſtians made a Sect " apart, out of the protection of the laws; and which became un- " neceſſary and dangerous, when Chriſtianity had a legal eſtabliſh- " ment.—The conduct of Conſtantine on this occaſion muſt needs " appear extremely abſurd to every one who conſiders the conſe- " quences it had *." Can there be a greater encomium on the principles of the *Alliance?* The *fundamental error* of CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment was, the ſuffering the Church to RETAIN ITS INDEPENDENCY. The fundamental condition of eſtabliſhment on the theory of *Alliance* is, that the Church GIVES UP ITS INDEPENDENCY.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuſe of the ALLIANCE? " The ſole intention and ſole effect of it " [the theologic ſyſtem of the ſchools] was to eſtabliſh an eccle- " ſiaſtical Empire, under that ſpiritual Monarch the Pope, and " his ſpiritual Miniſters the Clergy. THIS WAS THE EFFECT " OF THAT SUPPOSED ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND " STATE †."

Before, It was CONSTANTINE *and his Succeſſors, who raiſed that Spiritual Tyranny* ‡: And it was done, he ſays, by means of *his Eſtabliſhment*; which ſuffered the Church to retain its independency, *and admitted it on the ſame foot on which it had ſtood while it was a Sect* §. But now, it is the *ſuppoſed Alliance between Church and State* which raiſed this ſpiritual Tyranny; an Alliance which will not ſuffer the Church to retain its dependency; or *admit it on the ſame foot on which it ſtood while it was a Sect.*

We have ſeen ſuch amazing inſtances of his Lordſhip's contradictions, as not to be ſurprized at the boldeſt of them. Sometimes, when rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what

* Vol. iv. p. 438, 439.
† Vol. iv. p. 621, 622.
‡ Vol. iv. p. 446.
§ Vol. iv. p. 438.

the

the man in the Play did by his *ingratitude*, he ſtrives *to cover the monſtrous bulk of them*, by a proportionable *ſize of words*; ſometimes again, to ſhew his utter contempt of the Public, he chuſes to follow the advice there given; *to let them go naked, that men may ſee them the better.* But, when he maſks his double face, the falſification of the Theory of the Alliance always affords him the beſt play. He conſtantly takes it for granted or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument againſt the Book, that the Author contends for and maintains the *independency of the Church on the State, under an eſtabliſhment.* This brings CONSTANTINE'S Eſtabliſhment, and the Eſtabliſhment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the ſame thing; ſo that the miſchiefs aſcribed to one, may be ſafely transferred to the other.

And here, Sir, in concluſion, the odd fortune of this book of the *Alliance* is worth Your notice. It had been writ againſt by many nameleſs ſcribblers, before his Lordſhip: And two very capital crimes had been objected to it: The one was, *That it makes the Church a Creature of the civil Magiſtrate*; the other, *That it makes the civil Magiſtrate a Creature of the Church.* Some inſiſted on the firſt of theſe charges, ſome on the ſecond. But to prevent its eſcaping, one furious fellow, in a thing called a *Comment on the Alliance*, roundly inſiſted upon both. So that his Lordſhip, whoſe care is for the State, and the Diſſenting Anſwerers who are as anxious for the Church, will come in but for halves in the full merit of this illuſtrious Commentator.

I have now, Sir, given you, as I promiſed, a view of his Lordſhip's POLITICAL TALENTS. The Author whom I have defended againſt him, is no further my concern than as he afforded me the occaſion. Nor is there any reaſon he ſhould grow vain of the ſuperior diſtinction of being picked out to be immolated, as it were, to the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. For let me tell him, that as I defended him for want of a better, ſo his Lordſhip abuſed him becauſe he could not find a worſe. He had perſonally *injured* and *affronted* his

his Lordſhip. And to theſe inſolencies, the following words allude, where his Lordſhip takes leave of his Friend, in the laſt volume of his never-dying Works: "You have, I know, at your elbow a "*very foul-mouthed and very trifling Critic*, who will endeavour to "IMPOSE UPON YOU ON THIS OCCASION, AS HE DID ON A FORMER. "He will tell you, again, that I CONTRADICT myſelf, *&c.* But if "the *dogmatic pedant* ſhould make this objection, be pleaſed to give "him this anſwer, &c.*."

This, the Curious will readily perceive, ſmells of the Anecdote. As the ſecret has been communicated to me by a good hand, I ſhall not ſcruple to lay it before You. It may ſerve at leaſt to entertain you, in the quality of Farce to this ſerious Piece.

Mr. POPE had permitted Lord BOLINGBROKE to be conſidered by the public, as his PHILOSOPHER AND GUIDE: and in their converſations concerning the impious complaints againſt Providence on account of the unequal diſtribution of things natural and moral in the preſent Syſtem, they agreed that ſuch objections might be well evaded on the Platonic principle of THE BEST. This encouraged the Poet to philoſophiſe: and the fruits of his ſpeculations we have in the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN. In which, if you will take his Lordſhip's word, or indeed, attend to his argument, you will find that Pope was ſo far from putting his proſe into verſe (as has been invidiouſly ſuggeſted) that he has put Pope's verſe into proſe. They agreed, as we obſerved, in the principle of *the Beſt*. And Mr. Pope thought they had agreed in the queſtion, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has ſince ſhewn that they differed very widely. The *Eſſay on Man* is a real vindication of Providence, againſt Libertines and Atheiſts.—The *Eſſays on the firſt Philoſophy* are a pretended vindication of Providence againſt an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts.—The Poet directs his argument againſt Atheiſts and Libertines in ſupport of RELIGION;——The Philoſopher, againſt Divines, in ſupport of NATURALISM.

* Vol. v. page the laſt.

TURALISM. But though his Lordſhip thought fit to keep this a ſecret from his Friend, as well as from the Public; yet he took ſo friendly a ſhare in the prodigious ſucceſs of the *Eſſay on Man*, that he could not forbear making the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongſt their common Acquaintance, as a man who underſtood nothing of his own principles, nor ſaw to what they naturally tended. For the truth of this inſtance of his Lordſhip's virtuous emulation, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

While things were in this State, Mr. de Crouſaz wrote ſome malignant and abſurd *remarks* on the *Eſſay on Man*; accuſing it of Spinoziſm, Naturaliſm, and all the heretical *-iſms* in the Bigot's Dictionary. Theſe Remarks by great chance fell into the hands of the Author of the *Divine Legation*. And mere indignation at an ill-natured caviller put him upon writing a defence of the *firſt epiſtle*. Which being well received by the Public, he was induced to defend the reſt on the ſame principles of natural and revealed Religion, againſt this blundering Swiſs Philoſopher; frequently indeed miſled by a very faithleſs tranſlation of the *Eſſay* into French verſe.

Mr. Pope, who was naturally on the ſide of Religion, embraced the ſenſe given to the *Eſſay* by his new Commentator, with the utmoſt pleaſure and ſatisfaction; as appears by the Letters he wrote on that occaſion. You will hardly ſuppoſe, his Lordſhip took the ſame delight in them. He ſaw his Pupil *reaſoned* out of his hands; He ſaw (what was worſe) the Eſſay republiſhed with a Defence, which put the Poem on the ſide of Religion, and the Poet out of the neceſſity of ſupporting himſelf on his Lordſhip's Syſtem, when he ſhould condeſcend to impart it to him: And (what was worſt of all) he ſaw a great number of lines appear, which out of complaiſance had been ſtruck out of the MS. and which, at the Commentator's requeſt, being now reſtored to their places, no longer left the religious ſentiments of the Poet, equivocal.

It

It was his chagrine at theſe changes which occaſioned his Lordſhip (when he NEW MODELED the *introductory Letter to his Eſſays addreſſed to Mr. Pope)* to end it in this manner: "I cannot conclude my diſcourſe on this occaſion better than by *putting you in mind* of a paſſage you quoted to me *once* with great applauſe from a ſermon of FORSTER, and to this effect, "Where MYSTERY begins, RELIGION ends." The Apophthegm pleaſed me much, and I was glad to hear ſuch a truth from any pulpit, ſince it ſhews an inclination at leaſt, to purify Chriſtianity from the leaven of *artificial Theology*; which conſiſts principally in making things that are very plain, myſterious; and in pretending to make things that are impenetrably myſterious, very plain. *If you continue ſtill of the ſame mind, I ſhall have no excuſe to make to you, for what I have written, and ſhall write. Our opinions coincide. If you have changed your mind, think again and examine further.* You will find it is the MODEST, not the PRESUMPTUOUS, Enquirer who makes a real and ſafe progreſs in the diſcovery of divine truths. One follows Nature and Nature's God; that is, he follows God in his Works, and in his Word; nor preſumes to go further, by *metaphyſical and theological commentaries of his own invention*, than the two texts, if I may uſe this expreſſion, carry him very evidently.—They who have done otherwiſe, have been either ENTHUSIASTS OR KNAVES*." But, alas! this kind admonition came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a better *Guide* than either FORSTER or his LORDSHIP. I mean, Mr. LOCKE; who, in the concluſion of his firſt Letter to Biſhop Stillingfleet, had taught the Poet to anſwer thus, "I know not any thing more diſingenuous, than not publicly to own a conviction one has received, concerning any thing erroneous in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater offence againſt Mankind than to propagate a falſhood, whereof one is convinced; eſpecially in a matter wherein Men are highly concerned not to be miſled. The

* Vol iv. p. 344.

"HOLY

"HOLY SCRIPTURE is to me, and always will be, the conſtant "GUIDE of my aſſent: and I ſhall always hearken to it, as con- "taining infallible truth, relating to things of the higheſt con- "cernment. *And I wiſh I could ſay there were no* MYSTERIES *in* "*it. I acknowledge there are, to me*, and I fear always will "be. But where I want the evidence of things, there yet is "ground enough for me to believe, becauſe God has ſaid it: and "I ſhall preſently condemn and quit any opinion of mine, as ſoon "as I am ſhewn that it is contrary to any Revelation in the holy "Scripture *."

But the Author of *The Divine Legation* ſoon after committed a much greater offence againſt his Lordſhip's philoſophic Dignity. And to this, the following words, quoted above, more particularly allude: *You have, I know, at your elbow, a very ſoul-mouthed and a very trifling Critic, who will endeavour to impoſe upon you on this occaſion, as he did on a* FORMER.

About the year 1742, a little before Lord Bolingbroke's return to England, this *Critic* was with Mr. Pope at T. who ſhewed him a printed book of *Letters on the Study and uſe of Hiſtory*, and deſired his opinion of it. It was the firſt volume of the work ſince publiſhed under that name. Mr. W. on turning over the book, told him his thoughts of it with great ingenuity. What he ſaid to Mr. Pope of the main ſubject is not material: but of the Digreſſion concerning the Authenticity of the Old Teſtament, he told his Friend very frankly, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from other Writers; and had been often confuted to the full ſatisfaction of the learned world: that the Author of theſe *Letters*, whoever he was, had miſtaken ſome of thoſe reaſonings; had miſrepreſented others; and had added ſuch miſtakes of his own, as muſt diſcredit him with the learned, and diſhonour him with all honeſt men: that therefore, as he underſtood the Author was his Friend, he could not do him better ſer-

* Locke's Works, Vol. i. p. 405.

vice then adviſe him to ſtrike out this *Digreſſion*, a digreſſion that had nothing to do with his ſubject, and would ſet half his Readers againſt the work, which, without this occaſion of ſcandal, would have much ado to make head againſt the other half, whenever it ſhould appear. Mr. Pope ſaid, his friend (whoſe name he kept ſecret) was the moſt candid of all Writers; and that he the Author of *The Divine Legation* could not do him a greater pleaſure than to tell him his thought with all freedom on this occaſion. He urged this ſo warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then alone, ſcribbled over half a dozen ſheets of paper before he roſe from the table, where they were then ſitting. Mr. Pope read what was written: and, as he had a wonderful partiality for thoſe he loved, approved of them: and to convince his friend (the *Scribbler*, as my Lord rightly calls him) that he did ſo, he took up the printed Volume, and croſſed out the whole *Digreſſion*. The remarks were written, as you may well ſuppoſe, with all the civility, Mr. W. was likely to uſe to a friend, Mr. Pope appeared ſo much to reverence: but the word *prevarication*, or ſomething like it, chanced, it ſeems, to eſcape his pen. The papers were ſent to Paris; and received with unparalleled indignation. Little broke out; but ſomething did: and Mr. Pope found he had not paid his court by this officious piece of ſervice. However, with regard to the Writer of the papers, all was carried, when his Lordſhip came over, with ſingular complaiſance; ſuch as men uſe when their deſign is to draw on thoſe whoſe homage they propoſe to gain. In the mean time, his Lordſhip was meditating and compiling an angry, and elaborate Anſwer to this private, haſty, and impertinent, though well-meant, *Scribble*: and it was as much as They could do, who had moſt influence over him, to prevail with him at length to burn it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble Perſon, one of the greateſt Characters of this, or indeed of any age; who being much courted by his Lordſhip (for ſuperior virtue will force homage from the moſt unlike) was for ſome time able, and at all times moſt deſirous,

ſirous, of reſtraining the extravagance of that *firſt Philoſophy*, which he deteſted and deſpiſed.

The event has ſince ſhewn, that it had been happy for his Lordſhip's reputation, had the advice to ſtrike out the *Digreſſion* been approved. For it is this which firſt ſunk him in the popular opinion; and made men overlook the merit of the very beſt of all his Compoſitions.

Mr. Pope, however, was ſtill flattered and careſſed. And the vengeance treaſured up againſt him for the impiety of eraſing thoſe ſacred pages, did not break out till the Poet's death: then indeed it came forth with redoubled vehemence, and on the moſt ridiculous pretence. Pope had, as his Lordſhip pretended, unknown to him, printed an Edition of the *Patriot Prince*, or *Patriot King*, (for it had two titles, as his Lordſhip's various occaſions required), a very innocent thing, which might have been proclaimed by the common Cryer, without giving the leaſt umbrage or offence. To ſay the truth, it was a mere School-declamation, which, in great pomp of words, informs us of this Secret, *That if a Prince could but once be brought to love his Country, he would always act for the good of it.* As extraordinary as this diſcovery appears, there was much odd practice employed to give a colour of neceſſity for the publiſhing it. However, publiſhed it was, and the memory of Pope traduced in ſo cruel, ſo ſcandalous a manner, that the Reader is ſuffered to conclude, even CURLL himſelf could not have acted a more infamous or raſcally part: For it muſt be owned, his Lordſhip has dealt one equal meaſure to his COUNTRY, his RELIGION, and his FREIND. And for what was all this outrage? To ſpeak the worſt of the offence, For one of thoſe private offices of indiſcreet good will, which generous men are always ready to forgive, even when they ſee themſelves moſt incommoded by it.

The Public ſtood amazed. And thoſe who had any regard for the Poet's Memory, waited with impatience to ſee, Which of his *old* Friends would reſcue it from his Lordſhip's talons. Contempt, I ſuppoſe, of ſo cruel a treatment, kept them all ſilent. How-

ever, the ſame contempt at length provoked an Anonymous Writer to publiſh a Letter to the *Editor of the Patriot King*; for his Lordſhip had divided himſelf into the two perſonages of *Editor* and *Author*. This Letter, written with all the reſpect due to his Rank and Character, he thought fit to aſcribe to the Author of *The Divine Legation*; ſo that you need not wonder if it expoſed the ſuſpected writer to all his Lordſhip's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his Sycophants; of which, ſome, that was ſaid to paſs through this great Man's hands, was in language bad enough to diſgrace even Gaols and Garrets.

This, Sir, is the Anecdote I promiſed you. And now I ſhall releaſe you from ſo tedious a Subject. I have compleated my *View of his Lordſhip's Philoſophy*; which I choſe to addreſs to You in compliance with his Challenge; who appeals, for the truth of all he advances, from *Artificial Theology* and *School-Learning*, to the breaſt of the PLAIN HONEST MAN,

"Slave to no Sect, who takes no private road,
"But looks through nature up to nature's God;"

Him whoſe heart is filled with the love of God and Man. To this Tribunal he appeals; and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it, You, whom he has made his judge, muſt now tell us. I greatly ſuſpect, that of all his Principles one only is likely to eſcape your cenſure: and with this, as I would part with him upon good terms, I ſhall conclude: it breaks out unexpectedly from amidſt the corruption of party politics; and in all likelihood was ingendered by them.—SOME MEN THERE ARE, THE PESTS OF SOCIETY I THINK THEM, WHO PRETEND A GREAT REGARD TO RELIGION IN GENERAL, BUT WHO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF DECLAIMING PUBLICKLY AGAINST THAT SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST AGAINST THAT CHURCH-ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RECEIVED IN BRITAIN *.

I am, &c.

* Diſſertation on Parties, p. 148. 8vo. Edit.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON

MR. DAVID HUME'S ESSAY

ON THE

Natural Hiſtory of Religion.

REMARKS, &c.

REMARK I.

THE purpoſe of this ESSAY is to eſtabliſh NATURALISM on the ruins of RELIGION; of which, whether under Paganiſm and Polytheiſm, or under Revelation and the doctrine of the Unity, Mr. HUME profeſſes to give the NATURAL HISTORY.

And here let me obſerve it to his honour, that, though he be not yet got to THEISM, he is however on the advance and approaching to the borders of it; having been in the dregs of Atheiſm when he wrote his Epicurean arguments againſt the being of a God. Sometime or other he may come to his ſenſes. A few animadverſions on the *Eſſay* before us may help him forwards. The thing is full of curioſities: And the very *title-page*, as I obſerved, demands our attention. It is called,

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION.

You aſk, why he chuſes to give it this title. Would not the *Moral hiſtory of Meteors* be full as ſenſible as the *Natural Hiſtory of Religion?* Without doubt. Indeed had he given the hiſtory of what he himſelf would paſs upon us for the only true Religion, namely, NATURALISM, or the belief of a God, the Creator and Phyſical Preſerver, but not moral Governor of the world, the title of *Natural* would have fitted it well, becauſe all *Morality* is excluded from the Idea.

But

But this great Philoſopher is never without his Reaſons. It is to inſinuate, that what the world calls Religion, of which he undertakes to give the hiſtory, is not founded in the JUDGMENT, but in the PASSIONS only. However the expreſſion labours miſerably, as it does through all his profound Lucubrations. And where is the wonder that he, who diſdains to think in the mode of common ſenſe, ſhould be unable to expreſs himſelf in the proprieties of common language?

As every Inquiry which regards Religion (ſays that reſpectable Perſonage) *is of the utmoſt importance, there are two queſtions in particular which challenge our principal attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reaſon, and that concerning its* ORIGIN IN HUMAN NATURE *.

Here, we ſee, he aims at a diſtinction. And what he aims at is not hard to find. The queſtion is, whether he has hit the mark. I am afraid, not. And then the diſcovery of his aim is only the detection of his ignorance. In a word, it is a diſtinction without a difference.

If man be rightly defined a *rational animal*, then his Nature, or what our Philoſopher calls *human Nature*, muſt be a *rational* Nature. But if ſo, a FOUNDATION IN REASON and an ORIGIN IN HUMAN NATURE are not two different predicates, but one and the ſame only in different expreſſions. Do I ſay, therefore, that our Philoſopher had no meaning, becauſe he was unable to expreſs any? Far be that from the Reverence due to this Rectifier of Prejudices. My objection at preſent is not to his Theology but his Logic. By *Origin in human Nature* he meant, Origin in the fancy or the Paſſions. For that Religion, which has the origin, here deſigned, is what the world calls RELIGION; and this he reſolves into *fanatiſm* or *ſuperſtition*: As that Religion which has its *foundation in reaſon* is what the world calls NATURALISM, the Religion of Philoſophers like himſelf, and which he endeavours in this Eſſay to eſtabliſh.

* P. 1. Nat. Hiſt. of Religion.

In

In his third Section, at the 16th page, he makes UNKNOWN CAUSES the origin of what men call *Religion*, that Religion which his Hiſtory pretends to inveſtigate. "Theſe UNKNOWN CAUSES," He ſays, "become the conſtant object of our hope and fear; and "while the paſſions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious ex- "pectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in "forming ideas of thoſe powers, on which we have ſo entire a de- "pendance." He then goes on to acquaint us with the original of theſe UNKNOWN CAUSES. "Could men anatomize Nature, accord- "ing to the moſt probable, at leaſt the moſt intelligible, philoſo- "phy, they would find, that theſe *Cauſes* are nothing but the "particular fabric and ſtructure of the MINUTE PARTS OF THEIR "OWN BODIES AND OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS; and that, by a regu- "lar and conſtant machinery, all the events are produced, about "which they are ſo much concerned. But this Philoſophy exceeds "the comprehenſion of the ignorant multitude *."

Here we ſee the original of theſe *unknown Cauſes* is nothing but the reſult of MATTER and MOTION. And again, "The Vulgar, "that is, indeed, ALL MANKIND, a few excepted, being ignorant "and uninſtructed, never elevate their contemplation to the Hea- "vens, or penetrate by their diſquiſitions into the SECRET STRUC- "TURE OF VEGETABLE OR ANIMAL BODIES; ſo as to diſcover a "ſupreme mind or original providence, which beſtowed order on "every part of Nature. They conſider theſe admirable works in "a more confined and ſelfiſh view; and finding their own happi- "neſs and miſery to depend on the ſecret influence and unforeſeen "concurrence of external objects, they regard with perpetual at- "tention the UNKNOWN CAUSES, which govern all theſe natural "events, and diſtribute pleaſure and pain, good and ill, by their "powerful, but ſilent operation. The UNKNOWN CAUSES are ſtill "appealed to, at every emergence; and in this general appearance "or confuſed image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and

* Page 17.

" fears, wiſhes and apprehenſions. By degrees, the active imagi-
" nation of men, uneaſy in this abſtract conception of objects, about
" which it is inceſſantly employed, begins to render them more
" particular, and to clothe them in ſhapes more ſuitable to its natu-
" ral comprehenſion. It repreſents them to be ſenſible, intelligent
" beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible
" by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and ſacrifices. HENCE THE
" ORIGIN OF RELIGION: *And hence the origin of idolatry or Poly-*
" *theiſm* *."

The *few excepted* out of the *whole race of mankind* are, we ſee, our Philoſopher and his gang, with their Pedler's ware of *matter* and *motion*, *who penetrate by their diſquiſitions into the ſecret ſtructure of vegetable and animal bodies*, to extract, like the Naturaliſt in Gulliver, *Sunbeams out of Cucumbers*; juſt as wiſe a Project as this of raiſing Religion out of the intrigues of *matter and motion*.

All this ſhews how deſirous our Eſſayiſt was of not being miſunderſtood: as meaning any thing elſe than Naturaliſm (or the belief of a Creator and Phyſical Preſerver, but not Moral Governor) by the Religion he would recommend in the place of that Phantom, whoſe phyſical, or rather metaphyſical, hiſtory, he is writing. For this Phantom of a Religion, which acknowledges a *moral Governor*, ariſes, he tells us, from our ignorance of the reſult of *matter* and *motion*, caballing *in the minute parts of vegetable and animal bodies*.

The ſum then of all he teaches is this; That that Religion, of which he profeſſes himſelf a follower, and which has *its foundation in Reaſon*, is NATURALISM; and, That that Religion which *all mankind* follow, *a few excepted*, and of which he undertakes to give a *natural hiſtory*, is nothing but *Superſtition* and *Fanaticiſm*, having *its origin in human Nature*; that is, in the imagination and the paſſions only.

* Page 54, 55.

RE-

REMARK II.

This fully juſtifies the cenſure, which has been paſſed upon him for his *Hiſtory of Great Britain*; namely, that he owned no RELIGION but what might be reſolved into SUPERSTITION or FANATICISM; having repreſented the eſtabliſhed Epiſcopal Church, and the tolerated Presbyterian Form, under the Names and the Ideas of Superſtition and Fanaticiſm. Indeed (to do him juſtice) though with much offence, yet without much malignity and contrary to his intention. For he ingenuouſly enough confeſſed, that he gave his Hiſtory that attic ſeaſoning for no other end than to fit it to the palate of a very polite people; whoſe virtues, having only reached him at a diſtance, had, as is uſual, been much exaggerated. To make amends, however, for this falſe ſtep, he thought proper to give an ample apology for his conduct towards the cloſe of the ſecond Volume of his Hiſtory. And this containing ſomething more than an inſinuation that he believed, what his *Natural Hiſtory of Religion* ſhews he does not believe, namely, the truth of Chriſtianity, I ſhall take leave, without any ſuſpicion of being thought to go out of my way, to conſider it paragraph by paragraph.

This Sophiſm, ſays he, *of arguing from the abuſe of any thing, againſt the uſe of it, is one of the groſſeſt, and at the ſame time the moſt common to which men are ſubject. The hiſtory of all ages, and none more than that of the Period which is our ſubject, offers us examples of the abuſe of Religion: And we have not been ſparing in this volume, more than in the former, to remark them. But whoever would from thence draw an inference to the diſadvantage of Religion in general, would argue very raſhly and erroneouſly* *.

Thus he begins his Apology: And would not every Reader of him naturally believe that he was quoting the words of an animadverter upon him, in reproof of this very Sophiſtry; which he

* Hiſt. of Great Britain, Vol. II. p. 449, 450.

was going to anſwer? For who was it, that had been *drawing this inference to the diſadvantage of Religion*, but our wiſe Hiſtorian himſelf; who had acknowledged no Religion but one or other of theſe ſpecieſes, *Superſtition* or *Fanaticiſm*; and had done his beſt to ſhew of what infinite miſchief both of them were to Society? The Reader may believe what he pleaſes (and if he be a Reader of Mr. Hume, he will find exerciſe enough for his faith); but, this ſage obſervation is our Hiſtorian's own. And the pleaſantry of it is, you are obliquely requeſted to conſider it as a reproof, not of his own malice, but of the folly of his readers, who underſtood their Hiſtorian to be in *earneſt* when he gave this picture of the religion of his country; whereas they had read him to little purpoſe, if they did not ſee him to be in the number of thoſe who throw about them firebrands and death, and then ſay, am I not in *jeſt?* However, to be fair, I am ready to excuſe *his readers* in this (perhaps they can be excuſed in little elſe), for it is not to be diſguiſed that their maſter does indeed make *the abuſes of Religion* and *Religion itſelf* to be one and the ſame thing. All things conſidered therefore, I cannot but take this introduction to his apology to be the pleading guilty with the inſolent air of an Accuſer, and, under the circumſtances of a convict, talking the language of his judge.

However, though in his firſt Volume of Hiſtory he neither ſpoke of, nor ſuppoſed any other Religion than what might be compriſed either under ſuperſtition or fanaticiſm, yet here, in the ſecond, he does indeed bring us acquainted with another, and defines it thus: *The proper office of Religion is to reform men's lives, to purify their hearts, to inforce all moral duties, and to ſecure obedience to the laws of the civil Magiſtrate.* Now, was Mr. David Hume only playing the Philoſopher, I ſhould take this to be no more than the definition of a mere *moral mode*, known by the name of a *divine philoſophy in the mind*; ſomething fluctuating in the *brain* of theſe Virtuoſi, and ennobled with the title of *Natural Religion:* But as he is writing Hiſtory, and the Hiſtory of Great Britain, where the *Religion* of

of Jesus, as he has since learnt, is yet professed, I can hardly persuade myself that he can mean any other, than a Religion whose abode is in the *heart*, and which expatiates into virtuous practice; and is therefore indeed capable of performing all these good things he speaks of. But why then, when he had heard so much of those bugbear Counterfeits, *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*, was there not one word slipt in, in recommendation of this *reforming Religion?* One word, in mere charity, for the honour of his dear country? That Strangers at least (for he writes at large and for all mankind) might not suspect, if ever indeed there was a true Religion amongst us, that these Impostors and Counterfeits had driven her quite away. Well; be not too hasty. To this he has an admirable Answer; and you shall have it in his own words—*While it* [i. e. the true species of Religion, which he had just defined] *pursues these salutary purposes, its operations, though infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the cognizance of history. The adulterate species of it alone, which inflames Faction, animates Sedition, and prompts Rebellion, distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the great source of Revolutions and public Convulsions. The Historian therefore has scarce any occasion to mention any other kind of Religion, and he may maintain the highest regard for true piety, even while he exposes all the abuses of the false.*

So it seems, that what *reforms men's lives, purifies their hearts, inforces moral duties, and secures obedience to the laws of the civil magistrate*, is not worth a wise Historian's Notice. If it were, he gives a very cogent reason why he should bring it to the Notice of his readers likewise, for he tells us that the effects of this are SECRET and SILENT. Should not the Historian therefore lend a tongue to this powerful but modest directress of human life, and bring her in all her lustre into our acquaintance? But *she seldom comes under the cognizance of History*. More shame for these false masters of the Ceremonies who so scandalously abuse their office.

Then it is, the Historian shines when he celebrates that *adulterate species of Religion, which inflames faction, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion:*

rebellion: For then it is that to theſe public Miſchiefs he may add his own, and under the cover of the *adulterate ſpecies* inculcate to the people that all Religion is either *ſuperſtition* or *fanaticiſm.*

If this was not his purpoſe, and he had no other deſign than to write ſober hiſtory, how could it ever enter into his head, that it was not at leaſt equally his buſineſs to explain to us what that thing is which makes ſociety happy, as what that is which makes it wretched and miſerable? But from the honeſt man let us turn to the able writer; for in that light too he ſeems to have failed. It appears to me a matter of much greater importance that we ſhould be brought acquainted with true religion and its bleſſings, than with the falſe and all its miſchiefs: Becauſe how ſhall we be able to avoid the latter, under our ignorance of the former, without running into the oppoſite extreme, and profeſſing no religion at all? Now, though this perhaps is what our Hiſtorian would be at, yet he has found, by experience, his Readers are not ſo ready to follow as he is to lead.

Had our Hiſtorian only conſulted the Dignity of his Subject, in this too he would have found a great difference; or if he could not, a great example at leaſt was before his eyes, to have pointed out that difference; Lord BACON, in his Hiſtory of Henry VII. This, which in many reſpects is a model for this kind of writing, is much larger and more preciſe in the account of thoſe Laws by which Henry laid the foundation of a flouriſhing and happy Kingdom, than of the Inſurrections and Rebellions which diſturbed his own reign. Had he taken our Author's route, and incurred the cenſure ſo juſtly due to it, I apprehend he had made a very fooliſh figure both amongſt his contemporaries and poſterity, by an apology of this kind. *The proper office of* LAWS *is to reform mens' lives, to inforce all moral duties and to ſecure obedience to the civil Magiſtrate; but while they purſue their ſalutary purpoſes, their operations, though infinitely valuable, are ſecret and ſilent, and ſeldom come under the cognizance of Hiſtory.* LAWLESS RAGE *alone, which inflames Faction, animates Sedition, and prompts Rebellion, is what diſtinguiſhes itſelf on the*

the open theatre of the world, and is the proper province of the Hiſtorian. Suppoſe this great Hiſtorian, and He too was a *Philoſopher*, had executed what he once projected, the hiſtory of his illuſtrious Miſtreſs, are we to believe that becauſe Walſingham's *ſalutary operations* were done in *ſecrecy* and in *ſilence*, that there he would let them have lain, as *not coming under the cognizance of hiſtory*, and *only* buſied himſelf in a circumſtantial detail of the rogueries and turbulencies of the ſons of Loyola? Would he not have gained more honour to himſelf, and procured more benefit to his reader, by revealing and explaining all the wheels and movements of that political machine, from which, as from the urn of a Demi-God, flowed abundance and felicity on his country, than by unravelling the intrigues of the Jeſuits which ſpread ſedition, rebellion, and murders, all around them?

But to ſee how differently men's heads are framed even amongſt great Hiſtorians. TACITUS laments bitterly that his fortune had thrown him in an age, when there was nothing to write of but theſe horrors, *faction, ſeditions, public convulſions and Revolutions.* "Opus aggredior opimum caſibus, atrox prœliis, diſcors ſeditioni-"bus, ipſa etiam pace ſævum: quatuor principes ferro interempti: "tria bella civilia, plura externa, ac plerumque permixta." Our Chriſtian Hiſtorian riots in theſe calamities; and thinks that *what inflames faction, animates ſedition, prompts rebellion, and diſtinguiſhes itſelf on the open theatre of the world, is the only thing becoming the dignity of Hiſtory.*

In a word, the offence he gave was for calling the Chriſtian Religion, *Superſtition* and *Fanaticiſm.* He ſays, it was *falſe* Religion, not the *true*, which he thus qualifies. He is aſked then, how he came to ſay ſo much of the *falſe*, and nothing of the *true?* His anſwer is, That the true does every thing in *ſecrecy and ſilence.* The greater occaſion therefore was there for him to reveal this noble Myſtery; for he tells us that both its aims and operations are *infinitely valuable.* If therefore he be for keeping it hid, like a court-

court-secret, or if, in his own words, *it comes not under his cognizance*, we must conclude, that either he knows little of the matter, or that he believes less.

In conclusion, his own Apology has reduced him to this Dilemma. If he says, he intends the definition of religion here given for the definition of the *Christian*, how came he to comprise all Religion, as he does in the first volume of his History, under the names of *Superstition* and *Fanaticism?* He there mentions no other species; and so great a Philosopher could not be guilty of an imperfect enumeration. If he says, he means *Natural Religion* by his definition; he only fixes the charge against him the more strongly, namely, Irreverence and contempt of Revelation.

REMARK III.

But from his *Civil* let us return to his *Natural History*; and see how he supports his Thesis. He does it by something between history and argument. He calls it both: And some perhaps will think it neither.

The belief of one God, the physical preserver but not moral Governor of the Universe, is, what we have shewn our Philosopher dignifies with the title of *the primary principles of genuine Theism* and *Religion*. Now, if the belief of one God, a moral Governor, was prior in time to Polytheism, it will follow, that NATURALISM or the belief of one God, a Physical preserver only, is not *genuine Theism and Religion*. Because in his endeavour to prove Polytheism the first in time, he has shewn the inability of mere uninstructed man to rise up to this knowledge, on the first Essay of his Reason; the consequence of which is, that if the infant world had this knowledge, it must have been taught them by Revelation, and whatsoever is so taught, must be *true*.

But it is become the general opinion (which, though it has been a long while a growing, our philosopher hopes very speedily to eradicate), that a belief of one God, the moral Governor, was the first Religion; induced thereto by the express assertion of an antient book

book confeſſedly of as good authority as any other record of very remote antiquity.

Our Philoſopher's buſineſs therefore is to diſprove the Fact. And how do you think he ſets about it? You ſee there are but two ways. Either to prove *à priori*, and from the nature of things, that Polytheiſm muſt be before Theiſm; and then indeed he may reject hiſtory and record: Or elſe *à poſteriori*, and from antient teſtimony; in which caſe, it will be incumbent on him to refute and ſet aſide that celebrated record which expreſsly tells us, Theiſm was the firſt. Our honeſt Philoſopher does neither. He inſiſts chiefly on ancient teſtimony, but is as ſilent concerning the Bible as if no ſuch book had ever been written.

Lord Bolingbroke before him had employed this very medium of the priority of Polytheiſm to Theiſm, to inforce the ſame concluſion, namely, NATURALISM; but knowing better how to reaſon, and being perhaps at that moment leſs diſpoſed to inſult common ſenſe in ſo profligate a manner, he labours all he can to depreciate the authority of the Bible. But our North Britiſh Philoſopher deſpiſes his reader too much to ſtand upon Punctilios with him; he roundly affirms that all antiquity is on his ſide; and, as if Moſes had no human authority becauſe he allows him no divine, he will not condeſcend ſo much as to do him the honour, he has done Sanchoniathon, of quoting him, though it was in order to confute him. But you ſhall hear his own words, becauſe his egregious diſhoneſty has led him into as ridiculous an abſurdity.

"As far as writing or hiſtory teaches, mankind, in antient "times, appear univerſally to have been Polytheiſts. Shall we "aſſert, that, in more antient times, before the knowledge of let-"ters, or the diſcovery of any art or ſcience, men entertained the "principles of pure Theiſm: That is, while they were ignorant "and barbarous, they diſcovered truth: But fell into error, as ſoon "as they acquired learning and politeneſs *."

* Page 4.

Shall we aſſert, ſays he. Why, no body ever aſſerted that Theiſm was before Polytheiſm but thoſe who gave credit to their Bible. And thoſe who did ſo can eaſily evade his difficulty, *that it is not natural to think that before the knowledge of letters, or the diſcovery of any art or ſcience, men entertained the principles of pure Theiſm*; becauſe this Bible tells us, that the firſt man did not gain the principles of pure Theiſm by *a knowledge of letters or the diſcovery of any art or ſcience*, but by REVELATION. But this man, who had run into unlucky miſtakes before concerning the ſtate of Religion in South Britain, believed in good earneſt that we had burnt our Bibles, and that therefore it would be leſs generous to inſult its aſhes, than to bury them in ſilence. This, I think, can only account for that virtuous aſſurance where he ſays, that AS FAR AS WRITING OR HISTORY REACHES, MANKIND IN ANTIENT TIMES APPEAR UNIVERSALLY TO HAVE BEEN POLYTHEISTS. And what ſyſtem do you think it is, of the *origin of mankind*, which he eſpouſes, inſtead of the Moſaic, to prove that Polytheiſm was the firſt Religion? No other, I will aſſure you, than the old Egyptian nonſenſe, which attempts to teach that men firſt ſtarted up like Muſhrooms. In a word, the men, on whoſe principles this wonderful Logician argues, never queſtioned the truth of his Theſis. To them therefore all this buſtle of a diſcovery is ridiculous and impertinent. And thoſe who diſpute the fact with him, the Religioniſts, he leaves in poſſeſſion of all their arguments. So they laugh at it as an idle dream, raiſed on the abſurdeſt of the Atheiſtic principles, the Epicurean.

To this ridicule the reader ſees, our Philoſopher expoſes himſelf, even if we believe him to be here ſpeaking of *pure Theiſm*, in the proper ſenſe of the words; that is, of the belief of a God, the *moral Governor of the World*. But *Ridicule* may not be all which this mighty *Theiſt* deſerves. For what, if our Philoſopher ſhould mean by his *pure and genuine Theiſm*, to which he denies a priority of being, his favourite NATURALISM? I ſhould not be ſurpriſed, if

if he did: It is but running his *uſual* philoſophic courſe, from knavery to nonſenſe.

The reader, as he goes along, will ſee abundant reaſon for this charge. An Eſſay, then, ſo devoid of all manly ſenſe, and even plauſibility of reaſoning, can afford a Remarker no other opportunity of entertaining the Public with him, than that of drawing the picture of ſome of his characteriſtic features, ſome of the predominant qualities, of which he is made up. I ſhall therefore preſent the Public with a few ſpecimens of his philoſophical virtues, his Reaſoning, his Conſiſtency, his Candour, and his Modeſty; and all theſe promiſcuouſly, as they riſe in the natural diſorder of his *Eſſay*.

REMARK IV.

"Convulſions in Nature, ſays he, diſorders, prodigies, MIRACLES, though the moſt oppoſite to the plan of a wiſe ſuperintendent, impreſs mankind with the ſtrongeſt ſentiments of religion; the cauſes of events ſeeming then the moſt unknown and unaccountable *."

Our philoſopher forgets himſelf. He owns and admits *the plan of a wiſe ſuperintendent*; this *plan* is eſſential to his NATURALISM. He owns and admits the actual exiſtence of *convulſions in Nature, diſorders, and prodigies*; for theſe conform to his great principle of EXPERIENCE, his only rule of credit, and which therefore ſhould be his rule of right. Yet theſe *convulſions, diſorders, prodigies, are*, he tells us, *moſt oppoſite to the plan of a wiſe ſuperintendent*. Which in plain Engliſh is neither more nor leſs than, "That a wiſe ſuperintendent croſſes and defeats his own Plan."

You aſk, how he fell into this abſurdity? Very naturally. He was betrayed into it by his childiſh prejudice to MIRACLES: which happening to croſs a hurt imagination, while he was in the neigh-

* Page 44.

bourhood of *Prodigies*, as Mountains and Giants always met together in the rencounters of Don Quixote, he would not let them paſs without carrying with them ſome mark of his reſentment. And having ſhewn, in a book written for that good purpoſe, that MIRACLES were *moſt oppoſite to the plan of a wiſe ſuperintendent*, he was not content to brand *miracles* alone with this infamy, but (ſo dangerous it is to be found in ill company) he charges the ſame villany, on *Convulſions in nature*, *diſorders*, *and prodigies*, things in themſelves very innocent, and by old experience known to have exiſted.

Thus a laudable zeal againſt his capital Enemy, MIRACLES, happening to be ill placed, this great philoſophic detection of one of the prime maſter-wheels of ſuperſtition labours with immoveable nonſenſe.

REMARK V.

But now I have mentioned our Author's averſion to miracles, it may not be improper juſt to take notice, in paſſing, of that capital argument, which he and Lord Bolingbroke have borrowed from Spinoza againſt them. "It is, that they are incredible, becauſe "contrary to all experience, and to the eſtabliſhed courſe of "Nature."

But is not this an admirable argument? A circumſtance is urged againſt the reality of miracles, which muſt neceſſarily attend miracles, if there ever were any: their *eſſence* conſiſting in their being effects produced contrary to the common courſe of Nature; and their *end* in their being effects contrary to experience. For could they be eſteemed the immediate work of the Lord of Nature, if they did not controul Nature? Or, could they be eſteemed the extraordinary declaration of his will, if not contrary to our experience of the common courſe of Nature?

RE-

REMARK VI.

There is a ſtrange perverſity in the arrangement of our Author's philoſophical ideas, occaſioned by the vain affectation of ſingularity.

Nothing hath been more uncontroverted, either in antient or modern times, than that the notion of the Unity, amongſt the Pagans, aroſe from their *Philoſophers*. No, ſays this penetrating Sage, it came from the *People:* and that by the moſt natural progreſs in the world. "Men's exaggerated praiſes and compliments "ſtill ſwell their ideas upon them; and elevating their Deities to "the utmoſt bounds of perfection, at laſt beget the attributes of "UNITY and Infinity, Simplicity and Spirituality *."

"THE PEOPLE ſure, the people are the ſight."

Turn this people to the South, and you ſee them fall down before Dogs and Cats and Monkeys. Place them to the North, and they worſhip ſtocks and ſtones. But give them once an Eaſtern aſpect, and they ſhoot out into *praiſe* and *panegyric*, which preſently produces a *firſt Cauſe*. It is pity but we could leave them here in quiet poſſeſſion of their glory. It is not my fault that we cannot. Our Philoſopher ſeems to be oppreſſed with his own diſcovery. Though the people might, in this manner, find out the *firſt Cauſe*, yet he is ſenſible they knew not what to do with it, when they had it. They *would* not leave their falſe Gods for the true; they *could* not bring both to a good underſtanding; they had neither ſkill nor addreſs to aſſociate them together; and the true God was neither to be *praiſed* or *panegyriſed* into an alliance with the falſe. What was to be done? Some philoſophic fetch, much above the people, was, as he rightly obſerves, neceſſary to complete the ſyſtem of paganiſm. This the Philoſophers performed, and finiſhed all with a maſter-ſtroke.

* Page 55.

"Such

"Such refined ideas, being ſomewhat diſproportioned to VULGAR "COMPREHENSION, remain not long in their original purity; but "require to be ſupported by the notion of inferior mediators or "ſubordinate agents, which interpoſe between mankind and their "ſupreme deity. Theſe demi-gods or middle beings, partaking "more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become "the chief objects of devotion, and gradually recal that idolatry, "which has been formerly baniſhed by the ardent prayers and pa-"negyrics of timorous indigent mortals*."

Thus the *vulgar*, you ſee, in their high flights of *praiſe and panegyric*, roſe up to the diſcovery of a *firſt Cauſe*; while a ſet of *wiſer men* are called in to reſtore the mob of middle deities to their priſtine honours: And this, to ſuit the objects of worſhip to *vulgar comprehenſion*.

Now ſhallow men, like You or me, would ſay, why all this buſtle and the bandying about of an unjointed Syſtem? Why did not one ſet of workmen undertake the whole? Or, if there were need of Coadjutors, how came the parties to act in ſo prepoſterous a manner, that the people aſſumed to themſelves what belonged to the Philoſophers, the *diſcovery of the firſt Cauſe*; and the Philoſophers undertook what belonged to the people, the *diſcovery of demi-gods and middle beings?* Or, will he ſay, that the *People* did both? Diſcovered the Unity in their blind, *timorous and indigent* ſtate, and, when they were ſo well informed, ſtruck out, in a lucky moment, their groſs ſyſtem of Polytheiſm?

He may ſay what he will; but nobody ſhall perſuade me but that an Author, who makes ſo great a figure himſelf in the various walks of Philoſophy, would have given the honour of the whole to his own Profeſſion; could it have been done without dimming and impairing, in ſo capital a manner, the illuſtrious character of an original thinker.

* Page 55, 56.

RE-

REMARK VII.

" The Getes (ſays our Hiſtorian) affirmed Zamolxis their Deity " to be the only true God; and aſſerted the worſhip of all other " nations to be addreſſed to fictions and chimæras *."

This aſſertion contradicts all Antiquity, as well as the very nature and genius of Paganiſm itſelf. But what of that? It ſerved an honeſt purpoſe: the purpoſe to which all his patriot endeavours tend, the diſcredit of Revelation. And on ſuch an occaſion a gratuitous aſſertion coſts him nothing.

Now it hath been deemed one characteriſtic mark of favourable diſtinction in behalf of Revelation, that *the Jews affirmed the God of Iſrael to be the only true God*; *and aſſerted the worſhip of all other nations to be addreſſed to mere fictions and chimæras.* So far was well. But then he ſhould have taken care not to contradict himſelf ſo very ſoon afterwards; where ſpeaking of the univerſal genius of Paganiſm, he tells us, " Idolatry is attended with this evident ad- " vantage, that by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, " it naturally admits the Gods of other ſects and nations to a ſhare " of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, " ceremonies or traditions, compatible with each other †."

But as this obſervation was not his own, being ſtolen from a late writer on the hiſtory of Paganiſm, it is no wonder he ſhould ſo eaſily forget it.

REMARK VIII.

But the Paragraph (from which the laſt quotation is borrowed) will afford us further matter of ſpeculation. It contains a detailed compariſon between the advantages and diſadvantages of IDOLATRY and THEISM; and thus the account is ſtated.

* Page 53. † Page 58.

" POLY-

" POLYTHEISM or idolatrous worſhip, being founded entirely in " vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any " practice or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted, may be au- " thorized by it; and full ſcope is left for knavery to impoſe on " credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled from the reli- " gious ſyſtems of mankind. At the ſame time, idolatry is at- " tended with this evident ADVANTAGE, that, by limiting the " powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods " of other ſects and nations to a ſhare of divinity, and renders all " the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, " compatible with each other. Theiſm is oppoſite both in its ad- " vantages and DISADVANTAGES*."

The advantages and diſadvantages of *Polytheiſm* are, we ſee, ſuch as ariſe from the *nature and eſſence* of Idolatry. Would you not expect, that the advantages and diſadvantages of *theiſm* ſhould have the ſame relation to their ſubject? Good logic ſeems to require it. But what of that, if his cauſe requires other management? He ſcruples not therefore to tell us in the ſame page, that the *diſadvantages* here mentioned as ariſing from Theiſm, come not from the *nature* but the abuſe of it. " *They ariſe*, ſays he, *from the vices* " *and prejudices of mankind.*"

REMARK IX.

Still we are detained on the ſame ſpot; which is ſo fruitful of curioſities, that there is no ſtirring from it. He is ſpeaking of the abſurdities or miſchiefs, I cannot well ſay which, that ariſe from Revelation. And one, or perhaps both of theſe he intends to infer from the following obſervation.

" While one ſole object of Devotion is acknowledged, the wor- " ſhip of other deities is regarded as abſurd and IMPIOUS. Nay, " this *unity of object ſeems naturally to require the* UNITY OF FAITH

* Page 58, 59.

" AND

" AND CEREMONIES, and furniſhes deſigning men with a pretext " for repreſenting their adverſaries as prophane, and the ſubjects of " divine, as well as human vengeance *."

The calumnious inſinuation, in this paſſage, about the origin of Perſecution (the abuſe, and not the reaſonable conſequence of a true principle) is below any body's notice. What I quote it for is a curious obſervation, though made but on the bye—that *the unity of object ſeems naturally to require the* UNITY OF FAITH AND CEREMONIES.

Unity of object, ſays he, *ſeems to require unity of faith*. I am apt to think it does. For if the object of belief be ſingle, the belief can ſcarce be double: unleſs by a drunkenneſs of the underſtanding, like that which doubles the objects of ſenſe. But then, *that unity of object as naturally requires unity of ceremony*, is not ſo clear. *Unity of faith* is neceſſary, becauſe *truth*, which is the general object of faith, is but *one*. But who ever affirmed, before our author, that *unity of ceremony* was neceſſary? *Ceremony* is only an expreſſion of duty: And duty may be expreſſed a thouſand different ways. *Unity of civil obedience* under the ſame government is neceſſary. But is *unity of civil obeiſance* to the ſame Governor, equally neceſſary?

But in the brain of this paradoxical Philoſopher, *Faith* and *Ceremonies* ſeem to have changed places. We ſee here how he has exalted *ceremonies*. You ſhall ſee next how he degrades *faith*.

He aſſures us, that " the *Egyptian Religion, though ſo abſurd, yet* " *bore ſo great a reſemblance to the Jewiſh, that the ancient Writers,* " *even of the greateſt genius, were not able to obſerve any difference* " *between them* †; in proof of which he quotes Tacitus and Sue- " tonius: And then adds, " *Theſe wiſe Heathens, obſerving ſomething* " *in the* GENERAL AIR *and* GENIUS *and* SPIRIT of the two Reli- " gions *to be the ſame*, ESTEEMED THE DIFFERENCES OF THEIR " DOGMAS TOO FRIVOLOUS TO DESERVE ANY ATTENTION ‡."

* Page 59. † Page 76. ‡ Page 77.

Theſe *wiſe Heathens* were ſhrewd obſervers. But what then becomes of the wiſdom of a much greater man, our Philoſopher himſelf? who hath aſſured us, that *the general air and genius and ſpirit of the two Religions* were ſo far from being the *ſame*, that they were totally different. For ſpeaking of Revelation and Paganiſm, or of Theiſm and Polytheiſm, he found this remarkable difference in *the air and genius and ſpirit* of the two Religions, that "Idolatry has this evident ADVANTAGE over Theiſm, that by li- "miting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally ad- "mits the Gods of other ſects and nations to a ſhare of divinity, "and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, "or traditions, compatible with each other."—Whereas in Theiſm, "While one ſole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worſhip "of other deities is regarded as abſurd and impious." Nay he tells us in the ſame place, "That Theiſm is oppoſite to Polytheiſm, "both *in its advantages and diſadvantages* *.

In ſhort, in that Section nothing is alike: in the Section before us every thing is the ſame. So various in wiſdom is antient and modern Infidelity! However a difference between the Jewiſh and Egyptian Religion, he owns, there was. But it was a difference only in DOGMAS TOO FRIVOLOUS TO DESERVE ATTENTION; being indeed nothing more than this, whether mankind ſhould fall down before a dog, a cat, or a monkey, or whether he ſhould worſhip the God of the Univerſe. From this curious ſpecimen of our Author's ideas concerning FAITH and CEREMONIES, we cannot but conclude, that he has ſet up for a writer againſt Religion, before he had learned his Catechiſm.

REMARK X.

"MACHIAVEL obſerves, ſays our great Philoſopher and Divine, "that the doctrines of the Chriſtian Religion [meaning the CA-

* Page 58, 59.

"THOLIC,

" THOLIC, for he knew no other], which recommended only paſ-
" ſive courage and ſuffering, had ſubdued the ſpirit of mankind,
" and fitted them for ſlavery and ſubjection. And this obſervation
" would certainly be juſt, were there not many other circumſtances
" in human ſociety, which control the genius and character of a
" Religion *."

Machiavel, ſays he, *meant the Catholic Religion.* That is, he meant the Roman Catholic, in contradiſtinction to the Goſpel. Machiavel meant no ſuch thing. If he had, the *ſuper-ſubtile Italian* had wrote like this rambling North-Briton. For it is not the Catholic Religion, ſo diſtinguiſhed, but the Goſpel itſelf, which gave libertine men the pretence of ſaying, that *it ſubdued the ſpirit of mankind, and fitted them for ſlavery and ſubjection.* But here a ſudden qualm comes over our Philoſopher. He was aſhamed of ſaying this of the Goſpel. And well he might. For, though he ſays, *the obſervation is certainly juſt*, there never was a ranker calumny. The Goſpel recommends no ſuch thing as *paſſive courage and ſuffering*, either with regard to the domeſtic invaders of our civil rights, or to the foreign enemies of our country: And there are but one or two illiterate and fanatic ſects, of very ſmall extent, in the whole Chriſtian world, who have ſo underſtood and abuſed the Goſpel. The only *paſſive courage and ſuffering it recommends* is to particulars, whoſe conſciences civil ſociety hath iniquitouſly violated. Now, if inſtead of this *paſſive courage and ſuffering* the Goſpel had recommended to its private followers to fly to arms and repel the force of the civil magiſtrate, when he abuſed his authority, in ſuppreſſing truth and the rights of conſcience, what tragical exclamations would theſe very men have raiſed againſt the factious ſpirit of Chriſtianity! Indeed, to our Author's ſhame be it ſpoken, the very contrary of all this is the truth. The effects of the Goſpel are moſt ſalutary to *human Society*: for by encouraging inquiry,

* Page 66, 67.

and by inſpiring a ſpirit of liberty in religious matters, it naturally inclines its followers to carry the ſame diſpoſitions into civil.

REMARK XI.

But this honeſt man can allow himſelf, on all occaſions, to calumniate the Religion of his country: ſometimes openly and groſsly; but oftner, as in the following inſtance, in the oblique way of Inſinuation only.

" Were there a Religion *(and we may ſuſpect Mahometaniſm of* " *this inconſiſtence)* which ſometimes painted the deity in the moſt " ſublime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth; ſometimes " degraded him nearly to a level *with human creatures in his powers* " *and faculties*; while at the ſame time it aſcribed to him *ſuitable* " *infirmities, paſſions and partialities of the moral kind*: That Religion, " *after it was extinct*, would alſo be cited as an inſtance of thoſe " contradictions, which ariſe from the groſs, vulgar, natural con- " ceptions of mankind, oppoſed to their continual propenſity towards " flattery and exaggeration. Nothing indeed would prove more " ſtrongly the divine origin of any Religion, than to find *(and hap-* " *pily this is the caſe with Chriſtianity)* that it is free from a contra- " diction ſo incident to human nature*."

We ſee what the man would be at, through all his diſguiſes. And, no doubt, he would be much mortified, if we did not; though the diſcovery, we make, is only this, That, of all the ſlanders againſt Revelation, this before us is the triteſt, the dirtieſt, and moſt worn in the drudgery of Free-thinking. Not but it may paſs with his friends. And they have my free leave to make their beſt of it. What I quote it for, is only to ſhew the rancour of heart which poſſeſſes this unhappy man, and which could induce him to employ an inſinuation againſt the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Religions; not only of no weight in itſelf, but of none, I will venture to ſay, even in his own opinion.

* Page 49, 50.

RE-

REMARK XII.

" The learned, philoſophical Varro (ſays our no leſs learned " and philoſophical Naturaliſt) diſcourſing of Religion, pretends " not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances : " Such was his good ſenſe and moderation! But the paſſionate, " the zealous Auguſtin inſults the noble Roman on his ſcepticiſm " and reſerve, and profeſſes the moſt thorough belief and aſſurance. " A Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the Saint, ABSURDLY eſteems the religious ſyſtem of the latter, ſo falſe, that " even the credulity of children, he ſays, could not engage them " to believe it *."

From the fact, as here delivered, we learn, that the Pagans inſulted the Chriſtians, and the Chriſtians the Pagans, for the ſuppoſed abſurdity of each other's ſyſtem. Agreed. And what then? Were their ſeveral ſyſtems equally abſurd? This is what he would inſinuate, or his obſervation is impertinent. Yet does not Mr. David Hume inſult the *Religioniſts*, as abſurd? They, him, as ten times more abſurd? Will he ſay, that He and they have equal reaſon? But what, in the mean time, becomes of *Naturaliſm?* We muſt conclude then, that it is poſſible, one party may be in the right, and the other in the wrong. The conſequence is, that his approbation of Varro, and his cenſure of Auguſtin, is temerarious and unjuſt. For what hinders but that Auguſtin's *thorough belief and aſſurance* might be full as reaſonable when he defended Chriſtianity, as Varro's not venturing *beyond probabilities and appearances*, when he apologized for Paganiſm? Had our modern Philoſopher, who has a much worſe cauſe than Varro's to defend, but imitated Varro's *moderation*, which he commends, inſtead of Auguſtin's *thorough aſſurance*, which he condemns, his reader perhaps would have thought better both of his ſenſe and honeſty.—

* Page 80, 81.

Oh,

Oh, but for his honeſty and impartial indifference between Chriſtianity and Paganiſm, he has given us ſuch a convincing proof in this very inſtance, that he ought ever hereafter to go ſcot-free. We have obſerved, that he has praiſed Varro and condemned Auguſtin: but to ſhew—Tros Rutuluſve fuat—he tells us honeſtly—*that a Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the Saint,* ABSURDLY *eſteems the religious ſyſtem of the latter* [i. e. Chriſtianity] *ſo falſe, that even the credulity of children, he ſays, could not engage them to believe it.* Now here, where he has been at the expence of ſo much fair dealing, he ought to be indulged in rewarding himſelf for it, which he has done in this modeſt inſinuation, that Chriſtianity was ſo falſe and nauſeous that even children could not be brought to ſwallow it.

He may talk what he pleaſes of the *abſurdity* of poets. But while one Philoſopher lives, I defy all the poets of antient or modern date to equal him either in abſurdity or fiction. The poet, he here abuſes, is CLAUDIUS RUTILIUS NUMATIANUS. He tells You, how this poet reviles Chriſtianity: and quotes the Poem, the book, and the page. Would you ſuſpect all this to be a flam, and not one word of truth, from beginning to end? Yet ſo it is. Rutilius is ſpeaking of a JEW, by name and title; and the Rites of *Judaiſm*, as they diſtinguiſh that Religion from all other, are the ſubject of his Satire. The whole paſſage is as follows:

—" Namque loci querulus curam JUDÆUS agebat;
" *Humanis* animal diſſociale *cibis*.
" Vexatos frutices, pulſatas imputat algas,
" Damnaque libatæ grandia clamat aquæ.
" Reddimus obſcœnæ convincia debita genti,
" Quæ *genitale caput propudioſa metit:*
" Radix ſtultitiæ, cui frigida *ſabbata* cordi;
" Sed cor frigidius religione ſuâ eſt.
" *Septima* quæque dies turpi damnata veterno,
" Tanquam laſſati mollis imago Dei.

" Cetera

" Cetera mendacis deliramenta cataſtæ,
" Nec pueros omnes credere poſſe reor *."

The Pagan writers indeed frequently confound the two ſects of Judaiſm and Chriſtianity, with one another. But here, there is not the leaſt room for that poor ſubterfuge. Rutilius ſpeaks of Judaiſm by name: and to ſhew us that he underſtood his ſubject, he reviles it for thoſe very rites, which are peculiar to Judaiſm; namely, the diſtinction between *clean and unclean meats*, *circumciſion*, and the *Sabbath*. Yet, if You will believe this honeſt man, Rutilius repreſents CHRISTIANITY as ſo falſe, that even the *credulity of children could not engage them to believe it*. And why ſhould You not believe him? He is a Philoſopher, a follower of truth, and a virtuous man: One (as he ſays of himſelf) *whoſe errors ſhould be excuſed*, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CANDOUR AND SINCERITY WHICH ACCOMPANIES THEM †.

REMARK XIII.

" If ever there was a nation or a time (ſays our Philoſopher) in " which the public religion loſt all authority over mankind, we " might expect, that infidelity in *Rome*, during the *Ciceronian* age, " would openly have erected its throne, and that Cicero himſelf, in " every ſpeech and action, would have been its moſt declared abet- " tor. But, it appears, that, whatever ſceptical liberties that great " man might uſe, in his writings or in philoſophical converſation: " he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation " of DEISM and PROFANENESS. Even in his own family, and to " his wife *Terentia*, whom he highly truſted, he was willing to " appear a devout religioniſt; and there remains a letter, addreſt to " her, in which he ſeriouſly deſires her to offer a ſacrifice to *Apollo* " and *Æſculapius*, in gratitude for the recovery of his health ‡."

* Iter, L. I. v. 383. † Dedicat. p. iii. ‡ Page 81, 82.

Here

Here he ſeems to commend Cicero (for his vanity, perverſeneſs, and love of paradox, make him always think at large, and write at random) on a topic which expoſes his own wicked practice, namely, Cicero's care, *in the common conduct of life*, to ſet the people an example of reverence for the eſtabliſhed Religion. But whether this was ſaid in praiſe or diſpraiſe of that noble Roman, it matters not, ſince preſently after he contradicts his own account, and aſſures us, that the ſame Cicero was ſo far from *avoiding, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of* DEISM *and* PROFANENESS, that *He made no ſcruple in a public court of Judicature, of teaching the doctrine of a future ſtate, as a* MOST RIDICULOUS FABLE, *to which nobody would give any attention* *. And this without the leaſt care of reconciling Cicero, to himſelf; or his own contradictory obſervations, to his reader.

REMARK XIV.

But he treats whole Bodies of men no better than Particulars. "We may obſerve (ſays he) that, notwithſtanding the dogmatical, "imperious ſtyle of all ſuperſtition, the conviction of the Religio- "niſts, in all ages, is more affected than real, and ſcarce ever ap- "proaches, in any degree, to that ſolid belief and perſuaſion, "which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not "avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts, which they en- "tertain on ſuch ſubjects: they make a merit of implicit faith; "and diſguiſe to themſelves their REAL INFIDELITY, by the "ſtrongeſt aſſeverations and moſt poſitive bigotry. But nature "is too hard for all their endeavours, and ſuffers not the obſcure, "glimmering light, afforded in thoſe ſhadowy regions, to equal the "ſtrong impreſſions, made by common ſenſe and by experience. "The uſual courſe of men's conduct belies their words, and ſhews, "that the aſſent in theſe matters is ſome unaccountable operation

* Page 91.

"of

" of the mind betwixt disbelief and conviction, but approaching " much nearer the former than the latter *."

This is ſuperlatively modeſt. When the Religioniſt ſays that an infidel writer (like this man) in order to ſkreen himſelf from the reſentment of the Law, ſays one thing and thinks another, there is no end of the clamours raiſed againſt uncharitable Churchmen. But Mr. David Hume may ſay all this and more of Religioniſts, and yet preſerve his character of a philoſopher and a friend of Truth. But infidelity owed him a ſhame, and he preſently unſays it all; and confeſſes that Religioniſts are ſo far from being toſſed about in *doubt* and *unbelief*, that nothing is more conſtant than the courſe of even the wiſeſt and moſt experienced of them, invariably ſteady to the point of faith. For after having ſaid a great deal to ſhew that Socrates and Xenophon did in reality give credit to Augurs and Omens, he concludes thus, " It is for the ſame reaſon, " I MAINTAIN, that Newton, Locke, Clarke, &c. being Arians " or Socinians, were VERY SINCERE, in the creed they profeſſed: " and I ALWAYS OPPOSE THIS ARGUMENT to ſome Libertines, who " will needs have it, that it was impoſſible but that theſe great Phi- " loſophers muſt have been HYPOCRITES †."

Our modeſt Philoſopher had employed the 83d page of this wonderful eſſay to prove, that, notwithſtanding *the dogmatical imperious ſtyle of all ſuperſtition*, yet Religioniſts are HYPOCRITES, *their conviction in all ages being more* AFFECTED *than* REAL: and a great deal more traſh to the ſame purpoſe. Yet here in the 91ſt page he MAINTAINS *againſt Libertines*, that theſe Religioniſts are VERY SINCERE, and no Hypocrites. Nay, in ſpite, as it were, to his 83d page, he affirms that he ALWAYS *oppoſes this argument to libertines*.

But are you to think, he talks thus wantonly, for no other end than to ſhew his contempt of the reader? By no means. For though this be, ſometimes, motive ſufficient for our paradoxical Gentleman to *contradict*, yet we muſt needs think there was ſome

* Page 83. † Page 91.

important occaſion which induced him thus *to give the lie to himſelf*. He had it in his choice (for what hindered him, when unreſtrained by the conſiderations of truth or falſhood?) to repreſent the Religioniſts as either KNAVES or FOOLS. But this did not content his noble paſſion for miſchief. He would have them BOTH. Unluckily this could not be done without a contradiction. To make them *Knaves*, he was to ſhew they profeſſed one thing, and believed another: To make them *Fools*, they were to be repreſented as *ſteadily* and *ſincerely* believing all things. The contradiction, we ſee, was unavoidable: but how he came ſo needleſsly to ſaddle himſelf with the *lie*—*I* ALWAYS, ſays he, *oppoſe this argument to libertines*—I confeſs ſurpaſſes my comprehenſion.

Well, having floundered ſo ſhamefully, he is for recovering himſelf; and therefore ſteps into the gap, between theſe two extremes, a moderating tenet; and ſo leaves all Religioniſts, both antient and modern, in a kind of MIDDLE STATE, between *Knaves* and *Fools*. His conciliating tenet, is this—"In the mean time it is "obvious, that the empire of all religious faith over the underſtand-"ing is wavering and uncertain; ſubject to all varieties of humour, "and dependent on the preſent incidents, which ſtrike the imagi-"nation. The difference is only in the degrees. An ancient will "place a ſtroke of impiety and one of ſuperſtition alternately through "a whole diſcourſe: A modern often thinks in the ſame way, "though he may be more guarded in his expreſſions *."

I am ſo tired with his contradictions that I ſhall let this paſſage go, unexamined upon that head, notwithſtanding it looks ſo aſquint both to the right and left, and agrees neither with the thorough *Hypocriſy*, nor the *ſincere belief* of the two paſſages, it is brought to reconcile. But, as it ſtands alone, I may be allowed to aſk, Why is the *modern* Chriſtian *more guarded in his expreſſions*, than the *ancient* Pagan? Does not human nature always operate alike in the like circumſtances? If therefore, in this *modern ſuperſtition*, called

* Page 86, 87.

Chriſ-

Chriſtianity, men are more conſiſtent in the profeſſion of their belief, than in that *antient ſuperſtition*, called Paganiſm, does not this ſhew that the circumſtances were not alike? And what other difference in circumſtances could there be, if not this, that Chriſtianity having a rational foundation, its profeſſors ſtood ſteady and unmoved; and Paganiſm only fluctuating in the fancy and unſupported by the underſtanding, communicated the ſame inconſtancy and variableneſs to its followers?

Oh, but ſays our Philoſopher, I will not allow that ſteadineſs to be more than pretended, *A modern often thinks in the ſame way*, [i. e. inconſtantly], *though he may be more guarded in his expreſſions*. How prejudiced! what pretence has he to ſuppoſe it an *inconſtancy*, only *guarded in the expreſſion*, when the very uniformity of the profeſſion excludes all data whereon to ground his ſuſpicion that the belief is only pretended?

He muſt take it then for granted (as without doubt he does) that Chriſtianity has no more reaſonable foundation than Paganiſm. No need, will he ſay, of that at preſent. The *faſhion*, the faſhion, does all. An unſteadineſs in Religion is diſcreditable in theſe *modern* times: hence the *guarded expreſſion*.

Well, admit it to be ſo. What, I pray you, made unſteadineſs in Religion now diſcreditable, which was creditable in former times, but this, that Chriſtianity has now the ſupport of, at leaſt, plauſible arguments, which Paganiſm never had?

REMARK XV.

In comparing the two Religions, Paganiſm and Chriſtianity, our Philoſopher finds that the former is to be preferred to the latter, both in its REASONABLENESS and in its BENEVOLENT SPIRIT.

"Upon the whole, the greateſt and moſt obſervable differences "betwixt a *traditional*, *mythological* religion, and a *ſyſtematical*, "*ſcholaſtic* one, are two: The former is often more REASONABLE, "as conſiſting only of a multitude of ſtories, which, however

" groundleſs, imply no expreſs abſurdity and demonſtrative contra-
" diction; and ſits alſo ſo eaſy and light on men's minds, that
" though it may be as univerſally received, it makes no ſuch deep
" impreſſion on the affections and underſtanding *."

The *reaſonableneſs*, we ſee, is reſolved into this, that You cannot reduce the Profeſſors of Paganiſm to *an expreſs contradiction*, and that the Profeſſion *ſits mighty light and eaſy on men's minds*. As to the firſt property of paganiſm, its incapacity of being reduced to a contradiction, this it has in common with NONSENSE, which is likewiſe incapable of ſuffering the ſame diſgrace. And this will account too for its ſecond property, the *ſitting ſo light and eaſy on the minds of men*. For nothing takes leſs hold of the mind than NONSENSE, or ſo little diſturbs its tranquillity, while we have the diſcretion to take it for what it is. To this he will tell you, you miſtake his aim, if you think it was to credit paganiſm: the compariſon was made only to diſcredit Chriſtianity, by inſinuating that its DOGMAS are *contradictory*, and its SANCTIONS *oppreſſive*.

As to the ſuperior BENEVOLENCE in the ſpirit of Paganiſm, this is made out as follows.

" Lucian obſerves, that a young man, who reads the hiſtory of
" the Gods in *Homer* or *Heſiod*, and finds their factions, wars, in-
" juſtice, inceſt, adultery, and other immoralities ſo highly cele-
" brated, is much ſurprized afterwards, when he comes into the
" world, to obſerve, that puniſhments are by Law inflicted on the
" ſame actions, which he had been taught to aſcribe to ſuperior
" beings. The contradiction is ſtill perhaps STRONGER betwixt the
" repreſentations given us by ſome latter Religions and our natural
" ideas of generoſity, lenity, impartiality, and juſtice; and in pro-
" portion to the multiplied terrors of theſe religions, the barbarous
" conceptions of the divinity are multiplied upon us †."

The DII MAJORUM GENTIUM, as we learn from their hiſtory, were, " *a rabble of Tyrants, Pathics, and Adulterers, Whores,*

* Page 92, 93.

† Page 98, 99.

" *Vagabonds,*

" *Vagabonds, Thieves, and Murderers* *." Yet, gracious Heaven! a Philoſopher of North Britain, in the Reign of George the Second, has dared to tell us, with very little diſguiſe, that *the barbarous conceptions of the Divinity, multiplied upon us* by Chriſtianity, are ſtill more *contradictory to our natural ideas of generoſity, lenity, impartiality, and juſtice.*

But here his *modeſty* ſeemed to labour a little; and he is for caſting part of the odium of this diabolical inſinuation from himſelf upon another. " But in order, ſays he, to ſhew more evidently, " that it is poſſible for *a Religion* to repreſent the Divinity in a ſtill " more immoral, unamiable light than the antient, we ſhall cite " a long paſſage from an author of TASTE and IMAGINATION, who " was ſurely no enemy of Chriſtianity †." You will ſuſpect him to be juſt on the point of playing you a trick when your hear him talk of his authority, as an author of *taſte and imagination*, when the ſubject requires that the voucher for it ſhould have a clear judgment and ſtrong underſtanding. After all, there was no occaſion for this ſlight of hand. The trick, I ſpeak of, is to be played, as you will find, not by this *man of taſte*, but by our Philoſopher himſelf. His voucher, the Chevalier Ramſey, is perfectly innocent of all our Philoſopher brings him to atteſt.

The words juſt quoted plainly imply, that in the opinion of this *man of taſte*, Revelation, or the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Religion, as delivered in the Bible, *repreſents the Divinity in a ſtill more immoral and unamiable light than the antient.—It is poſſible*, ſays he, *for a* RELIGION—which, I think, implies the Religion itſelf, and not the ſuperſtitious followers, much leſs the profeſſed enemies of it. Turn now to the *long paſſage*, which this *man of truth* has quoted in his 100th page, and you will find that this *immoral and unamiable light in which the Divinity is repreſented*, is not the repreſentation of the Religion itſelf, but of its falſe friends and open enemies. " What ſtrange ideas (ſays the Chevalier Ramſey) would

* D. L. iv. B. 4, 5.

† Page 99.

" an

" an Indian or a Chineſe Philoſopher have of our holy Religion, " if they judged by the ſchemes given of it by our MODERN FREE- " THINKERS and PHARISAICAL DOCTORS OF ALL SECTS? Accord- " ing to the odious and too vulgar ſyſtem of theſe INCREDULOUS " SCOFFERS and CREDULOUS SCRIBLERS, the God of the Jews is a " moſt cruel, unjuſt, partial, and fantaſtic Being—To accom- " pliſh the partial, barbarous decree of predeſtination and reproba- " tion, God abandoned all nations to darkneſs, idolatry, and ſuper- " ſtition, &c."

This turns out ridiculous enough. The Chevalier Ramſey is brought to prove, that the Bible *repreſents the divinity in a more immoral and unamiable light than Paganiſm:* and the Chevalier Ramſey turns the tables on him, and proves that they are only ſuch as our Philoſopher himſelf and his crew who ſo repreſent the Divinity.

Well, but ſay you, the Chevalier Ramſey is made by our Philoſopher to conſider the *repreſentation* as the repreſentation of Revelation, whoever made it. The *man of Truth's* words are theſe—*To ſhew more evidently that it is poſſible for a Religion to repreſent, &c. we ſhall cite a long paſſage from an author, who was ſurely no enemy to Chriſtianity.* Why were theſe laſt words added but to inſinuate that the repreſentation, however diſadvantageous, was yet owned to be a true one; unwillingly perhaps, as he was a friend of Chriſtianity, but from the mere force of evidence. Whereas turn but your eyes upon the *long paſſage*, and you will find that the repreſenters, the *free-thinkers* and *Phariſaical Doctors*, are heartily cenſured by the Chevalier for thus *diſfiguring* and *diſhonouring* Revelation. His concluding words are, " Thus the *incre-* " *dulous Free-Thinkers*, the *Judaizing Chriſtians*, and the *fataliſtic* " *Doctors*, have diſfigured and diſhonoured the ſublime myſteries of " our holy faith; thus they have confounded the nature of good " and evil; transformed the moſt monſtrous paſſions into divine " attributes, and SURPASSED THE PAGANS IN BLASPHEMY, by " aſcribing

" aſcribing to the eternal nature as perfections, what makes the " horrideſt crimes among men."

The ſum is this. The *man of truth* calls upon the *man of taſte* to prove that the Jewiſh and Chriſtian religions, as they lie in the Bible, *repreſent the Divinity in a more immoral and unamiable light than Paganiſm.* And the *man of taſte* bears evidence, that it is not the Bible, but the *man of truth* and his crew, who give this repreſentation of the Divinity: a repreſentation which SURPASSES indeed the very PAGANS IN BLASPHEMY.

REMARK XVI.

We now come to his account of the origin of that Religion, of which, meaning *Superſtition*, he pretends to give a natural Hiſtory.

" The primary religion of mankind ariſes chiefly from an " anxious fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally " be entertained of inviſible unknown powers, while men lie under " diſmal apprehenſions of any kind, may eaſily be conceived. " Every image of vengeance, ſeverity, cruelty, and malice, muſt " occur, and augment the ghaſtlineſs and horror which oppreſſes " the amazed religioniſt. A panic having once ſeized the mind, " the active fancy ſtill farther multiplies the objects of terror; " while that profound darkneſs, or, what is worſe, that glimmer- " ing light, with which we are environed, repreſents the ſpectres " of divinity under the moſt dreadful appearances imaginable. " And no idea of perverſe wickedneſs can be framed, which thoſe " terrified devotees do not readily, without ſcruple, apply to their " deity.

" This appears the natural ſtate of religion, when ſurveyed in one " light. But if we conſider, on the other hand, that ſpirit of praiſe " and eulogy, which neceſſarily has place in all religions, and " which is the conſequence of theſe very terrors, we muſt expect

" a quite

" a quite contrary ſyſtem of theology to prevail. Every virtue, " every excellence muſt be aſcribed to the divinity, and no exag- " geration be eſteemed ſufficient to reach thoſe perfections with " which he is endowed. Whatever ſtrains of panegyric can be " invented are immediately embraced, without conſulting any " arguments or phænomena. And it is eſteemed a ſufficient con- " firmation of them, that they give us more magnificent ideas " of the divine object of our worſhip and adoration.

" HERE therefore is a kind of contradiction betwixt the different " principles of human nature, which enter into Religion. Our " natural terrors preſent the notion of a deviliſh and malicious deity: " Our propenſity to praiſe leads us to acknowledge an excellent " and divine. And the influence of theſe oppoſite principles are " various, according to the different ſituation of the human under- " ſtanding *."

Thus has this wretched man miſrepreſented and calumniated thoſe two ſimple principles, which under the guidance of natural light led the people to a deity, and kept him always in ſight, namely, FEAR, and LOVE. A man leſs maliciouſly diſpoſed to abuſe and ſlander human nature, would have fairly told us, that FEAR kept the Religioniſt from evil, as a thing offenſive to the deity; and that LOVE inclined him to virtuous practice, as moſt acceptable to the divine nature. No, ſays this accuſer of his Kind, FEAR preſented the Religioniſt *with the notion of a deviliſh and malicious deity: and* LOVE *exaggerated the perfections of the deity, without conſulting any arguments or phænomena:* i. e. arguments or phænomena, which might have convinced him that they were *exaggerations*. Whereas the truth of the caſe is merely this, whenever ſimple nature did not work by *fear* and *love*, to avoid evil and to follow good, but inſtead of that to invent a *fantaſtic*, or a *diabolic* deity, the impediment was accidental, occa-

* Page 94, 95.

ſioned

ſioned by the intervention of ſome unhappy circumſtance foreign to the natural workings of the human mind.

REMARK XVII.

" It is remarked by Xenophon (ſays our Philoſopher) in praiſe " of Socrates, that that philoſopher aſſented not to the VULGAR " opinion, which ſuppoſed the Gods to know ſome things, and " be ignorant of others: He maintained that they knew every " thing, which was done, ſaid, or even thought. But this was " a ſtrain of philoſophy much above the conception of his coun- " trymen *."

This is pleaſant. It is but in the foregoing page he aſſures us, that not only the *Vulgar* of Greece, but the *Vulgar* of all the world, knew that their Gods *were ignorant of nothing*. His words are theſe. *If we conſider that ſpirit of praiſe and eulogy*, WHICH NECESSARILY HAS PLACE IN ALL RELIGIONS, *we ſhall find that every virtue, every excellence muſt be aſcribed to the divinity, and* NO EXAGGERATIONS BE ESTEEMED SUFFICIENT TO REACH THOSE PERFECTIONS, *with which he is endowed.* Now is not OMNISCIENCE a PERFECTION? And was not the ſpirit of exaggeration, which never thought it ſaid enough, able to reach the idea of *knowing all things?* How happened it then that this exaggerating mob of Religioniſts wanted a Socrates to tell them, that *the Gods not only knew ſome things, but all things?* But the man has got his readers, and he uſes them as they deſerve.

REMARK XVIII.

But now for a diſcovery indeed. " As men further EXALT " the idea of their divinity; it is often their NOTION OF HIS " POWER AND KNOWLEDGE ONLY, NOT OF HIS GOODNESS, which

* Page 96.

" is improved. On the contrary, in proportion to the ſuppoſed " extent of his ſcience and authority, their terrors naturally aug- " ment *."

This is hard. Common ſenſe ſeems to tell us ſo much of our common nature, that the *ſpirit of love*, which is ever *for exalting further and further the idea of* its object, is chiefly delighted in dwelling on the GOODNESS of that object: as *fear* is moſt converſant in the divine attributes of *power and knowledge*. But this ſublime Philoſopher has diſcovered, that both we and nature are miſtaken; and that, *as men further exalt the idea of their divinity, it is often their notion of power and knowledge, not of his goodneſs*, that is improved. And his kind reader might be diſpoſed perhaps to take his word, but that he ſees it contradicts, in expreſs terms, what he had ſaid but two or three pages before: Where he as magiſterially aſſures us, that *a ſpirit of praiſe and eulogy makes men aſcribe every virtue, every excellence to the Deity, and to* EXAGGERATE THEM ALL: Therefore, I ſhould ſuppoſe, GOODNESS, along with the reſt.

REMARK XIX.

After all theſe feats, he will now account how it happens that Religioniſts are ſo generally diſpoſed to prefer rites and poſitive inſtitutions to morality and natural duties. And the ſecret is revealed in this manner.

" Perhaps, the following account may be received as a true ſo- " lution of the difficulty. The duties, which a man performs " as a friend or parent, ſeem merely owing to his benefactor or " children, nor can he be wanting to theſe duties, without break- " ing through all the ties of nature and morality. A ſtrong incli- " nation may prompt him to the performance: A ſentiment of " order and moral beauty joins its force to theſe natural ties:

* Page 97,

" And

" And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty, " without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the " virtues, which are more auſtere, and more founded on reflec- " tion, ſuch as public ſpirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; " the moral obligation, in our apprehenſion, removes all pretence " to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is eſteemed no " more than what we owe to ſociety and to ourſelves. In all " this, a ſuperſtitious man finds nothing, which he has pro- " perly performed for the ſake of his deity, or which can pecu- " liarly recommend him to the divine favour and protection. He " conſiders not, that the moſt genuine method of ſerving the " divinity is by promoting the happineſs of his creatures. He " ſtill looks out for ſome more immediate ſervice of the Su- " preme Being, in order to allay thoſe terrors, with which he is " haunted *."

It is to be lamented that but juſt before he had proved all this fine reaſoning not worth a ruſh, where he confeſſes *that there are popular Religions, in which it is expreſsly declared that nothing but morality can gain the divine favour* †. For, if thoſe who prefer rites to moral duties, are yet taught by their Religion that *nothing but morality can gain the divine favour*, it is plain, his ſolution can have no place, which is, that ſuperſtitious men give that unjuſt preference, *becauſe they can find nothing in morality which can peculiarly recommend them to the divine favour*. Had he not therefore done better, as in the former inſtance of *the genius of Paganiſm*, to have ſtolen his ſolution? He has not boggled at greater matters. And a Philoſopher, who deſerves no quarter from him, might have ſaved his credit, and been pillaged with advantage.

" Next to the knowledge of one God, ſays this excellent " man, a clear knowledge of their duty was wanting to man- " kind. This part of knowledge, though cultivated with ſome " care by ſome of the Heathen philoſophers, yet got little footing

* Page 106, 107. † Page 104.

" amongſt the people. The prieſts made it not their buſineſs to " teach men virtue. If they were diligent in their obſervations " and ceremonies; punctual in their feaſts and ſolemnities, and " the tricks of religion; the holy tribe aſſured them, the Gods " were pleaſed, and they looked no farther. Few went to the " ſchools of the Philoſophers to be inſtructed in their duties, and " to know what was good and evil in their actions. *The Prieſts* " *ſold the better penny-worths, and therefore had all their cuſtom.* " *Luſtrations and proceſſions were much eaſier than a clean conſcience,* " *and a ſteady courſe of virtue; and an expiatory ſacrifice, that atoned* " *for the want of it, was much more convenient than a ſteady courſe* " *of virtue* *."

This is the ſolution of a philoſopher indeed; clear, ſimple, manly, rational, and ſtriking conviction in every word; unlike the refined and fantaſtic nonſenſe of a writer of Paradoxes.

But then don't imagine that our author was not aware of this ſolution. No, he deſpiſed it becauſe it was ſo reaſonable. For he thinks to obviate it by ſaying, " *That it is not ſatisfac-* " *tory to alledge that the practice of morality is more difficult than* " *that of ſuperſtition; and is therefore rejected* †." But how does he make out this point? Why, by giving us to underſtand *that the four Lents of the Muſcovites, and the auſterities of ſome Roman Catholics, appear more diſagreeable than* MEEKNESS AND BENEVOLENCE. Let him ſay, as Mr. Locke does, honeſtly—than a STEADY COURSE OF VIRTUE. And we ſhall better judge whether *theſe auſterities* be indeed more difficult than *ſuch* a morality.

REMARK XX.

Well, but he makes ample amends for the ſlight here ſhewn " of STEADY VIRTUE. For, as a ſupplement to his account of this myſterious phænomenon, " We may add, ſays he, that even

* Locke's Works, Vol. II. p. 575.

† Page 105.

" after

" after the commiſſion of crimes, there ariſe remorſes and ſecret " horrors, which give no reſt to the mind, but make it have re- " courſe to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its of- " fences. Whatever weakens or diſorders the internal frame pro- " motes the intereſts of ſuperſtition: AND NOTHING IS MORE DE- " STRUCTIVE TO THEM THAN A MANLY STEADY VIRTUE, which " either preſerves us from diſaſtrous melancholy accidents, or teaches " us to bear them *."

We may add, ſays he, That he may ſay ſafely whatever he pleaſes; who has a public to deal with ſo eaſily bubbled into the opinion of his being a philoſopher. Which makes me the more wonder at the trouble his friends gave him, of refining his *natural hiſtory* from the groſſer fæces of Atheiſm, before it was preſented to the world. But this public, it ſeems, was become a little ſqueamiſh, having been ſo lately overdoſed by the quackery of Bolingbroke.

NOTHING, ſays our Philoſopher, IS MORE DESTRUCTIVE TO THE INTEREST OF SUPERSTITION, THAN A MANLY STEADY VIRTUE: Which in plainer Engliſh is, " None will be ſo free " from Superſtition as the moſt hardened Rogue." For the fact, from which he deduces this propoſition, is this, *That after the commiſſion of crimes, there ariſe remorſes and ſecret horrors, which make men have recourſe to expiatory rites. Theſe remorſes*, BY WEAKENING AND DISORDERING THE INTERNAL FRAME, *promote ſuperſtition*. Now the contrary ſtate of this *internal frame* can be no other than ſuch as enables us to bear the retroſpect of our rogueries without *remorſe and horror*; this he calls *a manly ſteady Virtue*. Do I wrong him? Let his friends judge. Had he meant, by *manly ſteady Virtue*, what common moraliſts ſo call, he muſt have told us, that this *Virtue* produced in the offender, reparation of injuries and amendment of life; things, in reality, *moſt deſtructive to the intereſts of ſuperſtition*. Whereas the *manly ſteady Virtue*

* Page 109, 110.

of

of our Philoſopher does no more, by his own confeſſion, than *either preſerve us from diſaſtrous melancholy accidents* [i. e keep us from hanging ourſelves] *or teaches us to bear them* [i. e. to recall to memory our paſt crimes without remorſe]. And this, hardened roguery, and nothing but hardened roguery, is capable of atchieving. Or, will he, to ſave himſelf from this atrocious charge, ſay, that by a *manly ſteady Virtue* he meant ſuch a *Virtue* as *prevents* the commiſſion of crimes? This had been to the purpoſe. But let him then ſhew us how this meaning is to be gathered from his *expreſſion*. To ſay the leaſt, if, in exceſs of candour, one muſt ſuppoſe him to have *meant well*, no well-meaning philoſopher ever expreſſed himſelf ſo wretchedly.

REMARK XXI.

I have given a ſpecimen of his philoſophic virtues, his reaſoning, his conſiſtency, his knowledge, his truth, his candour, and his modeſty, as they promiſcuouſly appear in the NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION. I have hunted him from track to track. And now what thick cover, do You ſuppoſe, has he choſen to ſkreen himſelf from the public contempt? He takes ſhelter in the dark umbrage of SCEPTICISM. Theſe are his concluding words.

" The whole is a riddle, an ænigma, an inexplicable myſtery. " Doubt, uncertainty, ſuſpence of judgment, appear the only re- " ſult of our moſt accurate ſcrutiny, concerning this ſubject. " But ſuch is the frailty of human reaſon, and ſuch the irreſiſtible " contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could ſcarce " be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and oppoſing one ſpe- " cies of ſuperſtition to another, ſet them a quarrelling; while " we ourſelves, during their fury and contention, happily make " our eſcape, into THE CALM, THOUGH OBSCURE, REGIONS OF " PHILOSOPHY."

Thus,

Thus, we ſee, his laſt effort is to defend his *dogmatical* nonſenſe with *ſcepticiſm* ſtill more nonſenſical. Nor to this, neither, dares he truſt himſelf; but preſently meditates an *eſcape*, as he calls it, by ſetting the *Religioniſts a quarrelling:* without which, he frankly owns, that *deliberate doubt could ſcarce be upheld.* For the ſake of this beloved object, DELIBERATE DOUBT, there is no miſchief he is not ready to commit, even to the unhinging the national Religion, and unlooſing all the hold it has on the minds of the people. And all this for the ſelfiſh and unnatural luſt of *eſcaping* from right reaſon and common ſenſe, *into the calm, though obſcure regions of philoſophy.* But here we have earthed him; rolled up in the Scoria of a *dogmatiſt* and *Sceptic*, run down together. He has been long taken for a Philoſopher: and ſo perhaps he may be found—like Ariſtotle's ſtatue in the block,

" Then take him to develop, if you can,
" And hew the block off, and get out the Man."

BP. WARBURTON'S NOTES

ON

NEAL'S HISTORY OF THE PURITANS.

Extract from a Letter of the Biſhop of Glouceſter [Dr. Warburton] to me, Feb. 26, 1765. R. W.

" —*Neal's Hiſtory of the Puritans in Three Volumes, now in the Library at* " *Durham, which in one of my Reſidences I took home to my Houſe, and,* " *at Breakfaſt time, filled the Margins quite through; which I think to be* " *a full Confutation of all his falſe Facts and partial Repreſentations.*"

COPY OF REMARKS ON NEAL'S HISTORY,

BY

BISHOP WARBURTON,

ENTERED IN AN EDITION OF THAT WORK IN THE LIBRARY AT DURHAM.

NEAL'S HISTORY—OCTAVO—VOL. I.

V. I. Chap. iii. *YOU have the word, &c.* p. 89.

This is to lye, under the cover of truth. Can any body in his ſenſes believe that when the only contention between the two parties was, Who had the *word*; that the more powerful would yield it up to their adverſaries? Without all doubt, ſome Proteſtant member, in the heat of diſpute, ſaid, *We have the word*; upon which the Prolocutor inſultingly anſwers—But *we have the ſword*—without thinking any one would be ſo fooliſh as to join the two propoſitions into one, and then give it to the Prolocutor.

Ch. iv. p. 178. *Yet Fuller, &c. who had the liberty of perusing.*

But did he peruse them?

P. 186. *(Fox) had no preferment, &c.*

This is a mistake; for he was installed in the third prebendary of Durham, Oct. 14, 1572, *Pilkington* being then Bishop, who had much the same sentiments with Fox, but held it not long, Bellamy succeeding to the same stall, Oct. 31, 1573.

P. 191. *Because his* [*Bucer's*] *head was not square.*

I think his head was out of square.

P. 192. *The grand question*, "*Whether they should desert their ministry, or comply.*"

What then? must they needs be more in the right in this trifling question, than they were in that important one of religious liberty, in which the Author thinks, and truly, that they were all wrong?

Dr. Horn, &c.

and this was very consistent.

P. 194. *Till* [*the habits*] *are sent to Hell, &c.*

If they came from Hell, they certainly were not indifferent: But the Devil has better merchandize for souls, than this gear, pharisaical purity and spiritual pride.

Our first Reformers ascribed no holiness, &c.

Who ascribes any holiness or virtue to them now, I pray? *Decency*, indeed, they do, and that is enough to justify their use.

P. 231. "*Each party blamed the other.*"

The Church of England doubtless was right in exacting Conformity to their terms of Communion. Then it was, they became offenders, when they denied a toleration to these who would not accept their terms of Communion: for their refusal proceeding from an opinion (however weak and foolish), that the terms were sinful, they had a right to worship God in their own way; and the crime

of

of Schiſm, if they were guilty of it, they were to anſwer for to God only, who was the only judge how far the ſincerity of their erroneous conſcience rendered them excuſable.

P. 240. *Natural right, &c.*

With what face could the author ſpeak of the *natural right* every man has to judge for himſelf, as one of the heads of controverſy between the Puritans and Conformiſts, when his whole Hiſtory ſhews that this was a *truth* unknown to either party; and that, as the Conformiſts perſecuted becauſe they thought themſelves in the right, ſo the Puritans inſiſted on their Chriſtian liberty, becauſe they were in the right: not becauſe all ſects (whether in the right or wrong) have a title to it; in which foundation only true Chriſtian liberty riſes.

Ch. v. p. 243. "*Prove that.*"

They might eaſily have proved that every particular Church has this authority, becauſe it is of the eſſence of a religious ſociety, as ſuch; and when the ſtate unites with, and eſtabliſhes, any particular Church, *then* the civil Magiſtrate, as head of the Church, has this power.

P. 294. "*And it may have ſettled them.*"

Can there be a ſtronger proof than this, of Chriſt's not inſtituting a diſcipline for the Church, as Moſes did for the Synagogue, That he left the matter to particular Churches to inſtitute, ſuch as each thought moſt convenient?

Ch. vi. p. 365. *The Biſhop of London, &c.*

This is an unfair charge, which runs through the Hiſtory. The exacting conformity of the miniſtry of any Church by the Governors of that Church is no perſecution: Indeed, the doing more than ſimply expelling them from the Communion is ſo; much more the not permitting them to worſhip God in their own way, as a ſeparate ſect.—Whether the terms of Communion or Conformity were not too narrow, is another queſtion.

P. 369.

P. 369. *Mr. Stubbs' right hand, &c.*

This was infinitely more cruel than all the ears under Charles the Firſt; whether we conſider the puniſhment, the crime, or the man.

P. 369. *Jan.* 10. *The Commons voted, &c.*

If this was only a faſt for themſelves, there was nothing in it contrary to Law and Equity; but, if they enjoined it to be obſerved without doors, it was a violation of all order and good government, as well as law.

Ch. vi. p. 372. *Satyrical Pamphlets, &c.*

Without doubt, the puniſhment was much too ſevere for the offence: but a fair and impartial hiſtorian would have ſpoken in much ſeverer terms of ſuch ſatirical pamphlets as Martin Mar-Prelate, &c. &c. for theſe are the pamphlets he alludes to.

P. 374. *Men that act on principles, &c.*

It is juſt the ſame with men who act upon *paſſion and prejudice*, for the poet ſays truly,

" Obſtinacy's ne'er ſo ſtiff
" As when 'tis in a wrong belief."

P. 380. *Influence on the next generation, &c.*

It had, as is ſeen from the overthrow of the Conſtitution both in Church and State by the *generation ſo influenced.*

P. 381. *In defiance of the Laws, &c.*

Were the Jeſuits more faulty in acting in *defiance* of the Laws, than the Puritans? I think not—They had both the ſame plea, Conſcience; and both the ſame provocation, Perſecution.

P. 386. *The Biſhops will be a diſtinct, &c.*

The Puritans were even with them, and to the Jus divinum of *Epiſcopacy*, oppoſed the Jus divinum of *Preſbytery*, which was the making each other Anti-chriſtian.

P. 389.

P. 389. *It ſeemed a little hard, &c.*

That is, It is hard that the diſpenſers of poiſon ſhould be hanged for going on obſtinately in miſchief, becauſe He who compounded the poiſon was on his repentance pardoned. But thus does Party and Prejudice ſpeak on all occaſions.

Ch. vii. p. 405. "*Profeſſed reverence for the eſtabliſhed Church.*"

When the Puritans write againſt the Biſhops, p. 403, they call the *eſtabliſhed Church* an hierarchy, that never obtained till the approach of *Antichriſt*. Yet *here* to the Council profeſs to reverence *it*, and ſee no neceſſity of ſeparating from the unity of it.

P. 459. "*But now if the whole*," *&c.*

The very nature of the ſupremacy (placed in the ſovereign in a ſtate, where the legiſlative power is ſhared between the ſovereign and the ſtates) hath in time brought the ſupremacy to that *equitable* condition the author ſpeaks of.

P. 464. "*He erected a kind of Judicatory.*"

P. 396. The Archbiſhop publiſhes articles, which, becauſe they were not under the Great Seal, though by the Queen's direction, the author pronounces againſt law—becauſe *againſt* the Puritans. Here the Biſhop of Lichfield, without the Queen's direction, *erects a kind of Judicatory*, which he reckons to be agreeable to Law—becauſe in *favour* of the Puritans.

P. 466. "*The writer of Hooker's Life*," *&c.*

It was diſingenuous to quote the quaint traſh of a fantaſtical life-writer, as *He* knew the words, thus ſeparate, would be underſtood in a ſenſe the life-writer never meant, namely, that Mr. Hooker was only a tool or creature of the Archbiſhop: whereas that immortal man ſpoke no language but that of truth, and dictated by conſcience.

P. 470.

P. 470. " *Mr. Hooker concludes*," *&c.*

This anſwer of his is one of the greateſt maſter-pieces for purity and elegance of language, eloquence, and dignity of diſcourſe, clearneſs and ſtrength of reaſoning, that ever was written.

P. 481. This bill offered to the Houſe was ſuch an inſolent mutinous action in the Puritan miniſters, that one would wonder a writer of this author's good ſenſe could mention them without cenſure, much more that he ſhould do it with commendation. It was no wonder the Queen ſhould except from a general pardon men ſo ready to oppoſe authority. A bill for toleration for themſelves had been juſt and reaſonable, and perhaps, in the temper of the Houſe of Commons in their favour, they had ſucceeded—but a bill to eſtabliſh themſelves, and impoſe their diſcipline upon others, was an inſufferable inſolence. But it proceeded from that wretched principle, which the author would conceal in his friends, but is always ready, on every occaſion, to exclaim againſt in his adverſaries; namely, " that error is not to be tolerated, without the " guilt of partaking in other mens ſins."

P. 482. " *To prove his doctrine of Popery*," *&c.*

This is the general fault of controverſial Divines, and has been ſo in every age ſince the apoſtolic times. In combating one extreme, they run into another; and, while they are oppoſing their enemies on the right hand, give advantages to thoſe on their left. This is often the miſhap even of the more cautious, who are combating honeſtly for what they think the truth. Others, who are fighting only for their party, their reputation, and advancement, act like mere engineers, who never inquire whoſe ground it is they ſtand upon, while they are erecting a battery againſt their enemies.

P. 483. " *For relief*."

What relief? Toleration? No: An Eſtabliſhment. To this the Author would ſay, all they firſt wanted, was to be let alone and not perſecuted. Yes, but it was to bring in their diſcipline by degrees; 1ſt,

1ſt, to quarrel with ſurplices and ſquare caps, then to cavil at the Common Prayer, and laſtly to condemn Epiſcopacy. All this time, indeed, they were for continuing in the Church. But what was this, but aiming to eſtabliſh their diſcipline, on the ruins of the Epiſcopal Church? Had they, on their firſt perſecution, left the Church, we had ſeen all they deſired was toleration: but perſevering to continue in it to reform it, it is plain they wanted an Eſtabliſhment.

Ch. vii. p. 488. "*It has been eaſy at this time*," *&c.*

Was it not diſtreſſing the Government and the Hierarchy to revile them in the bittereſt language, on the eve of an invaſion from Spain, when the only ſecurity that Government had was the people's love, and conſequently attachment to Church and State? Did not theſe pamphlets abate the people's love and reverence for both, in which they were told that the Government was unjuſt and tyrannical; and the Hierarchy, Antichriſtian?

P. 491. "*They aſſumed no authority*," *&c.*

What is meant by this? They aſſumed no authority. Did not they expell from their ſociety all who would not obſerve their decrees? Yes. But they exerciſed no coercive power. How could they? This belongs only to the civil ſtate, and is derived from thence to the Eſtabliſhed Church only. Why, this is not what they would be at. They were for being the Eſtabliſhed Church. This is the reaſon why they were for *wiping off* the calumny of ſchiſm, by communicating, as they pretended, with the Church, which this author makes a matter of great merit in them.

P. 495. "*It will then follow*."

This is a very pitiful ſophiſm, as may be ſeen by only changing names. If *Prieſts* by God's ordinance are *ſuperior* Governors over the *Deacons*, it will follow that her Majeſty is not *ſupreme* Governor over the Deacons.

P. 496. "*But this is a quite different thing to ſay*," &c.

It is not a different thing, as Hooker has ſhewn, who has proved that a difference in the legiſlature makes no difference in the eſſence of things.

P. 498. "*Moſt of the Clergy*," &c.

This is moſt true. The great Hooker was not only againſt, but laid down principles that have entirely ſubverted it, and all pretences to a divine unalterable right in any form of Church Government whatſoever. Yet, ſtrange to ſay, his book was ſo unavoidable a Confutation of Puritanical principles, which by the way claimed their Preſbytery as of divine right, that the Churchmen took the advantage of the ſucceſſes of their Champion, and now began to claim a divine right for Epiſcopacy on the ſtrength of that very book, that ſubverted all pretences to every ſpecies of divine right whatſoever.

Ch. viii. p. 508. "*Mr. Udall*," &c.

This is unworthy a candid hiſtorian, or an honeſt man. Udall, we ſee, p. 519, did not *ſuffer death* (which in common Engliſh ſignifies dying by the hand of the executioner), but died in priſon; he ſays, indeed, heart-broken: but there is as much difference between an hiſtorian's pronouncing a man heart-broken, and actual breaking on a wheel, as between a prieſt's pronouncing an excommunicate damned, and actual damnation.

P. 574. *Remarks.*

In one part of theſe Remarks he appears not to have underſtood Hooker; in another, he draws conſequences which do not follow from Hooker's principles; and in the third he argues againſt Church power from the abuſe of it.

P. 575. "*Muſt I then*," &c.

He either miſtakes or miſrepreſents Hooker. What that great author affirms is this, that whoever is born in a Church where the true

true doctrine of Chriſt is taught and profeſſed, is obliged to ſubmit to thoſe laws of the ſociety, without which no ſociety can ſubſiſt. Juſt as he who is born in a civil ſociety, founded on the principles of natural liberty, is bound to ſubmit to thoſe laws of the ſociety, without which civil ſociety cannot ſubſiſt.

P. 575. "*But all thoſe of Rome.*"

How ſo? Does it follow, that, becauſe I have a right to the *uſe* of a power, I have a right to the *abuſe* of it? The Church of Rome, that of England, and every other Chriſtian Church of one denomination, may as a ſociety make laws of order and diſcipline. The Church of Rome abuſes this right—therefore the Church of England ſhall not uſe it.

P. 579. "*Blew up their liberties.*"

Blow up a fool's head. This proceeded from the natural perverſity of the populace, which will always oppoſe authority, when they can with ſafety, even though they deprive themſelves of all their other ſatisfactions.

P. 581. "*Articles.*"

I would fain know how theſe men could ſpeak worſe of the evil being himſelf. How deplorable are the infirmities of human nature! See here the feveriſh ſtate of a Puritanical conſcience. Theſe men could ſet Church and State in a flame for ſquare caps, ſurplices, and the croſs in baptiſm; while they ſwallowed, and even contended for, theſe horrible decrees; the frightful and diſordered dreams of a crude, ſour-tempered, perſecuting Bigot, who counter-works his Creator, and makes God after man's image, and chooſes the worſt model he can find, *himſelf*.

Ibid. The Puritans by Dr. Reynolds in the name of the Brethren at the Hampton Court conference, deſired that theſe godly articles might be inſerted among the Thirty-nine. See p. 15, 2d. vol.

P. 583. This went upon the true Puritan principle, that whatever was Popiſh was falſe.

P. 584. Their caſe was indeed more ſad than their hiſtorian intended to ſuggeſt. It was the common infirmity of Churchmen to perſecute, when in *power*; but to perſecute, as the Puritans here did, while under oppreſſion, ſhews the extreme depravity of the heart.

P. 584. "*Lambeth Articles.*"

There is ſomething very ſpiteful in this, not to be content to abuſe Lambeth for paſſing doctrines contrary to theirs, but to abuſe them for eſpouſing their favourite Decrees. But Lambeth, like Rome, can do nothing right.

P. 587. "*With Hypocrites.*"

Notwithſtanding this proteſtation, it appears as clear as the day from Harſnet's detection, that this affair was a vile impoſture, and as fairly charged on the Puritan Divines, as a like impoſture, carrying on at the ſame time, and detected by the ſame able writer, in the Popiſh quarter, was fairly chargeable on the maſs-prieſts.

P. 589. "*Of thoſe that have.*"

This weak ſpeech an able hiſtorian ſhould not have quoted, for the ſake of his party. They were indicted as acting againſt Law, not againſt the Goſpel; and the judge, if a good lawyer, was qualified to try them, let his knowledge in divinity be what it would—the reſt the legiſlature was to anſwer.

Ibid. "*The foundations of diſcipline.*"

i. e. Were not diſpoſed to overturn the Conſtitution of the Church. We ſee by this what was aimed at, an Eſtabliſhment, not a Toleration. There was too much pretence therefore to treat them as ſeditious ſubjects.

P. 594. "*Eraſtian Principles.*"

It is true that Eraſtus's famous book *De Excommunicatione* was purchaſed by Whitgift of Eraſtus's widow in Germany, and put by him to the preſs in London, under fictitious names of the place and

and printer. This Selden diſcovered, and has publiſhed the diſcovery in his book *De Synedriis*. Had the author known this, it had been a fine ornament to his Hiſtory.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME, 8vo. Ed. 1732, London.

PREFACE TO NEAL'S HISTORY OF THE PURITANS.

VOL. II. 8vo. LONDON, 1733.

P. x. "*To which it is expoſed.*"

The Author has here, and in his Preface to the former Volume, confounded together two things very diſtinct and different, *a Teſt* for the ſecurity of the Eſtabliſhment, and the *Sacramental* Teſt, enjoined for that purpoſe. I think a *Teſt* abſolutely neceſſary for the ſecurity of the Eſtabliſhed Religion, where there are diverſities of ſects in the State; and I think the Sacramental Teſt the very worſt that could have been choſen for that purpoſe, becauſe it is both evaded and prophaned.

P. xi. "*And penalties for not doing it.*"

Moſt certainly.

VOL. II. HISTORY.

Ch. i. p. 3. "*In the years* 1581 *and* 1590."

A fair hiſtorian would here have acquainted us with the villainous and tyrannical uſage of the Kirk of Scotland to their King, of which the Scotch hiſtorians of that time are full; and by which we ſhould have ſeen the high provocation they had given him, and how natural it was for him to return their uſage, when he had once emancipated himſelf from them: The King himſelf hints at this, p. 19.

P. 19. "*Pray let that alone.*"

Sancho Pancha never made a better ſpeech, nor more to the purpoſe, during his Government.

P. 78. "*Which he propheſyed.*"

How would the Hiſtorian have us underſtand this? As a true prophecy to be fullfilled, or a falſe prophet confuted?

Ch. ii. p. 101. "*No certain proof of it.*"

This is abominable. There was no proof at all. He was ſuſpected indeed to have been poiſoned, nobody knows by whom, becauſe no Prince dies untimely without that ſuſpicion.

P. 107. "*Received in their room.*"

It could never be a bad exchange which ſet aſide the nine horrid Articles of Lambeth.

Ibid. "*A national Reformation.*"

In other words, when the Puritans had long laboured in vain for an Eſtabliſhment, they would now be thankful for a Toleration. They had no juſt pretence to the firſt, and it was unjuſt to deny them the latter: But he who aſks too much is often in danger of loſing his *due*.

P. 115. "*Unexceptionable manner.*"

But our Hiſtorian forgets to tell us what Mr. Hales ſaid upon the ſum of things; i. e. when he had heared the great Epiſcopius make his celebrated defence, He, from that moment, bade John Calvin good night.

P. 118. "*Nothing here than Scripture, Reaſon, and Fathers.*"

This was ſaid ironically.

P. 120. "*Turned their taſk-maſters out of the kingdom.*"

Soon after they uſed their intereſt to this purpoſe, and I believe they began to uſe it as ſoon as ever they got it.

P. 121. "*Raiſed up by this treatiſe.*"

Where was the ſtorm, except in this fanciful author's ſtandiſh, when Selden taught the clergy to raiſe their parſonage-barns on the

the ſure foundation of Law; which before they had fooliſhly placed upon crutches, the feeble prop of an imaginary divine right?

P. 125. "*Two Religions eſtabliſhed by Law.*"

This is a miſtake, and the fancy of two eſtabliſhed Religions in one ſtate, an *abſurdity*. The caſe was this: part of the Bohemians before the Reformation held the neceſſity of communicating under both kinds; theſe were the Huſſites. This privilege was granted them; and theſe were called the *ſub utrâque*, and the reſt *ſub unâ*. But theſe were not two Religions, but one *only*—adminiſtering a ſingle rite differently. After the Reformation the Huſſites became Proteſtants, i. e. of a different Religion from the *ſub unâ* part: but then they were no longer an eſtabliſhed Church, but a tolerated one only.

P. 126. "*Rejoiced at this Providence.*"

Juſt ſuch a *providence* as the Long Parliament depriving Charles the Firſt of his Crown, and ſetting up a Republick.

P. 144. "*Loſt both his crown and life.*"

This is an utter calumny: a coalition of the two Churches was never in the King's thoughts; happy for him, if he never had worſe; what he aimed at, was arbitrary power. Had he given his Parliaments ſatisfaction in that point, he might have reduced the Puritans to a lower condition, than ever they were in, in the time of Elizabeth. The cry of *Popery* was the addreſs of thoſe who were only ſtruggling for *civil Liberty*, as believing (in which they were miſtaken) that the real danger of civil liberty was not of force enough to draw in the people to their ſide, without poſſeſſing them with fears from the imaginary danger of Popery.

P. 147. "*Harſnet.*"

Was a man of the greateſt learning and parts of his time.

P. 148.

P. 148. "*To the mother* * *than to the ſon* † *of God.*"

† *Of God*, ſhould be eraſed. The mother meant, was Buckingham's, who, being a violent Papiſt, and yet having the diſpoſal of preferments, gave Gondamer hopes of the re-eſtabliſhment of Popery by advancing its friends.

* This is a vile perverſion of facts. Gondamer's words were *more devotion to the mother, than the ſon*; meaning Buckingham's mother, who carried on the traffic of preferments for her ſon, and conſequently had a much greater levée. So this, we ſee, was a mere prophane joke of Gondamer's, ſpeaking of court corruption under the terms of Religion. Now here comes an *Hiſtorian*, who by adding the words, *of God*, makes Gondamer give teſtimony to the growth of Popery. But could he really believe that one Epiſcopal clergyman of this time ever prayed to the mother of God?

Ibid. "*Upon their principles.*"

If he means the *principles* which Laud followed in the adminiſtration of Church affairs, it is nothing to the purpoſe. If he means the principles Laud advanced in that conference, he knows not what he ſays; they were unanſwerable.

P. 149. "*Selden ſays of the clergy of theſe times.*"

Here is another of the hiſtorian's arts. Selden ſpeaks of the Puritan clergy: Yet by the terms here uſed the reader would naturally imagine that Selden ſpoke of the Epiſcopal clergy.

Ch. iii. p. 156. "*Attorney General Noy.*"

Could a fair hiſtorian have any more omitted telling his reader that NOY was a great Lawyer, than, if he ſpoke of Bacon, to acknowledge his great talents for Philoſophy?

P. 178. "*More likely, &c. reputation depended.*"

Too abſurd to be confuted. The circumſtance of ſending home the Queen's domeſticks might have ſhewn him the folly of his conjecture.

conjecture. Buckingham makes a war to diſguſt the Parliament, and ſends home the Queen's domeſticks to *pleaſe* them.

P. 185. "*Acceſſary to all the abominations of Popery.*"

From ſo ſilly a ſophiſm, ſo gravely delivered, I conclude, *Uſher* was not that great man, he has been repreſented.

Ch. iv. p. 209. "*And reverend aſpect.*"

Here the Hiſtorian was much at a loſs for his Confeſſor's good qualities, while he is forced to take up with his *grave and reverend aſpect.*

P. 232. "*Should be cancelled.*"

Had Laud done nothing worſe, than to proſecute this factious and illegal ſcheme, he might have paſſed both for a good ſubject and a prudent Prelate.

Ch. v. p. 257. "*Filled with ſo much learning,*" *&c.*

It is written alſo with much wit and humour, which Lord Clarendon calls *Levity.* It might be ſo in a ſubject of importance: but on ſo trifling a queſtion, wit and humour was in its place. But is it not ſomething odd, that this hiſtorian ſhould repreſent it as a trifling queſtion, after he had made ſurplices, hoods, and ſquare caps, a matter of ſuch importance, that the whole kingdom was to be ſet in a flame, rather than to comply with them?

P. 272. "*That God would forgive Queen Elizabeth her ſins.*"

This is an unfair repreſentation—They were the ſins of perſecuting the holy Diſcipline which he prayed for the remiſſion of; and *that* reflecting on her adminiſtration was the thing which gave offence.

P. 289. "*I can do no more.*"

Had he been content to do nothing, the Church had ſtood. Suppoſe him to have been an honeſt man and ſincere, which I think muſt be granted, it will follow that he knew nothing of the Con-

ſtitution either of civil or religious ſociety; and was as poor a Churchman as he was a Politician.

P. 290. "*Awakening Preachers—wild notes.*"

i. e. A mad fanatic, who will always draw the people after him. We have at preſent of theſe bull-finches without number, and their wild notes are as awakening as ever.

P. 295. "*Bp. Williams retired to his Dioceſe.*"

This proſecution muſt needs give every one a very bad idea of Laud's heart and temper. You might reſolve his high acts of power in the ſtate into reverence and gratitude to his maſter; his tyranny in the Church to his zeal for, and love of, what he called Religion: but the outrageous proſecution of theſe two men can be reſolved into nothing, but envy and revenge: and actions like theſe they were which occaſioned all that bitter, but indeed juſt exclamation againſt the Biſhops in the ſpeeches of Lord Falkland and Lord Digby.

P. 303. "*Franciſcus de Clará.*"

His real name was Chriſtopher Davenport. He publiſhed an expoſition of the Thirty-nine Articles in the moſt favourable ſenſe. But it pleaſed not either party. It was put into the Index Expurgatorius by the Spaniſh inquiſition, and would have been condemned at Rome, had not the King and Archbiſhop Laud preſſed Penzani, the Pope's Agent in London, to ſtop the proſecution. *Popiſh Ch. Hiſt. V. III. p.* 104, *in V. Div.*

Ch. vi. p. 387. "*Bp. Hatfield's tomb, which had been erected* 25 "*years.*"

250 it ſhould have been.

Ch. viii. p. 429. "*More a jingle of words than ſtrength of ar-* "*gument.*"

If Grimſtone's argument be a jingle of words, as the Hiſtorian confeſſes, how ſhould Selden's, which was delivered to expoſe the other,

other, be a jingle of words too? Every one ſees it is a thorough confutation. And whenever a jingle of words is deſignedly ſet in a light to be expoſed, by making an argument out of them of the ſame form, they are no longer a jingle of words, but a conveyance of ſenſe. The truth is, as to Grimſtone's argument, the fallacy lies here, in ſuppoſing every thing of the Jus Divinum was queſtionable in a Biſhop, and out of queſtion in an Archbiſhop; whereas they both had in them the Jus Divinum of Preſbyters; and therefore, as ſuper-intendants of other Preſbyters, they might ſuſpend them. The fallacy of Selden's reply lies in this, that it ſuppoſes that Convocations and Parliaments meddle with any thing in Religion, which is *jure divino*; when they do not; but thoſe things that are *jure humano*, as is every thing relating to Government and diſcipline.

P. 431. "*Archives of Oxford.*"

If this were worth notice, the Hiſtorian ſhould have added that Bradſhaw's broad-brimmed hat is to be met with in the ſame place.

P. 434. "*Goodman himſelf was not executed.*"

Whoſe fault was this? He was remitted to the pleaſure of the Houſe, and they would not order his execution. The truth of the matter was this: each party was deſirous of throwing the odium of Goodman's execution on the other; ſo between both the man eſcaped. In the mean time how prejudiced is the repreſentation of our Hiſtorian!

P. 436. "*A right to do by virtue of a clauſe.*"

To talk of the Legiſlature's having a right to do a thing by virtue of a clauſe in an Act of Parliament, is nonſenſe. The Legiſlature which makes the Act, is ſuppoſed never to die. So it is juſt the ſame as to ſay the Judge has a right to interpret the Law, by virtue of his own declaration affirming he had that right. So that if an attainder was a thing agreeable to natural juſtice, the

Legiſlature needed no clauſe to enable them to paſs it; if it was not agreeable to natural juſtice, no clauſe or declaration of their own could make it ſo.

Ch. ix. p. 438. "*This* [Lord Strafford's] *Letter was but a feint.*"

It is affirmed by Carte (in his Life of the Earl of Ormond, and with ſome ſhew of reaſon), that this was a forged Letter, to induce the King's conſent.

Ch. x. p. 504. "*But though the King,*" *&c.*

Theſe inſinuations againſt the King are certainly very unjuſt and groundleſs.

P. 505. "*That the Engliſh Court admitted,*" *&c.*

If he meant by the Engliſh Court, the King, he is ſcandalouſly uncharitable.

P. 510. "*That the King was willingly ignorant,*" *&c.*

This is a villainous accuſation, deſtitute of all proof and likelihood. The poor King had follies and crimes of ſtate enough to anſwer for, without loading him with ſo injurious and groundleſs a calumny. As to the favour the King afterwards ſhewed the Iriſh rebels, and his entry into treaty with them, it was in his diſtreſſes to recruit his army, to make head againſt the overbearing power of the Parliament; in which he acted as became one in his ſtation, though it was fooliſh and unmanly in him to deny it.

P. 512. "*At the motion of Lord Digby.*"

Why are we told this but to miſlead us? A year ago, before the King had made full ſatisfaction for his miſgovernment, ſuch a Remonſtrance was ſeaſonable: now he had made full ſatisfaction, it was factious and ſeditious. And that their very purpoſe was not to ſecure what they had got for the ſervice of the old Conſtitution, but to pave the way for a *new*, was plain from their printing and publiſhing their Remonſtrance, before the King could prepare his anſwer.

P. 512. "*When the proſpect of an agreement*," *&c.*

i. e. When this unhappy accident afforded the demagogues in Parliament an opportunity of widening the breach between the King and Parliament. Otherwiſe this was a natural means for their uniting more firmly than ever.

P. 527. "*Not that the Houſe can be charged*, *&c.* for the very "next day."

The notorious falſhood of this aſſertion cannot better be expoſed, or ſhewn in a more contemptible light, than by the reaſon given of the aſſertion; *for the very next day*, *&c.* They have been charged by all mankind with encouraging the tumults; but nobody ever charged them with *avowing publickly*, that they did encourage them: and this is all that their precious Hiſtorian clears them of, by his *for the very next day*.

P. 532. "*Null without the Peers*."

Fooliſh—On the hypotheſis (though a falſe one) there are three eſtates, Lords Spiritual, and Temporal, and Commons. Two of them ſit in one Houſe, and compoſe one body: the third ſit in one Houſe, and compoſe another body. The Lords Spiritual are excluded; they remonſtrate, and ſay, a force being put upon a part of that body, the acts of the other part are void. This is good reaſoning on the hypotheſis. But the hypotheſis is falſe. The Biſhops do not make a diſtinct eſtate, but are part of the general Baronage which compoſes the Houſe of Lords. However, our Hiſtorian reaſons on the hypotheſis, and ſays, that the Commons might as well pretend that the Lords proceedings were void without them, as that the Biſhops ſhould pretend ſo. What, do the Commons, like the Biſhops, make up one body with the Lords, on which the Biſhops argument is founded? Do they not ſit and act as a diſtinct body? *Riſum teneatis?*

P. 532.

P. 532. "*Occaſion the diſſolution of the Parliament.*"

If the King hoped ſo, he was fit for Bedlam too: but every body, but theſe poor-ſpirited Hiſtorians, ſee, that all the King could poſſibly hope from it, was, the getting the Biſhops reſtored to their right.

P. 534. "*Becauſe by the ſame rule.*"

That is to ſay, by the ſame rule that I pluck out a rotten tooth, I may pull out the whole ſet. This is only ſaid to expoſe the Hiſtorian's fooliſh reaſoning. As to the action itſelf, it was the moſt unparalleled folly that ever was committed.

P. 535. "*Mr. Echard with great probability,*" *&c.*

A charge againſt the Papiſts has always great probability with this Hiſtorian. It is a known uncontroverted fact that the advice was Digby's; nay the Hiſtorian confirms it by obſerving, that on its ill ſucceſs Digby immediately withdrew out of the Kingdom. Yet in the ſame breath he tells us, it is more probable it was a project of the Queen and her cabal of Papiſts; and this on the authority of that poor ſcribler, *Echard.* They neither of them knew that at this time the Queen was almoſt frightened out of her wits, for fear of an impeachment; was actually projecting her eſcape; and was incapable of any vigorous counſel, intent only on her own ſafety: to effect which, ſhe gave up Strafford to the ſlaughter, by that poor and ungrateful poſtſcript ſhe perſuaded the King to add to his letter to the Lords.

P. 536. "*To leave Whitehall.*"

When a man runs away from his own houſe, it is a plain proof, I think, that he could ſtay no longer in it with ſafety. It is confeſſed the people were on the ſide of the Parliament. In ſuch a ſituation we ſee how commodious it was for that body to pretend fears; it was the attaching the people more cloſely to them. But for the King, in this ſituation, to pretend fears, was acting

acting the part of an idiot; for as all love of Majesty was gone, and the people restrained only by the apprehensions of its power, for the King to shew by pretended fear that he had no power was removing the only barrier to their rage and insult. We must needs conclude therefore that the King's were real, and not pretended.

P. 540. "*The hand of God was against them*," &c.

The Puritans have a strange kind of logic. A seat in the civil Legislature for the Bishops the Puritans deemed an abuse. They are now deprived of their seat, which, in the sense of the Puritans, was bringing them nearer to the primitive standard. Yet this blessing (for such an one it was, if it brought them nearer to the practice of the purest times) must be reckoned, by these very Puritans, the hand of God in judgment for their sins. A Puritan gossip met a Churchwoman, her neighbour, one morning in the streets of Exeter. Heark you, neighbour, says the first, do you hear the news? Merchant such an one is a bankrupt, and Merchant such an one, the Churchman, loses ten thousand pounds by the break: there is God's judgment for *You*; the Merchant was ever a great scoffer at the Conventicle. And is this all you have heard? said the other. Yes.—Why then you have heard but half the news. Mercer such an one of *your* religion has lost fifteen hundred pounds by this break. I must confess, replied the first, a severe trial.

Ch. xi. p. 544. "*Resolutions of the Councils at Windsor, I leave* "*with the Reader*."

The judicious reader will laugh at our Historian for referring this question to his determination. The Parliament was not now acting on the principles of Grotius' book *De Jure*, but on those of Machiavel's, called *the Prince*, where every thing is just, that is profitable.

P. 550. "*The whole controversy*."

It is very evident, these suppositions (demonstrable as they are) this impartial Historian is by no means willing we should mak[illegible] by

his illuſory expreſſion in the firſt of them, where he ſays, *the King left his Parliament, and would act no longer in concert with them.* If by *leaving* he means deſerting, as he would have the reader underſtand it, it is falſe: and if, by *not acting in concert*, he means that he refuſed doing his part in the Legiſlature, that is falſe likewiſe. If by leaving, he only meant removing from them to a diſtance, the King had reaſon; He was drove away by the tumults. If by not acting in concert, he meant not doing every thing the Parliament commanded, the King had reaſon here, too; for they would have ſtripped him of his whole Prerogative.

P. 551. "*In the opinion of the Lords and Commons.*"

Here is ſome miſtake. The Hiſtorian is here appealing to his reader's opinion (not the opinion of the Lords and Commons), and telling us what concluſions the reader ſhould make from his own opinions. So, if the reader *thinks the conſtitution was entire, that the laws were ſufficient to ſecure us againſt Popery and Slavery*, he was to conclude the King's arguments ſtrong. But if the two Houſes declared that the King had deſerted them, &c. what then? Why then we are to conclude that the two Houſes are in the right: not the more for their declaration, I promiſe you. But ſuch a reaſoner is this Hiſtorian. He does not know how to ſtate the oppoſite parts of his propoſition.

P. 567. "*His Majeſty had his ambiguities.*"

Here was no ambiguity. The King underſtood by *foreign aids* what certainly the Parliament meant, *foreign troops.* Are arms and ammunition, bought with the crown jewels of England, what in Engliſh we ſignify by the words, *foreign aids?* But now there is neither end nor meaſure to this Hiſtorian's prejudices and falſe repreſentations.

P. 569. "*And feeling apprehenſion.*"

The truth is, theſe poor people *felt*, as Sancho Pancha *ſaw*, by hearſay. The pulpit incendiaries had uſurped all the people's faculties, and aſſumed the right of judging for them.

P. 583.

P. 583. " *Power of the Keys to themſelves.*"

And wiſely too. They had ſeen this power impiouſly abuſed by the Prelates; and they had no inclination to ſee a Prelate in every pariſh, more imperious, more cruel, and more ignorant, than the very worſt of Laud's biſhops. However, throughout the whole uſurpation, the Preſbyterian was the *eſtabliſhed* Religion to all intents and purpoſes.

P. 586. " *Deſerted the Houſe of Commons*," *&c.*

When a man is liſted into a party, you may always know him by his badge. Speaking of thoſe who left the Houſe of Commons and retired to the King, NEAL always uſes the party-word *deſerted*, which implies the betraying their truſt. So indeed the Parliament called it; but an Hiſtorian's uſing it is taking for granted the thing in diſpute; namely, whether leaving the Houſe at this time, and going to the King, was betraying their truſt or preſerving their *allegiance*. I conſider the author here, (as you ſee, by the defence of himſelf in his *Review*, he would be conſidered, nay complains of his adverſary for not conſidering them, that is to ſay) as an *Hiſtorian*, not as a *Puritan*. See p. 5. of the *Review*.

P. 588. " *Maſſacre of Ireland.*"

What *ſenſe* is there in this compariſon, if you do not ſuppoſe the author to inſinuate, that in the civil war in England, as in the maſſacre of Ireland, all the Proteſtant blood was ſhed on one ſide, and unjuſtly and cruelly? and what *honeſty* is there in the compariſon, if you do?

P. 596. " *Parliament had the better men?*"

To all theſe teſtimonies I think it ſufficient to oppoſe that of Oliver Cromwell, in his ſpeech to his Parliament, who ſpeaks of it to them by way of appeal as a thing they very well knew, That the Preſbyterian armies of the Parliament, before the ſelf-denying ordinance, were chiefly made up of *decayed ſerving-men, broken Tap-*

ſters, and men without any ſenſe of religion: and that it was his buſineſs to inſpire *that ſpirit of religion* into his troops on the reform, to oppoſe to the principles of honour in the King's troops, made up of gentlemen. And Oliver was a man who underſtood what he ſaid, and knew what he did: It is true, *Fanaticiſm* was called Religion by Oliver, juſt as *Cant* is called Religion by our Hiſtorian.

P. 597. "*Great ſcarcity of preachers of a learned education.*"

This ſure is no compliment to the *good old cauſe*, to have the learned againſt it. But, to make amends for want of acquired knowledge, they abounded in inſpired.

P. 600. "*Comparing the learning of the Puritan Divines*," &c.

Our hiſtorian had owned juſt before, p. 597, that there were but few among them of a learned education. He had better have ſtuck to his word. Selden, Lightfoot, Cudworth, Pococke, Whichcot, &c. can with no propriety be called of the *party*: the moſt that can be ſaid of them is, that they ſubmitted to *the power*.

P. 615. "*In which the kingdom is inflamed.*"

I believe all parties are agreed that if a miſtaken King, of *good faith*, had made that full reparation for his miſconduct, which Charles the Firſt did, before the having recourſe to arms, the Parliament ought to have acquieſced in peace with what they had got for the people. But Charles was a man of *ill faith*; and thence another queſtion ariſes, Whether he was to be truſted? But here we muſt begin to diſtinguiſh. It was one thing, whether thoſe particulars, who had perſonally offended the King, in the manner by which they extorted this amends from him; and *another*, whether the publick, on all the principles of civil government, ought not to have ſate down ſatisfied.—I think particulars could not ſafely take his word; and that the publick could not honeſtly refuſe it. You will ſay then, the leaders in Parliament were juſtified in their miſtruſt. Here, again, we muſt diſtinguiſh. Had they been private

private *men* only, we ſhould not diſpute it. But they bore another character; they were *Repreſentatives* of the publick, and ſhould therefore have acted in that capacity.

NOTES ON NEAL'S HISTORY OF THE PURITANS.

Vol. III. 8vo. London, 1736.

REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL FACTS IN THE FIRST VOLUME.

P. 5. "*Dreſs up Mr. Neal in the habit of a Puritan.*"

An atrocious injury, without doubt! Mr. Neal is only an Hiſtorian. It puts one in mind of the trumpeter, who, being ſeized by his enemy in the rout of his own party, cried out for mercy, as being only a *trumpeter*. The more rogue you, cried the honeſt veteran, who ſet other people together by the ears, and will not fight yourſelf!

APPENDIX.

P. 83. "*With writers of theſe times.*"

The Author of the Vindication having been a Diſſenter.

PREFACE TO THIRD VOLUME.

P. vii. "*This obſcure clergyman.*"

This is a very juſt reproof.

Ch. ii. p. 62. "*More decency and reſpect.*"

Without doubt he would.—He had infinitely more eſteem for the learning of the *Epiſcopal* Clergy, though perhaps no more love for their perſons.

P. 80. " *Religious part of the nation.*"

i. e. the Puritan, for Puritaniſm and Religion are convertible terms with this Hiſtorian.

Ibid. " *Though it appears.*"

Why for this very reaſon it was not to be juſtified, becauſe it was a force upon the conſcience of theſe *Epiſcopal Divines of greateſt figure.*

P. 93. " *From Geneva.*"

Deodati, the Prince of Divinity there, returned a very temperate anſwer, no way inconſiſtent with the re-eſtabliſhment of Epiſcopacy. W. Hayes, MS. in Library, N° 28, M. G. Claſs.

P. 102. " *The intereſt of Dr. Cheynel.*"

Cheynel's villainous book, wherein he gives an account of his treatment of Chillingworth, is yet extant; and it confirms Lord Clarendon's accuſation. Locke read it, and ſpeaks of it in the harſheſt terms, but not more ſeverely than it deſerves.

Ch. iii. p. 107. " *Baſe and mutinous motion.*"

There is no circumſtance that bears harder on the King's conduct than this. It is not to be conceived that theſe men, who hazarded all to ſupport the King's right, could adviſe him to any thing *baſe* in a mutinous manner. I doubt therefore that this is too ſtrong a proof that nothing leſs than arbitrary government would heartily ſatisfy him.

Ch. iv. p. 164. " *Not inconſiſtent with public peace.*"

What! is not the declaiming againſt human literature, crying down magiſtracy, talking of a fifth-monarchy, inconſiſtent with the public peace?

P. 166. " *My wiſhes are.*"

It is apparent, from many circumſtances in the young man's conduct, that he had his eye upon the crown, matters being gone too far for the King and Parliament ever to agree.

Ch. v.

Ch. v. p. 247. "*More a man of buſineſs than letters.*"

Juſt the contrary. He did not underſtand buſineſs at all, as fully appears from the Hiſtorian's account of his civil adminiſtration, and was a great maſter of religious controverſy.

P. 253. "*Admirable argument to induce the Prince to put the "ſword into the King's hands.*"

This is a fooliſh declamation. The ſubject here was Ireland, not the militia. The King is charged with breaking his promiſe to leave the Iriſh war to the Parliament. His anſwer is to this effect, and I think very pertinent—"It is true, I made this promiſe, "but it was when the Parliament was my friend, not my enemy. "They might be then intruſted with my quarrel; but it would "be madneſs to think they now can. To prevent therefore their "making a treaty with the Iriſh, and in their diſtreſſes bringing "over the troops againſt me, I have treated with them, and have "brought over the troops againſt *them*." This was ſpeaking like a wiſe and able Prince.

P. 258. "*Epiſcopacy jure divino.*"

The Marquis of Hertford ſeems to have read Hooker to more advantage, than the King his Maſter; who fancied that great man contended for the jus divinum of Epiſcopacy in his E. P. in which he has been followed by many Divines ſince.

P. 263. "*Were not theſe reaſonable requeſts.*"

The Hiſtorian miſtakes Lord Clarendon, who is not here telling us, what the Parliament were able, but only what they were willing to do. Their hands were tied, not by the Scotch *Covenant*, but by the Scotch aſſiſtance, which they could not keep without adhering to the Covenant.

P. 265. "*His Majeſty's ſenile attachment to her imperious dictates.*"

Never was the obſervation, of the King's unhappy attachment, made in a worſe place. His *honour* required him not to give up his

his friends; and his *religion*, viz. the true principles of Chriſtianity, to take off the penal laws from peaceable Papiſts; and common humanity called upon him to favour thoſe who had ſerved him at the hazard of their lives and fortunes.

Ch. v. p. 266. "*The Earl by his Majeſty's Commiſſion yielded*," &c.

The Earl exceeded his Commiſſion, which is known to every body.

Ch. vi. p. 270. "*Taking themſelves to an eaſier and quieter life.*"

I don't know what any one could ſay worſe of theſe pretended Miniſters of Chriſt, the Puritans, than what is here confeſſed. They ſet out in the office of trumpeters of rebellion, being chaplains to the Regiments of Eſſex's army. As ſoon as they had gained their end, which was diſpoſſeſſing the Epiſcopal beneficed clergy, they neſted themſelves in their warm Parſonages, and left the Parliament ſoldiers a prey to thoſe they themſelves moſt hated, the independent fanatic lay preachers.

Ch. vii. p. 360. "*An unjuſt and malicious aſperſion.*"

The Hiſtorian, before he ſaid this, ſhould have ſeen whether he could anſwer theſe two queſtions in the affirmative.—Would the Engliſh have paid the arrears without the perſon of the King?—Would the Scots have given up the King, if they could have had the arrears, without?

Ch. viii. p. 408. "*Not only abandoned and renounced theſe ſe-*
"*nile doctrines, but have*," &c.

To know whether the Preſbyterians have indeed *abandoned* their perſecuting principles, we ſhould ſee them under an eſtabliſhment. It is no wonder that a *tolerated* ſect ſhould eſpouſe thoſe principles of Chriſtian liberty, which ſupport their Toleration. Now the Scotiſh Preſbyterians are *eſtabliſhed*, and we find they ſtill adhere to the old principle of *intolerance*.

Ch. x.

Ch. x. p. 493. "*Selden.*"

What has Selden here to do with Miniſters, Puritans, and Perſecutors?

P. 495. "*Keep a weekly faſt.*"

Theſe were glorious Saints, that fought and preached for the King's deſtruction; and then faſted and prayed for his preſervation, when they had brought him to the foot of the Scaffold.

P. 497. "*And not being willing to apply,*" *&c.*

They had applied to the Protector, and received ſuch an anſwer as they deſerved. A deputation of the London Divines went to him to complain, that the Cavalier Epiſcopal Clergy got their congregations from them, and debauched the faithful from their miniſters. Have they ſo? ſaid the Protector: I will take an order with them; and made a motion, as *if* he was going to ſay ſomething to the Captain of the Guards; when turning ſhort, But hold, ſaid he, after *what manner* do the Cavaliers debauch your people? By preaching, replied the miniſters. Then preach BACK again, ſaid this able ſtateſman; and left them to their own reflections.

P. 527. "*And virtuous morals.*"

How could he ſay that theſe officers, who, he owns, were high enthuſiaſts, were yet men of ſober and virtuous morals, when they all acted (as almoſt all enthuſiaſts do) on this maxim, That the end *ſanctifies the means*, and that the elect (of which number they reckoned themſelves chief) are above ordinances?

P. 530. "*Publiſhed a Proteſtation.*"

And yet theſe very ſecluded members had voted the Biſhops guilty of high treaſon for proteſting in the ſame manner, when under the like force.

Ibid. "*Oliver Cromwell was in doubt.*"

And this Hiſtorian indeed ſo ſimple as to think *Oliver Cromwell* was really in doubt?

P. 545.

P. 545. "*As ſtrong and convincing as any thing of this nature "poſſibly can be.*"

There is full as ſtrong evidence on the other ſide; all of which this honeſt Hiſtorian conceals—evidence of the King's bed-chamber, who ſwear they ſaw the progreſs of it—ſaw the King write it—heard him ſpeak of it as his—and tranſcribed parts of it for him. It appears by the wretched falſe taſte of compoſition in Gauden's other writings, and by his unchaſte language, that he was utterly incapable of writing this book. Again, conſider what credit was to be given to Gauden's aſſertion of his authorſhip. He confeſſes himſelf a falſary and an impoſtor, who impoſed a ſpurious book on the publick in the King's name. Was not a man ſo ſhameleſs, capable of telling this lye for a Biſhoprick, which he was ſoliciting on the pretended merit of this work? As to *Walker*, it is agreed that Gauden told him that He (Gauden) was the author of the book, and that he ſaw it in Gauden's hand-writing; which is well accounted for by a ſervant, a tithe-gatherer of Gauden, who ſwears that Gauden borrowed the book of one of the King's friends (to whom it was communicated by the King for their judgments) to tranſcribe; that he [Gauden] ſat up all night to tranſcribe it, and that He [the tithe-gatherer] ſat up with him to ſnuff his candles, and mend his fire. It is agreed that Charles II. and the Duke of York believed, on the word of Gauden, when he ſolicited his reward, that He [Gauden] wrote it. But then this forwarded their prejudices: and what they believed, Lord Clarendon would believe too. On the whole, it is ſo far from being certain, as this Hiſtorian pretends, that the book is ſpurious, that it is the moſt uncertain matter I ever took the pains to examine. There is ſtrong evidence on both ſides; but I think the ſtrongeſt and moſt unexceptionable is on *that* which gives it to the King.

P. 549. "*This unrighteous charge.*"

The Preſbyterians ſubdued and impriſoned the King. This is agreed on all hands. Then the Independents, getting uppermoſt, took

took the King from them, and were determined to murder him. They would have had the Preſbyterians join with them in this murder, of which they [the Independents] were to have all the profit, and the Preſbyterians only a ſhare in the odium. Beſides, they mortally hated the Independents for oppoſing their two darling points, the *Divine Right of Preſbytery*, and the *uſe of force in religious matters*. Was it likely that in theſe circumſtances the Preſbyterians ſhould join with the Independents in the odious project? And had they not a wonderful deal of merit in oppoſing it? But had theſe Independents been ready to ſet up their idol of Preſbytery, and on their own terms, on condition of joining with them in the murder; I *aſk* then, whether it is likely they would have ſtood out? Thoſe who have read only *this hiſtory* of them, will have little reaſon to think they would. Thoſe who were capable of puniſhing Arians with death, were capable of doing any wickedneſs for the *cauſe of God*.

P. 551. "*Who had the greateſt hand in it of all.*"

There is doubtleſs a great deal of truth in all this. *No party of men*, as *a religious body*, further than as they were united by one common enthuſiaſm, were the *actors in this tragedy*, (ſee what Burnet ſays below). But who prepared the entertainment, and was at the expence of the exhibition, is another queſtion.

A

LETTER

FROM

AN AUTHOR,

TO

A MEMBER of PARLIAMENT,

CONCERNING

LITERARY PROPERTY.

MDCCXLVII.

A

LETTER*

FROM

AN AUTHOR,

TO

A MEMBER of PARLIAMENT.

SIR,

IT ſeemeth, to me, an odd Circumſtance, that, amidſt the juſteſt and ſafeſt Eſtabliſhment of PROPERTY, which the beſt Form of Government is capable of procuring, there ſhould yet be one Species of it belonging to an Order of Men, who have been generally eſteemed the greateſt Ornament, and, certainly, are not the leaſt Support of Civil Policy, to which little or no Regard hath been hitherto paid. I mean, the *Right of Property* in AUTHORS to their *Works*. And ſurely if there be *Degrees of Right*, that of *Authors* ſeemeth to have the Advantage over moſt others; their Property being, in the trueſt Senſe, their *own*, as acquired by a long and painful Exerciſe of that very Faculty which denominateth us MEN: And if there be *Degrees of Security* for its Enjoyment, here again they appear to have the faireſt claim, as *Fortune* hath been long in Confederacy with *Ignorance*, to ſtop up their Way to every other kind of Acquiſition.

* The following information, communicated by a friend, may be acceptable to the reader. R. W.

"The queſtion, diſcuſſed in this Letter, came afterwards before the Court of King's Bench in the caſe of Millar *verſus* Taylor: And, on Feb. 7, 1769, That Court gave Judgment in favour of the perpetual and excluſive right of an Author, by the Common Law, to print and publiſh his own Works. The queſtion was revived in the caſe of Donaldſon *verſus* Becket; which came before the Court of Chancery. The Lord Chancellor decreed in conformity to the opinion of the Court of King's Bench. But upon an appeal from this decree, it was reverſed by the Houſe of Lords on the 22d of February, 1774."

Hiſtory

Hiſtory indeed informeth us, that there was a Time, when Men in public Stations thought it the Duty of their Office to encourage Letters: And when thoſe Rewards, which the Wiſdom of the Legiſlature had eſtabliſhed for the Learned in that Profeſſion deemed more immediately uſeful to Society, were carefully diſtributed amongſt the moſt deſerving. While this Syſtem laſted, *Authors* had the leſs Occaſion to be anxious about Literary Property: Which was, perhaps, the Reaſon why the Settlement of it was ſo long neglected, that at length it became a Queſtion, whether they had any Property at all.

But this fond Regard to Learning being only an Indulgence to its infant Age; a Favour, which, in theſe happy Times of its Maturity, many Reaſons of State have induced the public Wiſdom to withdraw; *Letters* are now left, like *Virtue*, to be their own Reward. We may ſurely then be permitted to expect that ſo ſlender a Pittance ſhould, at leaſt, be well ſecured from Rapine and Depredation.

Yet ſo great is the vulgar Prejudice, againſt an *Author's* Property, that when, at any time, Attempts have been made to ſupport it, againſt the moſt flagrant Acts of Robbery and Injuſtice, it was never thought prudent to demand the public Protection as a *Right*, but to ſupplicate it as a *Grace:* And this, too, in order to engage a favourable Attention, conveyed under every inſinuating Circumſtance of Addreſs; ſuch as promoting the Paper Manufactory at Home; or augmenting the Revenue, by that which is imported from Abroad.

The Grounds of this Prejudice are various. It hath been partly owing to the Complaints of unſucceſsful Writers againſt Bookſellers, for not bringing their Works to a *ſecond Edition*; and partly, to the Complaints of little Readers againſt ſucceſsful ones, for a contrary Cauſe; when, to the great Damage of the Purchaſers of the *firſt* Edition, they have fraudulently improved a *ſecond*. For the Proprietor profeſſing to ſell only his Paper and Print, and not the

Doctrine

Doctrine conveyed by it; the Purchaſer, who has nothing elſe for his Money, never reckons (and often with good Reaſon) his Improvement for any Thing. So that when a *ſecond* Edition leſſeneth the Price of the *firſt*, he very naturally thinks himſelf tricked of his Money.

Another ground of Prejudice, is the unfair Advantage made of the Author's Property, by Bookſellers: Which if true, would be juſt as good a reaſon for refuſing him the public Protection, as it would be to turn all thoſe Eſtates upon the Common, which one of your *Peter Walters* has out at Nurſe. For why ſhould it be expected of an Author, and of no one elſe, to become ſage before he be entruſted with his own? Let him but ſhare in the common Security, and he will ſoon learn the Value of Property, and how to uſe it like his Neighbours. As it is, we need not wonder, he ſhould be diſpoſed to part with that, for little, which he is unable to preſerve but at great Hazard and Expence.

A third Ground of Prejudice is the odious Sound of the Word MONOPOLY. But this is taking the thing in Queſtion for granted, *viz.* that an Author hath no Right of Property: For a *Monopoly* is an excluſive *Privilege* by *Grant* of doing that, which all Men have a Claim to do; not an excluſive *Right* by *Nature* of enjoying what no one elſe has a Claim to. So that to make this a Monopoly, is making a *Proprietor* and a *Monopoliſt* the ſame.

A fourth Ground of Prejudice is the favorite Sound of LIBERTY, in theſe Times commonly uſed for LICENTIOUSNESS; and apparently ſo on this Occaſion. For *Liberty* ſignifies the Power of doing what one will with one's own; which is the *Right* we here contend for: And *Licentiouſneſs* the doing what we will with another man's; which is the *Wrong* we ſeek to redreſs. So that, as ſure as *Licentiouſneſs* deſtroys *Liberty*, ſo certain is it, that the Protection of the *Right* in Queſtion adds Strength and Vigour to it.

But it is not my Deſign to defend the *Uſe* men *make* of Property; but to vindicate the *Right* they *have* in it. For were it not for theſe

Prejudices,

Prejudices, could we eaſily think that a Printſeller or Engraver ſhould be able to obtain that for his Baubles, which LEARNING hath ſo long ſued for in vain? I ſhall therefore go to the Bottom of *them*; and, as they all ſupport themſelves on the falſe Logic here detected, *the taking the thing in Queſtion for granted*, I ſhall ſhew, that an Author has an undoubted Right of Property in his Works.

Things ſuſceptible of PROPERTY muſt have theſe two eſſential Conditions; that they be *uſeful* to Mankind; and that they be capable of having their Poſſeſſion *aſcertained*. Without the *firſt*, Society will not be obliged to take the *Right* under its Protection; and, and without the *ſecond*, it will never venture upon the Trouble.

Of theſe, ſome are *moveable*, as Goods; ſome *immoveable*, as Lands: And they become Property either by firſt *Occupancy*, or by *Improvement*.

Of *Moveables*, ſome are things *natural*; others, things *artificial*. Property in the firſt is gained by Occupancy; in the latter, by Improvement.

Moveable Property, ariſing from Improvement, is of two Sorts; the Product of the *Hand*, and of the *Mind*; as an *Utenſil* made; a *Book* compoſed. For that the Product of the *Mind* is as well capable of becoming Property, as that of the *Hand*, is evident from hence, that it hath in it thoſe two eſſential Conditions, which, by the allowance of all Writers of Laws, make Things ſuſceptible of Property; namely, common *Utility*, and a Capacity of having its Poſſeſſion *aſcertained*.

Both theſe Sorts of Things, therefore, being capable of Property, we are next to conſider, as they are ſo different in their *Natures*, whether there be not as great a Difference in the *Extention of their Rights*.

In the firſt Caſe, then, it is agreed, that Property in the Product of the Hand, as in an Utenſil, is confined to the individual Thing made; which, if the Proprietor thinks not fit to hide, others

others may make the like in imitation of it; and thereby acquire the ſame Property in their *manual Work*, which he hath done in his.

But, in the other Caſe of Property in the Product of the Mind, as in a *Book* compoſed, it is not confined to the Original MS. but extends to the *Doctrine* contained in it; Which is, indeed, the true and peculiar Property in a Book. The neceſſary Conſequence of which is, that the Owner hath an excluſive Right of tranſcribing or printing it for Gain or Profit.

This *Difference*, in theſe *two Sorts* of Property, ariſes from an equal Difference in the *Things:* As will appear by conſidering the *different nature of the Works*; and the *different Views of the Operators*.

With Regard to the *Nature of the Work:* An *Utenſil*; and a *Book* only conſidered as a Compoſition of Paper, and Ink drawn out in artificial Characters, are both Works of the *Hand*; and, as ſuch, the Property is confined to the individual Thing. But a *Book* conſidered merely in this Light, is conſidered inadequately and unjuſtly; the complete Idea of a Book being ſuch a Compoſition as is here ſpoken of, together with a *Doctrine contained*. But under this Idea it aſſumes another Nature, and becomes a *Work of the Mind*. We have proved a Work of the *Mind* to be ſuſceptible of Property, like that of the hand. Now if the Property in a *Book* be confined to the individual Volume, here is a Work of the *Mind* executed without any Property annexed: The Property in the *Individual* Volume, ariſing from its being *merely* the Work of the *Hand*. A Doctrine *abſurd in Speculation*, as it is making manual and mental Operation one and the ſame, which are two diſtinct and different Things: And *unjuſt in Practice*, as it depriveth the Owner of a Right annexed by Nature to his Labour. Again, in the *Utenſil* made, the principal Expenſe is in the *Materials employed*; which, whoever furniſheth, reaſonably acquires a Property in the Thing made, though made by Imitation. On the contrary, in a *Book* compoſed, the principal Expence is in the

form given: which as the original Maker only can ſupply, it is but reaſonable, how greatly ſoever the Copies of his Work may be multiplied, that they be multiplied to his own excluſive Profit.

Let us next conſider it, with regard to the *different Views of the Operators*. He who makes an Utenſil, in Imitation of another he ſees made, muſt neceſſarily work with the ſame Ideas the original Operator had, and ſo juſtly acquires a Property in the Work of his own Hands. But the moſt learned Book in the World may be copied by one who hath no Ideas at all. What Pretence, then, hath ſuch a one to Property, in a Work of the *Mind*, who hath employed, in copying it, only the Labour of the *Hand*; and which tends but to make his Theft the more impudent, as he ſteals what he doth not underſtand? Again, In an Utenſil made, the Framer of it hath plainly no regard to any one's Benefit but his own: And he muſt finiſh it before it can be fitted for his Uſe. His End, then, being obtained in that individual Piece of Work, it is but reaſonable his Property ſhould there terminate. In a mental Work, the Thing turns the other Way. Here the Contriver may himſelf enjoy all the Fruits of his Diſcoveries without drawing them out ſcholaſtically in Form. When he doth this, it is but candid to ſuppoſe that it is done for the Benefit of others. Can any Thing, therefore, be more juſt than that he ſhould be owned and protected in a Property, which he hath not merely acquired to himſelf, but which is generouſly objective to the Benefit of others?

In a Word, to inſiſt once again upon what hath been ſaid.—If an *Author* have only a Property in his individual Manuſcript, he hath, truly ſpeaking, no Property, in his Book, at all; that is, as his Book is a Work of the Mind; which, in this Caſe, ſtill lies *in common*. The Conſequence is, (as appears from the Explanation of Property given above) *That no Property ariſeth from a Thing ſuſceptible of Property*: Nay, which is ſtill more abſurd, *from a Thing actually become Property*; as being attended with all thoſe eſſential Conditions

Conditions from whence Property ariſeth. To deny an Author, therefore, or his Aſſigns, an excluſive Privilege to print and vend his own Work, ſeemeth to be a Violation of one of the moſt fundamental Rights of Civil Society.

But here let it be obſerved, that, in our Diviſion of *artificial Moveables*, into the *two* Sorts, of *manual* and *mental*, we purpoſely omitted a *Third*, of a complicated Nature, which holds of both the other in common; as reſerving it for this Place, to ſupport and illuſtrate what hath been ſaid above of the two more ſimple Kinds: And that is, of *mechanic Engines*. Now theſe partaking ſo eſſentially of the Nature of *manual* Works, the Maker hath no *perfect* Right of Property in the *Invention*. For, like a common Utenſil, it muſt be finiſhed before it can be of Uſe to himſelf; like that, its materials are its principal Expence; and like that, a ſucceſsful Imitator muſt work with the Ideas of the firſt Inventor: Which are all Reaſons why the Property ſhould terminate in the individual Machine. Yet becauſe the Operation of the Mind is ſo intimately concerned in the Conſtruction of theſe Works, their Powers being effected and regulated by the right Application of geometric Science, all States have concurred in giving the Inventors of them a Licence of Monopoly, for a Term of Years, as on a Claim of Right. Now the Reaſon of this, we ſay, can be explained only on the Principles here advanced, that the Conſtructor of a Piece of Mechaniſm hath his Property confined to the individual Thing made; and the Compoſer of a ſcholaſtic Work hath *his*, extended to the ideal Diſcourſe itſelf. And a Mathematical Machine holding of the Nature of both, but more eſſentially of the former, there was no Way of adjuſting and ſatisfying an *imperfect Right* but by ſuch a Grant as is here mentioned.

But it is no unfrequent Practice for the Claimants of a *perfect Right* to apply to the Magiſtrate, or Legiſlature, for the better *Security* of *an acquired* Property, in the ſame manner that Claimants of an *imperfect Right* do, *to acquire* Property: Sometimes,

to the one for a *Licence*; and ſometimes, to the other for an *Act of Parliament*. Yet from thence to conclude, that the Claimants of a *perfect Right* have, by ſuch Application, waved, or given up their Claim; or that the Magiſtrate or Legiſlature have, by their *Licences* or *Acts* of excluſive Privilege for a certain Time, either abridged or ſuperſeded that Claim, appears, to me, the higheſt abſurdity; as it will, I am perſuaded, to others, on reflecting upon the plain and obvious Reaſons why the Petitioners *ſeek* this additional Security, for the Enjoyment of a natural Right; and why the Magiſtrate and Legiſlature *grant* it only for a certain Term of Years.

In the common Adminiſtration of Juſtice, the Way, in uſe, to reſtrain the Invaſion of Property, is to oblige the Offender to repair the Damages ſuſtained. Now ſuch is the Nature of the Property in Queſtion, that it may be long invaded before the Sufferer can diſcover the Offender: So that ſuch a one having a fair Chance not to be detected; and if detected, a Certainty of refunding only what he hath unjuſtly gained; bad Men will have but too great Encouragement to invade their Neighbours' Property. Therefore, to counteract this undue Temptation, it was natural for ſuch Proprietors, in their own Defence, to apply to the State for additional and accumulative Penalties againſt the Invaders of their Right. In which, they act but as the State itſelf doth for the Security of Government in general; when, for the Support of that natural *Allegiance*, which all Men owe to the Society under which they chuſe to live, and whereby they are protected, *it* addeth, by *poſitive* Laws, the additional Sanction of Oaths, and other ſolemn Engagements. Now if the *State*, in this Caſe, can never be ſuppoſed to have waved or ſuperſeded its natural Claim to Allegiance, and to reſt it ſolely on the Oaths taken, or the Engagements made; what Reaſon have we to think that the Subject, in his turn, when he applies to the State for *Protection*, in the Inſtance in Queſtion, ſhould give up or impeach his natural Right, while his

his only Purpoſe is to ſeek additional Security for the Enjoyment of it?

This leadeth us to our ſecond Queſtion, Why the Magiſtrate and Legiſlature *reſtrain* this additional Sanction to a certain Term of Years. And the Reaſon is evident. The Petitioners neither require more; nor doth the State find, that more is needed. The great Temptation to invade this Property being while the Demand for it is great and frequent; which is, generally, on the firſt Publication of a Book, and ſome few Years afterwards. While this Demand continueth, the Proprietor hath need of all additional Sanctions, to oppoſe to the Force of the Temptation: But when, in courſe of Years, the Demand abateth, and, with it, the Temptation; the common legal Security of natural Rights is then ſufficient to keep Offenders in Order.

However, as clear and undoubted a Property as this is by Nature, and the common Principles of Society, it cannot be denied, but that the Legiſlature may abridge, ſuſpend, or abrogate it within its own Juriſdiction, as it is accuſtomed to do with ſeveral other the like Rights, for the Sake of the Whole. But, then, it muſt be done by *expreſs* Declaration and Decree: Implication, Inference, or any mere Law-conſequence, or even a Miſtake of Judgment, in the Legiſlature, going on a Suppoſition that there was no natural Right where indeed there was, would be, ſimply, inſufficient to abrogate it. And the Reaſon is plain, becauſe the *Believing* a Thing to be no natural Right doth not infer a *Judgment*, that the Enjoyment of it, as ſuch, would be hurtful to the Society; which Judgment is the only Cauſe of the Legiſlature's abridging or abrogating a natural Right.

This was neceſſary to premiſe, in order to ſet a Caſe in its true Light, which hath, above all others, encouraged the Invaſion of Property; though the *Act*, from whence it ariſes, was ſolely contrived to prevent that Invaſion. I mean the Act of the Eighth of Queen *Anne*; which Ignorance and Knavery have concurred

to

to repreſent as a *reſtrictive*, and not *accumulative* Law; and conſequently, to ſuppoſe it *the ſole Foundation*, inſtead of *an additional Support*, of Literary Property. It is intitled, *An Act for the Encouragement of Learning*; in which an excluſive Right of Property, under certain Conditions, is ſecured, by particular Penalties, to Authors, and Bookſellers claiming under them, for the Term of one and twenty Years.

Now in this Act, we are ſo far from finding any *Declaration* to abridge, ſuſpend, or abrogate this natural Right (which, as we ſay, *would be* indeed ſufficient to diſſolve it) or any *Expreſſion intimating the Opinion* of the Legiſlature againſt its Exiſtence (which, as we ſay, *would not be* ſufficient); that, on the contrary, there is in the preamble of it, an *Expreſſion* plainly declarative of their Opinion, that Authors had a Right, prior to this Act; and, towards the Concluſion, a *Proviſo*, which leaves the Queſtion of the Right, free from, and undetermined by, what is, in this Statute, enacted concerning Property.

The *Expreſſion* is this,—**Whereas Printers, Bookſellers, and other Perſons, have of late frequently taken the Liberty of printing, reprinting, and publiſhing, or cauſing to be printed, reprinted, and publiſhed, Books, and other Writings, without the Conſent of the Authors or PROPRIETORS of ſuch Books or Writings, to their very great Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and their Families,** *&c.*—Now, could the injured Parties, here mentioned, be *Proprietors* of that in which they had no Property? Or did the Legiſlature, in a Law for the Regulation of ſo momentous a Branch of what was deemed and claimed as *Property*, uſe the terms of the Subject in Queſtion inaccurately or unfitly? If it were poſſible to think ſo of a *Britiſh* Legiſlature, the Suppoſition would be excluded *here*; becauſe, not only the *Expreſſion*, but the *Sentiment*, neceſſarily ſuppoſes that they uſed the Word PROPRIETORS in its ſtrict and exact Signification: it being a Repreſentation of the bad Effects from the Liberty

Liberty taken of printing and reprinting Books, without the Consent of the Authors, or their Assigns.

The *Proviſo*, in the Concluſion, is in theſe Words —Provided that nothing in this Act contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, either to PREJUDICE OR CONFIRM any RIGHT that the ſaid Univerſities, or any of them, or any PERSON or Perſons have, or claim to have, to the Printing or reprinting any Book or Copy already printed or HEREAFTER TO BE PRINTED——Now, though it may be eaſily granted, that one Purpoſe of this *Proviſo* was to leave undecided all Claims, or Pretences of Claim, to excluſive printing, from Patents, Licenſes, *&c.* yet the large wording of it appears to have a particular aim at obviating ſuch Miſconſtruction of the Statute, as if the additional temporary Security, thereby given, either implied that there was no Right of Property before, or elſe abrogated what it found. And the having theſe two Things in its Intention, *viz.* the *natural Right*, and that which is *founded on Patents*, ſeems to be the Reaſon of its ſaying that it neither PREJUDICED NOR CONFIRMED: It being unjuſt to *prejudice* a plain *natural Right*; and inexpedient to *confirm* an unexamined Claim by *Patent*. For what the Legiſlature's Senſe was of this *natural Right*, appears from what hath been obſerved of their Uſe of the Word *Proprietors*, in the Preamble.

But laſtly, in Caſes where the Senſe of the Legiſlature is uncertain or obſcure, There the Interpretation of the ſupreme Magiſtrates of Juſtice hath been always deemed to have the Force of a legal Deciſion. And this Deciſion hath been made in favour of Property, on the *Act* in Queſtion. For, in the High Court of Chancery, Actions for Damages have been ſuſtained, where the Action for Forfeiture and Penalties on this Statute was not competent in any other Court: Which ſhews, that that great Magiſtrate did not conſider this *Act* as a *Reſtrictive*, but as an *accumulative* Law. It being a Rule, that *poſitive correctory Laws* are to be

be *ſtrictly* interpreted. For in every civil Society, Experience ſhews, that the Subject, in many Caſes, muſt be put under Reſtraint with regard to Things in themſelves lawful, meerly becauſe of the bad Conſequences, to the Public, by the Abuſe of Liberty. But, in all ſuch *reſtrictive* Laws, right Reaſon, at the ſame time, forbids theſe Laws to be extended, in the ſmalleſt Particular, beyond the Letter of the Act. To do otherwiſe would be abridging Liberty, without Authority of Law, which is the ſame Thing with private Violence. This plainly ſhews the Judgment of the High Court of *Chancery* to be, that there was a Right of Property previous to the Statute; which the Statute had neither abrogated nor abridged; and, on that Right, the Action was ſuſtained, where the Action for Forfeiture and Penalties was not competent. For an additional Security of Property, made for the Benefit, and at the Requeſt of the Proprietors, can never be deemed to exclude them from having recourſe, at Pleaſure, to that legal Remedy, which, on the common Principles of a Court of Equity, they had a Claim to, prior to the Grant of ſuch additional Security.

All this laid together, it ſeems abundantly evident, that no Right is taken away by this *Act*, which Authors, or their Aſſigns, had before the making of it. And conſequently that it is no *reſtrictive*, but an *accumulative* Law, brought in aid of a *natural* Right, whoſe Reality I have here endeavoured to ſupport.

But now, Sir, when I conſider to whom I have addreſſed theſe Reflections, I find myſelf in the fooliſh Situation of that old *Greek* Sophiſt, who would needs entertain *Hannibal* with a Lecture on the Art of War. And if my Impertinence eſcape his Cenſure, I ſhall be indebted only to your diſtinguiſhed Character of Politeneſs, and general Candour, as well as to your known Partiality and Friendſhip for the Author: For I have ventured to give my Thoughts on a Queſtion of Law, before one, to whoſe ſuperior Eminence in that Profeſſion, we ſee joined a Force of Reaſon and Splendor of Eloquence, which make Truth reverenced by thoſe it

it detects; and Juſtice amiable even to thoſe it puniſhes. But where ſhould an *Author* turn, if not to him who hath, on all Occaſions, ſo generouſly lent his Miniſtry to the Support and Protection of Letters, whenever they have been reduced to apply to Juſtice for Relief; and to whoſe ſucceſsful Patronage they are principally indebted for that ſhare of Security which they, at preſent, enjoy? For (to conclude my Application to you, in behalf of Learning, with the Words of your favourite AUTHOR) "Non cauſidicum neſcio quem, neque proclamatorem, aut rabulam conquirimus, ſed eum virum qui primum ſit ejus artis antiſtes: Qui ſcelus fraudemque nocentis poſſit dicendo ſubjicere odio civium, ſupplicioque conſtringere; idemque ingenii præſidio, innocentiam judiciorum pœna liberare; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad decus excitare, aut ab errore deducere, aut inflammare in improbos, aut incitatam in bonos, mitigare."

I am, &c.

APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

LETTERS BETWEEN

DR. MIDDLETON AND MR. WARBURTON,

IN 1736;

AND BETWEEN

DR. LOWTH AND DR. WARBURTON,

IN 1756.

LETTERS BETWEEN

Dr. MIDDLETON and Mr. WARBURTON,

in 1736.

Dr. Middleton's Letter to Mr. Warburton.

SIR, *Dorcheſter, Sept.* 11, 1736.

YOUR Candor, I hope, has already prevented me in ſuggeſting ſome favourable Excuſe for my long Silence. The Truth, which is always the beſt Apology, is, that I was abſent from *Cambridge*, when your Letter arrived there; and though it was tranſmitted to me at this Place, yet it found me in no Condition to anſwer it, either to your Satisfaction or my own. I am here unprovided of *Tully's* Works, and without the Help of my Papers to furniſh any Hints to me on the Subject; ſpending my Time ſuitably to the Taſte and Temptations of the Country, in Cards at home, and Sports abroad; yet I could not longer defer to pay my Thanks at leaſt for the great Entertainment, that it gave me; with Promiſe of further Payment, as ſoon as I am able.

The Point that you undertook to make good concerning *Tully*, is, that *he did not believe a future State*. In Proof of which you maintain,

maintain, that in *his Epiſtles onely*, of all his Works, we are to look for *his real Sentiments*.

This, though ſupported by you very ingeniouſly, is not, I own, agreeable to the Notion, that I had formed from my general Acquaintance with his Writings: And as I have not yet had Leiſure to make it the Subject of a particular Enquiry, ſo at preſent I can only give my looſe and indigeſted Thoughts on the Matter; which I ſhall do very freely, and in the Method, that you have ſketched out to me.

You aſſign four Reaſons of the Difficulty of diſcovering *Tully's* Opinions on the important Queſtions of Philoſophy. 1. The Character of the ancient Philoſophy in general. 2. The manner in which the *Romans* received the *Greek* Philoſophy. 3. The Nature of that Philoſophy, which *Tully* eſpouſed. 4. The peculiar Character of the Man.

1. By the firſt, you mean *the double Doctrine* of the old Maſters; *the external, and internal*; the one for the Vulgar, the other for the Adept. But whatever Effect this had in *Greece*, where that Way of Teaching ſeems to have been drop'd, long before *Tully*; it certainly had none in *Rome*, or at leaſt in *Tully's* Writings: The End and Purpoſe of which was to explain to his Countrymen, in the moſt perſpicuous Manner, whatever the Ancients had taught on every Article, either of ſpeculative or practical Knowledge.

2. *The Romans*, you ſay, *were far from the Humour of the Greeks; and did not regard the Doctrine of the Sect, that they eſpouſed, as a Rule of Life, but a kind of Furniture onely for their Rhetoric Schools.* But I ſee no Ground for this Diſtinction; if there was any between them, the *Greeks* were certainly the more diſputatious, and, agreeably to St. *Paul's* Character of them, more curious and fond of *every Thing new*. *Cato*, you ſee, from the Teſtimony, that you produce, made the *Stoical Doctrine his Rule of living*; and though he is laughed at for it by *Cicero*, yet not for making Philoſophy his Rule, but that particular Philoſophy, which was incompatible with common Life.

There

There is a Letter from *Tully* to *Trebatius*, upon his turning Epicurean; in which he rallies him for his new Principles, which muſt neceſſarily ſpoil the Lawyer, as breaking through all the old Forms of ſecuring Faith and Property amongſt Men: and concludes *that if he was ſerious in the Change, he was ſorry for it; if to make his Court only to* Panſa, *he excuſed it.* (Fam. l. 7. 12.) This ſhews, that the Choice of a Sect was not thought a Thing indifferent, but ſuppoſed to operate in Life and Manners. If then, as *Tully* ſays, a great Part took up their Philoſophy *diſputandi cauſa, non ita vivendi*; yet this was not the Thing generally intended by it, but on the contrary, what was generally thought blameable. Nor was it peculiar to the *Romans*, any more than to the *Greeks*, or to any other People, *not to live up to the Rule, that they profeſſed*; juſt as we ſee it now in the Caſe of Religion, which a great Part in all Countries contend for very warmly, yet practiſe very coldly.

3. You make *the Nature of Tully's Philoſophy* another Source of Difficulty in finding out his real Sentiments. His Philoſophy was *of the Academy*; and whether of the old or the new, much the ſame. But when you call it *perfectly ſceptical*, you ſeem to confound it with a different Sect, whoſe diſtinguiſhing Character was to *doubt of every Thing:* Whereas the Principle of the Academy was only *to ſuſpend their Aſſent*, till by examining all Sides of a Queſtion, they could diſcover *the probable.* For in ſpeculative Enquiries they diſclaimed *all Certainty*; and thought nothing ſo unworthy of a Philoſopher, as *a raſh Aſſent*, and the embracing for true what he did not comprehend. They imagined Truth and Falſhood to be ſo mix'd and blended by Nature, that it was extremely difficult, if not impoſſible, to ſeparate them entirely; that Probability was the utmoſt, that human Wit could arrive at. This therefore they made *their Rule*, both of thinking and acting. What the other Sects affirmed with Aſſurance, they made it their Taſk to confute or ſhew to be *uncertain*; taking from each ſtill what they liked, and following it, with this Difference only; that what the others called *true*, they called *probable.*

This, of all others, was the moſt rational Way of philoſophizing; ſubjecting them to no Maſter, no Syſtem of Opinions; but leaving a Liberty to chuſe, after a free Enquiry, whatever was found moſt agreeable to Reaſon and Nature. But what is there in this to create Difficulty in diſcovering a Man's Opinions, whenever he thinks fit to declare them? It might create, perhaps, ſome Diffidence in declaring them; and a Diſpoſition, to confute rather what others aſſert, than to aſſert any Thing of his own: But their Rule ſtill was as certain and conſiſtent as of any other Sect; and when perſuaded, of any Opinion, they purſued it as regularly, and explained as freely as any of the reſt.

4. But the *Embarraſs*, you ſay, *is compleated by the peculiar Character of the Man*; which you conſider in three different Capacities, of *the Orator, the Stateſman, the Philoſopher*; and contend, that he not only contradicts in one, what he affirms in another, but *is inconſiſtent with himſelf, even when he ſpeaks from one and the ſame Perſon:* Yet, from the beſt Attention that I have been able to pay to his Hiſtory, I find in him but one general, conſiſtent, glorious Character, of a great and good Man, acting and ſpeaking on all Occaſions, what the greateſt Prudence with the greateſt Virtue would ſuggeſt.

As an Orator, it was his Buſineſs to inforce, with all the Power of Eloquence, whatever he thought ſerviceable to his Client, and uſeful to the Cauſe that he was defending. Of this Part he acquitted himſelf with Glory; and tells us himſelf, what the Nature of the Thing would tell us for him, that we are not to expect his real Sentiments here.

As a Stateſman, the Caſe is ſtill the ſame. In his Harangues to the People he gives a different Account, you obſerve, of the ſame Fact, from what he had done in the Senate; that is, he adapts his Stile and Arguments to the different Genius of each Aſſembly; to engage them both the more effectually to promote the Meaſures, that he was then purſuing.

As

As a Philoſopher; if we join the Character of an Academic, we ſhall find him equally conſiſtent. For I cannot help agreeing with *Bentley*, in taking this *for the Key* of his philoſophical Writings, as much as I do with you, in your fixing the Time of his changing the Academy. This was the Philoſophy, that he profeſſed through Life; and to which he profeſſes himſelf indebted for all his Succeſs in it: And this Clue will lead us through *that Labyrinth of Contradictions*, which you ſeem to diſcover in his Works.

In his Book of Divination, you ſay, *he combats all Augury*; but in his Book of Laws *declares for it*; *in a manner too ſerious to ſuſpect him of feigning*. Yet all the Matter is, that in the one he acts the Philoſopher; in the other the Stateſman: In his Treatiſe on Divination, he aſſerts and eſtabliſhes it in the firſt Book, in the Perſon of his Brother, by all the Arguments, that can be brought for it; and refutes them all in the ſecond, in his own Perſon. This is the true Spirit of the Academy; after examining both Sides, to reject what has nothing ſolid in it. Yet in *his Treatiſe on Laws*, he recommends *Augury*; and no Wonder: for though he laughed at it as a Philoſopher; he had a great Opinion of it as a Politician: And always ſpeaks of *the Invention of its Ceremonies, and the making them Part of the civil Conſtitution, as an Inſtance of the greateſt Wiſdom and Prudence in their Anceſtors*. For it was wholly agreeable to that Scheme of Policy, which he conſtantly purſued from the Beginning to the End of Life, of throwing the chief Influence and Balance of Power in State Matters into the Hands of the better Sort.

Again you take Notice, that *in his Book on the Nature of the Gods*, he reflects on thoſe, *as too curious or impertinent*, who were calling upon him on all Occaſions to declare his own Opinion: *Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipſi ſentiamus, curioſius id faciunt, quam neceſſe eſt.* (l. 1. § 5.) yet *in his Academic Queſtions*, he ſwears *that he always ſpeaks what he thinks*: *Jurarem —— me et ardere*

ſtudio veri reperiendi, et ea ſentire, quæ dicerem. (l. 4. § 10.) In the firſt of theſe Works, he profeſſes only to collect what the old Philoſophers had taught; and, according to the Method of the Academy, to combat the Opinion of one Sect, with that of another, without declaring his own: So that the Difficulty of diſcovering it is not owing here, as you intimate, *to any Obſcurity* in delivering it; but to his not delivering it at all. But *in the Academic Queſtions*, as far as I can underſtand the Paſſage without the Context to aſſiſt me, he does not ſwear, as you render it, *that he always ſpeaks what he thinks*, but only, that *he thinks what he is there ſpeaking:* And if ſo, it confirms what I have been ſaying of the Academy, and its being *the true Key of his Sentiments.*

But you aſſert, *that his Sentiments are not to be collected from any of his Writings, that were deſigned for the Public, which include all but his Letters, becauſe, in all his Writings of that Kind, he affected an Obſcurity.* This is the firſt Time that I have ever ſeen the Character of *obſcure* applied to *Tully's Writings:* Surely no Man's Stile was ever farther removed from it, or more remarkably ſhining and perſpicuous, than his. But the whole Charge of Obſcurity, and all the Contraſt of Sentiments found in different Parts of his Works, may eaſily be ſolved, by conſidering only the different Circumſtances, in which they were delivered. By attending to this, we ſhall find his very Contradictions to be Conſiſtencies, and nothing elſe but what was prudent and proper to be ſaid by one and the ſame Man; acting the different Parts of the *Orator*, *the Stateſman*, *the Philoſopher.*

To come then at laſt to the principal Point in queſtion; the Diſcovery of *his real Thoughts concerning a future State, which are to be collected only*, you ſay, *from his Epiſtles.* And ſo far I agree, that in familiar Letters we may expect to find him more open and undiſguiſed, and as far as he touches any Subject, treating it with leſs Reſerve, than in Works deſigned for the Public: Yet all his Letters, as you allow, are not of this Sort: In many of them it

was

was his Buſineſs to ſay, not ſo much what was true, as what would pleaſe. But let us ſee what he has actually ſaid in the Teſtimonies, that you have produced from them. In a Letter to *Atticus*, (l. 4. 10.) *Sed de illa ambulatione, fors videret, aut ſi qui eſt, qui curet, deus.* To *Torquatus*, (Ep. fam. l. 6. 3.) *Sed hæc conſolatio levis eſt: Illa gravior, qua te uti ſpero, ego certe utor: Nec dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: Et ſi non ero, ſenſu omnino carebo.* Again, (ib. 4.) *Deinde quod mihi ad conſolationem commune tecum eſt, ſi jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea republica avellar, quæ curendum eſſe doleam, præſertim, cum id ſine ullo ſenſu futurum ſit.* To *Toranius*, (ib. 21.) *Cum conſilio profici nihil poſſit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenerit, ferre moderate, præſertim, cum omnium rerum mors ſit extremum.* *Nothing*, you ſay, *can be more expreſs than theſe Paſſages againſt a future State: And that* Tully *ſpeaks in them his real Sentiments, there is not the leaſt room to doubt. They were Letters of Conſolation to his Friends, when he himſelf, by Reaſon of the ill State of public Affairs, moſt wanted Conſolation.*

As to the firſt of theſe Paſſages; you allow it to be *a Compliment to the Philoſophy of his Friend Atticus*, who was an Epicurean: And why is it not ſo too in the reſt? In the firſt to *Torquatus*, as in that to *Atticus*, the Caſe is put hypothetically, *ſi non ero*: And the very Uſe of ſuch a Topic in Conſolation, implies, that theſe Friends alſo were Epicureans, and that he was adminiſtering Comfort from their Philoſophy, not his own, as likely to have the more Weight with them; or arguing, as we ſay, *ad hominem*, not expreſſing his real Sentiments.

But as this is only conjectural, and, as ſome may think, contrary to Fact; let us try what other Defence can be made, and what Uſe in this Caſe of our *Key of the Academy*. Though I have often reflected on theſe Paſſages, yet my Notion has always been, that *Tully did believe a future State*. The whole Turn of his Writings, and the Tenor of his Life, ſhew it: He lived expecting it, and always, ſo as to deſerve it; and declares it to be

a favourite Opinion; which, though possibly an Error, he was resolved to indulge. But we must remember still, that he was an Academic; that is, that he believed it only to *be probable*; and as Probability necessarily admits the Degrees of *more and less*, so it admits a Variety likewise in the Stability of our Persuasion: And as *Tully* himself says, on another Occasion, *quis autem est, tanta quidem de re, quin varie secum ipse disputet?* In a melancholy Hour, when the Spirits are low, and the Mind under a Dejection, an Argument appears in a very different Light; Objections acquire Strength; and what humours the present Chagrin, finds the readiest Admission. These Passages were evidently of this Kind, written in his desponding Moments; and, as you say, *when he himself most wanted Consolation.* And if we allow them therefore to express what he really thought at the Time, yet they prove nothing more, than that *he sometimes doubted of what he generally believed*; consistently with the Character and Principles of an Academic, who embraced *no Opinions as certain.*

Thus, Sir, I have given you my free Thoughts on what you were so good as to communicate with regard to *Tully*: I will not be answerable for the Exactness of them; they are such only as my Recollection could furnish, without the Help of *Tully's* Works to refresh, or any Testimonies to support them. But as I reserve the more exact Consideration of this Argument to the Part of *Tully's* Life, which was the most employed on Philosophy, under *Cæsar's* Tyranny, so I shall be obliged to you for imparting any further Thoughts on the Subject, either to confirm or confute what I have here offered: And if any Occasion of Books or Friends should invite you again this Winter to *Cambridge*, where I propose to be about *Michaelmas*, I beg you to be assured, that no Man will be more ready to serve you in any manner there, or better pleased to enjoy as much of your Company as your Time and other Friends will allow to,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

CONYERS MIDDLETON.

P. S. I should

P. S. I ſhould be glad to hear that your great Work goes on ſucceſsfully; and as a ſure Omen of ſatisfying others, that you find more and more Satisfaction from it yourſelf. When I was laſt in *London*, I met with a little Piece, written with the ſame View and on the ſame Plan with yours: An anonymous Letter from *Geneva*, evincing *the divine Miſſion of* Moſes, *from the Inſtitution of the Sabbatic Year*. The Author ſets out, like you, from this ſingle Poſtulatum, that *Moſes* was *a conſummate Lawgiver*; and ſhews, that he could never have injoined a Law *ſo whimſical, impolitic, and hazardous*; *expoſing the People to certain Famine, as oft as the preceding or following Year proved barren*; *if He, who has all Nature at command, had not warranted the Succeſs of it.* The Letter is ingenious and ſprightly, and dreſſes out, in a Variety of Colours, the Abſurdity of the Inſtitution, on the Suppoſition of its being human. It is in *French*, and publiſhed in *Bibliotheque Germanique*, Tom. 30.

But will not this Gaiety of cenſuring the Law be found too adventurous, and expoſe *your Poſtulatum itſelf* to ſome Hazard? Eſpecially when there is *a Fact*, generally allowed by the Learned, that ſeems to overturn all this ſpecious Reaſoning at once; *viz. that this Law of the Sabbatic Year was never obſerved.* For if ſo, it may be objected, with ſome Shew of Reaſon, that *Moſes* had charged himſelf with the Iſſue of Events too delicate, and beyond his Reach, and imprudently injoined what Uſe and Experience ſhewed to be impracticable.

I am apprehenſive likewiſe, that your Work will not ſtand wholly clear of Objections: Your Scheme, as I take it, is to ſhew, that *ſo able a Man as* Moſes *could not poſſibly have omitted the Doctrine of a future State, thought ſo neceſſary to Government by all other Legiſlators, had he not done it by the expreſs Direction of the Deity*; *and that under the miraculous Diſpenſations of the Theocracy, he could neither want it himſelf for the enforcing a Reſpect to his Laws, nor yet the People for the Encouragement of their Obedience.* But what

was

was the Conſequence? Why the People were perpetually apoſtatizing either to the Superſtitions of *Egypt*, or the Idolatries of *Canaan*; and tired with the Load of their Ceremonies, wholly dropp'd them at laſt, and ſunk into all Kinds of Vice and Profaneneſs; till the Prophets, in order to revive and preſerve a Senſe of Religion amongſt them, began to preach up the rational Duties of Morality, and inſinuate *the Doctrine of a future State.*

As in the other Caſe then, ſome may be apt to ſay, that *Moſes* had inſtituted what could not be practiſed without Ruin to the State; ſo in this, that he had overlooked what could not be omitted without Ruin to Religion.

I have taken the Liberty to propoſe theſe Hints, that, if you think them of Weight, you may be better prepared to obviate them; if not, may proceed the more ſecurely by ſeeing Reaſon to ſlight them. As for myſelf, I can ſafely ſwear with *Tully*, that I have *a moſt ardent Deſire to find out the Truth:* But as I have generally been diſappointed in my Enquiries, and more ſucceſsful in finding what is falſe than what is true, ſo I begin, like him too, to grow a mere Academic, humbly content to take up with the *probable.* Whatever you have to offer me of this Kind, I ſhall thankfully embrace; and though I expect as much from you, as I do from any Man, yet in the arduous Subject, on which you are engaged, I dare not venture to raiſe my Expectations any higher.

MR.

MR. WARBURTON'S ANSWER.

SIR,

I RECEIVED the Favour of yours from *Dorcheſter*, and the beſt Return I can make for it will be to reply to it in the ſame free and friendly Manner.

Before I give you my Thoughts on each Head wherein we differ, I would premiſe one Word on the Subject in general. In the third Book of my Defence of *Moſes* I ſhall ſhew, that a future State of *Rewards and Puniſhments* (not a future Exiſtence merely, ſuch as a Reſolution of the Soul into the *anima mundi*, or any other Mode of ſimple Being) was not credited by any Sect of Philoſophy in *Greece*, though taught by almoſt all. I think I prove this by the cleareſt Paſſages in Antiquity. I go farther, and ſhew, not only that they *did* not, but that they *could* not believe it; becauſe there was one common Principle held by all, which overturned the Notion of a future State of *Rewards and Puniſhments*. As this Principle was *metaphyſical*, and, as at the ſame Time, it is owned they held ſeveral *moral* ones, which led naturally to the Belief of future Rewards and Puniſhments; I ſhew, in the laſt Place, that it was the general Cuſtom of the Philoſophers to be ſwayed, in their *ſpeculative* Concluſions, rather by their *metaphyſical* Principles than their *moral*. This ſeemed enough for my Purpoſe. But the great Character of CICERO, who transferred the *Greek* Philoſophy to *Rome*, and, as you juſtly obſerve, *explained to his Countrymen, in the moſt perſpicuous Manner, whatever the Antients had taught in every Article, whether of ſpeculative or practical Knowledge*, made it proper to examine his Sentiments on this Point. And though it might be fairly enough concluded, that he muſt believe with his *Maſters*, eſpecially

eſpecially as he held with them that general Principle I ſpeak of above, yet two Reaſons induced me to give the ſhort Diſſertation I ſent you. The one was, that the common Prejudice runs the other Way, contracted from ſeveral Paſſages in his Works, delivered either *exoterically* or under a *foreign* Character. The other Reaſon was, that my Notion of the Manner in which the *Romans* received the *Greek* Philoſophy ſeemed, at firſt Sight, to weaken my Concluſion of *Tully's* believing with his Maſters; ſo that it was proper to ſhew, that that Notion might be turned the other Way, to the Support of the Concluſion.

I ſhall now conſider your Objections to the four Points I go upon, in the Diſſertation I ſent you.

1. Againſt what I urged concerning the *double Doctrine*, you ſay, *whatever Effect this had in* Greece, *where that Way of Teaching ſeems to have been dropp'd long before* Tully, *it certainly had none in* Rome. The *Double-Doctrine* I take to have been of the *Eſſence* of the *Greek* Philoſophy, and therefore inſeparable from it. For the Fact, I appeal to the Writings of the later Stoics and Platoniſts that are come down to us, and to the Teſtimonies of *Clemens Alex. Origen, Syneſius, Saluſt* the Philoſopher, *Apuleius*, and many others. That the *Academics* practiſed it we have *Tully's* own Word, in a Fragment preſerved by St. *Auſtin*, "Mos fuit "*Academicis occultandi ſententiam ſuam nec eam cuiquam niſi qui* "*ſecum ad ſenectutem uſque vixiſſent aperiendi.*" That the *Stoics at Rome* uſed it, I think, *Seneca's* Works clearly ſhew; and that the *Academics* of that Place did the ſame, may be ſeen by a Quotation below, from *Ac. Qu.* l. 4. *c.* 18. Nor is this Mode of teaching, which ſo conſtantly occurs in antient Authors, ever ſpoken of as a Thing diſuſed or become obſolete. You add—*or at leaſt in* Tully's *Writings; the End and Purpoſe of which was, to explain to his Countrymen in the moſt perſpicuous Manner whatever the Antients had taught, &c.* Now becauſe this was indeed the End of moſt of his philoſophic Writings, I conclude they were of that

that Kind which (to uſe *Tully's* own Words) were "popularíter "*ſcriptum, quod* ἐξωτερικον *appellabant*;" and conſequently, that, from *ſuch*, his real Sentiments were not to be gathered. Why the Diſtinction is not *oſtentatiouſly* uſed in thoſe Writings, is plain: It is agreed that the Uſe of the *double Doctrine* was to hide ſome Things from the Vulgar, which were reſerved for the Adepts; but this *End* would have been defeated by laying the myſterious *Means* open to all.

2. To my Notion of the different Manner in which the *Romans* eſpouſed a philoſophic Sect, from what was the Practice of the *Greeks*, you reply—*You ſee no Ground for the Diſtinction. If there was any between them, the* Greeks *were certainly the more diſputatious, &c.* But I do not make a diſputatious Humour a Mark of no cloſe Adherence to a Set of Opinions. On the contrary, daily Experience informs us, that no Men are ſo diſputatious as Bigots, whether in Philoſophy or Religion: And Bigots of the firſt Kind, the *Greeks* were above all other Men. But when, on the Authority of *Tully*, I ſaid, that the *Romans* uſed the *Greek* Philoſophy to aſſiſt them in their Diſputations, I urged the Fact as a Proof, that they did not embrace, as true, all the Opinions of the Sect they eſpouſed: By which I meant, that theſe ſeveral PHILOSOPHIES, as *Studies of Humanity*, (and this is *Tully's* own Expreſſion) enabled them to invent readily, and reaſon juſtly: not on the Points of that Philoſophy only, from whence the Principles or Method was taken, but on any Subject in civil Life. And this I am perſuaded is what *Tully* meant.

You go on—*Cato, you ſee, from the Teſtimony you produce, made the Stoical Doctrine his Rule of living.* By this it would ſeem as if you ſuppoſed I made no Exception to the Manner in which, I ſay, the *Romans* entered themſelves into a Sect. But my Words muſt be reſtrained to *Tully's magna pars*, who is my Authority for the Aſſertion. You add—*And though he is laugh'd at for it by* Cicero, *yet not for making Philoſophy his Rule, but that particular Philoſophy which was incompatible with common Life.* I very readily own,

that theſe Words of *Tully*, taken alone, look very much that Way; and the *diſputandi cauſa* ſeems as if the Obſervation was confined to *Stoiciſm*, for that Sect had ſo entirely engroſſed the *Dialectics*, that the Followers of *Zeno* were more commonly called *Dialectici* than *Stoici*. So *Galen* is generally called *Dialecticus*. Notwithſtanding this, it plainly appears, I think, from the Context, that the Senſe I gave the Paſſage is the true one. *Cicero* introduces his Obſervation on *Cato's* Singularity in this Manner,—"*Quoniam non eſt nobis hæc oratio habenda, aut cum imperita multi-*"*tudine, aut in aliquo conventu agreſtium, audacius paullo de* ſtudiis "humanitatis, *quæ & mihi & vobis nota & jucunda ſunt, diſputabo.*" Here he declares, his Intention is not to give his Thoughts on the Stoical Philoſophy in particular (though that furniſhed the Occaſion), but on the *Greek* Philoſophy in general, *de ſtudiis humanitatis*. He then runs through the Stoical Paradoxes, and concludes, "Hæc *homo ingenioſiſſimus, M. C.—arripuit, &c.*" But had it been his Intention to confine his Obſervation to the Stoics, he muſt have ſaid *hanc*, not *hæc*; eſpecially when he ſays it was taken up *diſputandi cauſa*; for *hæc* refers to the foregoing Paradoxes, which had no Uſe in the Art of Diſputation; *that* was the Province of their Metaphyſics.

On the whole it appears, that the Words in queſtion were ſpoken of the *Greek* Philoſophy in general: And as *Cicero* laughed at Thoſe who took it up *vivendi*, we muſt conclude, he eſpouſed it *diſputandi* cauſa. If you doubt this, I can give you *Tully's* own Word for it in this very Oration. "*Fatebor, enim, Cato, me quo-*"*que in adoleſcentia*, diffiſum ingenio meo, quæſiſſe adjumenta Doc-"trinæ." Which, in other Words, is, I myſelf eſpouſed a *Grecian* Sect *diſputandi cauſa*. And this is full enough for the Purpoſe of my Diſcourſe, where it is only given as *one of the Cauſes* of the Difficulty in coming at *Tully's* real Sentiments.

3. I make the *Nature* of *Tully's* Sect of Philoſophy another *Cauſe*. But you ſay, when I call the Way of the *Academy perfectly ſceptical, I ſeem to confound it with a different Sect, whoſe diſtinguiſhing*

tinguishing Character was to doubt of every Thing. If that was the Character of the Sect you hint at, I am afraid the *Academy* will be found to agree but too well with it. But admitting I had *confounded* the two Sects, I do no more than what the Antients did before me. *Sextus Empiricus*, a perfect Master of this Point, if ever there was any, says, (in his *Pyrrhon. Hypot.* l. 1. c. 33.) that some of the Antients held the Academics and Sceptics to be one and the same, φασι μεν τοι τινες οτι η Ακαδημαικη φιλοσοφια η αυτη εςι τη Σκεψει. And though *Sextus* denies they were exactly the same, because, though both agreed that Truth could not be found, yet the Academics held there was a Difference in those Things which pretended to it; yet at last he owns that *Arcesilas* and *Pyrrho* had one common Philosophy. Ο μεν τοι Αρκεσιλαος, ου της μεσης Ακαδημιας ελεγομεν ειναι προςατην και αρχηγον, πανυ μοι δοκει τοις Πυρρωνειοις κοινωνειν λογοις, ως μιαν ειναι σχεδον την κατ' αυτον αγωγην και την ημετεραν. *A. Gellius*, too, assures us, that the Difference between the two Sects amounted to just nothing. "*Vetus autem quæstio & a multis* "*Scriptoribus Græcis tractata est, in quid, & quantum,* Pyrrhonios "*&* Academicos *Philosophos intersit. Utrique enim* ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ, "εφεκτικοι, απορητικοι, *dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, ni-* "*hilque comprehendi putant——differre tamen inter sese—vel maxime* "*propterea existimati sunt* Academici *quidem ipsum illud nihil posse de-* "*cerni quasi decernuut:* Pyrrhoni *ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum* "*dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.*" L. 11. c. 5.

However, when I said the Academy was *perfectly sceptical*, I meant in their *Principles* of philosophising, rather than in the *Conduct* of their Argumentation: The Remark in the first Sense being to my Purpose, in the other, not. Academics and Sceptics agreed in these Principles, "That nothing could be known, and that "every thing was to be disputed, without delivering their own "Sentiments at all." The Conclusion the *Sceptics* drew from hence, was, that nothing was to be assented to, but the Mind kept in an eternal Suspence. The *Academics*, indeed, concluded that

the probable, when it was found, ſhould be aſſented to; but till then, they were to go on with the Sceptics queſtioning, diſputing, and contradicting. And in Fact they did thus go on, without ever finding the probable in any thing, further than what was neceſſary to furniſh them with Arms for diſputing againſt every thing. This, indeed, was a Contradiction in their Scheme; but Scepticiſm is ever deſtructive of itſelf. The Miſchief was, that having allowed the probable thus far, it induced Strangers to think better of them than they deſerved; that is, to think they were conſiſtent. This I take to be the true Secret of all the Intrigues of the Academy; which *Tully* himſelf enables us to unravel.—— That nothing could be known, or ſo much as *perceived*, we have his Word. "*Opinionibus* & Inſtitutis *omnia teneri: Nihil veritati* "*relinqui: Deinceps* omnia tenebris *circumfuſa eſſe dixerunt. Itaque* "*Arceſilas negabat eſſe quidquam quod ſciri poſſet, ne* illud quidem "ipſum. *Sed* omnia *latere cenſebat in* occulto. *Neque eſſe quidquam* "*quod* cerni *aut intelligi poſſit: Quibus de cauſis nihil oportere neque pro-* "*fiteri neque affirmare quemquam, neque* aſſertione approbare." Ac. Qu. l. 1. c. 12——That every thing was to be diſputed, without interfering with their own Sentiments, he likewiſe makes the Character of the *Academy*. "*Carneades vero multo uberius iiſdem de rebus loque-* "*batur:* Non quo aperiret ſententiam ſuam *(hic enim mos patrius* "*Academicè* ADVERSARI SEMPER OMNIBUS *in diſputando) ſed*, &c. "de Orat. l. 1. c. 18. Again—Proprium *ſit Academicè* judicium "ſuum nullum interponere, *ea probare quæ ſimillima veri videantur*, "*conferre cauſas, & quid in quamque ſententiam dici poſſit expromere* "nulla adhibita ſua authoritate *judicium audientium reliquere inte-* "*grum & liberum*." De Divin. l. 2. From hence it appears, that *this probable*, which, you ſay, *they purſued as regularly, and explained as freely as any of the reſt*, was not any thing that related to their Aſſent or Approbation, but only what afforded Matter for diſputing plauſibly: It was not a *probable* to ſway their Judgments, but to inforce their Reaſoning. And what was this but being

perfectly

perfectly ſceptical? Laſtly, we have the Teſtimony of *Lucullus*, that though the Academics pretended their End was to find the probable, yet, like the Sceptics, they held their Mind in eternal Suſpence, and continued going on diſputing againſt every thing, without ever finding the probable in any thing, ſo far as to determine their Judgments——*Reſtat illud, quod dicunt veri inveniendi cauſa* contra omnia dici oportere & pro omnibus, *volo igitur videre* QUID INVENERINT? Non ſolemus, inquit, oſtendere. Acad. Qu. l. 4 c. 18. If this Anſwer was not founded on the *Double-Doctrine*, it will be hard to ſay what it drives at.—*Quæ ſunt tandem iſta myſteria? Aut cur celatis quaſi* turpe *aliquid, veſtram ſententiam.* Theſe *Myſteries* could be nothing but the *Scepticiſm* of the *Academy*; of which, I think, *Lucullus* truly ſays, *confundit vera cum falſis, ſpoliat nos judicio, privat approbatione.*

From all this I would draw theſe two Inferences. That the Genius of this Philoſophy makes it very difficult to diſcover the real Opinions of its Profeſſors; and conſequently that Dr. *Bentley* was miſtaken in ſuppoſing this to be the Key to come at *Tully's*. The other is, that *Tully* was not ſo great a Sceptic as his Sect might be ſuppoſed to make him; which I infer, as well from the Manner in which the *Romans* profeſſed the *Greek* Philoſophy, as from ſome expreſs Declarations in his Writings. If I had thought him ſo, it would be abſurd to pretend, as I have done, to find his real Sentiments; yet I think, the Principles of that Sect ſufficiently influenced him to juſtify my firſt Inference.

4. When I urged *Cicero's* Inconſiſtencies and Contradictions, as an Orator, a Stateſman, and a Teacher of the *Greek* Philoſophy, it was not to ſhew that he acted either a weak or an unfair Part (from which you have very well defended him) but that his Employment and Courſe of Life habituated him to diſſemble his Opinions. From which it might be fairly collected, that his real Sentiments were not to be diſcovered in theſe Parts of his Writings; and conſequently, that whatever he there ſays in Favour of

a *future*

future State was not to be objected to my Conclusion. This I took to be to the Purpose, as I could then urge the Passages in the Epistles with their due Force.

To my Quotation from *Tully*, *Ac. Qu. l.* 4. *c.* 20. *Jurarem, &c.* you say,—*as far as I can understand the Passage without the Context to assist me, he does not swear, as you render it, that he always speaks what he thinks*; *but only that he thinks what he is there speaking.* To determine this Point, it is, as you hint, necessary to have Recourse to the Context. *Lucullus* had been declaiming very tragically against the Academy: Part of his Accusation is given above. When *Tully* enters on its Defence, he thinks it necessary to premise something concerning himself. *Aggrediar igitur*, says he, *si pauca ante, quasi de* FAMA MEA *dixero.* He then declares, that had he embraced the Academy out of Vanity, or Love of Contradiction, it had not only reflected on his Sense, but on his Honour. *Itaque nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione id facere, quod cum de republica disceptatur fieri interdum solet: Jurarem per Jovem Deosque Penates, me & ardere studio veri reperiendi, & ea sentire quæ dicerem.* From hence I gather, that though the Question here be of the *Academic* Philosophy, and of *Cicero*, as an *Academic*, yet as he tells us he is now to vindicate himself in a Point in which his Honour was concerned, the Protestation is general, and concerns his constant turn of Mind, which always inclined him, he says, to speak his Sentiments.

Another Observation I would make, is, that *Tully* here seems to be sensible that *Lucullus* had but too much reason for his Charge against the Academics. Why else does he dis-join his Case from theirs, and take a way to secure himself, whatever became of his Sect?

You conclude this Point thus.——*And if so, it confirms what I have been saying of the Academy*; *and of its being the true Key of his Sentiments.* When I observed that the Academy was *not* the true Key of *Tully's* Sentiments, it was not because my Conclusion, concerning

cerning his Opinion of a future State, was at all influenced by the Truth or Falſhood of that Remark; but only becauſe I thought it true. For it is certain, that in all his Writings, he has never once affirmed, *in the Perſon of an Academic*, that the Doctrine of a future State was moſt *probable*.

To my Obſervation, That *Tully*, in all the Writings which he deſigned for the Public, affected an *Obſcurity*, you reply,—*this is the firſt Time that I have ever ſeen the Character of obſcure applied to Tully's Writings: Sure no Man's Stile was ever further removed from it, or more remarkably ſhining and perſpicuous than his.* By this it would ſeem as if you underſtood me to mean, "That *Tully expreſſed* "the Sentiments he delivered, *obſcurely*." So far from that, I think with you, that his Stile is clear and ſhining in a ſupreme Degree. I meant (and the Subject I was upon confined me to that Meaning, if I would not talk impertinently) he affected to obſcure his real Sentiments. This, I thought, I was warranted to ſay, not only from his Obſcurity on the Point in Queſtion, but from the Complaint of his Contemporaries; who, we find, *Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 5.* were at a loſs to know his real Sentiments. Now this Obſcurity is very conſiſtent with the utmoſt Clearneſs and Perſpicuity of Stile; as appears from his own Reply to this Complaint. For if the Reader's Ignorance of his real Sentiments in any Degree hindered them from underſtanding his Works, as it muſt have done had it aroſe from a cloudy and embaraſſed Expreſſion, he never could have condemned (as he does) their Curioſity as idle and impertinent——*qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipſi ſentiamus, curioſius id faciunt, quam neceſſe eſt.*

You juſtly call the principal Point in queſtion the Conſideration of his Letters. Here I ſhall be very ſhort. I apprehend, this Sort of Language, which he ſo often uſes in them,—"*mortem quam* "*etiam beati contemnere debeamus, propterea quod nullum ſenſum eſſet* "*habitura.—Nec enim dum ero angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa:* "*Etſi non ero ſenſu omnino carebo——præſertim cum omnium rerum*

"*mors*

" *mors fit extremum.*"——I ſay, I apprehend this to be the very Language of the Epicureans; and is beſt interpreted by his favourite Poet, *Lucretius*, who likewiſe uſes it as an Antidote againſt the Fear of Death.—

" *Scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui* NON ERIMUS *tum,*
" *Accidere omnino poterit* SENSUMQUE *movere.*

You think that *Tully* did believe a future State, and that the whole Turn of his Writings ſhews it. But you ſay,—*In a melancholy Hour when the Spirits are low, and the Mind under a Dejection, an Argument appears in a very different Light; Objections acquire Strength; and what humours the preſent Chagrine, finds the readieſt Admiſſion. Theſe Paſſages were evidently of this Kind, written in his deſponding Moments, and, as you ſay, when he himſelf moſt wanted Conſolation.*

To this give me Leave to reply, It is allowed that a deſponding Temper, like that of *Cicero's*, would in a melancholy Hour be always inclined to ſuſpect the worſt. But to what is its Suſpicion confined? Without doubt to the Iſſue of that very Affair which occaſioned the Diſtreſs. A melancholy Hour would have juſt the contrary Influence on his other Cogitations. And this is the wiſe Diſpoſition of Nature; that the leſs Support the Mind has perſuaded itſelf, it ſhall find, in one Quarter, the more it endeavours to make it up, in an Abundance of Hope from another. So that, unleſs *Cicero* was made differently from all other Men, one may venture to ſay, his Hopes of *future Good* (had *Philoſophy* permitted him to entertain any Hopes at all) would have riſen in Proportion to his Fears of the *preſent.*

I come to your *P. S.* in which I find myſelf obliged to you for your kind Enquiries into the Progreſs of my Work. I have nothing to apprehend in Diſcredit to the Method of it, but the Application of that Method to Caſes which will not bear it. The Inſtance you give me of the Tract on the *Sabbatic Year* is one of theſe

theſe Caſes. I ſuppoſe an internal Proof can never be drawn from thence of the Divinity of the *Moſaic Miſſion*; though for Reaſons different from yours: For I reckon, that this particular Inſtitution might be well accounted for, even on the Suppoſition of mere human Legiſlation. For all agree, that MOSES's main End was the Abolition of *Idolatry*, and Preſervation of the *Unity*. The Inſtitution of the *Sabbath* is ſhewn by *Spencer* and others to be, of all the Ceremonial, the very Rite moſt conducive to this End. So that it ſeemed to be fit, nay neceſſary, that the principal Rite, conducive to the principal End, ſhould be very well ſecured. Hence the *Sabbath* was ſupported by a *Sabbatic-Year*; and further ſtrengthened by a Year of *Jubilee*. As to the civil Conſequences of a Sabbatic-Year; a Relaxation from Culture, in the Proportion it required, muſt be extremely uſeful to ſuch a Soil as *Judæa*, which, to preſerve its Fertility, required a Remiſſion of at leaſt one Year in ſeven. A *partial Reſt*, of the ſeveral Parts, in Rotation, had, indeed, been the eligible Way, had nothing elſe been to be conſidered. But, on *this*, no Sabbatic Rite could have been founded. So that a total and periodic Ceſſation from Culture was neceſſary. But then, by a wiſe Proviſion in other Parts of the Inſtitution, *Moſes* obviated the Inconveniencies that ſometimes ariſe from a *total Reſt*. To ſpeak only of that which forbad Commerce with Strangers (and, for the ſame End, *viz.* to prevent Idolatry) from whence would follow their having greater Stores of Corn than could be conſumed. And the Sabbatic-Year being fixed, and the Event of it foreſeen, they had Warning and Ability to lay in Supplies for that Defect. To this, if we add, that, though, in the *Sabbatic-Year*, they did not enjoy the Fruits of Culture, yet, what came without, they were at Liberty to uſe, we muſt I think conclude, that a wiſe Legiſlator, who found Uſe in a *Sabbatic-Year*, for the Advancement of his Ends, would venture to inſtitute it, though he had no Expectation of a miraculous Supply; as the natural Conſequences were ſo little to be dreaded.

There is but one ſolid Objection, humanly ſpeaking, to this Inſtitution, that I know of; which is this, that, when the *Jews* fell under a foreign Dominion, their Maſters made them pay Tribute on the *Sabbatic-Year*. And this indeed was a heavy Oppreſſion. But it reflects not at all on the Wiſdom of the Lawgiver. For if *Moſes* had, as he pretended a divine Character, foreign Dominion was a Puniſhment for Idolatry; and theſe Circumſtances made that Dominion a Puniſhment in the Degree it was intended. But if *Moſes* was a mere human Lawgiver, it had been impertinent to have provided for this Caſe; becauſe, from his Knowledge of the World, he would have concluded, that ſuch foreign Dominion muſt have been the Diſſolution of his Republic, and, conſequently, attended with a ſpeedy Obliteration of its Rites.

Having cleared up this Matter, and diſengaged it from all Relation to mine, I proceed to conſider what it is that ſticks with you in my Caſe, and hinders you from giving me that full Aſſent to my Opinions, which I ſhould be always ambitious of gaining.

You think, *ſome may be apt to ſay that in this Matter of a future State, Moſes had overlooked what could not be omitted without Ruin to Religion; for the Conſequence of his Omiſſion was this, the People were perpetually apoſtatizing, either to the Superſtitions of Egypt, or the Idolatries of Canaan: And tired with the Load of their Ceremonies, wholly dropp'd them at laſt; and ſunk into all Kinds of Vice and Profaneneſs; till the Prophets, in order to revive and preſerve a Senſe of Religion amongſt them, began to preach up the rational Duties of Morality, and inſinuate the Doctrine of a future State.*

You think, *it may be ſaid, Moſes had overlooked what could not be omitted without Ruin of Religion.* But, whatever other Concluſion may be drawn from your Premiſes, I think I have obviated and excluded *this*, by ſhewing that my Adverſaries the Deiſts have, with full Conſent, allowed, that *Moſes was a conſummate Lawgiver.* And, but upon that Principle, indeed, they could never, with any Plauſibility, deny *Moſes* a foreign, that is, a *divine* Aſſiſtance.

Now

Now the chief Part of Legiſlation is perfectly to underſtand the various Effects Religion has on Mankind. But as the Conceſſion of our Adverſaries is a very ſlippery Security; and, at beſt, the reſting on it is often only arguing *ad hominem*, by which nothing can be ſhewn but the Inconſiſtency of thoſe with whom we have to deal, I have *ſecured* their Conceſſion by the Inforcement of many Inſtances, which ſhew *Moſes's* great Skill in Legiſlation; and make it very improbable that ſo great a Maſter in his Art ſhould blunder ſo ſtrangely in the very firſt Principle of it; a Principle that chiefly diſtinguiſhed the School He came from.

But you ſay, *The People were perpetually apoſtatizing either to the Superſtitions of Egypt, or the Idolatries of Canaan.* It is certain they were. But this makes nothing for your Inference, unleſs it could be ſhewn, that they ſought a *future State* in thoſe Superſtitions, as a Support for Religion. But this was by no Means the Caſe. You yourſelf give another, and indeed the true Reaſon; *they were tired with the Load of their Ceremonies.* And no Wonder, for they were chaſte and ſevere, and in *that*, rather than in their *Number*, different from the Ceremonies of their Neighbours, which were performed with all the Jollity, and Lubricity, that a profligate People were capable of inventing.

If we ſuppoſe the Omiſſion of a future State inclined them to this Defection from the Law of *Moſes*, one of theſe two Effects muſt have followed, which did not: Were they vicious and debauched, they would have ſunk into Irreligion, and rejected the Doctrine of Providence: were they virtuous, they would have borrowed the Doctrine of a future State from their Neighbours, and nothing more than what depended on it. And I ſay not this at Random. For though, at the Time in queſtion, this was not the Caſe of the *Jewiſh* People, either to be virtuous, or under the ordinary Diſpenſation of Providence; yet there was a Time, during the *Jewiſh* Commonwealth, when theſe two Circumſtances met together; and, at that preciſe Time, they did what I here ſuppoſe,

in such Circumstances, they must needs do; that is, borrow of their Pagan Neighbours this Doctrine of a *future State*, and no more. I conclude, therefore, that, whatever it was which occasioned their frequent Apostacy, it could not be the Omission of the Doctrine of a future State, because we find no Connexion between the supposed Cause and Effect.

You go on and say, ——*And tired with the Load of their Ceremonies, wholly dropped them at last, and sunk into all Kinds of Vice and Prophaneness, till the Prophets, in order to revive and preserve a Sense of Religion amongst them, began to preach up the rational Doctrines of Morality, and insinuate the Doctrine of a future State.*

I presume this cannot be the exact Case, even from your own Representation. For if they *had wholly dropp'd the Ceremonies* at the Time of the coming of the Prophets, *These*, who profess the Intent of their Mission to be the Re-establishment of the Law of *Moses*, should have begun their Preaching with the Necessity of observing the Ceremonies: Whereas they did, as you say, and as the Bible assures us, *begin with preaching up the rational Duties of Morality*. This seems to shew, that the *Jews* rather *stuck to their Ceremonies*, to the Violation of the Duties of Morality, than that they had *wholly dropped them*. And Scripture warrants this Conclusion, *To what Purpose* (says God by the Prophet *Isaiah*) *is the Multitude of your Sacrifices? I am full of your Burnt-Offerings, and I delight not in the Blood of Bulls or of Lambs. Bring no more vain Oblations. Incense is an Abomination to me. The new Moons and Sabbaths, the calling of Assemblies I cannot away with. Your new Moons and your appointed Feasts my Soul hateth.* This looks like a very strict Adherence to their Ceremonies. Here we see, the Fastidium, the loathing, comes from *God*, and not from the *People*. From whence I would beg Leave to observe, that though we can, from the Circumstances above mentioned, see the Reason why the Prophets should preach up Righteousness, in Preference to Ceremonies, when these had got the upper Hand; yet, without looking

looking further, we can never account for it, why God is brought in, ſpeaking with ſo much Contempt and Hatred of a Law of his own giving. We cannot, I ſay, account for this, without admitting the *common Notions of Theology*, which teach that it was to prepare the People for a *new Diſpenſation*. And if we conſider how much more and more the People grew beſotted with their *Ceremonies* even to the coming of Chriſt, we ſhall perhaps be induced to think well of this Explanation.

You add, in the laſt Place,——*And inſinuate the Doctrine of a future State.* You muſt ſuppoſe this was done to ſupply *Moſes's* Omiſſion of it, or it makes nothing for your Purpoſe. But, if this were the Intention, it was very prepoſterouſly executed.

1. Becauſe it was, as you yourſelf confeſs, *only an Inſinuation*. And it was the Practice (and indeed the Neceſſity of the Thing ſpeaks it) for all Lawgivers, when they employed this Sanction of a future State, to inculcate it, not by *Inſinuation*, but in the moſt open and explicit Manner.

2. Becauſe this *Inſinuation* of the Prophets was ſo extremely obſcure, that, when afterwards the Leaders of the *Jewiſh* People ſaw indeed a Neceſſity of introducing the Doctrine, they found ſo little in the Prophets to build upon, that they reſted the Revelation of it ſolely on Tradition.

3. But it is ſtill more evident from what follows, that the Doctrine of a future State was not *inſinuated* for the End you ſuppoſe: There was a Period in the *Jewiſh* State, as is here hinted at, and will be proved at large in my Book, when the Governors of it found it neceſſary to ſupply this Omiſſion. But how did they do it? Not by dark *Inſinuations* like their Predeceſſors, but in the plaineſt and moſt expreſs Manner, like the Gentile Lawgivers. And leſt it ſhould be thought, that the Supplial of the Omiſſion *now* did in any wiſe derogate from the Perfection of the *Moſaic* Scheme, I ſhew, that this was done at that preciſe Time when God had withdrawn his *extraordinary Providence*. Nor was this

Rabbinical

Rabbinical Doctrine, of a future State, any Revelation from God, but compoſed of Parts picked up from amongſt their Pagan Neighbours, varniſhed over indeed with the Authority of thoſe dark prophetic Inſinuations. Which appears, as from many other Particulars, ſo eſpecially from this, that it was founded on the Pythagoric Metempſychoſis, which at this Time was the general Mode of the Pagan future State.

On the whole then it appears, that no good Account can be given of the Conduct of the Prophets, in this Matter of *Inſinuation*, if their End was what you ſuppoſe. But take in the Scheme of a *new Diſpenſation*, and all becomes clear and full of Wiſdom. For a future State, taught by Revelation, is not *immediately* founded on the ſame Principle with *that* taught by natural Religion. The latter ſtands *immediately* on this Principle, *That God is juſt, and will give to every one according to his Works*; therefore, if the Diſtribution of Good and Evil be not made here, it will be hereafter. But the future State of Revelation ſtands only *mediately* on this, and *immediately* on its being a *Reſtoration to a loſt Inheritance, purchaſed by a Redeemer*. Now, though the other Mode of a future State might be taught clearly and explicitly at any Time, yet, it is evident, that *this* could not be preached up till the Time of that *Reſtoration* and *Redemption*. The Redeemer and his Work muſt be coeval, and go Hand in Hand. Accordingly, we find, that when the Prophets gave *dark Inſinuations* of the *Redeemer*, they gave *dark Inſinuations* of *Redemption*, at the ſame Time: But more, they could not do. And this I preſume is a reaſonable Account of their Conduct in their *inſinuating* (as you rightly ſay they did) *the Doctrine of a future State*.

You have now, Sir, my Thoughts on your Objection, which, acute and learned as it is (and it is ſo in a high Degree), is yet, by what I can ſee, founded in that Paralogiſm of *non cauſa pro cauſa*.

To deal ingenuouſly with you, I think the frequent Relapſes of the *Jews* into Idolatry has ſomething, at firſt View, very ſhocking

on

on the Revelation-Scheme. But then I think the *Objection* which may be raiſed, on this Circumſtance, holds rather againſt my Concluſion *directly*, than, as you put it, by the *Medium* of my Premiſes. As thus,—" If the *Jews* were, indeed, under an extraordinary Providence, how could they poſſibly relapſe ſo often into " Idolatry ? That Relapſe implying a Rejection of the Truth of " the Religion delivered to them by *Moſes*." Now though this has the Appearance of Weight, yet I ſuſpect it receives it all from the Influence which a *Set of mere modern* Ideas has upon us. To *embrace a new Religion*, and to *condemn the old of Falſhood*, are Actions ſo inſeparable, and go ſo conſtantly together, that the Union ſeems founded in the Nature of Things. But, in Truth, the Aſſociation is accidental and arbitrary : and more than that, unknown to the Antients, as I have hinted at in the third Part of my Book of the *Alliance :* Now, if this Obſervation be well founded, it will be no Diminution to its Credit, that it is capable of being applied to the Solution of more Difficulties than one. The antient Pagans, poſſeſſed with the Notion of local Deities, to whom the ſeveral Parts of the Earth were divided into Shares, readily credited the Truth of one another's Revelations, and as readily, on any ſiniſter Accident, went over to one another's Religion. And though the *Jewiſh* Law obviated and condemned this Principle of *Intercommunity*, it was no Wonder that a People bred up under that univerſal Prejudice, and who had ſeveral Inſtitutions, which, by prejudiced Minds, might be thought to look that way, ſhould be apt to go into ſuch Viſions. That they did, I will venture to ſay their whole Hiſtory ſhews ; as in many other Particulars, ſo in this, that in their frequent Defections they did not lay aſide the *Moſaic* Worſhip, but only polluted and corrupted it by a large Mixture of Pagan Rites.

If then it be allowed, that the *Jews*, when they fell into Idolatry, did not reject the *Jewiſh* Religion *as a falſe Pretence to Revelation*, all the Force of the Objection vaniſhes. And I

have

have obſerved above what ſtrong Temptations a vicious People had to neglect ſuch a Religion as that of *Moſes*, for ſuch a one as that of *Canaan*.

I am, &c.

Newark, Sept. 20,
1736.

W. WARBURTON.

LETTERS

LETTERS*

BETWEEN

DR. LOWTH AND DR. WARBURTON.

LETTER I.

To the Reverend Dr. Warburton.

Dear Sir, *Winchester, Sept.* 9, 1756.

OUR good Friends Dr. C. and Mr. S. have agreably to your deſire communicated to me ſome particulars of the converſation, which you have lately had with them relating to me: from which I collect, that you think you have reaſon to be offended with me on account of ſome things which I have ſaid in my Prelections on the ſubject of the Book of Job, which you look upon as aimed againſt you; and that you expect that I ſhould explain myſelf on this head. I am much obliged to you for the regard which you

* Theſe Letters (firſt publiſhed by Dr. Lowth) ſhew the grounds of that miſunderſtanding which had taken place between the writers of them in 1756; and the amicable manner in which it was compoſed. For the revival of it in 1766, ſee the Life.

have been pleaſed to expreſs for me, and for your candid and generous manner of dealing with me on this occaſion: and I ſhall endeavour to return it by dealing as fairly and as openly with you.

The Reaſons for my treating of the Book of Job in the manner which I have done, leſt they ſhould be miſtaken, I have there given; and that I might not give offence, have prefaced thoſe Lectures with an Apology, which was perhaps unneceſſary. Having examined and conſidered the Subject as well as I was able, I found myſelf obliged to differ in opinion from ſeveral Writers of great Authority in the Republic of Letters; ſuch as Grotius, Le Clerc, Biſhop Hare, Yourſelf, and many others: it was not my buſineſs, and much leſs was it my deſire, to enter into a formal diſpute with any one; all I had to do was to declare in a few words my own ſentiments, and to explain my Hypotheſis, ſo far as to make myſelf underſtood, when I came to treat of the ſubject; which it was abſolutely neceſſary for me to treat of, as being a principal and eſſential part of my plan. I thought the Book of Job the moſt antient extant, that it had no relation to the affairs of the Iſraelites, that it was neither Allegorical nor properly Dramatic; in all which I diſagreed not only with You, but with one, or other, or all, of the Authors above-mentioned, and a hundred others, whom I need not name to you now, nor was it at all more neceſſary for me to name them then. You ſeem to think I ought to have quoted you, or referred to your Book: and a Friend of yours charges me with writing againſt you, and being afriad of you. Your Friend is miſtaken in both theſe particulars; and the ground of your complaint I cannot poſſibly comprehend. Why ſhould I ſingle out you, and attack you for opinions, which were common to you with twenty other Authors of note? Would this have been a mark of reſpect to you? Would it not rather have argued a buſy and a litigious ſpirit in me? There were ſeveral living Writers of great Learning and Eminence, who ſtood juſt in the ſame ſituation with regard to me, that you did. What ſhould I have done? Should

I have

I have agreed with you all? That was impoſſible. Should I have complimented you all, or ſhould I have contended with you all? To have done either would have been equally unneceſſary and impertinent. I have never heard, that any of thoſe Gentlemen have been offended with me, for acting with reſpect to them juſt in the ſame manner as I have done with reſpect to you.

But You too it ſeems think, that I have written againſt you; that is, that I have aimed at you in particular, and attacked opinions that are peculiarly yours. I have upon this occaſion taken a review of your Diſſertation, and of my own Lectures, and cannot find upon what it is that you ground this charge. I have marked the paſſages in the latter which ſeemed moſt likely to have given you umbrage, and beg you would give yourſelf the trouble to turn to them. P. 312. *Nunquam in dubium*, &c. this cannot poſſibly be underſtood of you, being plainly reſtrained to thoſe who conclude, that if the Poem be Parabolical, therefore the Story is Fictitious: the abſurdity of which you yourſelf expoſe. In p. 319, I refer to the diſpute on the Text ſuppoſed to relate to the Reſurrection; to the Biſhop of London, Dr. Hodges, &c. I believe, I had not you then in my thoughts: however, if I had, I ſee nothing that ſhould offend you or any one. P. 320, obſerve, that I ſpeak of the opinion, that the Poem is Dramatic, as what has for ſome time almoſt univerſally prevailed among the Learned. Beſide, I do not ſee how the queſtion, whether the Poem be ſtrictly Dramatic or not, at all affects your main argument. So that this Diſcourſe upon the whole cannot be ſuppoſed to be directed particularly againſt you. In the next page I point out more particularly the Authors whom I have in view, by uſing their own expreſſions: *loquuntur enim*, &c. To give you full ſatisfaction here, and at the ſame time to ſave you and myſelf the trouble of a multitude of references, I beg leave to refer you only to two ſhort paſſages: Biſhop Hare's note at the end of the CVIIth Pſalm; and Calmet's Preface to Job, about the middle, the Paragraph begins with, *Mais*

ſans nier, &c. where you will find enough to account for every thing I have there ſaid, and even for every expreſſion which I have uſed. If there are any other paſſages which offend you as meant of you particularly, I aſſure you moſt ſincerely that they have eſcaped my notice; be ſo good as to point them out to me, and I will endeavour to give you further ſatisfaction.

Upon the whole, I did not mean to offend, neither do I think I have given any cauſe of offence. The ſubject lay at leaſt as much in my way, as it did in yours: I had as good a right to purſue my ſubject, and to deliver my ſentiments with freedom, as you had. I could not have ſpoken upon it at all without diſſenting from you in conjunction with many others, and I don't know how I could have ſignified my diſſent more inoffenſively. I cannot have miſrepreſented your particular notions, for I never intended to repreſent them at all, nor had I any thing to do with them. Nay, as far as I can recollect, I verily believe, that at the time when I wrote thoſe Lectures I had not your book before me; ſo far was it from my intention to cavil at your Diſſertation. In a word, my Lectures, and every expreſſion in them, might have ſtood juſt as they do now, though your Diſſertation on Job had never been written.

I beg the continuance of that regard and eſteem, which you have been ſo kind as to expreſs towards me: I will not now tell you how highly I ſhall prize it: your Friend above-mentioned, the Author of the Diſſertation on the Delicacy of Friendſhip, has ſtopped my mouth, and makes me very cautious of ſaying any thing that may be conſtrued into flattery or fear of you. I call him your Friend, becauſe I ſuppoſe he pretends to be ſo: what your opinion of him is, I cannot tell; but I think you owe him little thanks for his pains. He has at leaſt ſhewn more zeal than diſcretion in the undertaking, and more malevolent wit than good ſenſe or honeſt intention in the performance; the manifeſt tendency of which is to ſow ſtrife, and to foment diſcord; and its natural effect, if it has

any,

any, must be to lessen the number of those, who wish well to you and your designs: and I say so much of it in order to assure you, that it will not have that effect with me.

As to my opinions, if they stand at all in your way, and if you should think them worthy of your notice, I ask not your favour for them: you will treat them as you shall think your own cause and the cause of truth requires. I do not as yet see any reason to depart from them; but am not so fond of them, as to be inclined to enter into a dispute with any one in defence of them. I shall be offended with no man merely for differing from me in sentiment upon any subject; much less upon points so very doubtful, and upon which no two persons, out of all that examine and judge for themselves, either ever have agreed, or probably ever will perfectly agree. As to the manner in which you shall treat them, I leave it entirely to your own consideration; I shall be very little concerned about it. If you use me otherwise than I deserve, your own character will suffer, and not mine. Lay aside all regard to me upon this occasion; but respect Yourself and the Public.

I am, Dear Sir,

Your most obedient

humble Servant,

R. LOWTH.

LETTER

LETTER II.

To the Reverend Dr. Lowth.

Dear Sir, *Prior Park*, [*Sept.*] 17, 1756.

I HAD, this day, the favour of your Letter of the 9th, and think my ſelfe much obliged to our two Brethren for this good office, which I hope will have the deſired effect: And to promote it, all I can, I will follow your example in the frankneſs and openneſs of this eclairciſſement.

My complaint was not for your differing from me; nor yet for your manner of expreſſing that difference; but for, what I I conceived to be, a miſrepreſenting me.—You yourſelfe ſhall be judge. P. 64—non eo quod *permanere poſt mortem animos non crederent*, quod doctis quibuſdam placuit; ſed——You won't deny that I am here meant. Yet you might have underſtood by my book, that I hold, "that the early, as well as later, Jews believed the permanency of the Soul; only, having nothing, in their Law, of a ſtate of future rewards and puniſhments, the early Jews had no intereſting reflections concerning that permanency, and paid no attention to it.

P. 65—neque eos hac in parte vel minimum ſacri codices adjuvere; haud quia hanc iis cognitionem *invideret* Divina Revelatio, ſed quia—Was it not invidious, to inſinuate that I had repreſented divine Revelation as *envying* or grudging the Jews this bleſſing? when I had ſhewn the reaſon to be, that it did not belong to their Oeconomy; not for that ſtrange reaſon, quia humanæ mentis conditio eam omnino non recipiat, but becauſe the doctrine of life and immortality

immortality was reſerved for another Teacher. I call your reaſon, a ſtrange one, becauſe the moſt ignorant and unlettered are capable of comprehending all that Chriſtianity teaches concerning this matter. But I apprehend, in the words I here allude to, you entirely miſtake the queſtion you was upon——Qualis itaque ab animis a corpore ſejunctis vita viveretur, quis eorum locus, forma, conditio, Hebræi *juxta cum cæteris mortalibus* in ſumma ignoratione verſabantur. For the queſtion was not, Whether the reſt of mankind had *juſter* notions of the ſtate and condition of the ſoul in a ſtate of ſeparation; but Whether they had not the rational beliefe of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments in general, which the Jews wanted. It is this alſo, which is the proper ſubject for *poetic* ornament, (the thing you are upon) not the metaphyſic truth of things, which is too meagre for this entertainment; (as you may ſee by the 6th B. of Virgil) as well as too abſtracted for the *condition of the human mind.*

P. 321.—Cum Poema Jobi pro *vero* ac *legitimo* Dramate *cujuſmodi ſunt Græcorum Tragœdiæ* minime haberi poſſe contenderem—Had the reflection ended here, I could not poſſibly have gueſſed whom you had in your eye: Becauſe, I believe, no critic on this ſide the Cape of Good Hope ever ſaid or thought, the book of Job to be of the ſpecies of the Greek Drama. But when I read the following words—Hoc autem ut concedamus, vix erit ſatis; Sunt qui majus quiddam poſtulare videntur. Loquuntur enim de rerum conſtitutione, de Cataſtrophe dramatis, Θεον απο μηχανης induci dicunt——iiſdem certe vocibus utuntur, &c. When I read this, I ſay, I could no longer doubt, that *I only* was meant; becauſe I ſpeak of all theſe things; and of the *God from the machine*, no one could ſpeak but me; becauſe no one elſe, in their interpretations of the book of Job, contended for the thing underſtood by it. You ſeem your ſelfe to have been ſenſible that this needed a ſoftening, by your corrective,—*iiſdem certe vocibus utuntur.* Perhaps though, you may think, that my applying the terms of the Greek ſtage, to this

this book, fairly inferred that I ſuppoſed the writing to be of the ſame ſpecies. If ſo, give me leave to obſerve, I could do no other, tho' I thought it of a different ſpecies. Whoever goes about to ſhew that a work is of ſuch or ſuch a *genus*, if he would write intelligibly he cannot avoid uſing the terms of that *ſpecies* of it, which is beſt known or underſtood. Thus when I ſay, Religion compoſes a *Society*, and, in my account of the nature of this Society, I make uſe of the words, Magiſtrates, Laws, Sanctions (words which properly belong to civil Society) am I to be underſtood as holding, that Religion is of that *Species*, called civil Society, or that it is of the *genus* only of Society? But to prove, you are diſpoſed to do as much honour to the book of Job as any man, you conclude, by ſhewing, that the book has not all the artifice of the Greek drama; yet the Compoſer was capable of giving it that advantage.—— Profecto qui reputabit, &c. is nunquam poterit ſine ſumma admiratione intueri tot ante ſæculis natum Poema, tam pulchre inventum, tam ſolerter diſpoſitum, tam perfecte expletum, tam ſingularis exempli; quod ſimilitudinem atque imaginem quandam Dramatis ſtatim arripuit, unde non difficile fuiſſet ad ipſum abſoluti operis exemplar aſcendere, &c. Which would put one in mind of the religious caution of good Sir R. Blackmore, who, in his paraphraſe of this famous book, aſſures us, that though he will not poſitively affirm, that Job actually *waſhed his feet in butter*, yet he makes it plainly out, that Job's Dairy afforded butter enough for that purpoſe.

And now, Sir, reflect a little without prejudice: and aſk your ſelfe, Whether theſe paſſages bear the leaſt mark of good, or even of indifferent will, towards me; tho' I ſhould allow (as I am very ready to do) that you had no formed intention of miſrepreſenting me.

If you ſhould ſay, your deſign was that they ſhould neither bear the marks of good, or of evil will, towards me (this neutrality being all, as your letter ſeems to him, I had to expect of you)

you) then let me go on to a paſſage or two, which ſeem to ſpeak your diſpoſition ſtill ſtronger.

P. 312.—nimirum carmen hoc in Iſraelitarum ſolatium compoſitum fuiſſe, eorumque res aliquo modo adumbrare; quam ipſum eſſe VANISSIMUM arbitror: cum morum, rituum, rerum Iſraliticarum *nulla veſtigia*, nullam ſpeciem, aut umbram reperio. I dare appeal to your ingenuity, that I muſt needs be here meant. And will your politeneſs allow you to ſay, that the *vaniſſimum* was civil; or your modeſty, that the *nulla veſtigia* was decent, when I believe moſt competent readers are agreed, that there are infinitely more and ſtronger marks that the affairs under the Theocracy are alluded to, than that Auguſtus is ſhadowed under Virgil's Hero. Nor can I well reconcile this dogmatical ſentence with what you ſay in your letter, of the *ſo doubtful* nature of the queſtion we are divided about, where you attempt to ſhew how little reaſon I have to be offended with thoſe who differ from me.

Again you ſay, Nunquam in dubium vocata fuiſſet Hiſtoriæ [Jobi] veritas, niſi Allegoriarum Conquiſitoribus tantum placuiſſent ſuæ fictiones, ut nihil amplecti vellent quod non umbratile eſſet & commentitium. Now I will readily allow, that if, by theſe Allegoriſers you mean thoſe who annihilate the litteral ſenſe, you could not mean me; becauſe, as you obſerve, I have expoſed their folly. But would it have been more than juſtice, when you uſed ſuch general expreſſions, to have diſtinguiſhed my Allegory from theirs? Again, If it ſhould be aſked, Why ſo much unwillingneſs to have the book of Job an Allegory, and ſo much readineſs to admitt Solomon's Song to be an *entire Allegory?* Could you give a better reaſon than this, that the latter opinion is eſtabliſhed orthodoxy, and the former, yet, a paradox? But, a word in your ear? Can you poſſibly be ſerious in ſaying, of Solomon's Song, *omnino eſſe Allegoricum?* I pay you a compliment in this queſtion; tho' I made it only to ſhew you, that I treat you in the freedom and confidence of a friendly Altercation.

To proceed with your Letter. The general turn of it is to ſhew me, that I am unreaſonable in expecting common civilities from you, in a book where I lay ſo much in your way. Now give me leave to think, you ſeem neither rightly to underſtand your ſelfe, nor me. My ſervices to Religion and Society ſeem to intitle me to common reſpect, when my opinions are controverted and decried, from every man of letters, engaged in the ſame cauſe, where no perſonal animoſities have intervened. To *neglect* this, is not knowing the world: to *decline* it muſt be from fear of giving offence. If therefore the Author of the *delicacy of friendſhip* thought, a Writer of ſo much caution and reſerve, might be as backward to give offence to *me*, as to others, and for the ſame prudential reaſons, he was very excuſable, in his conjecture.

But you tell me, you are not afraid of me; and you affect to tell me ſo, again and again. All I will ſay to this is, that whoever injures me may not, at the long run, have reaſon to applaud his ſituation. But no man need be afraid of him he has not injured. And I am very ready to believe, that it is a conſciouſneſs of that, which makes you ſo brave. For my own part, I am not fond of reſenting that, as an injury, which was never intended.

You ſpeak your ſentiments of the Author and the Pamphlet on the *delicacy of friendſhip*: allow me to tell you mine. You make it a kind of queſtion, whether he be my friend. This is natural. Your notion of the commerce, amongſt learned men, in letters, may make you a little dazzled with ſuch a friendſhip, in the commerce of life. The Author, (if I know who was the Author, for the pamphlet was publiſhed before I had ſo much as heard of the contents) is a man of very ſuperior talents of genius, learning, and virtue; indeed a principal ornament of the age he lives in: ſo that was I to wiſh a bleſſing to the man I was moſt obliged to, I could not wiſh him a greater than the friendſhip of ſuch a perſon. And I not only hold my ſelfe highly honoured, and obliged to him,

for

for this mark of his good will towards me, but think the diſcourſe very ſerviceable to men of Letters, if they would condeſcend to make a proper uſe of it. He tries, in the fineſt irony in the world, to ſhame them out of that deteſtable turn of mind which, either out of a low envy is unwilling to give merit its due, or out of mean and baſe apprehenſions, dare not do it, for fear of its being unacceptable to their Superiors: And it was impoſſible for him to have choſen a properer object of his ſatire than the man he has choſen. The only thing blamable, and which, by the way, is the only real ground of offence, is his extravagant commendation of me. And if the generoſity and *immoderate* warmth of a friendly heart will not excuſe him (as it would be a wonder if ſo unexperienced a thing, ſhould) I know myſelfe ſo well, as to be conſcious, he has nothing better to urge.

To draw to a concluſion. You ſay, I am at liberty to purſue my own meaſures, *if your opinions ſtand at all in my way.* I will aſſure you, they do not. If I had any purpoſe of examining them, it was only while I thought my ſelfe injuriouſly treated. You aſſure me I was not. The negligence of it, I can very well bear.

However, you adviſe me to *reſpect my ſelfe and the Public.* How ready I am to follow it, you may underſtand by my paſt conduct. Can more reſpect be ſhewn the Public, by an Author, than by never giving any thing to them but what he deemed of high importance to the intereſts of Religion and Society? And can juſter reſpect be ſhewn to my ſelfe, than, when I have been attacked, in the moſt injurious manner, by above a hundred Scribblers of all ranks and profeſſions, never to committ my ſelfe with above two or three? not to mention that principal reſpect to ones ſelfe, the never *beginning* a literary altercation with any man.

It would anſwer no end to tell you, what I thought of the Author of the *Hebrew Poetry*, before I ſaw him. But this I may ſay that I was never more ſurprized, when I did ſee him, than

to find him of ſo amiable and gentle manners, of ſo modeſt, ſenſible and diſengaged a deportment. It would not have diſpleaſed me to find my ſelfe ill uſed by Pedants and Bigots; but it grieved me to think, I had any thing to explain, with ſuch a man.

You have here, Dear Sir, a faithful picture of my mind; frank but honeſt; and, if plain, yet generous; above all, a Lover of Truth and good Men: Not the moſt forbearing when I think myſelf ill treated; but ready to be reconciled by the leaſt ſhadow of a ſatisfaction.

Such as I am, I am at your ſervice; that is,

Your faithful and very obedient Servant,

W. W.

LETTER

LETTER III.

To the Reverend Dr. W.

Dear Sir, *Wincheſter, Oct. 6, 1756.*

I AM in the firſt place to return you my ſincere thanks for the candor of your ſentiments and expreſſions with regard to me in ſeveral parts of the Letter with which I am favoured: for your readineſs to allow that I had no formed intention of miſrepreſenting you; to believe that I was conſcious I had not injured you; to admit of the leaſt ſhadow of a ſatisfaction; and (if I do not flatter my wiſhes by interpreting your words too much in my favour) even to honour me with your friendſhip. Your remaining ſtill unſatisfied with my expreſſions, though you abſolve me of any ill intention, is a circumſtance that makes your preſent diſpoſition towards me but the more obliging: and I ſhould make but an ill return to it, unleſs I uſed my beſt endeavours to give you perfect ſatisfaction. This taſk therefore I reſume very willingly, and with full confidence of ſucceeding in it.

I was not informed that your complaint extended to any part of my book beſide the Lectures on Job; ſo could not think of looking after any other paſſages that might be liable to ſuſpicion. But you begin with p. 64, &c. As you have totally miſtaken my deſign throughout this paſſage, and many of my expreſſions, the readieſt way to ſatisfy you with regard to it, will be to aſcertain my meaning. My purpoſe was to ſhew, that the Sacred Poets in deſcribing the State of the Dead make uſe of ſenſible Images taken from

from their manner of Sepulture; and to give the reaſons why they deſcribe it in this manner, and in this only: namely, becauſe the ſubject is really inexplicable in any other way; becauſe we have no idea of the metaphyſical nature of the Soul, of its form, ſituation, and manner of exiſtence in a ſeparate ſtate; becauſe, from the nature of the human faculties, the Inſpired Writers could have no advantage above others in this caſe; and becauſe they had no Syſtematical Metaphyſics to help them out, and to enable them to talk themſelves and others, as the modern Philoſophers do, into a perſuaſion that they really know ſomething of the matter. Theſe I ſay were the reaſons for their invariably expreſſing themſelves in this way; not that they wanted the knowledge of the permanency of the Soul after death, as certain Learned perſons have held.——So much for the courſe of my reaſoning in general: now for my particular expreſſions. "Qualis itaque—haud quia "hanc cognitionem iis invideret Divina Revelatio, ſed," &c. *hanc cognitionem*, nimirum, qualis ab animis a corpore ſejunctis vita viveretur, quis, &c. not the general Knowledge of a Future State, the plain Doctrine of Life and Immortality; but the particular Knowledge of the eſſence of the Soul, its manner of exiſtence in a ſeparate ſtate, its place, form, and condition. I had ſaid but juſt before, that the Vates Sacri, the Inſpired Writers, were poſſeſs'd of the belief of the Immortality of the Soul, and of the Reſurrection of the Body: here I ſay that the Hebrews in general, Inſpired Writers and all, were in the ſame caſe with all other mortals, and wholly deſtitute of *this* Knowledge; that is, not ſurely of the Immortality, but of the Metaphyſical Nature of the Soul. I never ſpoke of Divine Revelation's grudging the former to any: nor of the latter, as if it could be a bleſſing to any. Be ſo good now as to review this paſſage fairly, and ſee if I am chargeable with the abſurd reaſoning, the miſtaking the queſtion, the miſrepreſentations, and invidious reflections upon you, which you impute to me. I have ſaid, that the Inſpired Writers (and obſerve that I

confine

confine it to them all along) believed the Immortality of the Soul; tho' certain Learned perſons have denied, that they did believe it: are you one of thoſe Learned perſons? have you not declared your ſentiments upon that head, and in the affirmative, that the Inſpired Writers had the knowledge and belief of a Future State? have not you proved, that Moſes knew the Immortality of the Soul, and that it is deducible from his Writings? that the Prophets gave ſtrong intimations of it, and gradually revealed it? How then could you poſſibly ſuppoſe, that you were here meant? Have I ſaid one word of the national belief of the Jews, or of a Future State's being contained in, or making a part of the Moſaic diſpenſation; of its being or not being a Sanction of their Law, or any thing elſe, which could lead you away ſo totally out of ſight of my meaning? Have I expreſſed myſelf vaguely, inaccurately, obſcurely? I think, I have not; at leaſt I profeſs 'tis beyond my ability to do it better in a language not familiar to me. Did not you rather read it with prejudice, with an unreaſonable jealouſy and ſuſpicion, that determined you to take offence, whether it was given or no? But enough of this, I hope. I ſhall only add, in order to be as explicit with you as poſſible, that the Author whom I principally had in view was Le Clerc: ſee his Comment. Index ad Hagiogr. in voce *Immortalitas*.

You inſiſt upon the paſſage P. 321, as meant of you, and of *you only*; "becauſe you ſpeak of the things there mentioned; and of the *God from the Machine* no one could ſpeak but you; becauſe no one elſe, in their interpretations of the Book of Job, contended for the thing underſtood by it." Now I had not only intimated to you before, that if my only deſign had been to deſtroy your Hypotheſis, I ſhould have beſtowed my pains to little purpoſe, by urging an argument that could not affect it; for allowing Job to be, as I contend, not a juſt Drama, but a mere Dialogue, your Allegory, as far as I can ſee, ſtands juſt where it did before: but moreover, to give you full ſatisfaction on this head, I had referred you to two

ſhort

ſhort paſſages, in which alone you might have found enough to account for every expreſſion I have there uſed. By your not being ſatisfied, I conclude that you have not looked on thoſe paſſages to which I referred you; perhaps you had not the Books at hand. I will therefore tranſcribe them for you. I ſhall add no more upon this article, and ſhall expect to hear no more of it from you. Calmet, *Preface ſur Job*; he is recounting the ſentiments of ſeveral Writers:——"Il s'eſt trouvé pluſieurs Ecrivains qui ont douté de la verité de l'hiſtoire qu' il contient. Ils traitent de paraboles & d' allegories tout ce qui y eſt raconté. Ils veulent que Job, &c. ſoint de noms feints & empruntez; que tout ce recit ſoit fait à plaiſir;—une piece de Poeſie;—non ce qui étoit en effet, mais ce qui pouvoit être. Pour appuyer cette opinion on releve le merveilleux——de cette hiſtoire. Un Prince puiſſant, heureux, &c. (a ſhort account of the ſubject——Dieu entre dans cette diſpute, paroit dans un tourbillon, comme l'on dit: *Deus e machina*; Il juge en faveur de Job, condamne ſes amis, & retablit le premier dans tout ſes biens. Quoi de plus ſemblable que tout cela à une *Tragedie?* Les *Actes*, les *Scenes*, les *Perſonnages*, le *Denoüement*, le *Merveilleux*, tous les *Caracteres*, y ſont admirablement bien obſervez. Les trois premiers Chapitres ſont comme le *Prelude* de la piece. Ils en expliquent le ſujet; ils font connoitre les perſonnages. Le premier *Acte* commence au Chap. III, & finit au Ch. XV. Le ſecond *Acte* commence au Ch. XV, & finit au Ch. XXII. Le 3me *Acte* commence au Ch. XXII, & finit au Ch. XXX. C' eſt en cet endroit qui Dieu ſe fait voir, & fournit le Denoüement de la Tragedie."

——Biſhop Hare, Note on Pſ. CVII. 40. "Liceat hic obiter obſervare librum iſtum (Jobi) non modo metro, ut Pſalmos, ſcriptum eſſe, ſed certiſſime Drama ſacrum eſſe; quod cum aliis argumentis, tum *hoc maxime* conſtat; quod ſi totum librum in ſeptem æquales partes dividas, quatuor implent Jobus & tres amici ejus, primis capitibus connumeratis, quintam Jobus ſolus, ſextam Elihuus, ſeptimam Deus." (He muſt mean that theſe ſeven parts were ſtrictly

ſtrictly ſpeaking ſeven *Acts*; elſe how is this the ſtrongeſt argument, or indeed any argument at all, of its being a Drama?) "Elihuus Dei cauſam in ſe recipit;———Deus vero ipſe tandem introducitur;—ut mœſtiſſimo Dramati Καλαστροφη tandem felix obtingat."

Pag. 312. Here you think I am wanting in decency and civility with regard to you; and charge me with talking dogmatically. I had but juſt before, in the Paragraph immediately preceding, deſired to be underſtood as propoſing what I had to ſay, non quaſi comperta ac plane percepta, ſed in opinione poſita; and p. 294, had profeſſed, that upon this Subject I ſhould rather give the opinions of others than my own. And here I deliver it as my opinion, in which as you well know I only follow many Authors generally eſteemed to be as competent judges in this caſe as any whatever, that the Allegorical Interpretation of Job is entirely groundleſs, or, if you pleaſe, falſe: for that for my part I cannot find any traces in it of the manners, rites, or affairs of the Iſraelites. You ſay, "you believe moſt competent readers are agreed, that there are *infinitely more and ſtronger marks* that the affairs under the Theocracy are alluded to, than that Auguſtus is ſhadowed under Virgil's Hero." A very modeſt recounting of preſumptive votes in your favour truly! I am as fully perſuaded as I can be upon any ſuch point, that there neither is, was, or ever will be, I do not ſay ſuch an agreement of moſt competent readers, but any one competent reader in the world of this opinion; nor can I believe that, with all the prejudice of hypotheſis poſſeſſing you, you can upon recollection poſſibly think ſo yourſelf.——But as for my expreſſions which you object to; if you had uſed the ſame upon a like occaſion in your writings, I believe they never would have been ſelected as remarkably deficient in point of civility and decency, nor as the moſt flagrant inſtance to be found there of the Dogmatical.

The next paſſage in the ſame page you give up, and allow that it could not be meant of you; but think that I ought to have diſtinguiſhed

your Allegory from that of others. I ſhould rather have reſtrained it, by my expreſſion, as well as by the circumſtances, to thoſe whom it only concerned: I ſhould have ſaid *quibuſdam* Allegoriæ conquiſitoribus; and I will correct it ſo, if ever I have an opportunity. As to my admitting Solomon's Song to be an Allegory, at the ſame time that I denied Job to be ſuch; it was, I aſſure you, neither out of perverſeneſs with regard to you, nor for fear of appearing unorthodox. I think there is a material difference between the two caſes: if you deny Job to be an Allegory, I ſee no ill conſequence; it ſtands juſt where it did: but if you deny that Solomon's Song is an Allegory, you muſt exclude it from the Canon of Holy Scripture; for it holds its place there by no other tenure. You may laugh at me, but I am really in earneſt in ſaying, that I am inclined to think Solomon's Song to be altogether Allegorical; I have given my reaſons for it; and do not yet think the difficulties that ſtand in the way of the Allegorical Interpretation equal to that of ſuppoſing, that Ezra, or whoever they were that ſettled the Canon of Scripture, would ever have admitted a looſe and profane Poem into the number and rank of their Sacred and Inſpired Writings.

You are pleaſed to ſay, "that the general turn of my Letter is to ſhew you, that you are unreaſonable in expecting common civilities from me, in a book where you lay ſo much in my way." Give me leave to ſtate my deſign, as I imagine, more juſtly: it was to ſhew you, that you did not lie ſo much in my way, as to have made it either neceſſary, or proper, or indeed not even extremely impertinent, for me to have entered into a diſpute with you. If I had really, as you ſay, neglected paying you common reſpect, or declined it for fear of giving offence, you might eaſily have ſuggeſted to yourſelf a proper plea for the prudence and juſtneſs of my conduct. To profit by the experience of others is the beſt uſe one can make of Knowledge of the world: the experiment of paying you a proper reſpect on a like occaſion had not ſucceeded well with others; a ſufficient reaſon why I ſhould not try it again. For inſtance,

inſtance, and it is a caſe in point; the Learned and Ingenious Dr. Grey gave an Edition of Job, and in his Preface had occaſion to ſpeak of the ſeveral prevailing opinions concerning the deſign of the Book; he found himſelf obliged to diſſent from you; he expreſſed his diſſent in a decent manner; he treated you with candor, civility, and reſpect. What was the conſequence? you were highly offended; you looked upon him as an enemy, marked him as an object of your reſentment, and treated him in a manner equally unworthy of him and yourſelf. After this you ought not to wonder, if no writer on Job ſhould care to have any thing to ſay to you.

To have done with Job: I cannot help noting another paſſage of mine upon that ſubject, which you have introduced for no other purpoſe but to pervert and ridicule it. I am manifeſtly ſpeaking p. 326, of an improvement that might have been made in proceſs of time and by a ſucceſſion of writers; as was the caſe with the Greeks, whoſe advances in this way I obſerve were very ſlow: you dexterouſly ſlip in *the compoſer*, as if I had ſaid that *He* was capable of making it himſelf; and then laugh at me for an abſurdity of which you are the author. I mention this as another inſtance to ſhew, that you did not read me with that candor and equity which is every writer's due. I ſuppoſe ſome friend of yours, who in the immoderate warmth of his affection reſolves to keep you to himſelf by ſetting you at variance with the reſt of the world, had prejudiced you againſt me, by informing you, that I had treated you with diſreſpect. In conſequence of which, you read my book through with the ſame ſpirit, which you have ſhewn in your gloſs upon the parts produced in your letter; and I need not be ſurpriſed to find, that you thought the Author, as well as the Book, made up of perverſeneſs, abſurdity, and nonſenſe.

You gueſs the true reaſon of my not being afraid of you; and I will give you the reaſon, why I told you ſo. After what your Friend had publiſhed to the world, and what you had ſaid yourſelf

(for your demand of an explanation was attended with a sort of denunciation of your resentment, in case of a refusal, or an unsatisfactory account of myself) I thought it incumbent upon me to tell you explicitly, and to repeat it, that I was not to be frightened. I should not have thought of setting forth my bravery, if I had not first been called a Coward, and accordingly looked upon as one that was to be awed by menaces.

I have now considered all your complaints; and since we are upon the business of expostulation, and as I hope for the last time, you must give me leave in my turn to make my own. It is not in behalf of myself, but of one for whom I am much more concerned, that is, my Father. In your Julian you bring a heavy charge against him of Uncharitableness. I have several objections to the whole passage, which I shall propose to you as distinctly as I can.

I. In charging him so severely, you do not quote his words; or so much as say, when or where these uncharitable reflections were made: so that not one in a hundred perhaps of your readers will know, where to find what he has said, and so be able to examine, whether you have charged him justly or not.

II. You say, that these reflections stand in the place of a confutation: whereas the confutation precedes them. Mr. L. charges Basnage with wilfully suppressing the unexceptionable evidence of an honest contemporary Heathen, Ammian. Marcellus: which is as much to the purpose in one line, and will go as far towards invalidating his judgement upon the case, as all that Criticism which you have displayed through so many pages.

III. You misrepresent what he has said: I must set before you his words; "sed profecto," ut observat Is. Vossius, "nullos reli-"gio Christiana infensiores habet hostes, quam ipsos Christianos:" aut saltem qui nomine tenus Christiani videri volunt: quales sunt Tan. Faber, Jac. Tollius, aliique istius Commatis Critici. The words *quales sunt* plainly relate to those only, qui nomine tenus Chris-

Chriſtiani videri volunt; and neither of theſe clauſes includes Baſnage. If Mr. L. had intended to include him, he ought to have ſaid, quales ſunt *ipſe Baſnagius*, Tan. Faber, &c. or quales *etiam* ſunt T. Faber, &c. or rather he could not have uſed at all with any propriety thoſe words of Voſſius, who ſpeaks of *Sincere* Chriſtians doing diſſervice to the cauſe of Chriſtianity: (De Sibyl. Orac. Cap. XI.) Mr. L. accordingly cenſures Baſnage, as a Chriſtian and a *real* friend, for his indiſcretion and perverſe oppoſition in this particular caſe; for a conduct which you allow to be *moſt provoking*, and ſuch *as cannot but give offence to every ſober reader*. His cenſure upon him is carried no further than the words of Voſſius, and really amounts to no more than what you have beſtowed on him yourſelf. Your remarks on what Mr. L. has ſaid relate to Baſnage only: Faber and Tollius you leave to ſhift for themſelves; and they were not either of them Miniſters of the Goſpel: ſo that your laboured amplification, by which you do all you can to aggravate the charge of uncharitableneſs, falls intirely to the ground, as being built only on your own uncharitable miſrepreſentation.

IV. It would have been more generous and juſt in you to have acknowledged yourſelf indebted to Mr. L. for the Application of the meteoric appearance of Croſſes from Caſaubon's Adverſaria to this Subject; which, when it appeared in your more popular Volume, was received with applauſe, as new and very ingenious; an applauſe which, as you could not but know, belonged to him.

I flatter myſelf that you will acknowledge the truth of theſe remarks; and expect, that when you give a new Edition of your Julian you will do Mr. L. common juſtice by rectifying all the above particulars.

You conclude your Letter with ſaying ſomething of me and of yourſelf. What you ſay of me is much more than I deſerve; but you qualify it by intimating, that you found me the very reverſe of my book. Let us e'en compound the matter between the Book and the Author: abate a good deal of one ſide and of the other, and

I ſhall

I ſhall be ſatisfied. What you ſay of yourſelf, of your deſigns and your diſpoſition, I moſt readily believe to be true: and aſſure yourſelf, that I always have been, and ſhall be, as ready to acknowledge upon all proper occaſions the ſuperiority of your Genius, your Learning, and your abilities. I do but join with many other ſincere well-wiſhers to you in regretting, that you have not ſomething more of the Spirit of Toleration in Literary matters; that you are ſo haſty in taking up your reſentments, and that you treat ſuch as differ from you in ſo ſevere, and ſo contemptuous a manner.

For myſelf as a member of the Commonwealth of Letters, I am a true Lover of peace and quietneſs, of mutual freedom, candor, and benevolence. I deteſt and I deſpiſe the Squabbles that are perpetually ariſing from the jealouſy and peeviſhneſs of the *genus irritable Scriptorum*. I am a ſtaunch Republican and a zealous Proteſtant in Literature, nor will ever bear with a Perpetual Dictator, or an Infallible Pope, whoſe Decrees are to be ſubmitted to without appeal, and to be received with implicit aſſent. *Manus hæc inimica tyrannis.* My favourite Principle is the Liberty of Prophecying, and I will maintain it with my laſt breath.

With regard to you in particular, depend upon my ſincerity when I aſſure you, that I ſhall not only always honour you as a man of the firſt rank in Letters, but ſhall be heartily diſpoſed to cultivate your acquaintance, and to merit your good opinion; ſhall be glad of every opportunity of enjoying the pleaſure and profit of your converſation; and moſt willing to enter into as near an intercourſe with you as you ſhall be pleaſed to permit, as a Neighbour, a Member of the ſame Society, and a Friend.

I am with great Truth and Reſpect,
Dear Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
Faithful humble Servant,
R. L.

LETTER

LETTER IV.

To the Reverend Dr. L.

Dear Sir, *Groveſnor Square* [*Oct.*] 12, 1756.

I HAVE this moment received the favour of your long letter of the 6th, it having been ſent me hither from Prior Park.

I had a great deal to ſay to the contents. In ſome places you have ſhewn I was miſtaken, in others you have convinced me I was not. And if you have ſhewn me I have here and there miſtaken your meaning, I have my revenge very amply, if I could take any pleaſure in it, in ſeeing you are as totally miſtaken in my moral character. But you have ſhut my mouth for ever on the ſubject of your letter; by the information you impart to me in the concluſion, namely, that the Mr. L. who ſent a few notes to Reading the Editor of the Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtorians, was your Father. I had not the leaſt ſuſpicion of it, when I pretended to take your uſage of me unkindly in your Prelections. Had I known that, I ſhould not only have forborn complaining, but have applauded your piety. The injurer of your Father's memory (and ſuch you took me to be, as appears by what you ſay here) deſerved no quarter from you. And this but gives me one reaſon more to eſteem you. And that I may not continue worſe in your eſteem than I deſerve, give me leave to tell you I am no plagiary of your Father's obſervations. By an odd fancy to a ſtrange unequal writer, I had read Meric Caſau-

Caſaubon's writings thro' and thro'. And I had finiſhed my book of Julian, and it was half printed off, when Dr. Jorten wrote me word of this note of Mr. L's. This is a point of honour in which I am particularly delicate. I will venture to boaſt again to you in this, that I believe no Author was ever more averſe to take to himſelfe any thing that belonged to another. However I owe ſo much to your piety, which is really edifying, as to ſtrike out that note againſt your Father, the very firſt opportunity. It is to this likewiſe, that I am ready to ſacrifice every diſguſt that ſome parts of your laſt might be naturally ſuppoſed to give me; as where you leave the queſtion between us, and dictate to me like a tutor or Pedagogue on my general conduct towards others; in which it is not to be ſuppoſed you could be acquainted with the whole of the caſe, or know my particular provocations, as in the caſe of Gray. I have ſaid to the world, (and they ought to believe me or diſprove me) that I had treated no man roughly, who had not firſt fallen upon me. But I thought it both below me, and impertinent in it ſelfe, to acquaint the public with the particulars. In a word, I repeat it once again, that my uſing your Father with diſreſpect amply juſtified you for every thing I complained of. But (for all I ſaid there, and when I ſaid it) I honoured his memory as one of the moſt learned Perſons of a better Age, if he was, as I ſuppoſe he might be, the Author of the Comments, &c. And be aſſured, I eſteem it not amongſt the leaſt of his ſervices to the Public, that he produced you with the reſt of his works. I accept with all cordiality the offer of your friendſhip. You know the worſt of me, and perhaps have given credit to a great deal more than the worſt, I mean the calumnies of my Enemies; for the future you are to believe only as you find.

I am, Dear Sir, Your very faithful
and affectionate humble Servant,

W. W.

P. S.

P. S. I am here in waiting. I mention it to you from a ſelfiſh view. *Regis* of this month is dying. What ſhould hinder your ſtepping into his place? it would ſurely be the eaſier, for there are now three or four vacancies amongſt the Chaplains by deaths and removals, and it would be an acquiſition to me to have you in this month.

LETTER V.

To the Reverend Dr. W.

Dear Sir, *Wincheſter, Oct.* 14, 1756.

I CANNOT omit the firſt opportunity of acknowledging the favour of your very obliging Letter, which is juſt now come to my hands.

I was unwilling to open my complaint to you relating to my Father, till I had, as I thought, totally removed the foundation of your exceptions againſt me. You allow, that I had no reaſon to go out of my way and to pay you any particular compliment; and you muſt give me leave ſtill to aver, that on the other hand I have not, upon that or any other account, gone out of my way with deſign to reflect upon you. To what I have already offered upon this head, I might add that the Argument and Subſtance of the XXXIId and XXXIIId Lectures, which ſeem chiefly to give you diſguſt, were drawn up to the ſame effect, as they now appear, ſome years before your Julian was publiſhed; as I could prove to you inconteſtably, if required, by the original papers, and by the teſtimony of the Biſhops of Oxford, Rocheſter, and

Norwich, and ſeveral other learned Friends, whom I conſulted upon my whole Plan. I ſimply purſued my plan, and differed from you no otherwiſe than I did from many other eminent writers, againſt whom I could have no prejudice. I thought there was no need of being tender in delivering one's opinion upon a ſubject of ſuch doubtful diſputation as Job: *nulli gravis eſt percuſſus Achilles.* However ſince it has happened contrary to my expectation, in return for your very obliging Conceſſion in regard to my Father, I will very readily endeavour to ſoften or alter any expreſſions which ſtill offend you, and which you will mark to me as ſuch, as far as I can do it conſiſtently with my general Theſis. In excuſe for what may offend you in my laſt, I might alledge, that I have ſaid nothing but what ſome paſſages in your Letter gave me, not only a fair opportunity, but a right to ſay:—but I am unwilling to reſume this ſubject; and take much more pleaſure in returning you my ſincereſt thanks for your very obliging expreſſions of all ſorts. Thoſe of your Poſt-ſcript are particularly ſo in every reſpect; and the reaſon you are ſo kind as to give for your mentioning the thing, would really be a great inducement to me to think of it. But my ambition is at an end; and otherwiſe an attendance of this ſort would be extremely inconvenient to me in my preſent ſituation.

I write this in a very great hurry, as you may well imagine, when I tell you, I am preparing to remove with my Family to Durham the beginning of next week. I hope I ſhall there have frequent opportunities of improving the friendſhip which you ſo generouſly offer me, and which I ſhall highly eſteem; and of demonſtrating in every way which lies in my power the ſincerity with which I am,

Dear Sir, Your moſt faithful

and affectionate humble Servant,

R. L.

FINIS.

ERRORS OF THE PRESS IN VOL. VII.

P. 580. *l.* 6. from the bottom for *hominet facias*, r. homines quod facias.
777. *l.* 11. for *is ſo far*, r. *is far.*
12. for *himſelf*, r. itſelf.
834. *n. l.* 13. for *juſſit moram*, point and read thus—juſſit. Moram, &c.
919. *l.* 2. from the bottom after *And*, inſert *is*.
936. The pages which follow this ſhould have been numbered 937, &c.
996. *l.* laſt, for *to him*, r. to hint.

University of California
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Return this material to the library
from which it was borrowed.

Warkentin, R
10-21-90

Hayduck, R
2/16/92

D 000 001 371

Unive
So
Li